A genuine realist theory of advanced modalizingJ Divers
doi: 10.1093/mind/108.430.217pmid: N/A
The principle of modal ubiquity - that every truth is necessary or contingent - and the validity of possibility introduction, are principles that any modal theory suffers for failing to accommodate. Advanced modal claims are modal claims about entities other than spatiotemporally unified individuals (perhaps, then, spatiotemporally disunified individuals, sets, numbers, properties, propositions and events). I show that genuine modal realism, as it has thus far been explicitly developed, and in so far as it deals with advanced modal claims, cannot accommodate the principles in question. On behalf of the genuine modal realist I motivate and propose a redundancy interpretation of advanced possibility claims and extend that interpretation to the cognate cases of necessity, impossibility and contingency. I then show that the problematic principles as they apply to advanced modal claims can be derived from these interpretations. I show further how the proposed interpretation enables the genuine modal realist to deal with a number of objections that centre on the alleged inadequacy of the genuine modal realist's expressive resources. I conclude that genuine modal realism emerges the stronger for having been shown capable of dealing with advanced modal claims on the basis of no conceptual and ontological resources beyond those it requires to deal with ordinary modal claims. Copyright 1999 « Previous | Next Article » Table of Contents This Article Mind (1999) 108 (430): 217-240. doi: 10.1093/mind/108.430.217 » Abstract Free Full Text (PDF) Free Classifications Article Services Article metrics Alert me when cited Alert me if corrected Find similar articles Similar articles in Web of Science Add to my archive Download citation Request Permissions Citing Articles Load citing article information Citing articles via CrossRef Citing articles via Scopus Citing articles via Web of Science Citing articles via Google Scholar Google Scholar Articles by Divers, J. Search for related content Related Content Load related web page information Share Email this article CiteULike Delicious Facebook Google+ Mendeley Twitter What's this? Search this journal: Advanced » Current Issue October 2015 124 (496) Alert me to new issues The Journal About this journal Books for Review Rights & Permissions Dispatch date of the next issue We are mobile – find out more This journal is a member of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) Journals Career Network Published on behalf of The Mind Association Editors Professor A.W. Moore Professor Lucy O’Brien View full editorial board For Authors Instructions to authors Review practices Self-archiving policy Submit now L5rKpSBe53Z6qiDquxayEwfrbppfmQN3 true Looking for your next opportunity? Looking for jobs... jQuery_1_11 = jQuery.noConflict(true); Alerting Services Email table of contents Email Advance Access CiteTrack XML RSS feed Corporate Services Advertising sales Reprints Supplements
The preface, the lottery, and the logic of beliefJ Hawthorne, L Bovens
doi: 10.1093/mind/108.430.241pmid: N/A
John Locke proposed a straightforward relationship between qualitative and quantitative doxastic notions: belief corresponds to a sufficiently high degree of confidence. Richard Foley has further developed this Lockean thesis and applied it to an analysis of the preface and lottery paradoxes. Following Foley's lead, we exploit various versions of these paradoxes to chart a precise relationship between belief and probabilistic degrees of confidence. The resolutions of these paradoxes emphasize distinct but complementary features of coherent belief. These features suggest principles that tie together qualitative and quantitative doxastic notions. We show how these principles may be employed to construct a quantitative model - in terms of degrees of confidence - of an agent's qualitative doxastic state. This analysis fleshes out the Lockean thesis and provides the foundation for a logic of belief that is responsive to the logic of degrees of confidence. Copyright 1999 « Previous | Next Article » Table of Contents This Article Mind (1999) 108 (430): 241-264. doi: 10.1093/mind/108.430.241 » Abstract Free Full Text (PDF) Free Classifications Article Services Article metrics Alert me when cited Alert me if corrected Find similar articles Similar articles in Web of Science Add to my archive Download citation Request Permissions Citing Articles Load citing article information Citing articles via CrossRef Citing articles via Scopus Citing articles via Web of Science Citing articles via Google Scholar Google Scholar Articles by Hawthorne, J. Articles by Bovens, L. Search for related content Related Content Load related web page information Share Email this article CiteULike Delicious Facebook Google+ Mendeley Twitter What's this? Search this journal: Advanced » Current Issue October 2015 124 (496) Alert me to new issues The Journal About this journal Books for Review Rights & Permissions Dispatch date of the next issue We are mobile – find out more This journal is a member of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) Journals Career Network Published on behalf of The Mind Association Editors Professor A.W. Moore Professor Lucy O’Brien View full editorial board For Authors Instructions to authors Review practices Self-archiving policy Submit now L5rKpSBe53Z6qiDquxayEwfrbppfmQN3 true Looking for your next opportunity? Looking for jobs... jQuery_1_11 = jQuery.noConflict(true); Alerting Services Email table of contents Email Advance Access CiteTrack XML RSS feed Corporate Services Advertising sales Reprints Supplements
