The Journal of Finance

doi: 10.1111/jofi.13491pmid: N/A

PIAZZESI, MONIKA

doi: 10.1111/jofi.70000pmid: N/A

This paper documents new stylized facts about returns and cashflow growth rates on stocks and housing over decade‐long holding periods. While cashflow growth rates on the two assets comove positively, their returns comove negatively until the Global Financial Crisis and positively thereafter. These facts present a puzzle for representative‐agent models that imply positive return comovement for assets with similar cashflows. I consider a heterogeneous‐agent model with segmented stock and housing markets connected through credit. News about the aggregate economy generates negative return comovement. Recent shifts such as wealthier homebuyers and institutional housing purchases reduce the importance of credit and segmentation.

GREENWALD, DANIEL L.; KRAINER, JOHN; PAUL, PASCAL

doi: 10.1111/jofi.13486pmid: N/A

Aggregate U.S. bank lending to firms expanded following the outbreak of COVID‐19. Using loan‐level supervisory data, we show that this expansion was driven by draws on credit lines by large firms. Banks that experienced larger credit line drawdowns restricted term lending more, crowding out credit to smaller firms, which reacted by reducing investment. A structural model calibrated to match our empirical results shows that while credit lines increase total bank credit in bad times, they redistribute credit from firms with high propensities to invest to firms with low propensities to invest, exacerbating the decrease in aggregate investment.

STEIN, JEREMY C.; WALLEN, JONATHAN

doi: 10.1111/jofi.13500pmid: N/A

We study supply‐and‐demand effects in the U.S. Treasury bill market by comparing the returns on T‐bills to the policy rate on the Federal Reserve's reverse repurchase (RRP) facility. We develop and test a simple model where the RRP‐bill spread is policed both by heterogeneously elastic money funds and by corporate treasurers who derive collateral benefits from holding T‐bills. In response to shifts in T‐bill supply, money funds act as front‐line arbitrageurs. However, when T‐bills become extremely scarce, less elastic corporate treasurers become the marginal investors and supply shifts have a larger effect on T‐bill rates.

FALATO, ANTONIO; SCHARFSTEIN, DAVID

doi: 10.1111/jofi.13502pmid: N/A

Using confidential supervisory risk ratings, we document that banks increase risk after going public compared to a control group of banks that filed to go public but withdrew their filings for plausibly exogenous reasons. The increase in risk improves short‐term performance at the expense of long‐term performance. We argue that the increase in risk stems from pressure to maximize short‐term stock prices and earnings once the bank is publicly traded. After going public, banks owned by investors that place greater value on short‐term performance increase risk more, and those managed by CEOs with more short‐term compensation also increase risk more.

JONG, ABE DE; KOOIJMANS, TIM; KOUDIJS, PETER

doi: 10.1111/jofi.13503pmid: N/A

Can banks’ reputational concerns improve the quality of opaque, off‐balance sheet securities, such as mortgage‐backed securities? We study this question in a uniquely parsimonious setting. In the 1760s, Dutch banking partnerships securitized West‐Indian plantation mortgages that were risky and opaque. High‐reputation banks originated better mortgages and issued securities that, on average, retained 17.5% more of their value during a market collapse. Reputational effects are attenuated when the managing partners were married into wealth or received a large share of profits in the short term, suggesting that bank reputation only works if bankers are personally exposed to (long‐run) reputational losses.

KOTIDIS, ANTONIS; SCHREFT, STACEY L.

doi: 10.1111/jofi.13475pmid: N/A

This article quantifies the effects of a multiday cyberattack that forced offline a technology service provider (TSP) to the banking sector. The attack impaired customers’ ability to send payments through the TSP, but the business continuity plans of banks and the TSP reduced the effect by more than half. Large banks performed better. Through contagion, banks not directly exposed to the attack experienced a liquidity shortfall, causing them to borrow funds or tap reserves. The ability to send payments after hours helped avoid further contagion. These results highlight the importance of preparedness by the private and official sector for cyberattacks.

FACCIO, MARA; MCCONNELL, JOHN J.

doi: 10.1111/jofi.13481pmid: N/A

We use newly assembled data overall encompassing up to 75 countries and starting circa 1910, to study impediments to the Schumpeterian process of creative destruction as it “proceeds by competitively destroying old businesses.” Political connections appear to represent an obstacle to the destructive part of the Schumpeterian process in the replacement of large firms. When accompanied by regulations that restrict entry, political connections can play a role in allowing large firms to remain large. When connected to Fogel, Morck, and Yeung (2008, Journal of Financial Economics 89, 83–108), the results imply that political connections, combined with barriers to entry, can retard economic development.

BORGSCHULTE, MARK; GUENZEL, MARIUS; LIU, CANYAO; MALMENDIER, ULRIKE

doi: 10.1111/jofi.13497pmid: N/A

We assess the long‐term effects of managerial stress on aging and mortality. Using a difference‐in‐differences design, we apply neural network–based machine‐learning techniques to CEOs' facial images and show that exposure to industry distress shocks during the Great Recession produces visible signs of aging. We estimate a one‐year increase in “apparent” age. Moreover, using data on CEOs since the mid‐1970s, we estimate a 1.1‐year decrease in life expectancy after an industry distress shock, but a two‐year increase when antitakeover laws insulate CEOs from market discipline. The estimated health costs are significant, both in absolute terms and relative to other health risks.

BUFFA, ANDREA M.; LIU, QING; WHITE, LUCY

doi: 10.1111/jofi.13496pmid: N/A

Real‐world contracts are typically private, observed only by their direct signatories, so agents working together are vulnerable to the principal opportunistically reducing other agents' incentives. The principal can mitigate this commitment problem by giving the most skilled agent a budget and delegating authority to write other agents' contracts. This endogenous hierarchy, never optimal with public contracts, raises effort, output, and compensation but allows rent extraction. The principal prefers it when contracts are opaque enough, skill is sufficiently heterogeneous across agents, and joint output is sensitive enough to effort. Our model provides novel predictions for the structure of banking syndicates.