Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

Ritchey, Andrew J.; Ruback, R. Barry

doi: 10.1177/0146167217733075pmid: N/A

From 1882 to 1926, lynch mobs in Georgia killed 514 victims in 410 separate events. Based on a new comprehensive dataset, this study examined characteristics of the mobs related to the level of the atrocity of the violence in the lynchings. Consistent with prior research, the size of the crowd was a stable predictor of level of atrocity. However, in contrast to two prior studies, results did not uniformly support the self-attention perspective. Instead, the findings were more consistent with the concept that situational norms were the important mechanism behind collective violence, particularly because the violence used in a lynching event reflected the violence used in nearby lynchings. These results suggest that, rather than losing all norms of behavior through a process of deindividuation, lynchers adopted norms they viewed as appropriate for the situation.

Sawicki, Vanessa; Wegener, Duane T.

doi: 10.1177/0146167217744196pmid: 29320929

“Strong” attitudes often have greater impact than “weak” attitudes. However, emerging research suggests that weak (uncertain) attitudes can substantially influence thinking or behavior. We propose metacognitive reflection as a moderator between traditional strength patterns and these emerging attitude bolstering patterns. Across six studies, research participants encountered a target person who agreed or disagreed with participants’ attitudes. When focused on evaluating the target, attitudes predicted target evaluations better when the attitude was held with certainty (Study 1A), or after certainty had been primed (Studies 2A and 3; strength effects). However, when engaged in attitudinal social comparison (metacognitive reflection), attitudes better predicted target evaluation when the attitudes were held with doubt (Study 1B), or after doubt had been primed (Studies 2B and 3; bolstering effects). Expected change in certainty served as a mediator of attitude effects in metacognitive reflection but not target-focus conditions when doubt had been primed (Study 4).

Ward, Sarah J.; King, Laura A.

doi: 10.1177/0146167217744525pmid: 29291658

Why do men view morally questionable behaviors as more permissible than women do? Five studies investigated emotional factors as explanations for gender differences in moral decision-making. In Study 1 (N = 324), gender differences in perceptions of moral wrongness were explained by guilt and shame proneness. Studies 2a and 2b (combined N = 562) demonstrated that instructions to adopt an unemotional perspective (vs. standard instructions) led women to have higher immoral intentions, no longer lower than men’s, as they were in the control group. Studies 3 and 4 (N = 834) showed that men expected immoral actions to result in higher positive and lower self-conscious moral emotions than women do. Study 4 (N = 424) showed that these emotional expectancies account for gender differences in immoral intentions. Study 5 (N = 450) showed that women—but not men—experience heightened self-conscious moral emotions and regret when recalling past transgressions done for personal gain.

Koriat, Asher; Adiv-Mashinsky, Shiri; Undorf, Monika; Schwarz, Norbert

doi: 10.1177/0146167217744527pmid: 29332487

Majority views are reported with greater confidence and fluency than minority views, with the difference increasing with majority size. This Prototypical Majority Effect (PME) was attributed generally to conformity pressure, but Koriat et al. showed that it can arise from the processes underlying decision and confidence independent of social influence. Here we examined the PME under conditions that differ in social influence. In Experiment 1, a robust PME emerged in the absence of information about the majority views, but the provision sof that information increased the choice of the majority view and magnified the PME. In Experiment 2, a PME emerged in a minority-biased condition that misled participants to believe that the majority view was the minority view, but the PME was stronger in a majority-biased condition. The results were discussed in terms of a dual-process view: The PME observed under social influence may contain externally driven and internally driven components.

Donnelly, Grant E.; Zheng, Tianyi; Haisley, Emily; Norton, Michael I.

doi: 10.1177/0146167217744766pmid: 29320930

Two samples of more than 4,000 millionaires reveal two primary findings: First, only at high levels of wealth—in excess of US$8 million (Study 1) and US$10 million (Study 2)—are wealthier millionaires happier than millionaires with lower levels of wealth, though these differences are modest in magnitude. Second, controlling for total wealth, millionaires who have earned their wealth are moderately happier than those who inherited it. Taken together, these results suggest that, among millionaires, wealth may be likely to pay off in greater happiness only at very high levels of wealth, and when that wealth was earned rather than inherited.

