Do Fundamentals Explain the Behaviour of the Swedish Real Effective Exchange Rate?Nilsson, Kristian
doi: 10.1111/j.0347-0520.2004.00379.xpmid: N/A
This study examines the long‐run relationship between the real effective exchange rate and its fundamental determinants, and derives a real effective equilibrium exchange rate for the Swedish krona. Our results indicate that the krona was severely overvalued in late 1992, when the fixed exchange rate regime was abandoned. By the end of 2000 the krona was undervalued by approximately 5 percent, given the prevailing economic conditions. Arithmetic examples of suitable SEK/EUR conversion rates are calculated under various assumptions to provide a guideline if Sweden were to adopt the euro in the future.
Swedish Postwar Business Cycles: Generated Abroad or at Home?Lindé, Jesper
doi: 10.1111/j.0347-0520.2004.00380.xpmid: N/A
The relative importance of foreign and domestic shocks for the Swedish postwar business cycle is examined in a neoclassical stochastic growth model of a small open economy. Since recent research has shown that fiscal policy shocks may be important for business cycles, I extend previous work in the literature by allowing for stochastic fiscal policy. It is found that the introduction of fiscal policy improves the empirical fit of the model, although not significantly so when hours worked are detrended with the HP filter. The results suggest that domestic shocks are more important than foreign shocks for output fluctuations. Among the domestic shocks, innovations in fiscal policy seem to have been more important than technology shocks during this period. Foreign shocks are very important for fluctuations in the real exchange rate and the current account.
Expansionary Fiscal Contractions? Evidence from Panel DataHogan, Vincent
doi: 10.1111/j.0347-0520.2004.00381.xpmid: N/A
We examine the ability of the expansionary fiscal contraction (EFC) hypothesis to explain the performance of OECD economies during fiscal crises. We find some limited evidence in its favour: if public consumption is reduced in response to a fiscal crisis (as defined by a high level of debt), private consumption does seem to increase. However, the size of the effect is smaller than that typically found in other studies. Furthermore, the increase in private consumption is usually not sufficient to offset the direct effect of a reduction in public consumption on output—fiscal contractions are not literally expansionary.
Is the Optimal Labor Income Tax Progressive in a Unionized Economy? *Aronsson, Thomas; Sjögren, Tomas
doi: 10.1111/j.0347-0520.2004.00382.xpmid: N/A
This paper concerns optimal nonlinear labor income taxation in an economy with union wage setting and endogenous hours of work. The purpose is to study the determinants of tax progression. We show that the optimal degree of progression of the labor income tax depends on the extent to which the government can influence the wage rate via tax policy as well as on its ability to redistribute income across individuals. In addition, the argument for progressive labor income taxation depends on whether hours of work are chosen by the employed themselves or the union.
Profit Sharing, Credit Market Imperfections and Equilibrium Unemployment *Koskela, Erkki; Stenbacka, Rune
doi: 10.1111/j.0347-0520.2004.00383.xpmid: N/A
We investigate the interaction between labour and credit market imperfections for equilibrium unemployment in the presence of profit sharing. In a partial equilibrium with exogenous outside options, increased bargaining power of banks has adverse employment effects. In a general equilibrium with endogenous outside options, this relationship is frequently reversed; reduced credit market imperfections increase equilibrium unemployment if the labour market imperfections—measured by the bargaining power of trade unions—are sufficiently strong and the benefit–replacement ratio is sufficiently high. Finally, we show that higher bankruptcy risks increase equilibrium unemployment under similar conditions.
Good Jobs, Bad Jobs and Redistribution *Lommerud, Kjell Erik; Sandvik, Bjørn; Straume, Odd Rune
doi: 10.1111/j.0347-0520.2004.00384.xpmid: N/A
We analyse the question of optimal taxation in a dual economy, when the policy‐maker is concerned about the distribution of labour income. Income inequality is caused by the presence of sunk capital investments, which creates a “good jobs” sector due to the capture of quasi‐rents by trade unions. With strong unions and high planner preference for income equality, the optimal policy is a combination of investment subsidies and progressive income taxation. If unions are weaker, the policy‐maker may instead choose to tax investment.
Does the Gap in Family‐friendly Policies Drive the Family Gap? *Nielsen, Helena Skyt; Simonsen, Marianne; Verner, Mette
doi: 10.1111/j.0347-0520.2004.00385.xpmid: N/A
Segregation of the labour market into a family‐friendly and a non‐family‐friendly sector implies that women self‐select into sectors depending on institutional constraints, preferences for family‐friendly working conditions and expected wage differences. We take this sector dimension into account and find a severe penalty after birth‐related leave in the non‐family‐friendly sector, so that women who would be affected by this penalty self‐select into the family‐friendly sector. The penalty is a combination of a large human‐capital depreciation effect, a child penalty and no recovery.
Fertility, Taxation and Family Policy *Apps, Patricia; Rees, Ray
doi: 10.1111/j.0347-0520.2004.00386.xpmid: N/A
Historically, there is clear evidence of an inverse relationship between female labour supply and fertility. However, the relationship across countries is now positive. Countries like Germany and Italy, with the lowest fertility, also have the lowest female participation rates. This paper analyses the extent to which this can be explained by public policy, in particular taxation and the system of child support. The results suggest that countries which have individual rather than joint taxation, and which support families through child care facilities rather than child payments, are likely to have both higher female labour supply and higher fertility.
Teams, Teamwork and Absence *Heywood, John S.; Jirjahn, Uwe
doi: 10.1111/j.0347-0520.2004.00387.xpmid: N/A
We argue that firms with interdependent worker productivity, team production, have a higher cost of absence and, as a consequence, spend additional resources on monitoring absence. As a result, firms with team production should have lower absence rates. We estimate the determinants of absence for blue‐collar workers using a sample of German manufacturing establishments. Workplace teams are used as a proxy for team production. The estimates reveal that firms with teams have lower absence rates, as do smaller establishments. The size effect, however, is unique to establishments with teams, which fits prior theoretical work that has not been previously tested.
Banking Competition, Risk and Regulation *Bolt, Wilko; Tieman, Alexander F.
doi: 10.1111/j.0347-0520.2004.00388.xpmid: N/A
In a dynamic framework, commercial banks compete for customers by setting acceptance criteria for granting loans, while taking into account regulatory requirements. By easing its acceptance criteria a bank faces a trade‐off between attracting more demand for loans, thus making higher per‐period profits, and deterioration in the quality of its loan portfolio, thus tolerating a higher risk of failure. Our main results state that more stringent capital adequacy requirements lead banks to set stricter acceptance criteria, and that increased competition in the banking industry leads to riskier bank behaviour. It is shown that risk‐adjusted regulation is effective. In an extension of our basic model, we show that it may be beneficial for a bank to hold more equity than prescribed by the regulator, even though issuing equity is more expensive than attracting deposits.