Journal of Communication

Badger, L., N.

doi: 10.1111/jcom.12179pmid: N/A

My experience with communication activism in higher education guides me to read this edited volume with great excitement and a fair dose of skepticism. I have served in an unpaid position as a Service Learning liaison for a local nonprofit, an experience that has left me doubting that activist-oriented communication education is possible within the context of Service Learning. The majority of instructors I have worked with have expected the organization to provide time-intensive outreach, orientation, and evaluation for students who put in a small number of “service” hours over the course of a semester. Student volunteer hours were consistently attached to assignments that were disaligned with their service or beyond the students' trained capacity, burdening both our part-time office staff and formerly incarcerated clients. Students were not given sufficient time or course-based direction to successfully address their continued participation in systems of oppression or their personal biases, but were asked by their instructors, sometimes against the explicit desire of the community partners, to become spokespersons for an undersupported cause or already disenfranchised community that they failed to identify with or understand. Conversations with representatives of other agencies that had hosted similar communication-oriented projects (rather than meeting a basic agency need, like sorting inventory) revealed that my experience was unfortunately common: Service learning advocacy projects were regularly manifesting as a burden on community organizations and local movements, while resulting, ultimately, in unintentionally premature and sloppy communication interventions. I begin with my personal experience because it reveals the way traditional Service Learning can ultimately hurt rather than extending the local social justice platform, and it also leads me to mark the important intervention that this book makes. Teaching Communication Activism builds a welcome response to the failures of Service Learning advocacy. It places responsibility on educators to build liberatory communication pedagogy that supports social justice activism and student empowerment. The editors draw heavily on critical pedagogy, but locate their intervention within communication, claiming that “Activism, fundamentally, is an accomplishment of (constituted in), and is accomplished through, communication. Moreover, from a communication perspective, social justice results from reinfranchising people who have been shut out of relevant discourses that have significant material consequences” (p. 24). The collection establishes frameworks for professors who are entertaining advocacy-centered service learning experiences or projects in their courses and are seeking resources and structure to facilitate transformative learning for students who often lack the tools, experiences, ethics, and direction to be able to make connections between their class and service experiences or provide supportive social justice interventions. For individuals already deeply invested in critical pedagogy and communication activism, the collection provides a cohort of like-minded teacher-activists who seek and volunteer imaginative possibilities for robust social-justice-oriented communication education. The book is unabashedly clear in its politics: It aims to revitalize education's civic mission and build relevant connections between the academy, local communities, and justice politics. Peter MacLaren argues that “Education now is more the problem than it is the solution, with many teachers operating within that educational system being depoliticized and demobilized intellectual laborers for the status quo who sustain the problem” (p. 6). The book's forward, introduction, and first chapter set the terms of communication activism pedagogy (CAP) and critique the market-focused education that is privileged across disciplines, including the field of communication. The authors refuse the assumption that the dominant educational structure is apolitical, and examine the unjust politics and practices that corporate education supports. Critical pedagogy and CAP are established as hopeful solutions in building educational models that counter capitalist politics and address social injustice. The book is in clear dialogue with the former Communication Activism volumes (reviewed by Pezzullo in issue 59 [2009] of this journal), and, as with the other books in the series, provides bibliographies that are expanded extensively online and a strong and concise literature review in the intro. The first four chapters provide a structure for CAP, exploring the history and rationale, theoretical frameworks, critical concepts and challenges, considerations for ethical practice, and an examination of the way CAP fits within and comes to modify community engagement through increasingly popular, and as I have noted, sometimes problematic, Service Learning initiatives. The editors reveal that “CAP is defined more by its goals than by its teaching tactics” (p. 26). The last 11 chapters, divided into three sections, confirm this point. They provide a wide array of reflexive contextualized examples of CAP practices, providing inspiration, but absent of rigid or formulaic prescription. Authors draw from diverse communication traditions and innovations ranging from theater and performance, health communication, rhetoric, organizational communication, media studies, applied communication, political communication, environmental communication, gender communication, speech communication, legal communication, and interpersonal communication. The reader represents intervention in a diversity of social justice issues, amplifying marginalized voices from stigmatized and disenfranchised populations. Some of the best interventions by CAP teacher-activist-scholars model personal investments not only in a generalized social justice but also in a specific context and course topic. These topics include representation of Holocaust survivors and members of habitually oppressed indigenous communities, gender violence and the policing of identities, incarceration, health care deficiencies and international global responsibility, community activism within migrant Latina/o communities, logging on public lands, bullying in schools, and mobilizing at the intersections of environmental energy and economic injustice. Chapters 5–8 provide examples of entire courses devoted to CAP, including specific pedagogical practices and syllabi examples. Highlights include a consideration of how students have been mobilized to reimagine communication activism as a critical part of their education and citizenship, teacher-decentered discussions, and navigating participation in advocacy communities. Chapters 9–11 return to the question of how to strengthen and challenge existing Service Learning paradigms, centering pedagogical practices that do not exacerbate community vulnerabilities and oppressions. Authors consider ways to create invested impact within habitually disenfranchised communities. Acknowledging that the semester's timeline provides a major constraint for the work of social justice, more than one example employs Service Learning methodology beyond the semester, sometimes for multiyear projects. Authors who build CAP for Service Learning insist on extending collaborations, deepening investment and possible impact, and building capacity in students not only as learners but also as engaged, well-equipped facilitators in our communities. Chapters 12–15 extend CAP beyond traditional and Service Learning classrooms, imagining more expansive educational frames for social justice encounters. Chapters 12 and 13 are strengthened because they are cowritten by educators and their advocacy community partners, modeling a collaborative networked approach, not only between communication education scholars but also in partnership with individuals and representatives of institutions and collectives that address injustice. The editors argue that collective community-based change means “arming activists with effective rhetorical practices and creating a community-driven sense of empowerment that their ideas could make a difference” (p. 22). This education within community sets the groundwork for the possibility of increasing collaborative scholarship that includes those most affected by social injustice, not only as subjects but also as coparticipants in the research and writing—a feature of CAP that is emphasized in the pedagogy, and which will hopefully be modeled further in our research practices. Acknowledgments L.N.B. facilitates Applied Rhetorical Democracy, Speech, and Advocacy classes and ongoing community think tanks for university students and incarcerated students in the Monroe County Jail. She is the recipient of the 2015 Central States Communication Association Cooper Award for Outstanding Teaching and the Indiana University Communication and Culture Award for Applied Communication. © 2015 International Communication Association

Gandy, Oscar, H.

doi: 10.1111/jcom.12170pmid: N/A

John Pollock has established a well-earned reputation as a productive scholar who believes that undergraduates can contribute to knowledge at the same time they are learning about the role that the media of communication play in shaping and reflecting the communities in which they will live. Professor Pollock routinely gives credit to an army of students at The College of New Jersey who have collaborated with him over the years in carving out a special niche in the literature on the relations between community structure and news media content. He does so again in his somewhat unusual introduction to this edited volume. It is unusual because it includes yet another example of Pollock's research; a test of 11 hypotheses about media coverage of the Occupy Wall Street movement, before and after the group's eviction from Zuccotti Park in New York City. Although Media and Social Inequality was originally published as a special issue of Mass Communication and Society, Pollock's expanded introduction and an analysis of newspaper coverage of the universal health insurance mandate written by Pollock and two of his former students are original contributions to this volume. The other six chapters cover a range of topics from an examination of community, or structural pluralism as a contribution to media and social theory, to a set of recommendations about how agenda-setting and community-structure approaches might be merged. Seunghan Nah and Cory Armstrong make an especially important contribution to this volume through their careful and comprehensive review of the variety of ways that structural pluralism has been utilized as a vantage point through which to understand how society affects the media, rather than the other way around. Although due credit is given to the contributions made by Phillip Tichenor, George Donohue, and Clarice Olien to the study of news media performance, Nah and Armstrong are careful to locate this research within an existing stream of power structure analysis associated with Robert Dahl. In presenting the various concepts and dimensions that have been brought together under the pluralism umbrella, Nah and Armstrong clearly identify what some see as an underlying weakness of the construct. The great variety of indicators and operational definitions of pluralism that have been used from time to time lead some to doubt that we actually have a clear understanding of how the exercise of power or the production of influence over decision making with the media actually works. Masamiro Yamamoto's contribution to this volume actually takes a stance in opposition to the dominant trend within the community structure research tradition. Rather than seeking to understand how community structure influences media coverage of social problems, Yamamoto seeks to understand “the role of local mass media in social mechanisms that explain community-level variations in crime and delinquency” (p. 54). Although an examination of the nature and location of axes of power within a community that might work to emphasize or ignore particular problems in their midst would be consistent with this tradition, Yamamoto's attention is focused on community media as agents of social control that work through their influence on the formation and maintenance of social ties and cultural capital. The characteristics of communities that structuralists might use to explain why the media responds differently to these problems are used by Yamamoto (following Robert Putnam) to explain the failure of media to have much in the way of a positive impact on the lives of the truly disadvantaged. In the chapter that follows, Yamamoto and Douglas Hindman focus more explicitly on variations in social capital and interpersonal trust as examples of media effects. Although Hindman and Yamamoto acknowledge that the “structural pluralism model was developed to help understand variation in local newspaper content and editor attitudes” (p. 76), this is not what concerns them. Instead they offer a hypothesis about “the impact of newspaper use on social trust,” which they assume will be greater in communities with “higher levels of structural pluralism” (p. 77). Although community pluralism was, as they expected, negatively associated with levels of trust within the community, they ignore the more powerful influences, such as race, gender, and political interest, that emerged in their regression analysis (p. 84). More critically, at least for the purpose of advancing community structure research as it relates to media, we actually need to know something about the content readers see in the newspapers of differentially structured communities. Brenda Watson and Daniel Riffe come much closer to this goal in their examination of the relationship between structural pluralism and local public affairs blogging. This is a timely engagement with “place blogging” as an emerging alternative to traditional news media. In one sense, this is a study of the structure of competition between media across communities. Implicitly, at least, they are asking about the impact of structural conditions within a media market that that invites entry into that market by socially oriented volunteers. Watson and Riffe add consideration of community stress, or a need for information, to more traditional expectations regarding the influence of community pluralism. If we grant that bloggers are influenced by whatever rewards they derive from “ratings” or measures of hits, “likes,” and links from other blogs, or even mainstream media, then it is easy to characterize their entry into this marketplace, or arena, as being in response to some structural influence. Watson and Riffe used data from a large number of midsized American cities in order to examine the relation between structure, stress, and the presence of bloggers. They find some support for their hypothesis that community pluralism would be associated with more public affairs place blogs. They found greater support for the second hypothesis, which predicted that greater stress would be associated with more blogging. Rather than overclaiming, Watson and Riffe are careful to point out the limitations in their models as reflected in low levels of explained variance, or correct classification. There is little doubt, however, that this expansion of the community pluralism framework to the structure of information environments is an important contribution for structurally oriented researchers to explore in the future. This somewhat gratifying chapter is followed by an effort by Kristen Kiernicki, John Pollock, and Patrick Lavery to apply Pollock's community structure approach to newspaper coverage of the healthcare policy debate. As is his tendency, Pollock and his coauthors developed 17 hypotheses regarding how structural features of communities relate to direction and prominence operationalized as an “impact vector” (p. 128). Specific structural variables are organized under four theoretically based umbrellas that have been used successfully by Pollock in the past. The “buffer” or “privilege” label is applied to communities that have been “buffered” from economic uncertainty (p. 121). Alternatively, the “vulnerability” hypotheses focus on the behavior of media within communities that we would recognize as disadvantaged or vulnerable. The “stakeholder” hypotheses relate expectations about which identifiable communities of interest have a position of influence, such as we might associate with a racial or ethnic group. Stakeholders might also be identified in terms of their political partisanship, or their stage within the lifecycle. Each hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between a structural feature and “favorable coverage of universal healthcare.” The value of these theoretical clusters becomes open to question when only a few hypotheses find support within the data. This kind of difficulty is especially likely when there are no clear indications about which communities, interests, or stakeholders are more likely to suffer or benefit from a public policy that is being formed within a highly contentious and ideologically fractious environment. It is also difficult when the general tendency across cities was for the newspapers to avoid featuring unfavorable coverage. In the absence of much variance to explain, it is not surprising that only 2 of 17 correlation coefficients were statistically significant (p. 138). Leo Jeffres and five of his colleagues provide yet another analysis that further marginalizes the role that variously distributed power and influence plays within communities through, dare I say following Anthony Giddens, its “structuration” of media behavior. The Jeffres team sets out to “merge” three different models that have risen from time to time to explain social relations within variously structured communities. In their review, they call attention to an important distinction between the kinds of communities examined by Tichenor and his colleagues in Minnesota, and the kinds of communities being explored by the so-called “urban communications scholars” (p. 146) who focus their attention on the metropolitan areas where the majority of Americans live. Perhaps as an example of searching where the light is better, Jeffres and his colleagues use an expanded array of information about the “environment in which people live” (p. 146) to evaluate this potential merger. Unfortunately, although the respondents in their relatively small national sample (n = 477) were asked about their media use, no attempt was made to characterize the performance of media with regard to coverage of any critical issues. It is not surprising to learn that media use and interpersonal communication is associated with civic engagement. What we do not learn is anything in particular about how variations in media performance might play a role, or about how variations in community structure might affect that performance. The final chapter by Maxwell McCombs and Marcus Funk brings these concerns back to the table. Their expansion of the dominant community structure paradigm actually delivers on the promise of a merger that would advance a common goal. As you might assume, the merger being proposed is between community structure and agenda setting frameworks. The theoretical and analytical challenge is to expand our understanding of how “the external influence of intermedia agenda setting and the internal influence of community structure interact to shape the news agendas of local daily newspapers” (p. 174). It is easy to grant that both community characteristics and “national journalism culture” are likely to influence local news coverage. The challenge is to understand how this happens. What McCombs and Funk offer is not bad as far as it goes. Issue salience at the local level is expected to influence the extent of coverage (p. 177). This is an assumption along the lines of a familiar, if ancient refrain: The media just provide what their audiences want. While McCombs and Funk engage creatively with the problems associated with variations across time in both community structure and national news agendas, there is no attempt to deal with the problems involved in determining what it is that these audiences actually prefer. We cannot simply assume that whatever local papers provide is what the audience wants. To do so is to discard any critically important notions about how power and influence is distributed and applied within different communities over time. I hesitate to characterize Pollock's efforts with Media and Social Inequality as a glass that is only a little more than half full. Although I have not asked, I suspect he is a bit disappointed that the level and flow in the stream of community structure research is nowhere as high or as fast as he would like, or as the tradition deserves. It is understandable that the increasingly popular focus within media studies on civic engagement would include considerations of community structure. It is also understandable that community structures might be discussed in terms of social inequality or disadvantage. But none of that justifies the marginalization of structural influences on the performance of media, best understood in terms of the content they provide and the issues they tend to avoid. Read selectively, this volume can be used to help undergraduates, not just those with the good fortune to be in one of John Pollock's classes, but the broad mass of young people getting ready enter into an uncertain future who desperately need to understand how it is that so many things have turned out in the way they have. © 2015 International Communication Association

