European Journal of Social Psychology

Macrae, C. Neil; Martin, Douglas

doi: 10.1002/ejsp.406pmid: N/A

Everyday social interaction is often dominated by categorical thinking, with generic group‐based knowledge structures guiding people's dealings with others. Noting the important influence that category‐cueing facial features exert during the initial stages of person construal, the current work explored the effects of hair cues on the process and temporal dynamics of sex categorization. Using a standard priming paradigm to index the products of person construal (i.e., categorical and stereotype‐ based knowledge), the results of three experiments revealed that: (i) hair cues alone are sufficient to trigger category and stereotype activation; and (ii) during the early stages of person perception, these cues have the capacity to reverse conventional priming effects and generate errors of categorical assignment (e.g., female faces prime male knowledge). These findings are considered in the context of contemporary accounts of person construal. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Martin, Douglas; Macrae, C. Neil

doi: 10.1002/ejsp.445pmid: N/A

Recent research has explored the dynamics of categorical thinking, with debate centering on the putative automaticity of this process. In a further investigation of this topic, the current inquiry assessed the influence of critical category‐cueing facial features on overt (i.e., category identification) and covert (i.e., category priming) measures of sex categorization. The results revealed that when a critical sex‐specifying facial cue (i.e., hairstyle) was present, priming effects emerged even under suboptimal processing conditions (i.e., facial blurring). When this cue was absent, however, priming no longer occurred. Interestingly, category identification was largely unimpeded by feature removal or facial blurring. Taken together, these results underscore the efficiency of categorical thinking and the importance of task objectives and feature‐based processing in person perception. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Reitsma‐van Rooijen, Margreet; Semin, Gün R.; van Leeuwen, Esther

doi: 10.1002/ejsp.410pmid: N/A

It is well known that people describe positive behaviors of others close to them (e.g., in‐group member, friend) in abstract terms, but with concrete terms in the case of people who they are not close to (e.g., out‐group member, enemy). In contrast, negative behaviors of people who we are close to are described in concrete terms, but in abstract terms for people who are distant. However, the communicative impact of such subtle differences in language use on a receiver who is also the actor of the behavior being described has never been addressed. We hypothesized and found that a positive abstract message compared to a positive concrete message leads to perceived proximity to the sender, while a negative abstract message compared to a negative concrete message leads to perceived distance. The implications of this study, which is the first to show the communicative impact of biased language use, are discussed. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Stapel, Diederik A.; Johnson, Camille S.

doi: 10.1002/ejsp.390pmid: N/A

While similarity typically breeds social comparison, all information gained from social comparisons is not equally influential. Three studies illustrate the situations in which individuals defensively interpret social comparison information such that they incorporate information that reflects positively on the self and disregard negative information. Study 1 extends previous research to show that self‐threat broadens the conditions under which defensive interpretations occur to include those in which similarity is ambiguous. Studies 2 and 3 demonstrate that defensive interpretations are less likely to occur when individuals are affirmed or when the comparison information is unimportant. These findings suggest that the impact of social comparisons on self‐views is determined by both similarity of comparison targets and the motives of the perceiver. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Garcia‐Marques, Teresa; Mackie, Diane M.

doi: 10.1002/ejsp.387pmid: N/A

We investigated the effects of familiarity on person perception. We predicted that familiarity would increase non‐analytic processing, reducing attention to and the impact of individuating information, and increasing the impact of category labels on judgments about a target person. In two studies participants read either incriminating or exculpatory individuating information about a defendant in a criminal case and made judgments of guilt. In Study 1, participants were subliminally exposed to the defendant's photo, another matched photo, or no photo before seeing the evidence. Participants familiar with the defendant's photo both processed and used the individuating information less. In Study 2, participants were subtly made familiar or not with the incriminating and exculpatory information itself, and the defendant was described either as a priest or as a skinhead. Familiarity with the information reduced attention to its content and also tended to increase reliance on category information in guilt judgments. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Claypool, Heather M.; Hugenberg, Kurt; Housley, Meghan K.; Mackie, Diane M.

