Un commento di età imperiale al libro secondo dell’Etica Nicomachea. Traduzione con introduzione e noteNatali, Carlo
2023 Elenchos
doi: 10.1515/elen-2023-0001
AbstractWe present here the first translation into a modern language of the anonymous commentary on the second book of the Nicomachean Ethics. It is an evidence of the style of exegetical work that was being done in the Peripatetic schools during the 2nd–3rd century AD, and a testimony to a particular version of 2nd century Aristotelianism. Even if the comment is not continuous, one gets the impression of listening to a good lecturer illustrating Aristotle’s text. He paraphrases it at times, makes comparisons with other passages of the corpus, illustrates the structure and the logic of the discourse, and shows the difference between Aristotle’s positions and those of other schools. In the most theoretically interesting parts of the commentary the anonymous discusses aporiai, and opposes Aristotle’s ethical theories to other schools, especially to the Stoics.
On Plato’s Precosmos (Ti. 52d2–53c3)Petrucci, Federico M.
2023 Elenchos
doi: 10.1515/elen-2023-0002
AbstractThe aim of this paper is to provide a new reading of Plato’s precosmos (Ti. 52d2–53c3). More specifically, I shall argue that the precosmos is populated by bodies deriving from random complexes of properties, and that this is the effect of the Receptacle’s full precosmic participation in the Paradigm. This will turn out to be consistent with a robust notion of ‘precosmic generation’ and will reveal why Plato may have sought to refer to this otherwise puzzling scenario: representing the precosmos in this way allows Plato to effectively justify why the Demiurge is responsible only for the goodness and perfection of the universe, and why it is properly the best possible cause.
Per una spiegazione causale delle differenze tra gli animali: Aristotele, Historia animalium I 1Mingucci, Giulia
2023 Elenchos
doi: 10.1515/elen-2023-0003
AbstractIt is now a widespread opinion among interpreters that Aristotle’s History of Animals is not a mere collection of empirical data but has its own theoretical framework; however, there is still disagreement as to exactly what this framework is. To address the problem, the article analyzes in detail the diairetic schemes of HA I 1, attempting to overturn the common opinion that this chapter is a mere expository introduction to the study of animals’ differences. On the contrary, it will be shown that in this chapter Aristotle not only applies the method of ‘multiple division’ theorized in Parts of Animals I 2–4, but also uses dividing criteria that are informed by his causal theory and his hylomorphist ontology. This analysis will therefore lead to the more controversial conclusion that HA is not an ‘early’ work by Aristotle but a mature treatise with its own specific theoretical aim: the aitiological explanation of the anatomical, eco-physiological and ethological differences among animals.
Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Active Intellect as Final CauseGuyomarc’h, Gweltaz
2023 Elenchos
doi: 10.1515/elen-2023-0004
AbstractIn his own De anima, Alexander of Aphrodisias famously identifies the “active” (poietikon) intellect with the prime mover in Metaphysics Λ. However, Alexander’s claim raises an issue: why would this divine intellect come in the middle of a study of soul in general and of human intellection in particular? As Paul Moraux asks in his pioneering work on Alexander’s conception of the intellect, is the active intellect a “useless addition”? In this paper, I try to answer this question by challenging a solution according to which the active intellect would intervene directly with the material intellect to trigger its ordinary working. I argue that the active intellect acts as a final cause, both for human intellect and for its ordinary objects of thought. The active intellect is twice “cause of the intellection”, i.e. cause of the actualization of human thought: once (i) when it offers thought occasions for thinking through objects, and again (ii) when it actualizes mediately the human intellect itself in its development. This reading agrees with Alexander’s usual position about the prime mover’s causality. It accounts for the multiplicity of expressions with which Alexander describes the causality of the active intellect in his De anima. It also explains why the development of human intellect has been described without direct reference to active intellect, since substances do not aim directly at the First cause, but their aiming at it is mediated by their desire for their own good.
L’articulation des chapitres 19 et 20 du traité VI, 2 [43] de Plotin. La priorité du genre sur ses espècesMouflier, Camille
2023 Elenchos
doi: 10.1515/elen-2023-0006
AbstractChapter 20 of Plotinus’ treatise VI, 2 [43] has received particular attention because it seems to deal with the Intellect. However, the connection of this chapter with chapter 19 is problematic insofar as the latter deals with the ways in which species are generated by the first genera. Our aim will be to show that chapter 20 can only be understood in the light of the notion of genus. More precisely, Plotinus’ aim in this chapter is to demonstrate the priority of the genus over its species by means of the theory of double activity. In order to demonstrate this point, the notion of Intellect is introduced by Plotinus as a model (παράδειγμα) to conceive this priority. We will study successively these two chapters to justify this point, insisting on the link between them as well as on the reinterpretation of some key Aristotelian concepts. This study also shows that the use of the comparison with science allows Plotinus to justify the primacy of the intelligible totalities that are the Soul and the Intellect as well as the generation of their respective parts, the particular souls and the particular intellects.
Une citation littérale de Mélissos dans le Sophiste de PlatonCordero, Nestor-Luis
2023 Elenchos
doi: 10.1515/elen-2023-0007
AbstractEven if Plato never claimed to be a ‘historian of philosophy’, there are in his dialogues many references to previous philosophers. Apart from his works on the Sophists, which do not claim to faithfully expose the ‘philosophy’ of their authors, we find in Plato’s dialogues comments and sometimes quotations from the Presocratics, from Thales to Philolaos. In some cases, Plato adds the name of the quoted philosopher, but sometimes he leaves to the reader the task of finding out who the commented or quoted author is. This is the case with Melissos in a passage of the Sophist (244b), where his name is not quoted, but an anonymous monistic philosopher expounds a literal quotation of the philosopher: ἓν μόνον ἔστιν (fr. B 8.1 DK).
Notes on Prior Analytics II 22.68a16–21Zanichelli, Riccardo
2023 Elenchos
doi: 10.1515/elen-2023-0008
AbstractAt Prior Analytics II 22.68a16–21, Aristotle argues that if A is predicated of all B and C and nothing else, and B is predicated of all C, then A and B convert. In justifying his argument, however, he appears to claim that B is not predicated of all A. This claim has long been a cause of puzzlement to commentators. A widespread view is that the kind of conversion discussed in the passage at issue should be explained in both extensional and intensional terms. After providing some textual evidence that Aristotle only apparently claims that B is not predicated of all A, I give a purely extensional account of Aristotle’s argument. This account is plausible, conservative and simpler than any of the intensional accounts that have been proposed so far.