Schulte, Stephanie, Ricker

doi: 10.1111/jcom.12181pmid: N/A

In his book Feeling Mediated, Brenton Malin connects the ways we understand emotion with the ways we understand technology. He shows how cultural views of emotion—assumptions about what emotion is, from where it stems, its larger purpose, where and how it should be performed—are contexts for using and integrating new technologies as well as criteria for assessing and studying their power. Malin also flips this argument, showing how new technologies have helped shape visions of emotion in a reflexive historical relationship. Playing the role of neutral-observer-time-traveler-tour-guide, Malin brings readers along on his romp through the first three decades of the twentieth century, the period marking the origins of electronic mass media such as motion pictures, phonographs, telegraph, and radio. Malin guides readers past the presentism conjured by their contemporary historical moment and transports them back into history, encouraging them to take a new look at old communication technology innovations. For a work of print, the book feels remarkably immersive. Although the meat of the work focuses on a rather narrow but important period of history, in his analysis Malin casts his historical net wide, back to Socrates, to reveal how communication technologies were understood in affective terms as mechanisms to: disembody and amplify emotion, detach and destroy emotional intimacy, speed up the world, reconfigure norms that dictate (in)appropriate public or private expression, perform emotions publicly, seamlessly or intimately connect in private, as well as to trick the mind or allow it access to deeper truths. He details how presumptions about effects of technologies on emotions emboldened critics and supporters alike, polarizing debates about the innovations along historically specific lines. Uniquely, Malin does not do this to indict one side or another or to vindicate who ultimately won, but to understand why the range of responses and common sense visions emerged in those historical moments in the first place, to outline what he calls the “various rhetorics of emotion and technology” (p. 10). His search for these rhetorics—his treasure hunt for mentions of emotion—was obviously challenging, leading Malin into unconventional archives and creative applications of established archives. This is, I think, one of the biggest interventions of this work: to drop anchors into the historical conversations that occurred in, through, and about communication technologies and emotion, to discuss what those conversations meant for technological development, American culture, law, and politics. In mapping the often-unpredictable roles emotion played in our technological history, Malin demystifies both emotion and technology, shows how technologies are deeply embedded in preexisting cultural values about emotion at the same time as they work to transform those values. For example, cultural visions of emotion as a “broad social and public good” shaped the telegraph's reception—the ways it was understood when it first appeared—as well as its uses—the types of messages sent, the ways those messages were received, etc. These visions led to legal decisions—such as holding telegraph companies legally responsible for the emotional trauma felt by people receiving bad news—ultimately shaping American legal precedents that would apply to future communication technologies. In each chapter, Malin beautifully describes this complex push and pull between culture, embodied and preformed affect, policy, infrastructures, and markets. He resists the impulse to diagnose simple causation in favor of complex contextualization. His work is sophisticated, nuanced, and deeply historical. Building on established concepts, such as Leo Marx's rhetoric of the technological sublime and Thorstein Veblen's conspicuous consumption, Malin develops his own concepts, such as “media physicalism” (p. 20, Marx, 1964; Veblen, 1899). This term describes the ways that thinkers in the early twentieth century began to “locate emotion in media technologies themselves as well as in a decidedly technologized version of the human body” (p. 21). This dominant vision of technology became well integrated into research about its effects, as what were imaged as threats to human emotions became wielded as tools to study them. However, those tools were already laden with cultural values and, ultimately, were used to reinforce problematic race, class, and gender-based assumptions about technology users. Media physicalism persists today. In this way, Malin illustrates the larger, contemporary stakes of his research. Views of emotion have worked historically and continue to both reinforce and mask inequities by shaping the media industries that produce technologies and by guiding scientific (and pseudoscientific) research upon which policies are often based. If this book has a weakness, it is that Malin revels in history, lingering too long in details that do not always drive his arguments or narratives forward. This revelry occurs, perhaps, at the expense of engaging affect theory in a more rigorous way. However, given that he is bridging a long and perilous crevice in the literature with an unconventional archive, this is excused. And more often than not, his examples were so interesting and so well written that I was happy to revel with him. Indeed one of the great joys in reading Feeling Mediated is its clear, breezy writing that is unencumbered by jargon. It is a page-turner, a rarity in academic books, especially those that take up emotion as a focus. In approachable tone, well-researched content, and cultural complexity, Malin's work reminds me of several writers: James Carey, Jeffrey Sconce, and Fred Turner (see Carey, 1992; Sconce, 2000; Turner, 2006, 2013). Scholars in media and communication and technology history, cultural and American Studies are likely to find this book most interesting. Scholars in affect studies will also find it interesting, but should know the book prioritizes uncovering lost (or assumed) historical and cultural material to enrich histories of technology rather than prioritizing engagement with the affect theory currently en vogue in other disciplines. References Carey , J. ( 1992 ). Communication as culture . New York : Routledge . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Marx , L. ( 1964 ). The machine in the garden: Technology and the pastoral ideal in America . New York : Oxford University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Sconce , J. ( 2000 ). Haunted media: Electronic presence from telegraphy to television . Durham, NC : Duke University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Turner , F. ( 2006 ). From counterculture to cyberculture: Stewart Brand, the Whole Earth Network, and the rise of digital utopianism . Chicago, IL : University of Chicago Press . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Turner , F. ( 2013 ). The democratic surround: Multimedia and American liberalism from World War II to the psychedelic sixties . Chicago, IL : University of Chicago Press . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Veblen , T. ( 1899 ). The theory of the leisure class: An economic study in the evolution of institutions . New York : Macmillan . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC © 2015 International Communication Association

Snow,, Nancy

doi: 10.1111/jcom.12177pmid: N/A

This book overthrows the commonly held thesis that domestic elites are the primary influence drivers behind mass public opinion during international conflict. The exercise in self-restraint to show a united front in international relations has been the conventional wisdom for nearly 70 years in U.S. foreign policy relations. Michigan Republican Arthur Vandenberg, chair of the Foreign Relations Committee in postwar 1947, called on his Senate colleagues to lend their support for the Truman Doctrine efforts to challenge Soviet imperialism overseas and said, “we must stop partisan politics at the water's edge.” That conventional wisdom was in dramatic form in Washington from just after Labor Day 2002 through 19 March 2003 when Democratic Party opposition to the Bush-Cheney military response to Iraq was all but on silent mode. Bush White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card explained the post-Labor Day timing of the strategic communications campaign, known as the White House Iraq Group (aka White House Information Group or WHIG), this way: “From a marketing point of view, you don't introduce new products in August” (Bumiller, 2002). “A centerpiece of the strategy, White House officials said, is to use Mr. Bush's speech on 11 Sept. to help move Americans toward support of action against Iraq, which could come early next year.” Couching the Iraq military invasion in the rally-round-the-flag syndrome of post-September 11, the bipartisan support for a military option against Iraq caught on in short order and with little notable dissent. On 11 October 2002, a three-quarter majority of the Senate, including many Democrats (77-23), notably 2008 presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton, authorized the use of military force against Iraq. This united front created an information vacuum that was filled by foreign elite voices opposed to the Bush administration in substance or procedure; even kingpins in the Senate were given a stage that did not reverberate. The book devotes an entire chapter, “Byrd Gets No Word,” to Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) and his eloquent, but futile, quest to amplify Democratic Party dissent: “Listen. You can hear a pin drop” (p. 51). An interesting footnote is that Hayes and Guardino show that the Department of Defense attempt to use military analysts to make the case for war in Iraq “did not appear to pay significant dividends for the Bush Administration, at least on network television before the war” (p. 40). Many of the foreign voices that impacted domestic opinion are long gone from the headlines today. They include Swedish U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix and Ghanian Kofi Annan of the United Nations, both of whom were not speaking like antiwar activists in the streets, but were using rhetoric that favored nonviolent diplomatic resolutions (substance) or letting the investigation of weapons of mass destruction proceed until its proper conclusion (procedure). Blix spoke at the University of California-Berkeley to a sold-out crowd amid mournful ticket seekers with signs that read “Blix Tix?” Journalism Dean Orville Schell said, “Who would have thought a year ago that 2,000 people would come to hear a weapons inspector speak?” (Powell, 2004). By then public opinion was beginning to turn against the Bush administration, but not enough to favor his Democratic challenger John Kerry in the 2004 presidential election. As the old Texas saying goes, “Dance with the one what brung ya,” and the events of 11 September 2001 were still very much in the forefront of most Americans' minds. Hayes and Guardino are quite persuasive in arguing that foreign voices in the domestic mass media, particularly the traditional elite broadcasters, play a far more important actor role in shaping foreign policy than we have heretofore acknowledged. It's not to say that we don't have plenty of studies on the media's coverage of politics but usually such studies are of how journalists cover conflicts after the policy has been rolled out, not before (Mowlana, Gerbner, & Schiller, 1992). This book uses a more comprehensive methodology than we normally see in mass media studies. Statistical models such as regression analysis reveal conclusions at the individual and survey level. They illustrate opposition voices in aggregate and the percentage of their inclusion in domestic mass media reports in that important last stage before the overseas international conflict goes live. Foreign elite voices become the opposition actors when domestic opposition has left the stage. This study of the influences on media and public opinion in foreign affairs is a short but meaty read in that it compels political communication scholars to value more the roles played by journalists who seek a pro/con balance in their news reportage. If there is no credible partisan opposition, then journalists will have to seek out alternative voices, in this case, elites from overseas. Influence From Abroad is a solid contribution to our understanding of dissent in public opinion and mass media, but raises more questions about why left-leaning domestic nonpartisans who raise the same criticisms as these foreign leaders are not included in domestic news coverage. The book concludes that U.S.-based antiwar activists, “activists” like myself, and independent media outlets like Amy Goodman's Democracy Now did not have measurable impact on domestic public opinion because the Big Three traditional broadcast media outlets ignored them and focused on dissenting foreign elite voices. (Figure 2.4 shows negligible impact of antiwar groups in the Distribution and Direction of Source Quotes in Prewar Network News Stories.) Heretofore, research focuses almost exclusively on persuasion and social influence of domestic political elites and now foreign elites. The book fits well into the public diplomacy and nation branding genre: “Our findings suggest that political observers and scholars no longer assume that foreign voices are irrelevant to U.S. public opinion, especially in an increasingly interconnected world marked by the global flow of people, information, and commerce” (p. 6), leaving us some cautionary notes that need more scholarly attention. This book is about elite media coverage of elite foreign voices. We will have to wait for other works that can investigate the full spectrum of dissenting opinion from elite and nonelite sources. Otherwise, nonelite media and voices may as well be spitting in the wind in terms of any measurable elite influence. Second, the explosion of social media and smart phone technology happened after the period under examination in this book. We have to begin to empirically measure our assumptions that social media and the blogosphere have a chaotic and often polarizing impact on political attitudes, the result in part of new voices from home and abroad. Political polarization in the United States has led some scholars like Robert J. Lieber to conclude that “politics can be delayed at the water's edge, but it certainly doesn't stop for long.” Here's a wish for Hayes and Guardino to expand their methodological research on politics and media to accommodate digital and diplomatic democracy in the post-Bush era. References Bumiller , E. ( 2002 , September 7). Traces of terror: The strategy; Bush aides set strategy to sell policy on Iraq. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/07/us/traces-of-terror-the-strategy-bush-aides-set-strategy-to-sell-policy-on-iraq.html. Mowlana , H. , Gerbner , G., & Schiller , H. ( 1992 ). Triumph of the image: The media's war in the Persian Gulf: A global perspective . Boulder, CO : Westview Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Powell , B . ( 2004 , 18 March). U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix faults Bush administration for lack of “critical thinking” in Iraq. UCBerkeleyNews. Retrieved from http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2004/03/18_blix.shtml. © 2015 International Communication Association

