Mental causationF Jackson
doi: 10.1093/mind/105.419.377pmid: N/A
I survey recent work on mental causation. The discussion is conducted under the twin presumptions that mental states, including especially what subjects believe and desire, causally explain what subjects do, and that the physical sciences can in principle give a complete explanation for each and every bodily movement. I start with sceptical discussions of various views that hold that, in some strong sense, the causal explanations offered by psychology are autonomous with respect to those offered by the physical sciences. I then proceed to views that see the problem of mental causation as that of identifying where in the physical story about us and our world lie the parts that in effect tell us abut mental causation - the kind of position that is pretty much standard in the cognitive science community - and consider issues raised by various forms of functionalism and externalism. The general thrust of my discussion is sympathetic to the story about mental causation suggested by those type-type versions of the mind-brain identity theory that allow for the possiblity of multiple realisability. I include a brief discussion of how a map-system account of belief, by contrast with a language of thought one, should understand explanations of behaviour in terms of what a subject believes. Copyright 1996 « Previous | Next Article » Table of Contents This Article Mind (1996) 105 (419): 377-413. doi: 10.1093/mind/105.419.377 » Abstract Free Full Text (PDF) Free Classifications Article Services Article metrics Alert me when cited Alert me if corrected Find similar articles Similar articles in Web of Science Add to my archive Download citation Request Permissions Citing Articles Load citing article information Citing articles via CrossRef Citing articles via Scopus Citing articles via Web of Science Citing articles via Google Scholar Google Scholar Articles by Jackson, F. Search for related content Related Content Load related web page information Share Email this article CiteULike Delicious Facebook Google+ Mendeley Twitter What's this? Search this journal: Advanced » Current Issue October 2015 124 (496) Alert me to new issues The Journal About this journal Books for Review Rights & Permissions Dispatch date of the next issue We are mobile – find out more This journal is a member of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) Journals Career Network Published on behalf of The Mind Association Editors Professor A.W. Moore Professor Lucy O’Brien View full editorial board For Authors Instructions to authors Review practices Self-archiving policy Submit now L5rKpSBe53Z6qiDquxayEwfrbppfmQN3 true Looking for your next opportunity? Looking for jobs... jQuery_1_11 = jQuery.noConflict(true); Alerting Services Email table of contents Email Advance Access CiteTrack XML RSS feed Corporate Services Advertising sales Reprints Supplements
Making room for going beyond the callP McNamara
doi: 10.1093/mind/105.419.415pmid: N/A
In the latter half of this century, there have been two mostly separate threads within ethical theory, one on 'superogation', one on 'common-sense morality'. I bring these threads together by systematically reflecting on doing more than one has to do . A rich and coherent set of concepts at the core of common-sense morality is identified, along with various logical connections between these core concepts. Various issues in common-sense morality emerge naturally, as does a demonstrably productive definition of doing more than one has to do. I then present an interpreted model-theoretic framework with the expressive power to generate truth-conditions for the core concepts, and the explanatory power to predict and explain the independently motivated logical connections between these concepts. The framework also has a certain heuristic power for 'discovering' substantive ethical theories that can derivatively generate the model-theoretic framework for the core concepts. Two theories discussed are expansions of traditional theories; two others, each giving pride of place to justice, are devised to resonate with more recent concerns. Methodologically, it is hoped that the approach within might suggest the possibility of bridging another gap: that between formal and informal studies of moral notions. Copyright 1996 « Previous | Next Article » Table of Contents This Article Mind (1996) 105 (419): 415-450. doi: 10.1093/mind/105.419.415 » Abstract Free Full Text (PDF) Free Classifications Article Services Article metrics Alert me when cited Alert me if corrected Find similar articles Similar articles in Web of Science Add to my archive Download citation