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doi: 10.1007/s10551-013-2036-0pmid: N/A
In this discussion of Shafer’s (J Bus Ethics, 2013, doi: 10.1007/s10551-013-1989-3 ) empirical research published in this issue, I raise several issues for future research. For example, I encourage ethics research to more carefully consider their use of climate versus culture, and call for an elucidation of the different characteristics of the two constructs. Additionally, the relationship between corporate ethical climate and employees’ perceptions of the importance of ethical behavior is complex. Because research commonly calls for organizations to improve their climate in order to improve ethical behavior, an exploration of the exit, voice, loyalty, or neglect options of employees in light of varying organizational ethical climates should be further explored.
Gao, Jingyu; Greenberg, Robert; Wong-On-Wing, Bernard
doi: 10.1007/s10551-013-2008-4pmid: N/A
It has been suggested that a reporting channel administered by a third-party may represent a stronger procedural safeguard of anonymity and avoids the appearance of impropriety. This study examines whistleblowing intentions among lower-tier employees, specifically examines whether an externally-administered reporting channel increases whistleblowing intentions compared to an internally-administered one. In contrast to the findings of an earlier study by Kaplan et al. (Audit J Pract Theory 28(2):273–288, 2009), our results suggest that whistle-blowing intentions are higher when the reporting channel is administered externally than when it is administered internally. We also find that an externally-administered reporting channel mitigates the negative effect of bystanders on whistleblowing intentions. Implications are discussed.
Kaplan, Steven; Samuels, Janet; Cohen, Jeffrey
doi: 10.1007/s10551-013-1995-5pmid: N/A
CEO compensation has received much attention from both academics and regulators. However, academics have given scant attention to understanding judgments about CEO compensation by third parties such as investors. Our study contributes to the ethics literature on CEO compensation by examining whether judgments about CEO compensation (e.g., say-on-pay) are influenced by two aspects of a company’s tone at the top—social ties between the CEO and members of the Executive Compensation Committee (ECC) and the CEO’s Reputation, particularly for financial reporting and disclosures. Although, stock exchanges such as NASDAQ require ECC members to be independent, CEOs still may have social connections to the ECC. In addition, CEOs develop a reputation for the quality of their company’s financial reporting and disclosures. We expect both CEO Social Ties and CEO Reputation to impact say-on-pay judgments, and that fairness perceptions about the CEO compensation will mediate the relationship. We conduct an experiment to test our hypotheses. In this study, we employ a two by two experimental design where we manipulate CEO Social Ties with members of the ECC (present/absent) and CEO Reputation for the quality of financial reporting disclosures (favorable/unfavorable). Participants were MBA students who provided a say-on-pay judgment (e.g., their agreement or disagreement with a resolution stating approval of the compensation paid to the Company’s CEO), and judgments about the fairness of the CEO’s compensation. Results indicate that CEO Social Ties affected participants’ say-on-pay judgments, which were fully mediated by their perceptions about fairness of the CEO’s compensation. Further, the CEO’s Reputation also affected participants’ say-on-pay judgments, which were fully mediated by their perceptions about fairness of the CEO’s compensation. Implications for research and public policy are presented.
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