Cabañes, Jason, Vincent

doi: 10.1111/jcom.12178pmid: N/A

In Media and the City: Cosmopolitanism and Difference, Myria Georgiou attends to the distinct condition characterizing today's global city: the increasing entwinement of its intense mediation and urbanization. She pays attention to how the media depend on the city for its overconcentration of infrastructure, talent, imaginaries, and consumers. She also looks into how the city depends on the media, for promoting its brand and for managing as well as encouraging its many layers of diversities. Through this, Georgiou makes the significant double move of contributing to and dialoguing with the literature on global cities (e.g., Sassen, 2000; Short, 2004; Taylor, 2004) and on urban communication (e.g., Gumpert, 2008; Matsaganis, Gallagher, & Drucker, 2013; McQuire, 2008). The book is particularly concerned with understanding how the global city allows for diverse kinds of cosmopolitanism to emerge, be sustained, and be challenged. This is because of how this city, so highly mediated and urbanized, serves as a powerful lens from which to vividly see the “urban trajectories in [today's] global times” (p. 2) and, crucially, the promises and problems that such trajectories hold for “how we live in close proximity to each other and how we communicate across difference” (p. 2). Throughout the book, Georgiou meticulously builds a simultaneously comprehensive and nuanced approach to unpacking how “media and the city become shaped by and shape cosmopolitanization” (p. 6). To undergird this approach, she weaves together several key concepts, which she establishes in Chapter 1 but develops across the work. One key term is mediation, which the book uses to capture how media shape the city. Drawing on the work of Roger Silverstone, Georgiou uses this term to refer to the “dialectical processes in which institutions and audiences are involved in the circulation of symbolic forms enabled through the media, but not exclusively located within the media” (p. 15). As in the case of other scholars who draw inspiration from Silverstone (e.g., Cabañes, 2014; Madianou, 2005; Thumim, 2012), this inclusive definition of mediation means that she takes into account diverse forms of communication practices—from the interpersonal to the mediated—that generate meanings about what it means to be urban and, equally important, to be cosmopolitan. Parallel to this is the street-level approach that the book deploys to analyze how the city shapes media. Here, Georgiou builds on her earlier pioneering work on flânerie (Georgiou, 2006) and, in so doing, has helped to spur the increasingly prominent “spatial thinking” in media studies, especially in works that reemphasize the interrelationship between digital and physical environments (e.g., see Aiello, Oakley, & Tarantino, forthcoming; Rovisco & Ong, forthcoming). What Georgiou does is to walk and explore the urban space, a la Walter Benjamin, as a way of “understanding the city as a site of struggle, as an unequal place, but also as an unpredictable place, precisely because it has always been a point of meetings of difference” (p. 9). Echoing recent scholarship that seeks to complement the established top–down approach to the global city with a more bottom–up perspective (e.g., Massey, 2007), she sheds light on how various urban agents—from the government to corporations to ordinary citizens to consumers—deploy, define, and redefine media. Finally, there is the concept of cosmopolitanization, which the book defines as “the process through which urban subjects are constantly exposed to difference through mediated and interpersonal communication” (p. 3). In relating this concept to the global city, Georgiou establishes one of the most significant innovations in her work. To be sure, she draws on already existing scholarship to describe the different cosmopolitan visions present in the global city: (a) neoliberal cosmopolitanism, which pertains to a neoliberal ethos of selectively celebrating difference for profit in order to “sustain the city's symbolic power and appeal to global audiences, consumers and capital” (p. 145); (b) vernacular cosmopolitanism, which pertains to the reflexive sensibilities and a sense of responsibility for others that organically emerge from being surrounded by “diverse and divergent world views, practices and moralities” (p. 146); and (c) liberatory cosmopolitanism, which pertains to a progressive political vision that builds on the experiential quality of vernacular cosmopolitanism and “raises questions about the significance of difference in advancing equality, recognition and redistribution” (p. 146). Georgiou's key contribution, however, is that she simultaneously brings to bear these concepts in assessing the empirical realities of the global city. Through this, she is able to capture the complex and contradictory ways that these cosmopolitan visions relate with media and the city. To ground her discussion, Georgiou focuses on the case of London, one of the most mediated and urbanized global cities in the Global North (Chapter 2). From this empirical starting point, she develops insights that she argues may be applied comparatively to other global cities. Specifically, Georgiou considers four key interfaces of media and the city and what they mean for cosmopolitanization. First, the book looks at the interfaces of consumption (Chapter 3) and identity (Chapter 4). Georgiou uses distinct urban cases—the redevelopment happening in Stratford and Shoreditch as well as the inner-city music and graffiti emerging from Hackney—to illustrate what happens on the ground when two cosmopolitan visions interact and, at many points, collide. She particularly talks about a top–down, neoliberal cosmopolitanism geared toward selectively appropriating and celebrating difference with a view to commodification vis-à-vis a bottom–up cosmopolitanism that articulates contrapuntal narratives and practices rooted in the city's long and continuing history of migration. The book then moves on to examining community (Chapter 5). By comparing the mediated and interpersonal communication of diverse urban groups—the Arab Diaspora in Europe, the multiethnic communities in inner-city London, and the community of elite trans-urban “nomads”—Georgiou reveals the surprising ways in which communicative practices can reinforce and challenge neoliberal cosmopolitanism. Finally, the book focuses on civic action (Chapter 6). It is here that Georgiou deals most directly with the possibility of instantiating liberatory cosmopolitanism. She takes the case of recent London protests, such as the 2011 urban riots and the Occupy Movement, to underscore the pitfalls of being able to make visible difference without a clear political vision, but also the promise of being able to articulate difference and claim recognition when it is premised on strong political intentionality. In the epilogue (Chapter 7), Georgiou emphasizes that the book allows us to see how media “mediate communication, miscommunication, and frame meanings of we-ness or other-ness” (p. 157). Indeed, one of the key values of this work is that by deploying mediation as a concept, it is able to account for how the meanings and values attached to cosmopolitanism are constantly circulated, contested, and transformed across the global city and beyond. Ironically, this move is also one of the crucial calculated risks the book takes. In choosing to emphasize mediation over media, it foregoes the opportunity to also understand how the affordances of the communicative platforms and technologies within the city matter in cosmopolitanization. What are the possibilities and limitations offered by the very medium of music (Hesmondhalgh, 2013)? Photography (Cabañes, forthcoming)? Polymedia (Madianou & Miller, 2012)? Georgiou also concludes by reflecting on the implications of the global city, with its intense mediation and urbanization, on the emergence of cosmopolitan skills and on the possibility of justice. In looking at the contemporary conditions of the global city, the book is able to offer empirically rich and deep insights about these two concerns. But again, this is another crucial calculated risk of the book. By strategically focusing on the “now and here” (p. 17), it foregoes the chance to take into account the particularity of the historical forces that have shaped the trajectory of the global city in the Global North. As such, the book leaves us with the question of whether and how its insights might apply to the major cities of the Global South, what with their very different colonial histories and postcolonial trajectories (Ong, 2006; Robinson, 2006; Simone, 2010). Is the relationship between media and the city in these urban spaces similar? Will they have visions of cosmopolitanism that are similar? Despite the questions that the book leaves unanswered, I have to say that I find the work an inspirational project. Throughout the monograph, Georgiou carefully and rigorously constructs and applies a robust conceptual approach that will undoubtedly have a significant impact on various fields of scholarship, from media and communication, to geography, to sociology, and to cultural studies. This seminal book will certainly serve as an important roadmap for the future of research on media, the city, and cosmopolitanism. References Aiello , G. , Oakley , K., & Tarantino , M. (Eds.) (forthcoming). Communicating the city . New York, NY : Peter Lang . Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Cabañes , J. V. A. ( 2014 ). Multicultural mediations, developing world realities: Indians, Koreans and Manila's entertainment media . Media Culture & Society , 36 ( 5 ), 628 – 643 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Cabañes , J. V. A. (forthcoming). Photography and the mediation of migrant voices: On producing and consuming photo essays about the lives of Indian and Korean Diasporas in Manila . Visual Studies . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Georgiou , M. ( 2006 ). Diaspora, identity and the media: Diasporic transnationalism and mediated spatialities . Cresskill, NJ : Hampton Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Gumpert , G. ( 2008 ). Communicative cities . International Communication Gazette , 70 ( 3–4 ), 195 – 208 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Hesmondhalgh , D. ( 2013 ). Why music matters . Chichester, England : Wiley Blackwell . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Madianou , M. ( 2005 ). Mediating the nation: News, audiences and the politics of identity . London, England : UCL Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Madianou , M. , & Miller , D. ( 2012 ). Migration and new media: Transnational families and polymedia . London, England : Routledge . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Massey , D. B. ( 2007 ). World city . Cambridge, England : Polity Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Matsaganis , M. , Gallagher , V., & Drucker , S. (Eds.) ( 2013 ). Communicative cities and urban communication in the 21st century . New York, NY : Peter Lang . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC McQuire , S. ( 2008 ). The media city: Media, architecture and urban space . London, England : Sage . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Ong , A. ( 2006 ). Neoliberalism as exception: Mutations in citizenship and sovereignty . Durham, NC : Duke University Press . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Robinson , J. ( 2006 ). Ordinary cities: Between modernity and development . London, England : Routledge . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Rovisco , M. , & Ong , J. (Eds.) (forthcoming). Taking the square: Mediated dissent and occupations of public space . London, England : Rowman & Littlefield . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Sassen , S. ( 2000 ). Cities in a world economy . Thousand Oaks, CA : Pine Forge . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Short , J. R. ( 2004 ). Global metropolitan: Globalising cities in a capitalist world . London, England : Routledge . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Simone , A. ( 2010 ). City life from Jakarta to Dakar: Movements at the crossroads . London, England : Routledge . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Taylor , P. J. ( 2004 ). World city network: A global urban analysis . London, England : Routledge . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Thumim , N. ( 2012 ). Self-representation and digital culture . New York, NY : Palgrave-Macmillan . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC © 2015 International Communication Association

Pfister, Damien, Smith

doi: 10.1111/jcom.12180pmid: N/A

“Connection” already feels like the 21st century's most overworked trope. Usually featured in advertising copy for digital products, “connection,” and specifically the “freedom to connect,” is also the lodestar for U.S. diplomacy under the Obama Administration. The “freedom to connect” was articulated in a speech titled “Remarks on Internet Freedom” that then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton delivered on 21 January 2010, on the heels of the so-called Twitter Revolution that followed the 2009 Iranian presidential election but before the “Arab Spring.” The idea of the “freedom to connect” initiated an Internet freedom agenda that continues as the beating heart of the United States' public diplomacy. The development of an Internet freedom agenda was a welcome acknowledgement of the increasing centrality of internetworked communication in public life. However, as Shawn M. Powers and Michael Jablonski's excellent The Real Cyber War: The Political Economy of Internet Freedom demonstrates, the rhetoric of connection and freedom often conceals a dynamic struggle over the political economy of the Internet. This struggle, which they deem the “real” cyber war, is an important one to attend to for scholars from communication, political science, law, and economics. Practitioners and policymakers, too, will find in The Real Cyber War the historical context, key stakeholders, and ongoing tensions that shape policy developments related to information law, Internet governance, public–private partnerships, cybersecurity, surveillance, and democracy promotion. Powers and Jablonski execute the close knitting that is the hallmark of careful political economy work—The Real Cyber War documents the interests at play in contemporary international communication and issues a clarion call to think otherwise about how the Internet might serve global interests rather than parochial ones. In the introduction and first chapter, Powers and Jablonski situate their work as an extension of recent scholarship (primarily by Jill Hills, Vincent Mosco, Kaarle Nordenstreng, Dan Schiller, Herbert Schiller, and Milton Mueller) that conceptualizes telecommunication technologies as deeply imbricated with geopolitical and economic forces. Although public and scholarly invocations of “cyber wars” often refer to cybersecurity (pointing to the implications of hackers, viruses, and netwars), Internet governance (especially as it relates to politicization of network protocols), or activism and public deliberation stimulated and mediated by the Internet (as political dissidents and social critics use the Internet to “war” against convention), none of these cyber wars can be understood without a more robust consideration of corporate and state interest. Powers and Jablonski, through careful historical contextualization, make two observations that pithily capture the thesis of The Real Cyber War: “The first is the persistent discourse suggesting that unfettered access to information promotes democracy and global peace. The second is an empirical understanding of how fettered access to information, such as occurs with copyright and patent restrictions, promotes U.S. business interests” (p. 32). Although the (constrained) flow of copyrighted information is a quintessential example of the inconsistencies inherent to the Internet freedom agenda, Powers and Jablonski's investigation pushes far beyond intellectual property rights. The second chapter, “The Information-Industrial Complex,” traces the growth of information and communication technologies out of ARPANET, through key regulatory hurdles surmounted by the Clinton/Gore Administration, and into the current post-9/11 environment. Surprises abound here, including the CIA's role, via the In-Q-Tel corporation, in bankrolling technology companies after the dot-com bubble bust of 2000. “Google, Information, and Power,” the next chapter, does a deeper dive into the information-industrial complex's key actor, Google. This chapter effortlessly weaves in quotations from Silicon Valley leaders and government officials, while highlighting the revolving door between the two sectors, in a way that confirms the tensions at the heart of the Internet freedom agenda. (The Real Cyber War is worth reading just for the collection of gobsmacking quotes from Google's Eric Schmidt.) Google is at the vanguard of spreading connectivity around the world so that global citizens can leverage the power of the Internet, but their business model is built on the commodification of personal information that such connectivity yields. Conceptually, this chapter usefully disaggregates the “data market” into four facets of information commodification: production, extraction/refinement, infrastructure, and demand. This nuanced treatment of the “information economy” may well, as the authors write, “facilitate thinking about the type of regulatory intervention required to prevent the monopolization of the entire sector” (p. 96). In Chapter 4, “The Economics of Internet Connectivity,” and Chapter 5, “The Myth of Multistakeholder Governance,” Powers and Jablonski show how the internationalization of Internet governance bolstered the actors who already had advantages in the new economy. As they note, “the greater congruence between regulatory environments and technical standards, the more able Western corporations are to expand confidently into new markets and quickly turn investments into revenue” (p. 108). Put simply, established corporations have economies of scale that give them substantially advantages in all things e-commerce. Although the International Telecommunications Union, as an international organization regulating international communication, could conceivably sort out information inequities between nation-states, the United States tends to dominate negotiations there in ways that privilege corporate actors such as AT&T, Cisco, and Google. The “myth” of multistakeholder governance, according to Powers and Jablonski, is that it works fairly to generate consensus. Such a myth is grounded in outmoded Habermasian accounts of the public sphere as a site where disagreements can be openly negotiated. In practice, advantaged actors exercise their advantage, by using asymmetries in information, skilled negotiation, or sheer bullying. Civil society actors hoping to shape international Internet governance, either through the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the Internet Society, or the Internet Engineering Task Force—all discussed in the chapter—are caught in a catch-22. Either they participate in these negotiations and risk legitimating decisions that simply authorize the interests of the powerful, or they do not participate and are seen as recalcitrant ideologues unwilling to negotiate. Powers and Jablonski point us, in Chapter 6, “Toward Information Sovereignty,” as a more supple way to navigate the policy questions raised by the regulatory issues related to the Internet. “Information sovereignty,” they explain, “refers to a state's attempt to control information flows within its territory” (p. 165). As they note, through four case studies of Egypt, Iran, China, and the United States, states use a mix of “law, technology, subsidy, and force” to assert information sovereignty (p. 174). Although states do assert information sovereignty, The Real Cyber War could have investigated the normative rationale for state exercise of information control more extensively. While the specter of global extremism and need for competitive advantage drives states to information control, the pressing question is not if information sovereignty is legitimate, but what degree of information sovereignty merits public support. As the Snowden NSA revelations proved, information sovereignty is too often abused, shielding states' efforts to track everyday citizens, civil society actors, and even the lovers of NSA employees. Nonetheless, Powers and Jablonski sketch the parameters for a more productive conversation that puts the discourse of Internet freedom into closer contact with consideration of information sovereignty. The final chapter, “Internet Freedom in a Surveillance Society,” picks up these issues in the context of anonymity's perceived challenge to national security and to e-commerce. The book concludes with a call to develop international protocols “governing the scope of acceptable surveillance online … [ensuring] a qualified guarantee of secrecy of correspondence” (p. 206). Although “acceptable” and “qualified” are the stickiest of sticky words, Powers and Jablonski usefully orient scholars and practitioners to the key issues for Internet policy in the future. Their caution to scholars about naively invoking the idea of Internet freedom and their warning that civil society actors ought to dodge multistakeholder processes where commercial interests dominate is similarly welcome. The rhetoric of the “real,” as it is invoked in the title The Real Cyber War, is useful in orienting our attention to an underappreciated phenomenon—in this case, the political economy of Internet freedom. But the rhetoric of the real also risks consigning all else to the status of epiphenomenon, obscuring possible connections and interactions between the different layers of cyber war (cybersecurity, governance, activism/public deliberation, and political economy). In privileging political economy as the master hermeneutic for understanding Internet policy, Powers and Jablonski elide the ways in which the networked public sphere (a term that represents a post-Habermasian vision of global public deliberation stimulated by internetworked media) might ultimately reconstitute the political economy of Internet freedom. For example, the public outcry over the revelations about corporate collusion with NSA spying had tangible effects on the political economy of international communication. The question of the optimal mix of information sovereignty and information freedom, similarly, is not one that should be left to technocratic decision-making by international organizations. Both the “right to be forgotten” and the “right to personal data” have bubbled up as a result of conversations stimulated by the networked public sphere. What effect might the codification of these rights in international regulatory agreements, rather than the right to have a qualified guarantee of secrecy of correspondence, have on the political economy of new communication technologies? These are pressing regulatory questions related to the Internet, requiring considerably more public, and scholarly, deliberation to address. Powers and Jablonski deserve credit for crystallizing the stakes of this conversation, warning us off unproductive paths, and developing conceptual tools to sharpen our analytic capacities. Damien Smith Pfister (Ph.D., University of Pittsburgh, 2009) is an assistant professor of Communication Studies at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. His book Networked Media, Networked Rhetorics: Attention and Deliberation in the Early Blogosphere (Penn State, 2014) reflects his research interests in internetworked communication and public deliberation. His personal site can be found at www.damiensmithpfister.net. © 2015 International Communication Association

Boukes,, Mark;Boomgaarden, Hajo, G.;Moorman,, Marjolein;, de Vreese, Claes H.