doi: 10.1002/ejsp.422pmid: N/A

Quickly and accurately perceiving others' facial affect is paramount for successful social interaction. This work investigates the role of familiarity in helping us to interpret others' facial emotions. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants viewed several faces, some familiar and some novel, and judged how happy each face appeared. As predicted, results showed that familiar faces were perceived as happier than were novel faces. In Experiment 3, participants again viewed several faces, some familiar and some not, and rated the perceived anger or happiness of these faces. As expected, familiar faces were perceived as happier and less angry than were novel faces. Thus, these results suggest that familiarity is one cue we use to interpret the facial affect of others. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Rydell, Robert J.; McConnell, Allen R.; Strain, Laura M.; Claypool, Heather M.; Hugenberg, Kurt

doi: 10.1002/ejsp.393pmid: N/A

This research examined the processes by which explicit and implicit attitudes changed to systematically differing levels of counterattitudinal (CA) information. Explicit attitudes changed quickly in response to relatively small amounts of CA information, reflecting rule‐based reasoning. On the other hand, implicit attitudes changed more slowly in the face of CA information, reflecting the progressive accretion of evaluation‐attitude object pairings. Thus, explicit attitudes were extremely malleable and changed quickly when CA information was presented, however, implicit attitudes revealed a slow, linear change trajectory resulting from the on‐going accrual of information about the attitude object. Implications for the processes underlying implicit and explicit attitudes are discussed. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

McClure, John; Hilton, Denis J.; Sutton, Robbie M.

doi: 10.1002/ejsp.394pmid: N/A

Four experiments investigated judgments about voluntary human actions and physical causes that were embedded in causal chains ending in negative outcomes (e.g., a forest fire). Causes were judged for their explanatory quality, their effect on the probability of the outcome, and the extent to which they could be socially controlled. Results supported legal theorists' claim that voluntary actions are judged better explanations than physical causes. Indices derived from theories of probability change generally failed to predict the preference for voluntary actions. In contrast, this preference was mediated by the perceived extent to which voluntary versus physical causes may be brought under social control. These results suggest that causal explanation, at least within causal chains, is not driven solely by changes in the probability of an outcome when a cause is added, and that observers recognize the potential social function of explanations in drawing attention to socially controllable causes. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Carnaghi, Andrea; Yzerbyt, Vincent Y.

doi: 10.1002/ejsp.402pmid: N/A

Two studies investigated the effect of stereotypes held by a prospective audience on participants' reactions to a stereotype‐disconfirming member. In Study 1, participants formed an impression of a positive disconfirming gay in order to communicate it to an audience known to hold a negative versus positive stereotype about gays. As predicted, participants subtyped the deviant more in the former than in the latter case. Moreover, participants' stereotype at the end of the study mirrored the audience's assumed stereotypes about gays. In Study 2, participants learned about a stereotype allegedly held by an ingroup or an outgroup audience about Belgians and then received information about a Belgian who disconfirmed the stereotype. As predicted, the deviant was seen as less typical when he violated the stereotype held by an ingroup than by an outgroup audience. Also, participants' stereotype about Belgians was more similar to the one held by the ingroup audience. A mediational analysis confirmed that participants subtyped the disconfirming member in order to embrace the stereotype advocated by the ingroup audience. Results are discussed in light of recent models of stereotype change. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Costarelli, Sandro; Colloca, Pasquale

doi: 10.1002/ejsp.403pmid: N/A

Attitudinal ambivalence has been found to moderate attitude–intention relations. However, no prior work has investigated the mechanisms by which this moderation effect occurs. The present research attempted to address this issue. Across two studies, there was evidence that an Ambivalence × Attitude interaction was mediated through judgements about attitude importance. Additionally, the present research ruled out the possibility that attitude certainty, a factor that is often found to be positively related to attitude importance, was not responsible for the observed mediating effects of this latter variable. While replicating previous evidence supporting the moderating properties of ambivalence on attitude–intention relations, the current research sheds light on the critical role that attitude importance plays in this relationship. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.