Request Permissions Citing Articles Load citing article information Citing articles via CrossRef Citing articles via Scopus Citing articles via Web of Science Citing articles via Google Scholar Google Scholar Articles by McNamara, P. Search for related content Related Content Load related web page information Share Email this article CiteULike Delicious Facebook Google+ Mendeley Twitter What's this? Search this journal: Advanced » Current Issue October 2015 124 (496) Alert me to new issues The Journal About this journal Books for Review Rights & Permissions Dispatch date of the next issue We are mobile – find out more This journal is a member of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) Journals Career Network Published on behalf of The Mind Association Editors Professor A.W. Moore Professor Lucy O’Brien View full editorial board For Authors Instructions to authors Review practices Self-archiving policy Submit now L5rKpSBe53Z6qiDquxayEwfrbppfmQN3 true Looking for your next opportunity? Looking for jobs... jQuery_1_11 = jQuery.noConflict(true); Alerting Services Email table of contents Email Advance Access CiteTrack XML RSS feed Corporate Services Advertising sales Reprints Supplements
Meaning's role in truthC Travis
doi: 10.1093/mind/105.419.451pmid: N/A
What words mean plays a role in determining when they would be true; but not an exhaustive one. For that role leaves room for variation in truth conditions, with meanings fixed, from one speaking of words to another. What role meaning plays depends on what truth is; on what words, by virtue of meaning what they do are requied to have done (as spoken) in order to have said what is true. There is a deflationist position on what truth is: the notion is exhausted by a given, specified, mass of 'platitudes', each to the effect that if words said (say) things to be thus, things must be that way. (The thought that thus-and-so is true iff thus-and-so.) These platitudes, and so deflationism, miss that aspect of truth that determines meaning's role. Truth requires words to have the uses which, given what they mean, they should have in the circumstances of their speaking. Through this link with use, when words would be true is a factor fixing what it is they said. Copyright 1996 « Previous | Next Article » Table of Contents This Article Mind (1996) 105 (419): 451-466. doi: 10.1093/mind/105.419.451 » Abstract Free Full Text (PDF) Free Classifications Article Services Article metrics Alert me when cited Alert me if corrected Find similar articles Similar articles in Web of Science Add to my archive Download citation Request Permissions Citing Articles Load citing article information Citing articles via CrossRef Citing articles via Scopus Citing articles via Web of Science Citing articles via Google Scholar Google Scholar Articles by Travis, C. Search for related content Related Content Load related web page information Share Email this article CiteULike Delicious Facebook Google+ Mendeley Twitter What's this? Search this journal: Advanced » Current Issue October 2015 124 (496) Alert me to new issues The Journal About this journal Books for Review Rights & Permissions Dispatch date of the next issue We are mobile – find out more This journal is a member of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) Journals Career Network Published on behalf of The Mind Association Editors Professor A.W. Moore Professor Lucy O’Brien View full editorial board For Authors Instructions to authors Review practices Self-archiving policy Submit now L5rKpSBe53Z6qiDquxayEwfrbppfmQN3 true Looking for your next opportunity? Looking for jobs... jQuery_1_11 = jQuery.noConflict(true); Alerting Services Email table of contents Email Advance Access CiteTrack XML RSS feed Corporate Services Advertising sales Reprints Supplements
Discussion. Backward causation and the direction of causal processes: reply to DoweH Price
doi: 10.1093/mind/105.419.467pmid: N/A
Dowe (1996) argues that the success of the backward causation hypothesis in quantum mechanics would provide strong support for a version of Reichenbach's account of the direction of causal processes, which takes the direction of causation to rest on the fork asymmetry. He also criticises my perspectival account of the direction of causation, which takes causal asymmetry to be a projection of our own temporal asymmetry as agents. In this reply I take issue with Dowe's argument at three main points: his claim that the backward causation hypothesis in QM is incompatible with my perspectival approach to the direction of causation; his defence of the fork asymmetry approach against a general criticism of mine based on the time-symmetry