doi: 10.1111/jcom.12173pmid: N/A

Abstract This study constructs and tests a conceptual model of how and for whom political satire affects political attitudes. With an experiment, we show that young adults compared to older people are more absorbed in satirical items than in regular news. Subsequently, absorption decreased counterarguing such that the attitude toward the satirized object was affected negatively. By contrast, we show that political satire positively affects the attitude toward the satirized subject via perceived funniness; this was particularly strong among those who held views congruent with the satire or lacked background knowledge, which follows disposition theory. Investigating the underlying and conditional processes gave insight into mechanisms through which satire influences attitudes and pinpointed possible reasons for mixed effects of this infotainment genre. Incongruity between what is expected and what is presented is an inherent element of humor (Eisend, 2009; Meyer, 2000). Political satire, by means of incongruity, allows for new ways of looking at political matters and can make the “taken-for-granted” less self-explanatory and influence attitude formation (Colletta, 2009). Besides that satire may close the age gap in political attentiveness between younger and older citizens (Hmielowski, Holbert, & Lee, 2011; Young & Tisinger, 2006), it thus makes a potentially significant democratic contribution by offering perspectives that differ from those in the traditional media (Holbert, 2013). Studies on political satire, however, have found persuasive effects that were often insignificant or rather weak (Holbert, 2013). We aim to advance the understanding of how satire may or may not affect citizens' attitudes using a conceptual model that provides insight into the most important processes through which satire may be persuasive. The conceptual model used to investigate how and for whom political satire is effective is grounded in an extensive review of the literature on political satire and builds on the pioneering studies of Nabi, Moyer-Gusé, and Byrne (2007) and LaMarre, Landreville, Young, and Gilkerson (2014). The model shows what precedes the persuasive effects of satire and pinpoints two possible reasons for prior findings of mixed or null effects of exposure to political satire. First, satire has been shown to evoke opposing underlying processes that may prevent an overall effect of political satire (Nabi et al., 2007). Therefore, our model includes two mediating processes, one through perceiving satire as funny and the other through absorption in the satire. These are examined and tested in one partially latent structural equation model, so that both underlying pathways through which satire may affect political attitudes are investigated at once. Second, we focus on the conditional nature of these processes as another explanation for the lack of strong effects in prior research (see Valkenburg & Peter, 2013). Effects of satire arguably play out stronger, weaker, positive, or negative depending on individual characteristics. This study shows that political preference, background knowledge, and age moderate particular pathways in our model and, thus, influence satire's attitudinal impact. Previous studies hitherto considered none or only one such nuance of opposing mediating or moderated processes at a time. As such, an integrated framework for whether and how political satire causes attitude change remains lacking (Young, Holbert, & Jamieson, 2013). In this study, professionally created stimuli were employed in an experiment that looked into the effects of satire and the complementary influence of exposure to regular news. The study speaks to the need (see Baym & Jones, 2012) to go beyond the late-night comedy genre and U.S. borders as it has been conducted in the Dutch context with a different type of satire and investigates the differential susceptibility to media effects (see Valkenburg & Peter, 2013) due to both dispositional factors (i.e., political preference) and developmental factors (i.e., age). The conceptual model we sketch for the effects of political satire brings conceptual clarity to the study of this genre. Moreover, it contributes to understanding the persuasiveness of other genres than only political satire, as we elaborate on in the discussion. The effects of political satire Most studies on political satire focused on direct persuasive effects without considering the underlying processes. However, due to a diversity of findings, questions arise as to how humor affects the political attitudes of viewers. Nabi et al. (2007) found that perceiving political messages as funny sets in motion two processes that, respectively, evoke and inhibit counterarguing: On the one hand, the information of funny messages is frequently discounted (Nabi et al., 2007), whereas on the other hand, humorous messages enhance engagement with the narrative, so-called “absorption” (Slater & Rouner, 2002, p. 179). LaMarre et al. (2014) shed light on similar processes by looking into satire's indirect effects on attitudes of message discounting, resource allocation, and argument scrutiny. By applying and combining the theoretical insights from these studies (LaMarre et al., 2014; Nabi et al., 2007), we substantially add to the understanding of political satire's persuasive process in the following ways: We investigate (a) how perceived funniness and absorption are impacted by political satire relative to regular news content, (b) whether these effects are conditional on viewers' characteristics, and (c) how satire through perceived funniness and absorption eventually affects people's attitudes indirectly via counterarguing. When is political satire perceived as funny and when is it not? The consumption of political satire is a participatory act in which people deconstruct a satirical message by using existing knowledge, often acquired through other media texts, and reconstruct the message to individually come to an understanding of what they see (Holbert & Young, 2013). This explains why some do and others do not recognize the intended meaning of satire (Colletta, 2009; Simpson, 2003), and hence perceive it is as funny or not. Fully understanding satire is not required to perceive it as funny; people also just laugh at what surprises or is odd (Matthes & Rauchfleisch, 2013). Yet, people only laugh when the joke is not perceived as a threat to one's self-image (Meyer, 2000). Disposition theory posits that joke appreciation depends on the favorableness of one's disposition toward the targeted subject (Becker, 2014; Zillmann & Cantor, 1972). Thus, because people interpret satire in the framework of their own experiences and values (Zillmann & Cantor, 1972), satire only evokes laughter when it is not perceived as threatening the receiver's self-image (Nabi et al., 2007). However, this presumption—people do not laugh at satire that targets themselves—was rejected more than once (Colletta, 2009). Unprejudiced viewers of the 1970s sitcom All in the Family liked that the prejudiced blue-collar worker Archie Bunker was being satirized. Prejudiced viewers, however, also liked the series because they loved seeing Archie expressing their feelings and, thus, found the sitcom funny by misinterpreting the satire and selectively processing it in a nonthreatening manner (Vidmar & Rokeach, 1974). Similarly, conservatives and liberals both laughed at The Colbert Report, but for different reasons that were in line with their political views (Colletta, 2009; LaMarre, Landreville, & Beam, 2009). Indications of both selective processing and disposition theory have thus been found for political satire. Circumstances may predict when one or the other occurs. When a satire's intended meaning is overly clear, people interpret it in the “correct” way and will therefore notice when it is incongruent with their existing views (Podlas, 2013). Most often, a satire's meaning is, however, only implicitly presented due to irony or sarcasm (Simpson, 2003; Young et al., 2013). In that case, interpretations can be guided by existing beliefs, and selective processing occurs, so people see reflections of their own preferences in the satire (Podlas, 2013). Consequently, when a satire's meaning is not explicitly made clear, people do not feel threatened, and laugh about the satire even when it actually was incongruent with their views. Satire's clarity, however, not only depends on message characteristics but arguably also on viewers' ability to understand the message (Holbert et al., 2011). This ability most likely relates to the possession of background knowledge, which often is retrieved from other media texts. The theoretical concept of intertextuality argues that the interpretation of a text (e.g., satire) not only comes from the text itself or from its producer but is also highly dependent on the readers' positioning and context of reception (Gray, 2006). This context and positioning consists not only of readers' demographic characteristics but also very much (on the accumulation) of previous textual experiences on the same topic, which helps to construct meaning of a new text and elaborate on its content (Landreville & LaMarre, 2013). As people differ on their previous experiences, the interpretations of a satire may differ too. Those who have been exposed to (media) content on the subject can construct an interpretation based on the knowledge they retrieved from those texts (Gray, 2006), whereas those without previous experiences probably find it difficult to “correctly” interpret the satire and have to rely on their existing views while (selectively) interpreting the satire. Following the elaboration likelihood model (ELM), this means that intertextual sense-making increases one's ability to centrally process the message (Landreville & LaMarre, 2013) and helps to recognize whether a satire is in line with or opposes one's preferences. Not much is known, however, about how satire functions together with traditional news (Holbert & Young, 2013), which typically provides citizens the background information to interpret political satire (Gray, 2006). Yet, knowledge regarding how satire functions in conjunction with regular news is of great importance in terms of external validity: Those who tune into political satire often do this supplementary to the consumption of traditional news and not in a news vacuum (Young & Tisinger, 2006). Following the line of reasoning behind intertextual sense-making (Gray, 2006), we expect those without previous textual experiences to lack the knowledge, and therefore the ability, to fully understand the intended meaning of a satire. Consequently, they will selectively process the satire in a manner that is not threatening to one's self-image (i.e., in line with their preferences) and hence perceive it as funny even if the producer's intended meaning was counterattitudinal (see Holbert et al., 2011). Satire viewers with previous textual experiences on the topic, by contrast, have sufficient background knowledge and, presumably, are able to interpret the satire in the intended manner (LaMarre & Walther, 2013; Landreville & LaMarre, 2013). Being able to understand the satire well provides these viewers with the means to decide whether they believe that the satirized subject was worthy of being attacked according to their preferences (Holbert et al., 2011) and thus determines whether viewers think it is funny or not. We hypothesize as follows: H1: Viewers find a satirical message funnier when its intended meaning is congruent with their political preferences than when it is incongruent with their preferences. The moderating role of preference (in)congruence is conditional on the availability of topic-specific background information such that only the viewers with topic-specific background knowledge dislike satire that is incongruent with their preferences. The consequence of perceiving political satire as funny Perceiving messages as funny has been shown to set in motion a discounting mechanism (Nabi et al., 2007); generally, humorous messages are perceived as less credible and less informational than nonhumorous messages (Eisend, 2009; LaMarre & Walther, 2013). The delivery of humorous messages suggests that the information contained in them is not serious and should therefore not be used in serious considerations (Nabi et al., 2007). Consequently, perceiving political messages as funny increases counterarguing due to this discounting process (Nabi et al., 2007). Evoking relatively more negative thoughts about the idea that a satire intends to convey, subsequently, negatively affects attitude-agreement with the satirist. That is, compared with similar content without humoristic cues, the attitude toward the targeted subject may be influenced relatively less negatively in the event that people find a message funny. Parody, for example, generally causes negative evaluations of parodied politicians, but perceived funniness of the parody simultaneously counterbalances this negative effect somewhat (Matthes & Rauchfleisch, 2013). Similarly, satirical content has been shown to evoke more positive thoughts toward the targeted subject than critical news (LaMarre & Walther, 2013): Rather than scrutinizing the message's target, people scrutinize the satirical message because it provides cues not to be taken seriously. This discounting mechanism was also found in the processing of different types of satire (LaMarre et al., 2014), horatian and juvenalian satire, which differ not only in the conduct of aggression and laughter but also on the degree of judgment implicitness (Holbert, 2014). Lighter forms of humor (horatian satire) were perceived as funnier and less serious than bitter approaches to humor (juvenalian satire; LaMarre et al., 2014). Horatian satire, therefore, caused more message discounting and more message scrutinizing than juvenalian satire, which eventually led to less agreement with the horatian satire message. When such differences between satirical messages are compared, the cognitive resources available to counterargue information are also greater when people are exposed to light-hearted satire than to more bitter and less funny forms of satire because the first are immediately perceived as funny and require less thinking to get the joke (LaMarre et al., 2014). Counterarguing, caused by perceiving a message as funny, will lead to a relatively positive attitude toward the satirized subject; after all, those who counterargue actively hold ideas incongruent with the satire's criticism on this subject. This criticism will, consequently, be less effective. We accordingly formulate the following hypothesis regarding the positive indirect effect of perceived funniness on the attitude toward the satirized subject: H2: The funnier a political message is perceived to be (a), the more it induces counterarguing, which subsequently (b) positively affects the attitude toward the satirized subject as it decreases agreement with the message's argument. Absorption in political satire Past research also established that humorous messages have a persuasive influence because they increase absorption in the message. When people are absorbed, they are “primarily engaged in the storyline, rather than in one's immediate environment” (Moyer-Gusé, 2008, p. 409). Entertainment, in general, and humorous content particularly have been shown to absorb viewers (Slater & Rouner, 2002). Advertising studies, for example, found that humorous messages draw more attention than nonhumorous messages (Eisend, 2009). The reason probably is that humor comprehension requires high cognitive loads (for an overview, see Young, 2008): Comprehending a joke typically involves more than language comprehension and also requires strategically recruiting background knowledge. As soon as people realize that a message is funny, they will be motivated to concentrate and process its content because they eventually hope to be rewarded with a laugh (Nabi et al., 2007). As a result, people allocate many cognitive resources to be able to understand the jokes of humorous messages. Hence, we propose the following hypothesis: H3: The perceived funniness of a political message positively affects people's absorption in this message. How much individuals are absorbed in entertainment content depends on how well it serves their needs and goals (Slater & Rouner, 2002). Compared to older audiences, satire arguably serves the needs and goals of younger people better than news formats as audience ratings and survey data show that it particularly attracts this audience segment (Hmielowski et al., 2011; Young & Tisinger, 2006), which at the same time tuned out from regular news (Mindich, 2005). The period of emerging adulthood, between 18 years of age and the late 20s, is typically identified as a time of being self-focused, identity exploration, and feeling “in-between.” These characteristics translate into certain usage and gratification patterns in one's media selection (Coyne, Padilla-Walker, & Howard, 2013) and arguably in a preference for satire over news (Rottinghaus, Bird, Ridout, & Self, 2008; Young, 2013). As emerging adulthood is the period in life in which people are particularly self-focused (Coyne et al., 2013), it is not surprising that emerging adults have little interest in news that covers public affairs. Young people perceive an isolation from the political process and, therefore, are not inclined to politically inform themselves through the regular news media (Mindich, 2005). Older generations, by contrast, grew up in times of limited media choice, were more likely to see news when they were young, and thereby developed an interest in politics and a habit of following the news (Mindich, 2005). Many young people did not develop this interest in watching news; yet, humor can make the coverage of politics and current affairs relevant to them and will attract their attention (Rottinghaus et al., 2008). In terms of identity exploration, emerging adults have a psychological and social need to develop world views (Coyne et al., 2013). Rather than being informed, it is their priority to know what opinions they should hold (Barnhurst, 1998), because their political preferences are still developing and partisan attachments have not crystallized yet (see Jennings & Markus, 1984). Compared with traditional news, political satire provides interpretations and demonstrates which ideas prevail in a critical discussion and, thereby, helps emerging adults to develop political attitudes (Marchi, 2012; Feldman, 2007). Emerging adults, by contrast, dislike the balance and superficial political detachment of regular news coverage because this is not particularly helpful for their development of opinions (Mindich, 2005). Lastly, emerging adulthood is experienced as a period of feeling in-between childhood and adulthood. Young people, therefore, begin to feel a responsibility to become engaged with politics; however, they may find the news media not entertaining enough (Feldman, 2007) or too didactical (Mindich, 2005) to do so. Emerging adults consider political satire an enjoyable alternative as it offers a comic relief to the serious and sad situations prevalent in the news (Rottinghaus et al., 2008; Young, 2013) and allows them to learn and to laugh simultaneously (Lee, 2013; Young, 2013). Because political satire fulfills the needs of emerging adults better than those of older ones, we expect younger adults to be more absorbed when watching political satire than regular news compared with older adults: H4: Younger viewers are more absorbed in political satire compared with traditional news than older viewers. The consequence of absorption in political satire Formats