Mind

Charles B. Cross

doi: 10.1093/mind/110.438.319pmid: N/A

In this essay I present a new version of the Paradox of the Knower and show that this new paradox vitiates a certain argument against epistemic closure. I then prove a theorem that relates the new paradox to epistemological scepticism. I conclude by assessing the use of the Knower in arguments against syntactical treatments of knowledge. Copyright 2001 « Previous | Next Article » Table of Contents This Article Mind (2001) 110 (438): 319-333. doi: 10.1093/mind/110.438.319 » Abstract Free Full Text (PDF) Free Classifications Article Services Article metrics Alert me when cited Alert me if corrected Find similar articles Similar articles in Web of Science Add to my archive Download citation Request Permissions Citing Articles Load citing article information Citing articles via CrossRef Citing articles via Scopus Citing articles via Web of Science Citing articles via Google Scholar Google Scholar Articles by Cross, C. B. Search for related content Related Content Load related web page information Share Email this article CiteULike Delicious Facebook Google+ Mendeley Twitter What's this? Search this journal: Advanced » Current Issue October 2015 124 (496) Alert me to new issues The Journal About this journal Books for Review Rights & Permissions Dispatch date of the next issue We are mobile – find out more This journal is a member of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) Journals Career Network Published on behalf of The Mind Association Editors Professor A.W. Moore Professor Lucy O’Brien View full editorial board For Authors Instructions to authors Review practices Self-archiving policy Submit now L5rKpSBe53Z6qiDquxayEwfrbppfmQN3 true Looking for your next opportunity? Looking for jobs... jQuery_1_11 = jQuery.noConflict(true); Alerting Services Email table of contents Email Advance Access CiteTrack XML RSS feed Corporate Services Advertising sales Reprints Supplements

Simon J. Evnine

doi: 10.1093/mind/110.438.335pmid: N/A

I argue for the thesis (UL) that there are certain logical abilities that any rational creature must have. Opposition to UL comes from naturalized epistemologists who hold that it is a purely empirical question which logical abilities a rational creature has. I provide arguments that any creatures meeting certain conditions—plausible necessary conditions on rationality—must have certain specific logical concepts and be able to use them in certain specific ways. For example, I argue that any creature able to grasp theories must have a concept of conjunction subject to the usual introduction and elimination rules. I also deal with disjunction, conditionality and negation. Finally, I put UL to work in showing how it could be used to define a notion of logical obviousness that would be well suited to certain contexts—e.g. radical translation and epistemic logic—in which a concept of obviousness is often invoked. Copyright 2001 « Previous | Next Article » Table of Contents This Article Mind (2001) 110 (438): 335-367. doi: 10.1093/mind/110.438.335 » Abstract Free Full Text (PDF) Free Classifications Article Services Article metrics Alert me when cited Alert me if corrected Find similar articles Similar articles in Web of Science Add to my archive Download citation Request Permissions Citing Articles Load citing article information Citing articles via CrossRef Citing articles via Scopus Citing articles via Web of Science Citing articles via Google Scholar Google Scholar Articles by Evnine, S. J. Search for related content Related Content Load related web page information Share Email this article CiteULike Delicious Facebook Google+ Mendeley Twitter What's this? Search this journal: Advanced » Current Issue October 2015 124 (496) Alert me to new issues The Journal About this journal Books for Review Rights & Permissions Dispatch date of the next issue We are mobile – find out more This journal is a member of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) Journals Career Network Published on behalf of The Mind Association Editors Professor A.W. Moore Professor Lucy O’Brien View full editorial board For Authors Instructions to authors Review practices Self-archiving policy Submit now L5rKpSBe53Z6qiDquxayEwfrbppfmQN3 true Looking for your next opportunity? Looking for jobs... jQuery_1_11 = jQuery.noConflict(true); Alerting Services Email table of contents Email Advance Access CiteTrack XML RSS feed Corporate Services Advertising sales Reprints Supplements

Oron Shagrir

doi: 10.1093/mind/110.438.369pmid: N/A

The paper presents an extended argument for the claim that mental content impacts the computational individuation of a cognitive system (section 2). The argument starts with the observation that a cognitive system may simultaneously implement a variety of different syntactic structures, but that the computational identity of a cognitive system is given by only one of these implemented syntactic structures. It is then asked what are the features that determine which of implemented syntactic structures is the computational structure of the system, and it is contended that these features are certain aspects of mental content. The argument helps (section 3) to reassess the thesis known as computational externalism, namely, the thesis that computational theories of cognition make essential reference to features in the individual's environment. It is suggested that the familiar arguments for computational externalism—which rest on thought experiments and on exegesis of Marr's theories of vision—are unconvincing, but that they can be improved. A reconstruction of the visex/audex thought experiment is offered in section 3.1. An outline of a novel interpretation of Marr's theories of vision is presented in section 3.2. The corrected arguments support the claim that computational theories of cognition are intentional. Computational externalism is still pending, however, upon the thesis that psychological content is extrinsic. Copyright 2001 « Previous | Next Article » Table of Contents This Article Mind (2001) 110 (438): 369-400. doi: 10.1093/mind/110.438.369 » Abstract Free Full Text (PDF) Free Classifications Article Services Article metrics Alert me when cited Alert me if corrected Find similar articles Similar articles in Web of Science Add to my archive Download citation Request Permissions Citing Articles Load citing article information Citing articles via CrossRef Citing articles via Scopus Citing articles via Web of Science Citing articles via Google Scholar Google Scholar Articles by Shagrir, O. Search for related content Related Content Load related web page information Share Email this article CiteULike Delicious Facebook Google+ Mendeley Twitter What's this? Search this journal: Advanced » Current Issue October 2015 124 (496) Alert me to new issues The Journal About this journal Books for Review Rights & Permissions Dispatch date of the next issue We are mobile – find out more This journal is a member of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) Journals Career Network Published on behalf of The Mind Association Editors Professor A.W. Moore Professor Lucy O’Brien View full editorial board For Authors Instructions to authors Review practices Self-archiving policy Submit now L5rKpSBe53Z6qiDquxayEwfrbppfmQN3 true Looking for your next opportunity? Looking for jobs... jQuery_1_11 = jQuery.noConflict(true); Alerting Services Email table of contents Email Advance Access CiteTrack XML RSS feed Corporate Services Advertising sales Reprints Supplements

Beall, JC; Colyvan, Mark

doi: 10.1093/mind/110.438.401pmid: N/A

Hyde, Dominic

doi: 10.1093/mind/110.438.409pmid: N/A

Yi, Byeong‐Uk

doi: 10.1093/mind/110.438.413pmid: N/A

Ridley, Aaron

doi: 10.1093/mind/110.438.423pmid: N/A

Olson, Eric

doi: 10.1093/mind/110.438.427pmid: N/A

Sainsbury, Mark

doi: 10.1093/mind/110.438.430pmid: N/A

Fischer, John Martin

doi: 10.1093/mind/110.438.432pmid: N/A