Van Assche, Jasper; Asbrock, Frank; Roets, Arne; Kauff, Mathias

doi: 10.1177/0146167217744767pmid: 29338555

Positive neighborhood norms, such as strong local networks, are critical to people’s satisfaction with, perceived disadvantage of, and intentions to stay in their neighborhood. At the same time, local ethnic diversity is said to be detrimental for these community outcomes. Integrating both frameworks, we tested whether the negative consequences of diversity occur even when perceived social norms are positive. Study 1 (N = 1,760 German adults) showed that perceptions of positive neighborhood norms buffered against the effects of perceived diversity on moving intentions via neighborhood satisfaction and perceived neighborhood disadvantage. Study 2 (N = 993 Dutch adults) replicated and extended this moderated mediation model using other characteristics of diversity (i.e., objective and estimated minority proportions). Multilevel analyses again revealed consistent buffering effects of positive neighborhood norms. Our findings are discussed in light of the ongoing public and political debate concerning diversity and social and communal life.

Talhelm, Thomas

doi: 10.1177/0146167217746151pmid: 29338556

This study tests whether liberals and conservatives within the same society think as if they were from different cultures. I tested this by measuring the cultural thought style of social liberals and conservatives in Hong Kong (Study 1). Liberals tended to think more analytically (more “WEIRD”), and conservatives tended to think more holistically (more common in East Asia). In Study 2, I trained people to think analytically or holistically before they read articles on political issues. Analytic thought caused people to form more liberal opinions, and holistic thought caused people to form more conservative opinions. The thought training affected participants’ responses to a social issue, but not an economic issue or whether they identified as liberal or conservative. This study replicates a previous U.S. finding in an East Asian culture and a different political environment, suggesting that the link between politics and thought style extends beyond the United States.

Effron, Daniel A.

doi: 10.1177/0146167217746152pmid: 29359629

This research demonstrates how counterfactual thoughts can lead people to excuse others for telling falsehoods. When a falsehood aligned with participants’ political preferences, reflecting on how it could have been true led them to judge it as less unethical to tell, which in turn led them to judge a politician who told it as having a more moral character and deserving less punishment. When a falsehood did not align with political preferences, this effect was significantly smaller and less reliable, in part because people doubted the plausibility of the relevant counterfactual thoughts. These results emerged independently in three studies (two preregistered; total N = 2,783) and in meta- and Bayesian analyses, regardless of whether participants considered the same counterfactuals or generated their own. The results reveal how counterfactual thoughts can amplify partisan differences in judgments of alleged dishonesty. I discuss implications for theories of counterfactual thinking and motivated moral reasoning.

Schaerer, Michael; Tost, Leigh P.; Huang, Li; Gino, Francesca; Larrick, Rick

doi: 10.1177/0146167217746341pmid: 29359627

We propose that interpersonal behaviors can activate feelings of power, and we examine this idea in the context of advice giving. Specifically, we show (a) that advice giving is an interpersonal behavior that enhances individuals’ sense of power and (b) that those who seek power are motivated to engage in advice giving. Four studies, including two experiments (N = 290, N = 188), an organization-based field study (N = 94), and a negotiation simulation (N = 124), demonstrate that giving advice enhances the adviser’s sense of power because it gives the adviser perceived influence over others’ actions. Two of our studies further demonstrate that people with a high tendency to seek power are more likely to give advice than those with a low tendency. This research establishes advice giving as a subtle route to a sense of power, shows that the desire to feel powerful motivates advice giving, and highlights the dynamic interplay between power and advice.

Itzchakov, Guy; DeMarree, Kenneth G.; Kluger, Avraham N.; Turjeman-Levi, Yaara

doi: 10.1177/0146167217747874pmid: 29347879

We examined how merely sharing attitudes with a good listener shapes speakers’ attitudes. We predicted that high-quality (i.e., empathic, attentive, and nonjudgmental) listening reduces speakers’ social anxiety and leads them to delve deeper into their attitude-relevant knowledge (greater self-awareness). This, subsequently, differentially affects two components of speaker’s attitude certainty by increasing attitude clarity, but not attitude correctness. In addition, we predicted that this increased clarity is followed by increased attitude-expression intentions, but not attitude-persuasion intentions. We obtained consistent support for our hypotheses across five experiments (including one preregistered study), manipulating listening behavior in a variety of ways. This is the first evidence that an interpersonal variable, unrelated to the attitude itself, can affect attitude clarity and its consequences.