that primarily intend to entertain have been shown to enhance persuasive impact due to absorption (Slater & Rouner, 2002). For this reason, the ELM has been extended into the E-ELM (Slater & Rouner, 2002), which predicts that people are less resistant, produce fewer counterarguments, and are more accepting of what they see as they are more absorbed in entertaining texts (Moyer-Gusé, 2008). The reason is that entertainment typically is not directly linked to one's own life and therefore does not induce a need for scrutinizing because it does not directly impinge on one's self-interest. Unconstrained by the need to be critical, messages used for entertainment purposes may absorb so much of viewers' attention and cognitive capacity that it becomes difficult to critically evaluate and counterargue its information (Nabi et al., 2007). As satire for many is entertainment and by definition a kind of criticism (Simpson, 2003), Holbert (2014) even speaks of attacks, one could expect satire to negatively affect the attitudes toward satirized subjects. The attempts to comprehend satire put such a high cognitive load on viewers (LaMarre & Walther, 2013; Nabi et al., 2007) that insufficient resources remain to scrutinize the validity of the satire's criticism (LaMarre et al., 2014; Young, 2008). Furthermore, and evidencing this theory, when satire is more complex and requires more cognitive effort, fewer resources are available for counterarguing (LaMarre et al., 2014), which increases persuasiveness. In addition to capabilities, viewer motivation also obstructs scrutinizing satire: Absorption and counterarguing “are fundamentally incompatible” (Slater & Rouner, 2002, p. 180). After all, message scrutiny undermines the reward component of comprehending a joke because it minimizes laughter (Young, 2008). Enhanced absorption thus increases susceptibility to the criticism of satire, because—as explained in the lead up to Hypothesis 2—counterarguing causes a decrease in agreement with a satirist's message. As absorption decreases the tendency of viewers to counterargue, agreement with the satirist increases, and the following negative indirect effect of absorption on the attitude toward the satirized subject is expected: H5: Absorption in a political message (a) reduces counterarguing, whereas (b) counterarguing has a positive effect on the attitude toward the satirized subject. Absorption, therefore, indirectly influences the attitude toward the satirized subject in a negative direction. Figure 1 summarizes our conceptual model and visualizes the hypotheses that are investigated in this study. Figure 1 Open in new tabDownload slide The conceptual model of satire's influence on political attitudes. Figure 1 Open in new tabDownload slide The conceptual model of satire's influence on political attitudes. Method Political satirists serve a “mixed dish” of humor techniques in which elements of aggression, play, laughter, and judgment implicitness are combined to attack a political subject (Holbert, 2014, p. 4). Within one specific mixture of humor techniques, jokes may still differ in their nature of attack by varying the degrees of aggression and play (Holbert, 2014). A joke, while employing the same techniques, may be gentle—relatively more play—in how it attacks its target or may attack in a harsher manner by showing more aggression (Holbert, 2014). Acknowledging that political humor comes in a variety of forms, which may lead to differing effects (e.g., Holbert et al., 2011; LaMarre et al., 2014), we manipulated the nature of attack of a satire: A gentle item and a harsh satire item were created with the same intended meaning and minimal differences in stimuli. Having two rather similar satire stimuli, we were able to verify the robustness of the experiment's findings (Jackson & Jacobs, 1983). A 2 (nature of attack: gentle vs. harsh) by 2 (background information provision: yes vs. no) with an appended control condition (a nonhumorous news item with no provision of background information) design was used to investigate the effects of political satire in an online experiment that was conducted on 3 and 4 April 2014. After providing informed consent and answering pretest questions, participants were randomly assigned by the online survey tool to one of the following five conditions: the nonhumorous news item (n = 53), the gentle satire item (n = 52), the harsh satire item (n = 58), provision of background information and the gentle satire item (n = 56), or provision of background information and the harsh satire item (n = 49).1 After exposure to a stimulus, the participants completed a posttest. Stimulus materials All videos addressed the same topic, which was the plan of the Dutch government to reduce funding for the public broadcasting organization. The government suggested that these budget cuts could be compensated for by scheduling more or longer advertising breaks between programs. The choice for a policy topic was made because recent content analyses showed that political humor often, especially in Europe (Matthes & Rauchfleisch, 2013), is issue-oriented and informative rather than person-oriented (Haigh & Heresco, 2010). The satire items were especially made for this experiment by the producer of LuckyTV, Sander van de Pavert. LuckyTV is broadcast as a 1-minute satirical closure of the popular daily prime-time infotainment talk show De Wereld Draait Door. LuckyTV always uses video materials that have previously been broadcast and these often originate from news broadcasts of NOS Journaal, which is the news program with the highest ratings in the Netherlands. LuckyTV puts a humorous twist on these materials by re-editing them, combining them with visuals or audio from other sources, and/or by manipulating the voiceover.2 An original news item was used as the treatment in the nonhumorous condition, whereas this item was manipulated into LuckyTV items for the satire conditions. Stimuli thereby were improved in terms of internal validity compared with previous studies. Except for the presence or type of humor, stimuli from previous studies also varied strongly on visuals, sounds, actors, and voiceovers because they relied on existing materials (an exception is Holbert et al., 2011). Our stimuli largely showed the same visuals, with the same actors, and a relatively similar time-length.3 The satire stimuli were consciously made identifiable as LuckyTV items by the introduction and its logo, whereas the news item was identifiable as NOS Journaal item, because people's expectations about what is to come determines how information is processed.4 As is common for political satire (Young et al., 2013), the intended meaning of the satire stimuli was not overly clear. Participants thus had to use their knowledge of the topic to understand the joke. If they succeeded, they would have realized that the satirist criticized and attacked the government's plan for the reason that the public broadcaster would become inundated with commercials (gentle item) or violence (harsh item) to attract audience share. Nonhumorous condition In the nonhumorous news condition, the participants were exposed to an existing item that was broadcast by NOS Journaal on 10 October 2013. The news item introduced the plan of the Dutch government to cut the budget for the public broadcasting organization and suggests that more or longer commercial breaks would be scheduled and that price of distribution would be renegotiated with operators. Then, the item shows an interview with State Secretary Dekker in which he explains that public broadcasters could fill up their deficit by broadcasting one or two more minutes of commercials per hour. Gentle satire conditions In two of the conditions, the participants were exposed to a satiric LuckyTV item with a gentle nature of attack. The item started with the same introduction as the NOS Journaal item stating that the Dutch government planned to cut the budget of public broadcasters and suggested broadcasting more commercials. After the State Secretary repeated that the public broadcaster should consider scheduling one or two more minutes of commercials, a tedious and ridiculous 1-minute commercial for a senior toilet began with epic movie music in the background. At the commercial's end, we see a news host waiting for the commercial to finally finish before he can continue presenting the headlines. Half of the participants who saw this gentle satire item were in the condition of only seeing this video. The other half additionally had read an article from the NOS news website before they saw the LuckyTV item. The article reported on the planned budget cuts for public broadcasting to provide participants with topic-specific background knowledge. This news article provided information that was also presented in the nonhumorous NOS item with a few more details. Harsh humor conditions The participants in the last two conditions were exposed to a LuckyTV item that addressed the same topic in a harsh satirical way. This video also began with the introduction of the NOS Journaal item that the Dutch government planned to cut the budget of public broadcasters. However, instead of filling up their deficits by broadcasting more commercials, this item suggested (by manipulating the voice-over) that more revenues could be derived by broadcasting violent series and movies. Furthermore, the interviewer's question to the State Secretary whether more commercials should be broadcast was replaced by the question whether more violence should be broadcast. As in the original, the State Secretary confirmed this expectation. Visuals from inside Parliament were replaced by violent scenes from movies. In addition, whereas the NOS Journaal item showed citizens watching sports on TV, in the LuckyTV item, the sports video was replaced by a video of a gun fight. Again, about half of the participants who saw this item had read the article from the NOS website before exposure to the video, whereas the other half only saw the satirical video. The harsh satire item was perceived as being 0.86 points (on a 10-point scale) more tasteless than the gentle item, p = .052, and 1.17 points more offending, p = .016, than the gentle satire item. As intended, the harsh item and the gentle item did not differ on how complicated they were to be understood, p = .662, nor in terms of clarity, p = .169, prompting people to think, p = .395, or ideological bias, p = .728. This shows that it was purely the nature of the attack that was manipulated and not something else. Participants Participants were recruited from the database of a market research agency, PanelClix. Quotas were set on age, gender, and political preference to ensure variation in the sample and to make it representative for Dutch society on at least these characteristics. With a 57.1% completion rate, 268 participants successfully completed the experiment. They showed to have done so attentively by correctly responding to an instructional manipulation check (IMC, see Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009).5 Participants' ages ranged from 18 to 72 years (M = 40.62, SD = 14.06, skewness = 0.04, kurtosis = −1.16), and 54.5% were female. Median educational level was elementary general secondary education, and 40.7% had obtained a bachelor's degree or higher. In our sample, 34% of the participants identified themselves with a left-wing political preference, 30.2% with no political preference, and 35.8% indicated a right-wing political preference. It took participants on average 32 minutes (SD = 17.37) to complete the experiment.6 Measures Independent variable Experimental condition The independent variable in this study was the experimental condition to which a participant had randomly been assigned. Moderators Political preference In the pretest, participants were asked on an 11-point scale whether cultural facilities should be maintained (−5) or whether the government should cut the budget for these expenses (+5; M = −0.92, SD = 2.41, skewness = 0.31, kurtosis = −0.58). This question operationalized people's opinions regarding the various budget cuts that the Dutch government proposed during the period in which this study was conducted. Mediators Perceived funniness How funny participants thought the video was to which they were exposed was measured with the response to one statement that was answered on a scale from 0 (not funny) to 10 (funny). The average score was 3.53 (SD = 3.03). As intended, the nonhumorous news item condition (M = 2.38, SD = 2.27) was perceived significantly, F(2,265) = 4.97, p = .008, η2 = 0.04, less funny than the gentle satire item (M = 3.97, SD = 2.99) and the harsh satire item (M = 3.66, SD = 3.03). Absorption How much people were absorbed in the item was measured with a latent scale of two items both assessed on 11-point scales (M = 5.75, SD = 2.18).7 The first item was whether people felt distracted or concentrated while watching the video; the second item asked whether people remained conscious of their surroundings or whether they were completely focused on the video. Both items are part of a larger scale used by Nabi et al. (2007) and were used as indicators of the latent construct “absorption” in the structural equation model and had standardized effect coefficients of 0.65 and 0.62, respectively. Counterarguing Immediately after stimulus exposure, the participants were asked to write down all thoughts they had during and directly after watching the video. They were given a minimum of at least 1 minute to accomplish this task and were provided with six text entry boxes to help structure their minds and stimulate responses. On average, the participants provided 2.18 thoughts (SD = 1.34), of which 1.18 (SD = 1.22) related specifically to the topic of budget cuts for the public broadcaster. The valence of the topic-related thoughts was coded by the first author to capture whether participants actively agreed or disagreed with the critical message of the satirist that the government's plans were not good. The coding scheme followed Young (2008) and distinguished between negative message–relevant thoughts (disagreeing with the satire items, i.e., stating that budget cuts were fine) and positive message–relevant thoughts (agreeing with the satire items, that is, stating that budget cuts were problematic). In total, 20% of the thoughts were randomly selected and coded by someone not involved in the study for the purpose of intercoder reliability assessment. The number of positive message–relevant thoughts were subtracted from the number of negative message–relevant thoughts (M = –0.52, SD = 0.99; Krippendorff's α = .87); so, higher scores indicated more counterarguing with satire stimuli. Dependent variable Attitude How much people supported the government's plan to cut the budget of the public broadcasting organization was measured using three responses to the following statements on 11-point scales (−5 to 5): whether people thought the plans were (a) a bad or good idea, (b) unacceptable or acceptable, and (c) foolish or sensible. The three items were used as indicators of the latent construct “attitude” (M = −0.88, SD = 2.78) and had standardized effect coefficients of 0.97, 0.90, and 0.94, respectively. Analysis Dealing with a multicategorical independent variable (i.e., allocation to one of five experimental conditions), being interested in more comparisons than only to a reference condition, and having a model with multiple mediators and moderators, a sophisticated analytical design was developed that allowed to analyze all of the hypotheses at once. Following Hayes and Preacher (2013), forward difference contrast coding was applied (see Table 1), which resulted in k – 1 variables (i.e., four in this case) (Serlin & Levin, 1985). Table 1 The contrast coding scheme applied to analyze the data Experimental condition . Contrast-coded variables . Gentle with background info versus gentle satire . Gentle satire versus news item . News item versus harsh satire . Harsh satire versus harsh with background info . Gentle with background info  0.8  0.6  0.4  0.2 Gentle satire item −0.2  0.6  0.4  0.2 News item −0.2 −0.4  0.4  0.2 Harsh satire item −0.2 −0.4 −0.6  0.2 Harsh with background info −0.2 −0.4 −0.6 −0.8 Experimental condition . Contrast-coded variables . Gentle with background info versus gentle satire . Gentle satire versus news item . News item versus harsh satire . Harsh satire versus harsh with background info . Gentle with background info  0.8  0.6  0.4  0.2 Gentle satire item −0.2  0.6  0.4  0.2 News item −0.2 −0.4  0.4  0.2 Harsh satire item −0.2 −0.4 −0.6  0.2 Harsh with background info −0.2 −0.4 −0.6 −0.8 Values in the columns show the weight given per condition in one of the four contrast-coded variables. Open in new tab Table 1 The contrast coding scheme applied to analyze the data Experimental condition . Contrast-coded variables . Gentle with background info versus gentle satire . Gentle satire versus news item . News item versus harsh satire . Harsh satire versus harsh with background info . Gentle with background info  0.8  0.6  0.4  0.2 Gentle satire item −0.2  0.6  0.4  0.2 News item −0.2 −0.4  0.4  0.2 Harsh satire item −0.2 −0.4 −0.6  0.2 Harsh with background info −0.2 −0.4 −0.6 −0.8 Experimental condition . Contrast-coded variables . Gentle with background info versus gentle satire . Gentle satire versus news item . News item versus harsh satire . Harsh satire versus harsh with background info . Gentle with background info  0.8  0.6  0.4  0.2 Gentle satire item −0.2  0.6  0.4  0.2 News item −0.2 −0.4  0.4  0.2 Harsh satire item −0.2 −0.4 −0.6  0.2 Harsh with background info −0.2 −0.4 −0.6 −0.8 Values in the columns show the weight given per condition in one of the four contrast-coded variables. Open in new tab Thereby, we could analyze most of the differences between experimental conditions that were of interest to our theory and conceptual model. The contrast-coded variables allowed for the following comparisons of conditions: gentle satire with background information versus gentle satire; gentle satire versus news item; news item versus harsh satire; and, harsh satire versus harsh satire with background information. The effect coefficients of contrast-coded variables replicate post hoc differences between conditions as in an analysis of variance (ANOVA). The contrast-coded variables were used in a partially latent structural equation model with attitude and absorption included as latent constructs (see Figure 2). The hypothesized moderated relationships were included as interaction effects with age and existing political preference. The analyses were conducted in AMOS 21/i using maximum likelihood estimation. The model fitted the data well; χ2 (90) = 110.36, p = .071, the comparative fit index (CFI) was =.99, standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) = 0.04, and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .03 with 90% confidence interval (CI) [.00, .05].8 Figure 2 Open in new tabDownload slide The partially latent structural equation model testing the underlying processes of satire's effect on political attitudes. Note: For reasons of clarity, we did not visualize the specified covariances between the exogenous variables, although they were included in the model. Figure 2 Open in new tabDownload slide The partially latent structural equation model testing the underlying processes of satire's effect on political attitudes. Note: For reasons of clarity, we did not visualize the specified covariances between the exogenous variables, although they were included in the model. Results Table 2 shows the estimates of the effects yielded with the structural equation model. Findings are discussed in the order of the hypotheses. Table 2 Parameter estimates for the partially latent structural regression model predicting attitudes toward budget cuts on public broadcasting by the government Hypothesis . Independent variable . Dependent variable . B . (SE) . p . 