Deceiving oneself or self-deceived? On the formation of beliefs 'under the influence'A Lazar
doi: 10.1093/mind/108.430.265pmid: N/A
How does a subject who is competent to detect the irrationality of a belief that p , form her belief against weighty or even conclusive evidence to the contrary? The phenomenon of self-deception threatens a widely shared view of beliefs according to which they do not regularly correspond to emotions and evaluative attitudes. Accordingly, the most popular answer to this question is that the belief formed in self-deception is caused by an intention to form that belief. On this view, the state of self-deception is taken to be a calculated outcome involving a person's intentional manipulation of her own thoughts. I argue that this answer is false and forms an impediment towards making sense of self-deception. I show that, contrary to philosophical prejudice, emotions and desires exert vast and systematic effects on the formation of beliefs. In this, and other, sections of the article, the results of experimental work are brought forward. Self-deception is portrayed here as resembling numerous instances of belief formation which are regularly affected by motivational factors. I argue that self-deceptive beliefs are direct expressions of the subject's wishes, fears and hopes. Qua beliefs which mostly correspond to such factors (rather than to evidence), self-deceptive states are a kind of fantasy. Copyright 1999 « Previous | Next Article » Table of Contents This Article Mind (1999) 108 (430): 265-290. doi: 10.1093/mind/108.430.265 » Abstract Free Full Text (PDF) Free Classifications Article Services Article metrics Alert me when cited Alert me if corrected Find similar articles Similar articles in Web of Science Add to my archive Download citation Request Permissions Citing Articles Load citing article information Citing articles via CrossRef Citing articles via Scopus Citing articles via Web of Science Citing articles via Google Scholar Google Scholar Articles by Lazar, A. Search for related content Related Content Load related web page information Share Email this article CiteULike Delicious Facebook Google+ Mendeley Twitter What's this? Search this journal: Advanced » Current Issue October 2015 124 (496) Alert me to new issues The Journal About this journal Books for Review Rights & Permissions Dispatch date of the next issue We are mobile – find out more This journal is a member of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) Journals Career Network Published on behalf of The Mind Association Editors Professor A.W. Moore Professor Lucy O’Brien View full editorial board For Authors Instructions to authors Review practices Self-archiving policy Submit now L5rKpSBe53Z6qiDquxayEwfrbppfmQN3 true Looking for your next opportunity? Looking for jobs... jQuery_1_11 = jQuery.noConflict(true); Alerting Services Email table of contents Email Advance Access CiteTrack XML RSS feed Corporate Services Advertising sales Reprints Supplements
Counterfactuals and access pointsM McDermott
doi: 10.1093/mind/108.430.291pmid: N/A
Common sense suggests that counterfactuals are capable of truth and falsity, and that their truth values depend on more than just the actual course of events. Projectivists, like Mackie, deny the first; reductivists, like Lewis, deny the second. I criticize Mackie's and Lewis's theories, thereby defending realism. There are parallel issues and positions concerning the other concepts of the natural necessity family. A realist theory may also have a positive part, consisting of an account of some of the conceptual relations within this family. I try to cast light on the counterfactual by postulating a relation of accessibility between possible worlds - accessibility at the 'point' at which an event occurs. Copyright 1999 « Previous | Next Article » Table of Contents This Article Mind (1999) 108 (430): 291-334. doi: 10.1093/mind/108.430.291 » Abstract Free Full Text (PDF) Free Classifications Article Services Article metrics Alert me when cited Alert me if corrected Find similar articles Similar articles in Web of Science Add to my archive Download citation Request Permissions Citing Articles Load citing article information Citing articles via CrossRef Citing articles via Scopus Citing articles via Web of Science Citing articles via Google Scholar Google Scholar Articles by McDermott, M. Search for related content Related Content Load related web page information Share Email this article CiteULike Delicious Facebook Google+ Mendeley Twitter What's this? Search this journal: Advanced » Current Issue October 2015 124 (496) Alert me to new issues The Journal About this journal Books for Review Rights & Permissions Dispatch date of the next issue We are mobile – find out more This journal is a member of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) Journals Career Network Published on behalf of The Mind Association Editors Professor A.W. Moore Professor Lucy O’Brien View full editorial board For Authors Instructions to authors Review practices Self-archiving policy Submit now L5rKpSBe53Z6qiDquxayEwfrbppfmQN3 true Looking for your next opportunity? Looking for jobs... jQuery_1_11 = jQuery.noConflict(true); Alerting Services Email table of contents Email Advance Access CiteTrack XML RSS feed Corporate Services Advertising sales Reprints Supplements
Misdisquotation and substitutivity: when not to infer belief from assentJG Moore
