<p>Abstract:</p><p>This article proposes a mereological approach to the <i>dao</i>-<i>you</i> relation in the <i>Daodejing</i>. It is claimed here that <i>dao</i> and <i>you</i> can be conceived of as two integrated subregions, defined in terms of rules of composition and their persistence through time. It is shown that <i>dao</i> is an atemporal object (a fourdimensional unrestricted composition), whereas <i>you</i> is a temporal object (a three-dimensional restricted composition). This particular approach can provide a new understanding of essential issues in Daoist metaphysics.</p>
<p>Abstract:</p><p>Agency and freedom express fundamental experiences that we have as humans in our conscious deeds and varied pursuits. The absence of terminological equivalents in premodern Chinese makes it challenging to explain Confucian views on these. It is attempted here to explain agency and freedom in Confucianism by following a metaphorâthe archerâfrom its primary sources. A paradigm for moral agent, the metaphor discloses Confucian perspectives on purposeful activity and self-determination.</p>
<p>Abstract:</p><p>A common interpretation of the <i>Zhuangzi</i> holds that the text is skeptical only about propositional knowledge and not practical knowledge. It is argued here that this interpretation is problematic, for two reasons. The first is that there is no motivation for Zhuangzi to criticize propositional knowledge, given some general pre-Qin epistemological assumptions. The second is that Zhuangzi explicitly criticizes a certain kind of practical knowledge. It is then explained how Zhuangzi's skepticism can co-exist with the idea of "great knowledge."</p>
Heim, Maria; Ram-Prasad, Chakravarthi
<p>Abstract:</p><p>Two issues are brought together here for their mutual illumination: (1) the particular use of that hoary Indian dyad, <i>nÄma-rÅ«pa</i>, literally "name-and-form," by Buddhaghosa, the influential fifth-century Theravada writer, to organize the categories of experience, and (2) an interpretation of phenomenology as a methodology.</p>
<p>Abstract:</p><p>It is sometimes argued that metaphysical anti-realists cannot consistently affirm the evident truth that the world existed before any conscious subjects evolved. Here it is considered how MÄdhyamikas could respond, and, in so doing, clarifies where Madhyamaka may be situated in debates about metaphysical realism.</p>
<p>Abstract:</p><p>Watsuji TetsurÅ's concept of <i>fÅ«do</i> is intended to capture the way in which nature and culture are interwoven in a setting that is partly constitutive of and partly constituted by a group of people inhabiting a particular place. This essay off ers a careful examination of the sense in which the self both constitutes and is constituted by the <i>fÅ«do</i> in which it is emplaced. It concludes with a brief survey of the prospects and problems posed by the interpretation of <i>fÅ«do</i> that has been presented.</p>
<p>Abstract:</p><p>This essay explicates the metaphor of counting ten coins as it appears in Fazang's <i>Treatise on the Five Teachings of Huayan</i>. The goal is to transform Fazang's inexact and obscure mentions of the metaphor into something that is clearer and more precise. The method for achieving this goal is threefold: first, by presenting Fazang's version of the metaphor as improving upon prior efforts by Zhiyan and Ŭisang to interpret a brief stanza in the <i>Avataá¹saka SÅ«tra</i>; second, by providing textual evidence to support this interpretation; and third, by contrasting this interpretation with alternatives from Francis Cook as well as Yasuo Deguchi and Katsuhiko Sano.</p>
<p>Abstract:</p><p>The fifteenth-century Tibetan scholar Gorampa Sonam Senge argues that the conventional truth (<i>kun rdzob bden pa</i>) can exist in multiple ways depending on its relationship to the minds of beings who apprehend it. This view, which I call <i>relational fictionalism</i>, enables Gorampa to reconcile a number of seemingly conflicting views about what it means to see the world correctly.</p>
<p>Abstract:</p><p>Recent theories of Confucian democracy are increasingly aware of pluralism in East Asian societies. This essay will first analyze Joseph Chan's Confucian politi cal perfectionism and Sungmoon Kim's public-reason Confucianism and argue that both suffer from distinct problems that stem from the failure to truly take pluralism seriously. Based on empirical evidence in contemporary East Asia, it will then be argued that the reasonable question to ask when it comes to the future of democracy in East Asia is how sustainable democracies can be established and maintained among a diversity of comprehensive doctrines, of which Confucianism is only one among many.</p>