1 Gentle with background info versus gentle humor Perceived funniness 0.36 0.58 .543 1 Gentle humor versus news item Perceived funniness 1.19 0.57 .037 1 News item versus harsh humor Perceived funniness −1.45 0.56 .009 1 Harsh humor versus harsh with background info Perceived funniness 0.76 0.60 .207 1 Existing preference (against vs. favoring budget cuts) Perceived funniness −0.07 0.07 .342 1 (Gentle with background info vs. gentle humor) × preference Perceived funniness −0.44 0.20 .028 1 (Gentle humor vs. news item) × preference Perceived funniness 0 Restricted 1 (News item vs. harsh humor) × preference Perceived funniness 0 Restricted 1 (Harsh humor vs. harsh with background info) × preference Perceived funniness 0.42 0.18 .020 3 Perceived funniness Absorption 0.12 0.05 .008 4 Gentle with background info versus gentle humor Absorption 1.02 1.26 .418 4 Gentle humor versus news item Absorption 3.98 1.39 .004 4 News item versus harsh humor Absorption −5.81 1.44 .000 4 Harsh humor versus harsh with background info Absorption 3.30 1.25 .008 4 Age Absorption 0.02 0.01 .013 4 (Gentle with background info vs. gentle humor) × age Absorption −0.03 0.03 .362 4 (Gentle humor vs. news item) × Age Absorption −0.11 0.03 .000 4 (News item vs. harsh humor) × Age Absorption 0.14 0.03 .000 4 (Harsh humor vs. harsh with background info) × Age Absorption −0.09 0.03 .005 2a Perceived funniness Counterarguing 0.07 0.02 .000 5a Absorption Counterarguing −0.16 0.05 .001 Age Counterarguing −0.05 0.04 .262 Existing preference Counterarguing 0.09 0.02 .000 2b & 5b Counterarguing Attitude 0.34 0.15 .025 Existing preference Attitude 0.39 0.06 .000 Age Attitude −0.03 0.01 .004 Perceived funniness R2 = 0.07 Absorption R2 = 0.24 Variance accounted for: counterarguing R2 = 0.15 Attitude R2 = 0.21 Hypothesis . Independent variable . Dependent variable . B . (SE) . p . 1 Gentle with background info versus gentle humor Perceived funniness 0.36 0.58 .543 1 Gentle humor versus news item Perceived funniness 1.19 0.57 .037 1 News item versus harsh humor Perceived funniness −1.45 0.56 .009 1 Harsh humor versus harsh with background info Perceived funniness 0.76 0.60 .207 1 Existing preference (against vs. favoring budget cuts) Perceived funniness −0.07 0.07 .342 1 (Gentle with background info vs. gentle humor) × preference Perceived funniness −0.44 0.20 .028 1 (Gentle humor vs. news item) × preference Perceived funniness 0 Restricted 1 (News item vs. harsh humor) × preference Perceived funniness 0 Restricted 1 (Harsh humor vs. harsh with background info) × preference Perceived funniness 0.42 0.18 .020 3 Perceived funniness Absorption 0.12 0.05 .008 4 Gentle with background info versus gentle humor Absorption 1.02 1.26 .418 4 Gentle humor versus news item Absorption 3.98 1.39 .004 4 News item versus harsh humor Absorption −5.81 1.44 .000 4 Harsh humor versus harsh with background info Absorption 3.30 1.25 .008 4 Age Absorption 0.02 0.01 .013 4 (Gentle with background info vs. gentle humor) × age Absorption −0.03 0.03 .362 4 (Gentle humor vs. news item) × Age Absorption −0.11 0.03 .000 4 (News item vs. harsh humor) × Age Absorption 0.14 0.03 .000 4 (Harsh humor vs. harsh with background info) × Age Absorption −0.09 0.03 .005 2a Perceived funniness Counterarguing 0.07 0.02 .000 5a Absorption Counterarguing −0.16 0.05 .001 Age Counterarguing −0.05 0.04 .262 Existing preference Counterarguing 0.09 0.02 .000 2b & 5b Counterarguing Attitude 0.34 0.15 .025 Existing preference Attitude 0.39 0.06 .000 Age Attitude −0.03 0.01 .004 Perceived funniness R2 = 0.07 Absorption R2 = 0.24 Variance accounted for: counterarguing R2 = 0.15 Attitude R2 = 0.21 Note: Cells contain unstandardized (B) coefficients with standard errors (SE) in parentheses and probabilities (p). Open in new tab Table 2 Parameter estimates for the partially latent structural regression model predicting attitudes toward budget cuts on public broadcasting by the government Hypothesis . Independent variable . Dependent variable . B . (SE) . p . 1 Gentle with background info versus gentle humor Perceived funniness 0.36 0.58 .543 1 Gentle humor versus news item Perceived funniness 1.19 0.57 .037 1 News item versus harsh humor Perceived funniness −1.45 0.56 .009 1 Harsh humor versus harsh with background info Perceived funniness 0.76 0.60 .207 1 Existing preference (against vs. favoring budget cuts) Perceived funniness −0.07 0.07 .342 1 (Gentle with background info vs. gentle humor) × preference Perceived funniness −0.44 0.20 .028 1 (Gentle humor vs. news item) × preference Perceived funniness 0 Restricted 1 (News item vs. harsh humor) × preference Perceived funniness 0 Restricted 1 (Harsh humor vs. harsh with background info) × preference Perceived funniness 0.42 0.18 .020 3 Perceived funniness Absorption 0.12 0.05 .008 4 Gentle with background info versus gentle humor Absorption 1.02 1.26 .418 4 Gentle humor versus news item Absorption 3.98 1.39 .004 4 News item versus harsh humor Absorption −5.81 1.44 .000 4 Harsh humor versus harsh with background info Absorption 3.30 1.25 .008 4 Age Absorption 0.02 0.01 .013 4 (Gentle with background info vs. gentle humor) × age Absorption −0.03 0.03 .362 4 (Gentle humor vs. news item) × Age Absorption −0.11 0.03 .000 4 (News item vs. harsh humor) × Age Absorption 0.14 0.03 .000 4 (Harsh humor vs. harsh with background info) × Age Absorption −0.09 0.03 .005 2a Perceived funniness Counterarguing 0.07 0.02 .000 5a Absorption Counterarguing −0.16 0.05 .001 Age Counterarguing −0.05 0.04 .262 Existing preference Counterarguing 0.09 0.02 .000 2b & 5b Counterarguing Attitude 0.34 0.15 .025 Existing preference Attitude 0.39 0.06 .000 Age Attitude −0.03 0.01 .004 Perceived funniness R2 = 0.07 Absorption R2 = 0.24 Variance accounted for: counterarguing R2 = 0.15 Attitude R2 = 0.21 Hypothesis . Independent variable . Dependent variable . B . (SE) . p . 1 Gentle with background info versus gentle humor Perceived funniness 0.36 0.58 .543 1 Gentle humor versus news item Perceived funniness 1.19 0.57 .037 1 News item versus harsh humor Perceived funniness −1.45 0.56 .009 1 Harsh humor versus harsh with background info Perceived funniness 0.76 0.60 .207 1 Existing preference (against vs. favoring budget cuts) Perceived funniness −0.07 0.07 .342 1 (Gentle with background info vs. gentle humor) × preference Perceived funniness −0.44 0.20 .028 1 (Gentle humor vs. news item) × preference Perceived funniness 0 Restricted 1 (News item vs. harsh humor) × preference Perceived funniness 0 Restricted 1 (Harsh humor vs. harsh with background info) × preference Perceived funniness 0.42 0.18 .020 3 Perceived funniness Absorption 0.12 0.05 .008 4 Gentle with background info versus gentle humor Absorption 1.02 1.26 .418 4 Gentle humor versus news item Absorption 3.98 1.39 .004 4 News item versus harsh humor Absorption −5.81 1.44 .000 4 Harsh humor versus harsh with background info Absorption 3.30 1.25 .008 4 Age Absorption 0.02 0.01 .013 4 (Gentle with background info vs. gentle humor) × age Absorption −0.03 0.03 .362 4 (Gentle humor vs. news item) × Age Absorption −0.11 0.03 .000 4 (News item vs. harsh humor) × Age Absorption 0.14 0.03 .000 4 (Harsh humor vs. harsh with background info) × Age Absorption −0.09 0.03 .005 2a Perceived funniness Counterarguing 0.07 0.02 .000 5a Absorption Counterarguing −0.16 0.05 .001 Age Counterarguing −0.05 0.04 .262 Existing preference Counterarguing 0.09 0.02 .000 2b & 5b Counterarguing Attitude 0.34 0.15 .025 Existing preference Attitude 0.39 0.06 .000 Age Attitude −0.03 0.01 .004 Perceived funniness R2 = 0.07 Absorption R2 = 0.24 Variance accounted for: counterarguing R2 = 0.15 Attitude R2 = 0.21 Note: Cells contain unstandardized (B) coefficients with standard errors (SE) in parentheses and probabilities (p). Open in new tab Effects of political satire via perceived funniness The significant parameter estimates in the structural equation model for the contrasts with the news item showed that the two satire items were perceived as funnier than the news item. Generally, no differences in perceived funniness were found between those who read the news article before they saw a satire item and those who were not provided with this background information before exposure. However, whether people were provided with background information did matter for how funny the satire was perceived to be. When the gentle and harsh satire conditions without background information were compared to the news item, no significant interaction effects were found with people's existing political preference. Therefore, these effects were restrained to zero (i.e., there were no effects) in the structural equation model, which indicates that political preferences did not moderate how funny the satire was perceived to be among those who were not provided with the news article that provided the background knowledge. The interaction effects with political preferences were, however, significant for the contrast-coded variables that compared the satire conditions without background information to the satire conditions that were provided with background information for both the gentle and the harsh items. Thus, the availability of background knowledge allowed political preferences to moderate the effect of satire on perceived funniness. When the news item condition was compared with the two satire conditions in which people were first provided with background information, the interaction effects were also significant. Johnson-Neyman significance regions (see Hayes, 2013) below 0.66 and −1.10, respectively, showed that people who were provided with background information and disagreed with the satire's viewpoint did not significantly perceive the satire items as funnier than the news item. Figure 3 plots these interaction effects and shows how funny people with different political preferences thought the videos were. The differences between the people who were against budget cuts on cultural facilities and those who favored these cuts were small and insignificant except in the satire conditions where they first had read the news article. In those conditions where background knowledge was provided, joke appreciation was significantly the highest among those who generally were against budget cuts and, thus, held political preferences congruent with the satirist's message. Figure 3 Open in new tabDownload slide Display of the interaction effect on perceived funniness between experimental condition and existing political preference. Note: The values of −2.5, 0, and 2.5 are chosen to visualize this interaction effect because on the scale from −5 to 5, they substantively can be interpreted as being moderately against the budget cuts (−2.5), moderately in favor of the budget cuts (2.5), or having no opinion on this issue (0). Figure 3 Open in new tabDownload slide Display of the interaction effect on perceived funniness between experimental condition and existing political preference. Note: The values of −2.5, 0, and 2.5 are chosen to visualize this interaction effect because on the scale from −5 to 5, they substantively can be interpreted as being moderately against the budget cuts (−2.5), moderately in favor of the budget cuts (2.5), or having no opinion on this issue (0). Background information, therefore, seemed essential to evoke laughter only when the satire was consistent with the participant's existing disposition, which supports Hypothesis 1. Confirming the theoretical foundation underlying this hypothesis, an ANOVA showed that participants in the conditions that first provided background information found it less difficult to understand the satire than participants without such background knowledge, F(1,213) = 5.02, p = .026, η2 = .02; most likely, this decreases the tendency to selectively process the satire in ways that reflect one's preferences and are not threatening to one's self-image. The expectation formulated in Hypothesis 2 has also been confirmed. Perceived funniness had a significant positive effect on counterarguing; counterarguing, subsequently, positively affected the attitude in a manner such that people agreed more with the government's plan and thus less with the satirist. The 95% bias-corrected 10,000 bootstraps interval of the indirect effect of perceived funniness on the attitude via counterarguing did not negatively exceed zero, which implies a significant positive indirect effect of perceived funniness on the attitude toward the government's plan (Hayes, 2013), b = 0.02, SE = 0.01, 95% CI [0.00, 0.06], p = .016. Effects of political satire via absorption How funny an item was perceived to be also increased engagement with the narrative. As Hypothesis 3 predicted, a positive effect of perceived funniness on absorption was found. The experiment also confirmed Hypothesis 4 that young adults were more absorbed in satire than in regular news compared with older people. The two interaction effects of age with the contrast-coded variables that compared exposure to the news item relative to seeing one of the two satire items were both significant. Figure 4 shows how the effect on absorption of being assigned to a satire condition relative to the news condition changes with age: Absorption was significantly stimulated among younger participants who saw the satire, whereas older participants were significantly less absorbed in it (i.e., they were more absorbed in the news item). Johnson-Neyman significance regions (see Hayes, 2013) showed that absorption significantly rose among participants aged under 28 years for the gentle satire video, whereas for the harsh satire, the same significant raise occurred among people younger than 35 years. This closely resembles the age of 30 years that has been described as the end of emerging adulthood (Coyne et al., 2013). Figure 4 Open in new tabDownload slide The visualized interaction effect on absorption (continuous line) and its 95% confidence interval (CI) (dotted lines) of being exposed to a gentle satire item (a; left graph) or harsh satire item (b; right graph) relative to exposure to the news item for different ages (x-axis). Note: When both sides of the CI are below or above zero on the y-axis (effect on absorption) at one point on the x-axis (age), this indicates statistical significance of the effect on absorption of the experimental condition at that particular age x. Figure 4 Open in new tabDownload slide The visualized interaction effect on absorption (continuous line) and its 95% confidence interval (CI) (dotted lines) of being exposed to a gentle satire item (a; left graph) or harsh satire item (b; right graph) relative to exposure to the news item for different ages (x-axis). Note: When both sides of the CI are below or above zero on the y-axis (effect on absorption) at one point on the x-axis (age), this indicates statistical significance of the effect on absorption of the experimental condition at that particular age x. Absorption was expected to negatively affect the attitude toward the government's plan due to a lack of resources and motivation to counterargue the criticism of the items. Hence, we investigated whether absorption had a negative indirect effect on the attitude via decreased counterarguing. First, a negative effect was found for absorption on counterarguing, which indicates that as participants were more absorbed in the message, relatively fewer critical thoughts raised about its intended meaning. Second (as described above), because the item was counterargued less, the attitude toward the government's plan was affected more negatively: Not disagreeing with the items increased support for the satirist's critical perspective. The indirect effect of absorption on attitude via counterarguing was significant: The bounds of its 95% bias-corrected 10,000 bootstraps interval did not positively exceed zero, b = −0.05, SE = 0.04, 95% CI [−0.17, −0.01], p = .020, which implies a significant negative indirect effect, which supports Hypothesis 5.9 Following these results, and because joint significance of direct effects very well indicates the significance of indirect effects (Taylor, MacKinnon, & Tein, 2008), the conclusion can be drawn that exposure to satire has a negative indirect effect via absorption and decreased counterarguing on the attitude toward the subject being satirized. However, this negative indirect effect will only occur for emerging adults because older people were not absorbed more in the satire than in the regular news item but rather the contrary. Effects of satire's nature of attack With two satire conditions in our experimental design, this allowed not only for a comparison of two types of satire that differed in their nature of attack but also for two comparisons of satire with comparable nonhumorous news content. Because the effects of both the gentle and the harsh satire items on the mediating variables were very similar (also their interaction effects) and user-defined estimates with bootstrapping showed that these never differed significantly, this actually replicated the results and demonstrates the robustness of our findings. Discussion This study has shown that political satire influences attitudes via two underlying processes, perceived funniness and absorption. These, respectively, evoke and inhibit counterarguing of the criticism put forward in satire. Because these mediators have opposite effects on attitude, no overall effect of satire exposure has taken place. In addition to adding another result in the mixed row of preceding studies, this study moves beyond extant research by explaining why effects of satire can be positive or negative, but frequently are insignificant, through an investigation of these underlying processes. Focusing on the insignificant overall effect, however, leads to a distorted picture; due to the conditionality of both indirect effects, certain people remain susceptible to a persuasive influence of satire. We show that emerging adults tend to be more absorbed in satire than in regular news. When viewers are absorbed in the content, satirists can affect political attitudes because absorbed people are unlikely to counterargue its criticism due to a lack of resources and motivation (LaMarre et al., 2014; Slater & Rouner, 2002). This is, however, counterbalanced via the indirect effect of perceived funniness (Nabi et al., 2007). As a message is perceived to be funnier, it is more likely to be counterargued. Due to such scrutinizing, less negative and more positive thoughts toward the message target are evoked, which goes against the intentions of the satirist and blocks an overall negative effect of absorption. To be effective, satirists should thus not provide too many discounting cues but make clear that although they bring their message in the form of a joke, they are serious about the content. Lighter forms of humor, such as horatian satire, thus appear to be less effective, not only because of the fewer resources they require (LaMarre et al., 2014), but also because they evoke more laughter compared with bitter approaches of humor—as in juvenalian satire. The current study has shown that if background information was provided, it affected the appreciation of satire; thereby, it provides evidence for both selective processing mechanisms (LaMarre et al., 2009; Vidmar & Rokeach, 1974) and disposition theory (Becker, 2014; Zillmann & Cantor, 1972). Indicative of selective processing was that people without background knowledge found the satire equally funny. For those with background knowledge, however, moderation by political