of microphysics; and his application of his preferred account of the direction of causal processes to the relevant cases in QM. Copyright 1996 « Previous | Next Article » Table of Contents This Article Mind (1996) 105 (419): 467-474. doi: 10.1093/mind/105.419.467 » Abstract Free Full Text (PDF) Free Classifications Article Services Article metrics Alert me when cited Alert me if corrected Find similar articles Similar articles in Web of Science Add to my archive Download citation Request Permissions Citing Articles Load citing article information Citing articles via CrossRef Citing articles via Scopus Citing articles via Web of Science Citing articles via Google Scholar Google Scholar Articles by Price, H. Search for related content Related Content Load related web page information Share Email this article CiteULike Delicious Facebook Google+ Mendeley Twitter What's this? Search this journal: Advanced » Current Issue October 2015 124 (496) Alert me to new issues The Journal About this journal Books for Review Rights & Permissions Dispatch date of the next issue We are mobile – find out more This journal is a member of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) Journals Career Network Published on behalf of The Mind Association Editors Professor A.W. Moore Professor Lucy O’Brien View full editorial board For Authors Instructions to authors Review practices Self-archiving policy Submit now L5rKpSBe53Z6qiDquxayEwfrbppfmQN3 true Looking for your next opportunity? Looking for jobs... jQuery_1_11 = jQuery.noConflict(true); Alerting Services Email table of contents Email Advance Access CiteTrack XML RSS feed Corporate Services Advertising sales Reprints Supplements
The tortoise and the prisoners' dilemmaP Shaw
doi: 10.1093/mind/105.419.475pmid: N/A
Simon Blackburn has claimed that on a theory of revealed preference it is tautological that any eligible player - one whose preferences are consistent - plays hawk, chooses a strategy of non-cooperation with the other prisoner. This claim is examined and rejected. A prisoner in the appropriate sense is defined not by preferences over actions (playing hawk or playing dove) but by preferences over the four possible outcomes which result from the players' actions jointly (both playing hawk, both playing dove, the first playing hawk and the second dove, and vice versa). It is not inconsistent to suppose that a prisoner has the appropriate preferences over outcomes but nevertheless chooses to play dove. This can happen either if the prisoner believes for some reason that the full range of outcomes is not available, or if the prisoner is simply a bad strategic thinker. It is perhaps tautological that a player with the appropriate preferences over outcome and with suitable beliefs will if rational choose to play hawk. However, rationality would then involve an appeal to a further principle, the sure-thing principle: if a prisoner would choose hawk knowing that the other will choose hawk, and would also choose hawk knowing that the other will choose dove, then hawk should be chosen when it is uncertain what the other will choose. Copyright 1996 « Previous | Next Article » Table of Contents This Article Mind (1996) 105 (419): 475-483. doi: 10.1093/mind/105.419.475 » Abstract Free Full Text (PDF) Free Classifications Article Services Article metrics Alert me when cited Alert me if corrected Find similar articles Similar articles in Web of Science Add to my archive Download citation Request Permissions Citing Articles Load citing article information Citing articles via CrossRef Citing articles via Scopus Citing articles via Web of Science Citing articles via Google Scholar Google Scholar Articles by Shaw, P. Search for related content Related Content Load related web page information Share Email this article CiteULike Delicious Facebook Google+ Mendeley Twitter What's this? Search this journal: Advanced » Current Issue October 2015 124 (496) Alert me to new issues The Journal About this journal Books for Review Rights & Permissions Dispatch date of the next issue We are mobile – find out more This journal is a member of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) Journals Career Network Published on behalf of The Mind Association Editors Professor A.W. Moore Professor Lucy O’Brien View full editorial board For Authors Instructions to authors Review practices Self-archiving policy Submit now L5rKpSBe53Z6qiDquxayEwfrbppfmQN3 true Looking for your next opportunity? Looking for jobs... jQuery_1_11 = jQuery.noConflict(true); Alerting Services Email table of contents Email Advance Access CiteTrack XML RSS feed Corporate Services Advertising sales Reprints Supplements