Understanding Metaphorical Comparisons: Beyond SimilarityGlucksberg, Sam; Keysar, Boaz
doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.97.1.3pmid: N/A
Traditionally, metaphors such as “my job is a jail” have been treated as implicit similes (i.e., this metaphor would be treated as if it were a comparison statement, “my job is like a jail”). Tversky's account of similarity is applied to such nonliteral similarity expressions, and is shown to apply as readily to nonliteral comparisons as to literal comparisons. But treating metaphors as comparison statements fails to account for certain important phenomena, including metaphoricity itself (the judgment that a comparison statement is nonliteral). We argue that metaphors are exactly what they appear to be: class-inclusion assertions, in which the topic of the metaphor (e.g., “my job”) is assigned to a diagnostic category (e.g., entities that confine one against one's will, are unpleasant, are difficult to escape from). In such assertions, the metaphor vehicle (e.g., “jail”) refers to that category, and at the same time is a prototypical exemplar of that category. This account of metaphor provides a basis for a theory of metaphor comprehension, and also clarifies why people use metaphors instead of similes.
Origins and Functions of Positive and Negative Affect: A Control-Process ViewCarver, Charles S.; Scheier, Michael F.
doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.97.1.19pmid: N/A
The question of how affect arises and what affect indicates is examined from a feedback-based viewpoint on self-regulation. Using the analogy of action control as the attempt to diminish distance to a goal, a second feedback system is postulated that senses and regulates the rate at which the action-guiding system is functioning. This second system is seen as responsible for affect. Implications of these assertions and issues that arise from them are addressed in the remainder of the article. Several issues relate to the emotion model itself; others concern the relation between negative emotion and disengagement from goals. Relations to 3 other emotion theories are also addressed. The authors conclude that this view on affect is a useful supplement to other theories and that the concept of emotion is easily assimilated to feedback models of self-regulation.
Intentional Action and Action SlipsHeckhausen, Heinz; Beckmann, Jürgen
doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.97.1.36pmid: N/A
The main assumption in this article is that actions are guided by mentally represented intentions. Intentions are subdivided into goal intentions and their contingent instrumental intentions. The latter are generated to overcome anticipated difficulties in three problem areas: initiation, implementation, and termination of an intended action. The action-guiding intention can be identified at various goal levels that relate to the alternative modes of implementation-imminent or wide-spanned goal representations. An ongoing action is controlled by a wide-spanned mode whenever implementation consists of automatized acts that require little or no conscious control. A wide-spanned goal representation facilitates the simultaneous execution of related or unrelated activity. The 2 control modes of narrow and wide goal span set the stage for the occurrence of action slips. A collection of various action slips can be categorized according to the 3 problem areas in the enactment of goal intentions: initiation, implementation, and termination slips. This categorization helps to elucidate the various types of action slips, and it highlights the effectiveness of instrumental intentions.
Development, Microevolution, and Social BehaviorCairns, Robert B.; Gariépy, Jean-Louis; Hood, Kathryn E.
doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.97.1.49pmid: 2408089
The central questions of social development—from the roots of mother–infant attachment to the plasticity of aggressive behavior—pivot on the relations between genetic and ontogenetic sources of variance. It is proposed that (a) developmental, experiential, and microevolutionary processes typically collaborate, rather than compete, in achieving social adaptation; (b) social behavior patterns are mostly closed to modification in the course of development and across generations, but avenues of vulnerability exist in ontogeny and microevolution for dynamic, rapid, and reversible changes in key features; (c) a general avenue for change is delay or acceleration in the developmental onset of one or more features of the behavior pattern, which in turn modifies the functions and properties of the adaptive configuration; and (d) the features of social behavior that are open to rapid change in ontogeny should be open as well to rapid changes in microevolution, although different underlying processes may be involved. Empirical findings from the investigation of aggressive interactions are used to illustrate this proposal on the dual genesis and coincident adaptation of social behaviors.