preference was found. This is consistent with disposition theory: Those who agreed with the satire found it funny, whereas those with preferences incongruent with the satire perceived it to be much less funny. These findings, however, may require some nuance as there are instances conceivable in which a satire is congruent with one's political preferences but is not perceived as funny (Simpson, 2003; Zillman, Bryant, & Cantor, 1974). Simpson's (2003) model for satirical uptake explains that an important condition for successful satirical uptake is that audiences judge its criticism on the satirized object as appropriate. If judged inappropriate, satire may misfire and evoke interpretations opposite to what was intended; viewers may interpret that something they sympathize with or they themselves are being attacked. This misfiring of satire especially occurs when the satire is on “red-flagged” taboo topics (e.g., death, sexuality; p. 175) or when receivers are closely situated or emotionally entangled to the satirized topic. Our satirical stimuli most likely were not judged inappropriate because they satirized a political topic of low salience with which probably none of the participants were personally involved. By explicitly including two topics (taboo or not) or the recruitment of participants from two groups (emotionally entangled or not) in an experimental design, Simpson's (2003) model for satirical uptake could be investigated under controlled circumstances. Our study, furthermore, showed that the provision of a news article with topic-specific background information affected how funny the satire was perceived to be, probably due to intertextual sense-making (Gray, 2006). To experimentally explore the effect of background information in future research more clearly, participants in conditions that are not provided with background information could be exposed to a nonrelevant news article to keep the activity and time spent with news equal among conditions. This study investigated the effects of political satire; yet, the lessons learned can be applied in the broader field of communication science. We show that absorption in a message increases its effectiveness. This is true for satire, but could be equally true for news items, political speeches, advertisements (political or not), health messages, etcetera. Thinking about message persuasiveness, it is thus important to think of its ability to absorb a receiver in the message. By contrast, the persuasiveness of satirical messages was blocked by how funny they were perceived to be and, consequently, was not taken seriously. For humoristic advertisement or health campaigns, for example, this could be the same. For other genres, the perceived reality or credibility probably plays a similar role (e.g., Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953). Thinking of such underlying mechanisms brings conceptual clarity to the study of political satire and media effects more generally. We frequently find or expect effects but the reasons behind it often remain a “black box.” By investigating the theoretically most prominent mediating processes, we shine a light on this matter; yet, much remains to be discovered. Future research may consider complementary underlying mechanisms or attend to explicitly manipulating the mediators. By manipulating the (perceived) funniness or the possibility of absorption, stronger empirical evidence could be gathered for the conceptual model of this study than is obtained with our experimental posttest cross-sectional data. Moreover, by focusing on the cognitive processing and the underlying mechanisms of satire's persuasive influence, we consciously made the choice to place less of an emphasis on direct attitudinal effects of the experimental condition, perceived funniness, and absorption. Satire effects have been hypothesized and empirically tested to be fully mediated through the indirect paths (i.e., via counterarguing), and the structural equation model together with several alternative models indicated that a model without direct effects provided the optimal solution. In conclusion, this study demonstrated two indirect ways through which satire affects political attitudes. Whereas the process via absorption negatively affected the attitude, the process via perceived funniness did so in a positive manner. This explains why studies on political satire often find no or mixed persuasive effects. As long as satirists primarily aim to be funny and provide sufficient cues to be perceived as jokesters, it seems unnecessary to have great concerns, or unrealistic to have too much hope, regarding the power of political satire to bring down societal power structures (Colletta, 2009). Acknowledgments This manuscript has been awarded the Top Student Paper Award at the International Communication Association 65th Annual Conference, 21–25 May 2015, San Juan (Puerto Rico) in the Political Communication division. Notes 1 " The current study was part of a larger experiment with a total of 12 conditions of which only these five were relevant to this manuscript. 2 " LuckyTV sometimes produces items in English, which may be helpful to understand its format. Two manipulated State of the Union addresses exemplify the humorous techniques used by its producer and can be found at http://www.luckymedia.nl/luckytv/2007/01/state‐of‐the‐union/ and http://www.luckymedia.nl/luckytv/2012/01/up‐down2/. 3 " The nonhumorous news item was 1 minute 11 seconds in time-length, the gentle satire item 1:37 (including the 55 seconds commercial), and the harsh satire item 1:03. Stimuli can be viewed on the following websites: non-humorous news (https://vimeo.com/90218719), gentle satire (https://vimeo.com/90218723), harsh satire (https://vimeo.com/90218724). 4 " Anticipation of a joke, strongest in the satire conditions, positively predicts how much people were absorbed in the item and how funny participants assessed the video. This variable was not included as an extra mediator to not make the model needlessly complicated. 5 " The IMC of Oppenheimer et al. (2009, p. 868) was slightly adjusted. As in the original version, a relatively long question text in which participants were told that the researchers wanted to test whether people actually read the questions was followed by a list of answer possibilities. Instead of a list with sports, a list of ten supermarkets was provided because more people visit supermarkets than practice a sport. And, instead of clicking “continue,” participants had to carefully check the list of answer possibilities to select “I read the questions attentively” to minimize the chance that the right answer was clicked accidentally. 6 " The distribution of completion time was highly skewed (skewness = 5.15) with various upward outliers. The median was 28 minutes. Findings do not substantially change when the outliers are removed from the sample. 7 " Latent variables in a structural equation model do not have a settled mean and standard deviation as these depend on the means and effects of the observed variables in the model as well as the constraints imposed in the model. The mean and standard deviation of latent constructs “absorption” and “attitude” are approximated by computing a mean scale of their indicators. 8 " Inclusion of direct effects from the experimental conditions to the attitude did not substantially change any of the effects in the model nor significantly improved model fit. 9 " Considering that perceived funniness also had an indirect effect on the attitude via absorption, its overall indirect effect remains significant, b = 0.02, SE = 0.01, 95% CI [0.00, 0.04], p = .016. References Barnhurst , K. G. ( 1998 ). Politics in the fine meshes: Young citizens, power and media . Media, Culture & Society , 20 ( 2 ), 201 – 218 . doi:10.1177/016344398020002003. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Baym , G. , & Jones , J. P. ( 2012 ). News parody in global perspective: Politics, power, and resistance . Popular Communication , 10 ( 1–2 ), 2 – 13 . doi:10.1080/15405702.2012.638566. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Becker , A. B. ( 2014 ). Humiliate my enemies or mock my friends? Applying disposition theory of humor to the study of political parody appreciation and attitudes toward candidates . Human Communication Research , 40 ( 2 ), 137 – 160 . doi:10.1111/hcre.12022. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Colletta , L. ( 2009 ). Political satire and postmodern irony in the age of Stephen Colbert and Jon Stewart . The Journal of Popular Culture , 42 ( 5 ), 856 – 874 . doi:10.1111/j.1540-5931.2009.00711.x. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Coyne , S. M. , Padilla-Walker , L. M., & Howard , E. ( 2013 ). Emerging in a digital world: A decade review of media use, effects, and gratifications in emerging adulthood . Emerging Adulthood , 1 ( 2 ), 125 – 137 . doi:10.1177/2167696813479782. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Eisend , M. ( 2009 ). A meta-analysis of humor in advertising . Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science , 37 ( 2 ), 191 – 203 . doi:10.1007/s11747-008-0096-y. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Feldman , L. ( 2007 ). The news about comedy: Young audiences, The Daily Show, and evolving notions of journalism . Journalism , 8 ( 4 ), 406 – 427 . doi:10.1177/1464884907078655. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Gray , J. ( 2006 ). Watching with The Simpsons: Television, parody, and intertextuality . New York, NY : Routledge . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Haigh , M. M. , & Heresco , A. ( 2010 ). Late-night Iraq: Monologue joke content and tone from 2003 to 2007 . Mass Communication and Society , 13 ( 2 ), 157 – 173 . doi:10.1080/15205430903014884. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Hayes , A. F. ( 2013 ). An introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis: A regression-based approach . New York, NY : Guilford Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Hayes , A. F. , & Preacher , K. J. ( 2013 ). Statistical mediation analysis with a multicategorical independent variable . British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology , 67 ( 3 ), 451 – 470 . doi:10.1111/bmsp.12028. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS PubMed WorldCat Hmielowski , J. D. , Holbert , R. L., & Lee , J. ( 2011 ). Predicting the consumption of political TV satire: Affinity for political humor, The Daily Show, and The Colbert Report . Communication Monographs , 78 ( 1 ), 96 – 114 . doi:10.1080/03637751.2010.542579. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Holbert , R. L. ( 2013 ). Developing a normative approach to political satire: An empirical perspective . International Journal of Communication , 7 , 305 – 323 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Holbert , R. L. ( 2014 , May). Political satire and the generation of influence within democratic frameworks: The political satire appropriateness (PSA) model. Paper presented at the 64th Annual Conference of the International Communication Association, Seattle, WA. Holbert , R. L. , Hmielowski , J., Jain , P., Lather , J., & Morey , A. ( 2011 ). Adding nuance to the study of political humor effects: Experimental research on juvenalian satire versus horatian satire . American Behavioral Scientist , 55 ( 3 ), 187 – 211 . doi:10.1177/0002764210392156. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Holbert , R. L. , & Young , D. G. ( 2013 ). Exploring relations between political entertainment media and traditional political communication information outlets: A research agenda. In E. Scharrer (Ed.), The international encyclopedia of media studies (pp. 484 – 504 ). Malden, MA : Blackwell . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Hovland , C. I. , Janis , I. L., & Kelley , H. H. ( 1953 ). Communication and persuasion: Psychological studies of opinion change . New Haven, CT : Yale University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Jackson , S. , & Jacobs , S. ( 1983 ). Generalizing about messages: Suggestions for design and analysis of experiments . Human Communication Research , 9 ( 2 ), 169 – 191 . doi:10.1111/j.1468-2958.1983.tb00691.x. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Jennings , M. K. , & Markus , G. B. ( 1984 ). Partisan orientations over the long haul: Results from the three-wave political socialization panel study . The American Political Science Review , 78 ( 4 ), 1000 – 1018 . doi:10.2307/1955804. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat LaMarre , H. L. , Landreville , K. D., & Beam , M. A. ( 2009 ). The irony of satire: Political ideology and the motivation to see what you want to see in The Colbert Report . The International Journal of Press/Politics , 14 ( 2 ), 212 – 231 . doi:10.1177/1940161208330904. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat LaMarre , H. L. , Landreville , K. D., Young , D., & Gilkerson , N. ( 2014 ). Humor works in funny ways: Examining satirical tone as a key determinant in political humor message processing . Mass Communication and Society , 17 ( 3 ), 400 – 423 . doi:10.1080/15205436.2014.891137. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat LaMarre , H. L. , & Walther , W. ( 2013 ). Ability matters: Testing the differential effects of political news and late-night political comedy on cognitive responses and the role of ability in micro-level opinion formation . International Journal of Public Opinion Research , 25 ( 3 ), 303 – 322 . doi:10.1093/ijpor/edt008. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Landreville , K. D. , & LaMarre , H. L. ( 2013 ). Examining the intertextuality of fictional political comedy and real-world political news . Media Psychology , 16 ( 3 ), 347 – 369 . doi:10.1080/15213269.2013.796585. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Lee , A. M. ( 2013 ). News audiences revisited: Theorizing the link between audience motivations and news consumption . Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media , 57 ( 3 ), 300 – 317 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Marchi , R. ( 2012 ). With Facebook, blogs, and fake news, teens reject journalistic “objectivity” . Journal of Communication Inquiry , 36 ( 3 ), 246 – 262 . doi:10.1177/0196859912458700. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Matthes , J. , & Rauchfleisch , A. ( 2013 ). The Swiss “Tina Fey effect”: The content of late-night political humor and the negative effects of political parody on the evaluation of politicians . Communication Quarterly , 61 ( 5 ), 596 – 614 . doi:10.1080/01463373.2013.822405. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Meyer , J. C. ( 2000 ). Humor as a double-edged sword: Four functions of humor in communication . Communication Theory , 10 ( 3 ), 310 – 331 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Mindich , D. T. Z. ( 2005 ). Tuned out: Why Americans under 40 don't follow the news . New York, NY : Oxford University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Moyer-Gusé , E. ( 2008 ). Toward a theory of entertainment persuasion: Explaining the persuasive effects of entertainment-education messages . Communication Theory , 18 ( 3 ), 407 – 425 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Nabi , R. L. , Moyer-Gusé , E., & Byrne , S. ( 2007 ). All joking aside: A serious investigation into the persuasive effect of funny social issue messages . Communication Monographs , 74 ( 1 ), 29 – 54 . doi:10.1080/03637750701196896. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Oppenheimer , D. M. , Meyvis , T., & Davidenko , N. ( 2009 ). Instructional manipulation checks: Detecting satisficing to increase statistical power . Journal of Experimental Social Psychology , 45 ( 4 ), 867 – 872 . doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2009.03.009. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Podlas , K. ( 2013 ). Funny or no laughing matter? How television viewers interpret satire of legal themes . Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law , 21 ( 2 ), 289 – 331 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Rottinghaus , B. , Bird , K., Ridout , T., & Self , R. ( 2008 ). “It's better than being informed”: College-aged viewers of The Daily Show. In J. C. Baumgartner, & J. S. Morris (Eds.), Laughing matters: Humor and American politics in the media age (pp. 279 – 294 ). New York, NY : Routledge . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Serlin , R. C. , & Levin , J. R. ( 1985 ). Teaching how to derive directly interpretable coding schemes for multiple regression analysis . Journal of Educational Statistics , 10 ( 3 ), 223 – 238 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Simpson , P. ( 2003 ). On the discourse of satire: Toward a stylistic model of satirical humor . Amsterdam : John Benjamins . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Slater , M. D. , & Rouner , D. ( 2002 ). Entertainment-education and elaboration likelihood: Understanding the processing of narrative persuasion . Communication Theory , 12 ( 2 ), 173 – 191 . doi:10.1111/j.1468-2885.2002.tb00265.x. OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Taylor , A. B. , MacKinnon , D. P., & Tein , J. ( 2008 ). Tests of the three-path mediated effect . Organizational Research Methods , 11 ( 2 ), 241 – 269 . doi:10.1177/1094428107300344. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Valkenburg , P. M. , & Peter , J. ( 2013 ). The differential susceptibility to media effects model . Journal of Communication , 63 ( 2 ), 221 – 243 . doi:10.1111/jcom.12024. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Vidmar , N. , & Rokeach , M. ( 1974 ). Archie Bunker's bigotry: A study in selective perception and exposure . Journal of Communication , 24 ( 1 ), 36 – 47 . doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.1974.tb00353.x. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Young , D. G. ( 2008 ). The privileged role of the late-night joke: Exploring humor's role in disrupting argument scrutiny . Media Psychology , 11 ( 1 ), 119 – 142 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Young , D. G. ( 2013 ). Laughter, learning, or enlightenment? Viewing and avoidance motivations behind The Daily Show and The Colbert Report . Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media , 57 ( 2 ), 153 – 169 . doi:10.1080/08838151.2013.787080. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Young , D. G. , Holbert , R. L., & Jamieson , K. H. ( 2013 ). Successful practices for the strategic use of political parody and satire: Lessons from the P6 symposium and the 2012 election campaign . American Behavioral Scientist , 58 ( 9 ), 1111 – 1130 . doi:10.1177/0002764213506213. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Young , D. G. , & Tisinger , R. M. ( 2006 ). Dispelling late-night myths: News consumption among late-night comedy viewers and the predictors of exposure to various late-night shows . The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics , 11 ( 3 ), 113 – 134 . doi:10.1177/1081180X05286042. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Zillmann , D. , Bryant , J., & Cantor , J. R. ( 1974 ). Brutality of assault in political cartoons affecting humor appreciation . Journal of Research in Personality , 7 ( 4 ), 334 – 345 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Zillmann , D. , & Cantor , J. R. ( 1972 ). Directionality of transitory dominance as a communication variable affecting humor appreciation . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 24 ( 2 ), 191 – 198 . doi:10.1037/h0033384. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS PubMed WorldCat © 2015 International Communication Association