<p>Abstract:</p><p>This essay studies what could be called a <i>natural hermeneutics</i>, represented by Plato and the Chinese Taoist philosopher Zhuangzi. It is proposed that both philosophers conceive of a hermeneutics that emphasizes the primacy of innate divisions or inborn patterns. The concept of natural hermeneutics, it is suggested, points to a new methodological tool.</p>
<p>Abstract:</p><p>This article offers a holistic view of thing-events by philosophically reconstructing the "logic of not" that is topicalized in the <i>Diamond SÅ«tra</i> of MahÄyÄna Buddhism. This logic is then employed to redress the problem of fragmentation in understanding oneself, others, and nature, which is rooted in dualistic, either-or, ego-logical modes of understanding predominant in the West.</p>
<p>Abstract:</p><p>Efforts by Zhu Xi's descendants since the mid-1990s to promote his "Family Instructions" not only introduce the activities of one wing of the Confucian revival in contemporary China but also provide a window onto changes in Communist Party policies toward universal values. The analysis here culminates with two recent books by prominent Beijing philosopher Chen Lai.</p>
<p>Abstract:</p><p>This essay contrasts NyÄya-VaiÅeá¹£ika and Buddhist explanations of attention. Section 1 lays out the ontological postulates that NyÄya-VaiÅeá¹£ikas and Buddhists deemed necessary for the explanation of attention. Section 2 looks at three arguments that the NyÄya-VaiÅeá¹£ikas gave for their principal postulate, the manas, and three corresponding Buddhist responses to these arguments. Sections 3 and 4 look at contrasting NyÄya-VaiÅeá¹£ika and Buddhist explanations of, respectively, "shifts of attention" and "competition for attention." Section 5 considers whether the Buddhist model can adequately account for voluntary or endogenous attention, and whether the NyÄya-VaiÅeá¹£ika model can adequately account for involuntary or exogenous attention. The final section identifies three things that are commonly attributed to attention and that may seem impossible in both the NyÄya-VaiÅeá¹£ika and the Buddhist models; it shows how the two Indian models can account for them.</p>
<p>Abstract:</p><p>Given culturally imposed limitations on women's participation in intellectual pursuits, it behooves us to explore a wide spectrum of sources when searching for women philosophers in the annals of history. In ancient Greece, Socrates expounded the philosopher Diotima in Plato's <i>Symposium</i>; in Heian Japan, Murasaki Shikibu penned the world's first psychological novel, <i>The Tale of Genji</i>, layered with Buddhist insight. Their common themes are beauty, love, longing, and liberation grounded in idealization. The essay is structured as a dialectical exchange between theory and <i>praxis</i>, by applying Diotima's theory of eros and beauty to the main characters in Murasaki's novel. We then analyze why the title character, Genji, like Alcibiades in the <i>Symposium</i>, fails to realize the erotic mission outlined by Diotima. Finally, author Murasaki's alternative Buddhist theory of love is extrapolated from the lives and thoughts of her central female characters.</p>
<p>Abstract:</p><p>Zhu Xi argues that "thoughts cannot render themselves sincere on their own," for thoughts tend to deceive themselves; thus, only the objective inquiry of knowledge can ensure a proper beginning to attain genuine sincerity. Wang Yangming's earlier doctrine of the unity of knowing and doing and his later doctrine of extending <i>liangzhi</i> (original knowledge of the good) could be understood as a response to Zhu Xi's puzzle of self-deception.</p>
Schepen, Renate; van Rappard, Hans
<p>Abstract:</p><p>African and Chinese Philosophies Compared: A Dialogue between East and South, a review of <i>Afrika und China im Dialog: Philosophische Süd-Ost-Dialoge aus westlicher Sicht</i>, and <i>Afrika en China in Dialoog: Filosofische Zuid-Oost-Dialogen vanuit Westers Perspectief</i>, by Heinz Kimmerle and Hans van Rappard Renate Schepen and Hans van Rappard</p>