“On the Possible Psychophysical Laws” Revisited: Remarks on Cross-Modal MatchingLuce, R. Duncan
doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.97.1.66pmid: N/A
A nonrelational theory of cross-modal matching, including magnitude estimation, is proposed for the general class of 1-dimensional measurement structures that have real-unit (ratio and interval scale) representations. A key feature of these structures is that each point of the structure can be mapped into each other point by a translation, which is the structural analogue of ratio scale transformations of the representation. Let M denote a 1:1 matching relation between 2 (not necessarily distinct) unit structures. The major assumption is that for each translation τ of one structure, there is a translation στ, of the other such that if xMs, then τ(x)Mστ(s). This property is shown to be equivalent to a power law holding between the unit representations. A concept of similar relations is taken from dimensional analysis, and 2 matching relations are shown to be similar if and only if their power laws differ only in the unit (modulus), not the exponent. A relation R between pairs in each system is said to be a ratio relation relative to a matching relation M satisfying the above condition provided that (x, y)R(s, t)obtains if and only if for some translation τ both τ(x)Msand τ(y)Mt. In that case, R is unique and is represented by the ratio of the values assigned to x and y in their unit representation being equal to a power of the ratio of the values assigned to s and t in their unit representation; the exponent is that of M. This theory is related to an earlier article by the author and is compared with the relational theory of Shepard (1978, 1981) and Krantz (1972).
A Functional Theory of the McCollough EffectDodwell, Peter C.; Humphrey, G. Keith
doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.97.1.78pmid: 2408090
Pattern-contingent color aftereffects, or McCollough effects (MEs), are used to probe the visual brain's operations psychophysically. Their neural substrate is unknown, however, and theories about them are weak. Our theory proposes a strong functional role for MEs and a neuropsychological basis that accounts for “top-down”(global) constraints ignored by other theories. The functional aspect of the theory is based on the concept of contingent adaptation level, following Helson (1964), and on the “error-correcting device”of Andrews (1964), which tracks and adjusts internal representation to external-world contingencies. The neuropsychological part of the theory postulates that global properties are the result of MEs being generated not at the individual detector level but in vectorfields of which the detectors are elements. It is an implementation of Lie transformation group theory (Hoffman, 1966). Evidence for this model is assessed.
Suicide as Escape From SelfBaumeister, Roy F.
doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.97.1.90pmid: 2408091
Suicide is analyzed in terms of motivations to escape from aversive self-awareness. The causal chain begins with events that fall severely short of standards and expectations. These failures are attributed internally, which makes self-awareness painful. Awareness of the self's inadequacies generates negative affect, and the individual therefore desires to escape from self-awareness and the associated affect. The person tries to achieve a state of cognitive deconstruction (constricted temporal focus, concrete thinking, immediate or proximal goals, cognitive rigidity, and rejection of meaning), which helps prevent meaningful self-awareness and emotion. The deconstructed state brings irrationality and disinhibition, making drastic measures seem acceptable. Suicide can be seen as an ultimate step in the effort to escape from self and world.
On Acquiring Knowledge About People and the Capacity to Pretend: Response to Leslie (1987)Hobson, R. Peter
doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.97.1.114pmid: 2309024
Leslie (1987) has proposed a cognitivist model for the young child's “theory of mind” and capacity to pretend. Serious shortcomings in Leslie's nondevelopmental, nonsocial, and restrictively cognitive account are noted, and an alternative thesis is proposed: A young child's knowledge about people is grounded in the experience of affectively charged interpersonal relations, and the child's capacity for pretend play develops on the basis of prior abilities to perceive the nature of other people's relatedness to the world. Clinical phenomena associated with autism and congenital blindness provide evidence for this thesis.
Prospects for a Cognitive Neuropsychology of Autism: Hobson's ChoiceLeslie, Alan M.; Frith, Uta
doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.97.1.122pmid: 2309025
Leslie (1987b) proposed a new, metarepresentational model for the cognition of pretense. This model identified a cognitive component necessary for the normal development of a “theory of mind.” In this article, the relation of the child's early affective sensitivities to this component is considered. Early affective sensitivities seem to be cognitively distinct from the metarepresentational component. Childhood autism provides an interesting opportunity to study this problem. Three theoretical possibilities for the pathogenesis of this condition are presented: (a) a basic affective disorder as proposed by Hobson (this issue, p. 114), (b) a basic affective disorder and a basic cognitive disorder jointly, and (c) a basic cognitive disorder. There is little evidence for Option a, and a growing body of evidence supports Option c. Option b is sidelined for the time being on grounds of parsimony. Leslie's original theoretical proposals are revised, and some resulting implications are presented for the future investigation of the cognitive neuropsychology of autism.