doi: 10.1093/mind/108.430.335pmid: N/A
In 'A Puzzle about Belief' Saul Kripke appeals to a principle of disquotation that allows us to infer a person's beliefs from the sentences to which she assents (in certain conditions). Kripke relies on this principle in constructing some famous puzzle cases, which he uses to defend the Millian view that the sole semantic function of a proper name is to refer to its bearer. The examples are meant to undermine the anti-Millian objection, grounded in traditional Frege-cases, that truth-value is not always maintained when co-referential names are intersubstituted in belief reports. I argue here that our disquotational practice is sensitive to certain shifts in conversational context, and it is only if we overlook these shifts - if we 'misdisquote' - that we can draw the conclusions Kripke wants to draw from his examples. In the wake of this conclusion, I provide a 'contextualist' treatment of Kripke's puzzle cases. I show how this treatment is motivated by certain norms of rationality, and I defend these norms against an intriguing 'anti-Cartesian' theory of mind. Throughout the paper, I develop the larger implications that my treatment of Kripke's argument has for the semantic theory of names and belief reports, and, more generally, for our picture of the relation between linguistic behaviour and our states of mind. Copyright 1999 « Previous | Next Article » Table of Contents This Article Mind (1999) 108 (430): 335-366. doi: 10.1093/mind/108.430.335 » Abstract Free Full Text (PDF) Free Classifications Article Services Article metrics Alert me when cited Alert me if corrected Find similar articles Similar articles in Web of Science Add to my archive Download citation Request Permissions Citing Articles Load citing article information Citing articles via CrossRef Citing articles via Scopus Citing articles via Web of Science Citing articles via Google Scholar Google Scholar Articles by Moore, J. Search for related content Related Content Load related web page information Share Email this article CiteULike Delicious Facebook Google+ Mendeley Twitter What's this? Search this journal: Advanced » Current Issue October 2015 124 (496) Alert me to new issues The Journal About this journal Books for Review Rights & Permissions Dispatch date of the next issue We are mobile – find out more This journal is a member of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) Journals Career Network Published on behalf of The Mind Association Editors Professor A.W. Moore Professor Lucy O’Brien View full editorial board For Authors Instructions to authors Review practices Self-archiving policy Submit now L5rKpSBe53Z6qiDquxayEwfrbppfmQN3 true Looking for your next opportunity? Looking for jobs... jQuery_1_11 = jQuery.noConflict(true); Alerting Services Email table of contents Email Advance Access CiteTrack XML RSS feed Corporate Services Advertising sales Reprints Supplements
The overdetermination argument versus the cause-and-essence principle - no contestP Noordhof
doi: 10.1093/mind/108.430.367pmid: N/A
Scott Sturgeon has claimed to undermine the principal argument for Physicalism, in his words, the view that 'actuality is exhausted by physical reality' (Sturgeon 1998, p. 410). In noting that actuality is exhausted by physical reality, the Physicalist is not claiming that all that there is in actuality are those things identified by physics. Rather the thought is that actuality is made up of all the things identified by physics and anything which is a compound of these things. So there are tables as well as their microphysical constituents. The argument that Sturgeon has in his sights is the Overdetermination Argument. In what follows, I shall argue that Sturgeon's criticism of the Overdetermination argument fails. I shall also argue that physicalism can accommodate his claim that causal statements concerning the mental and physical respectively may require diverse patterns of counterfactual activity for their truth. Copyright 1999 « Previous | Next Article » Table of Contents This Article Mind (1999) 108 (430): 367-376. doi: 10.1093/mind/108.430.367 » Abstract Free Full Text (PDF) Free Classifications Article Services Article metrics Alert me when cited Alert me if corrected Find similar articles Similar articles in Web of Science Add to my archive Download citation Request Permissions Citing Articles Load citing article information Citing articles via CrossRef Citing articles via Scopus Citing articles via Web of Science Citing articles via Google Scholar Google Scholar Articles by Noordhof, P. Search for related content Related Content Load related web page information Share Email this article CiteULike Delicious Facebook Google+ Mendeley Twitter What's this? Search this journal: Advanced » Current Issue October 2015 124 (496) Alert me to new issues The Journal About this journal Books for Review Rights & Permissions Dispatch date of the next issue We are mobile – find out more This journal is a member of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) Journals Career Network Published on behalf of The Mind Association Editors Professor A.W. Moore Professor Lucy O’Brien View full editorial board For Authors Instructions to authors Review practices Self-archiving policy Submit now L5rKpSBe53Z6qiDquxayEwfrbppfmQN3 true Looking for your next opportunity? Looking for jobs... jQuery_1_11 = jQuery.noConflict(true); Alerting Services Email table of contents Email Advance Access CiteTrack XML RSS feed Corporate Services Advertising sales Reprints Supplements