"Explanatory principles" in psychologyGeldard, F. A.
doi: 10.1037/h0059714pmid: N/A
Two opposed theories as to the task of science are (1) that it should content itself with description, and (2) that it should set up a unified structure, with rules for relating facts, and should give explanatory principles. The author holds that an examination of so-called explanations shows them to consist simply of further descriptions, their aptness depending on the intimacy of their relation to the facts being explained. To the systematic scientist, all must be explained in terms consistent with his prior knowledge or with a logical regimen which he has adopted. But there are pitfalls in the exclusive employment of a single limited point of view. For the psychologist, many of his facts lead quite naturally to explanation in physical, chemical, anatomical, or physiological terms. Our contemporary problems seem to yield best to known neurological facts and principles. But this is merely extended description.
Toward a theory of conditioningIrwin, O. C.
doi: 10.1037/h0054037pmid: N/A
Successful experiments on conditioning of infants by Wenger and Kantrow suggest the necessity for a systematic theory of conditioning which will correct the inadequacies of Pavlov's theory. A re-analysis of the seven assumptions underlying Pavlov's interpretation of conditioning phenomena, such as his emphasis on contiguity, on the cortex as the exclusive organ of conditioning, on the reflex character of the response, on spatial projection, on irradiation and on the brain as a passive inert receiver of impulses, shows these assumptions to be untenable. Wenger and Kantrow have demonstrated that (1) an original excitatory stimulus may become first inhibitory, then excitatory again; (2) feeding brings complete decrement; and (3) a partial decrement may be superimposed on an excitatory condition. After examining these findings in the light of several standard theories of inhibition, the author concludes that a theory of proprioceptive facilitation and inhibition offers the best explanation.
The law of effect or the law of qualitative conditioningRazran, G. H. S.
doi: 10.1037/h0057550pmid: N/A
It is contended that the law of effect is a special type of qualitative conditioning. It differs from the quantitative type in that not only a specific response is conditioned but also a general organismic quality, tendency, or affect. It consists mainly of the strengthening or weakening of one quality by another, rather than the substitution of one response for another. But it may influence, modify, or reverse the course of quantitative conditioning. An explanation of the variable effects of nocuous stimuli in learning is found in their tendency to arouse contradictory central tendencies––an abient one when the stimulus is applied and an adient one when it is removed. False reward signals readily assume the characteristic of punishments, but false punishment signals do not as a rule become rewards. Qualitative conditioning deals with levels of responding, whereas pattern conditioning deals with stimulation levels.
Symbolic technique in psychological theoryMiller, J. G.
doi: 10.1037/h0060441pmid: N/A
Psychology has reached the stage where the experimental data are far more accurate than the theoretical treatment accorded them, because of the failure to use rigid logical symbolic formulations. Hull has done much to bring careful theoretical techniques into psychology, but a number of false assumptions can be shown to have crept into his "theoretical systems," due to his failure to use a symbolic regimen. The terms used in his postulates are not carefully defined. When several of Hull's specific terms, such as "reinforcing state of affairs," "experimental extinction," "frustration," "seeking," "attempt," "discouragement," etc., are translated into symbolic terms, some of the logical inconsistencies in his arguments are apparent.
The effect of outcome on learningGuthrie, E. R.
doi: 10.1037/h0058583pmid: N/A
The criticisms offered by T. L. McCulloch of the author's formulations on the manner in which the effects of an action influence learning are admittedly well founded. In place of the theory that the successful act or series of acts is learned because it is always the last association with the drive, and that it remains because the drive has been removed by the consummatory response, McCulloch suggests that the effect of the correct or successful action is not to remove the drive, but to inhibit the precurrent restless behavior and remove excitement. Guthrie himself had called attention to this same point in another connection.
A note on Kellogg's treatment of skillsLynch, J. M.
doi: 10.1037/h0054314pmid: N/A
Although he assumes that all forms of learning, from conditioning and trial-and-error to Gestalt, belong to a common continuum, yet Kellogg sets acquisition of skills off from the rest as unique, involving neither addition nor subtraction, but mere perfection. This is objected to on the ground that skill learning involves new S-R connections, new insight, and the elimination of old reactions.