Bolsen,, Toby;Druckman, James, N.

doi: 10.1111/jcom.12171pmid: N/A

Abstract Few trends in science have generated as much discussion as its politicization. This occurs when an actor emphasizes the inherent uncertainty of science to cast doubt on the existence of scientific consensus. In this article, we offer a framework that generates predictions about when communications can be used to counteract politicization efforts aimed at novel energy technologies. We then present evidence from nationally representative survey experiments to demonstrate how warnings to dismiss future politicization and corrections to ignore past claims can counteract politicization's effects. The results provide novel insights about science communication in a politicized era and offer a blueprint on which future work can build. Few trends in science have generated as much discussion as its politicization. Politicization occurs when an actor emphasizes the inherent uncertainty of science to cast doubt on the existence of scientific consensus. This causes citizens to dismiss credible scientific information and undermines the positive role that science can play in informing political debates on issues with substantial scientific content (Dietz, 2013). Yet, politicization does not occur in a vacuum: Scientists and other opinion leaders can and do work to counteract it. Whether and when their attempts are successful, however, remain unanswered questions. We address these questions by first offering a precise definition of the politicization of science. We then develop a framework that generates predictions about the conditions under which communications can counteract politicization efforts aimed at novel energy technologies, focusing on support for hydraulic fracturing and carbon nanotubes (CNTs). We test these predictions with survey experiments conducted on nationally representative samples in the United States. The results demonstrate that communication efforts to counteract politicization can be effective under certain conditions. Specifically, warnings about future politicization attenuate its effects and lead to an increase in the impact of consensual scientific information on opinions. Corrections to dismiss politicization also counteract it, although, as we anticipate and discuss, they are not as effective as warnings due to the prevalence of directional motivated reasoning. The politicization of science Individuals base their opinions on a host of ingredients including values, identities, and factual information. Social scientists have developed a fairly thorough understanding of: how factual information affects opinions (e.g., Bauer, Allum, & Miller, 2007; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Miller, 1998); how individuals account for knowledge shortfalls (Lupia, 2006); how being uninformed or misinformed about politics influences views (e.g., Kuklinski et al., 2000); and how individuals may biasedly interpret factual information (Druckman, 2012; Taber & Lodge, 2006). This work reveals a subjective element in the interpretation of facts despite the fact that a fact, by itself, is not inherently subjective information (Shapiro & Bloch-Elkon, 2008).1 One of the most useful types of facts is “scientific evidence” that reports a verifiable and reproducible observation(s) stemming from the use of the scientific method. Dietz (2013) states, “A good decision must be factually competent [and] reflect our understanding of how the world works. Here, the role of science is obvious: Science is our best guide to developing factual understanding” (p. 14082; also see Kahneman, 2011). This is where politicization enters the picture. Although the term has been used in varying ways, close examination of the literature makes its meaning clear (e.g., Jasanoff, 1987; Oreskes & Conway, 2010; Pielke, 2007). Three defining features include: There exists a scientific finding or, in many cases, a body of scientific work that has been produced according to sound scientific procedures (i.e., through the use of the scientific method). Although it is not required, in many cases, politicization occurs once there is a body of work that approaches what many would consider a “consensus position” among scientists (Shwed & Bearman, 2010). Any scientific finding(s) contains inherent uncertainty. This is the case because science provides a method for evaluating evidence in support of, or in opposition to, a conclusion rather than confirming it with certainty: “After all, future observations may change…. [Moreover], falsification can never be… definitive” (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002, p. 15; also see Popper, 1984, p. 5). Thus, “scientific information is always, to some degree, vulnerable to concerns about uncertainty because scientists are trained to focus on uncertainty” (Dietz, 2013, p. 15084). An agent or agents call scientific consensus into question by accentuating a finding's inherent uncertainty and suggesting alternative possibilities. This is typically done not in an effort for scientific accuracy but rather in pursuit of a particular agenda. Thus, politicization occurs when an actor emphasizes the inherent uncertainty of science to cast doubt on the existence of scientific consensus. This definition coheres with that put forth by one of the most noted books on politicization—Merchants of Doubt—which defines politicization as “exploiting the inevitable uncertainties about aspects of science to cast doubt on the science overall… thereby magnifying doubts in the public mind” (Steketee, 2010, p. 2; also see Oreskes & Conway, 2010; Pew Research Center, 2009). The consequence is that “even when virtually all relevant observers have ultimately concluded that the accumulated evidence could be taken as sufficient to issue a solid scientific conclusion… arguments [continue] that the findings [are] not definitive” (Freudenburg, Gramling, & Davidson, 2008, p. 28; italics in the original). Horgan (2005) notes that this undermines the scientific basis of decision-making because opinions diverge from the scientific consensus as groups conduct campaigns with the goal of altering public policy to advance a favored agenda (also see Lupia, 2013). We believe our definition of politicization makes clear how this is a unique communicative tactic. As intimated, politicization differs from other communication strategies that influence opinion formation insofar as: (1) politicization is about emphasizing the inherent uncertainty of science to cast doubt on the existence of scientific consensus—it is not competitive framing of an issue, which would involve emphasizing, for example, the environmental and economic consequences of energy-related policies; (2) it need not come from a political actor—the source of politicization could be an interest group, a fellow citizen, or any other actor; and (3) it is not misinformation per se but rather involves accentuating the inherent uncertainty of science to cast doubt about the existence of a scientific consensus. This latter point is important as the concepts are related but misinformation refers to “false, misleading, or unsubstantiated information” (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010, p. 304). Politicization involves questioning the existence of scientific consensus but not offering false information per se (this would be called pseudo science; Hansson, 1996). Only one study, to the best of our knowledge, isolates the effects of politicization on opinion formation. Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook (2014a) show that messages that emphasize politicization not only stunt the impact of otherwise persuasive information from a credible source (e.g., the National Academy of Sciences [NAS]) but also directly increase anxiety and perceptions of threat and decrease overall support for an emergent energy technology's usage. Thus, as many worry, politicization undermines the impact of positive, consensual scientific information.2 Although these findings and other commentaries on politicization are telling, they also are limited when one considers the reality of science communication as an ongoing competitive process (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Scientists and other actors attempt to counteract politicization, when it exists, by asserting scientific consensus. It is these types of communication efforts to which Uhlenbrock, Landau, and Hankin (2014) refer when emphasizing that “[scientific] societies and organizations can play a central role in science policy discourse in addition to an individual scientist's voice” (p. 98, also see Newport et al., 2013). We next present a framework that generates predictions about when efforts to counteract politicization are likely to be effective. Politicization and opinion formation We focus here on opinion formation about two relatively novel energy technologies—CNTs and hydraulic fracturing—where consensual scientific information exists. We recognize that defining a scientific consensus is not straightforward; yet, this strikes us as a critical starting point for an empirical investigation because, as mentioned, politicization undermines scientific consensus. We explore how varying types of counteractive communication efforts influence opinions relative to the possession of no (communicated) information on a given technology (see Druckman (2001) on using this as a baseline). We present Table 1, which offers definitions of key concepts, to facilitate presentation of the theoretical framework motivating the hypotheses we state below. Table 1 Concepts and Definitions Concept . Definition . Scientific consensus General agreement within a field about existing knowledge (e.g., Shwed & Bearman, 2010) Politicization When an actor emphasizes the inherent uncertainty of science to cast doubt about the existence of scientific consensus (e.g., Steketee, 2010, p. 2; Oreskes & Conway, 2010) Warning A message that alerts individuals about the content of an upcoming message (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p. 347) Correction A message that provides information to individuals about a misperception they may hold, stemming from exposure to a prior communication (e.g., Cobb et al., 2013; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010) Directional motivated reasoning Tendency to view evidence as more effective when it is consistent with prior opinions (e.g., often dismissing information inconsistent with prior beliefs regardless of objective accuracy) (Taber & Lodge, 2006) Accuracy motivated reasoning Tendency to evaluate information/evidence with the goal of forming an accurate (or “correct”) belief by attempting to engage in an “objective,” or evenhanded, assessment of new information (Druckman, 2012) Concept . Definition . Scientific consensus General agreement within a field about existing knowledge (e.g., Shwed & Bearman, 2010) Politicization When an actor emphasizes the inherent uncertainty of science to cast doubt about the existence of scientific consensus (e.g., Steketee, 2010, p. 2; Oreskes & Conway, 2010) Warning A message that alerts individuals about the content of an upcoming message (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p. 347) Correction A message that provides information to individuals about a misperception they may hold, stemming from exposure to a prior communication (e.g., Cobb et al., 2013; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010) Directional motivated reasoning Tendency to view evidence as more effective when it is consistent with prior opinions (e.g., often dismissing information inconsistent with prior beliefs regardless of objective accuracy) (Taber & Lodge, 2006) Accuracy motivated reasoning Tendency to evaluate information/evidence with the goal of forming an accurate (or “correct”) belief by attempting to engage in an “objective,” or evenhanded, assessment of new information (Druckman, 2012) Open in new tab Table 1 Concepts and Definitions Concept . Definition . Scientific consensus General agreement within a field about existing knowledge (e.g., Shwed & Bearman, 2010) Politicization When an actor emphasizes the inherent uncertainty of science to cast doubt about the existence of scientific consensus (e.g., Steketee, 2010, p. 2; Oreskes & Conway, 2010) Warning A message that alerts individuals about the content of an upcoming message (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p. 347) Correction A message that provides information to individuals about a misperception they may hold, stemming from exposure to a prior communication (e.g., Cobb et al., 2013; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010) Directional motivated reasoning Tendency to view evidence as more effective when it is consistent with prior opinions (e.g., often dismissing information inconsistent with prior beliefs regardless of objective accuracy) (Taber & Lodge, 2006) Accuracy motivated reasoning Tendency to evaluate information/evidence with the goal of forming an accurate (or “correct”) belief by attempting to engage in an “objective,” or evenhanded, assessment of new information (Druckman, 2012) Concept . Definition . Scientific consensus General agreement within a field about existing knowledge (e.g., Shwed & Bearman, 2010) Politicization When an actor emphasizes the inherent uncertainty of science to cast doubt about the existence of scientific consensus (e.g., Steketee, 2010, p. 2; Oreskes & Conway, 2010) Warning A message that alerts individuals about the content of an upcoming message (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p. 347) Correction A message that provides information to individuals about a misperception they may hold, stemming from exposure to a prior communication (e.g., Cobb et al., 2013; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010) Directional motivated reasoning Tendency to view evidence as more effective when it is consistent with prior opinions (e.g., often dismissing information inconsistent with prior beliefs regardless of objective accuracy) (Taber & Lodge, 2006) Accuracy motivated reasoning Tendency to evaluate information/evidence with the goal of forming an accurate (or “correct”) belief by attempting to engage in an “objective,” or evenhanded, assessment of new information (Druckman, 2012) Open in new tab We begin by considering the impact of scientific consensus: information on which there is general agreement within a field about existing knowledge (see Table 1) (Shwed & Bearman, 2010). Such information matters because forming opinions about emergent technologies inevitably involves assessing uncertain future risks and benefits (National Research Council, 1994; Polasky, Carpenter, Folke, & Keeler, 2011). Moreover, psychological work on attitude change shows that “consensus implies correctness” (Kruglanski & Stroebe, 2005, p. 358); this is particularly the case when a communication includes the “citation of … evidence [which] appears to enhance [persuasiveness]” (O'Keefe, 2002, p. 186; also see, e.g., Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Miller, 1998). In this case, positive consensual scientific information reduces anxiety and perceived threat about the future impact of emergent technologies (Constans, 2001; Maner & Schmidt, 2006; National Research Council, 1994; Polasky, Carpenter, Folke, & Keeler, 2011; Weisenfeld & Ott, 2011). Reductions in anxiety and perceived threat, in turn, lead individuals to become more supportive of the technology (Bolsen et al., 2014a). Based on this work, we hypothesize that individuals will become less threatened and anxious and more supportive of an emergent technology's usage, when they receive positive consensual scientific information, relative to those who receive no information (hypothesis 1).3 When science is politicized—which, as presented and defined in Table 1, occurs when the inherent uncertainty of science is emphasized to cast doubt about the existence of scientific consensus—the confidence instilled by consensual scientific information is undermined. Psychological work suggests that anxiety—such as that stemming from politicization—generates a preference for risk aversion (i.e., favoring the status quo), and thus, decreases support for novel innovations (Arceneaux, 2012; Caplin & Leahy, 2001; Druckman & McDermott, 2008; Hirsh, Mar, & Peterson, 2012; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991). Consequently, when individuals are exposed to politicization, they become uncertain about whether to trust consensual scientific information in this context and more anxious due to greater perceived uncertainty and risk stemming from the technology's use. Increased anticipated risk, in turn, heightens anxiety (Constans, 2001; Maner & Schmidt, 2006). This will render any positive impact of the consensual scientific information on individuals' opinions impotent. We thus predict that individuals will become more threatened and anxious and less supportive of an emergent technology's usage in the presence of politicization, relative to those who receive no information (hypothesis 2).4 The existing literature stops here, leaving the impression that politicization trumps scientific consensus; yet, attempts to counteract politicization do occur. For instance, the mission of the NAS is to engage in such counter efforts by documenting consensus about contemporary scientific issues when it exists and providing “ independent, objective advice to the nation on matters related to science and technology” (http://www.nationalacademies.org/about/whatwedo/index.html). Nonetheless, even though scholars have called for research on ways to counteract politicization (Dietz, 2013; Nature, 2010), empirical work has remained silent on the matter. There are two potential ways to use competitive communications to counteract politicization (Chong & Druckman, 2010). Counteractive communications can take the form of a warning that a scientific consensus exists and efforts to call into question this consensus should be dismissed, or a correction with similar content that follows politicization. As shown in Table 1, a warning is a message that alerts individuals to the content of an upcoming message (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p. 347); in this case, it would be a communication that warns individuals to ignore/not believe future politicization toward an emergent energy technology. This could occur when scientific organizations, or individuals, anticipate politicization, which happens on many scientific issues (e.g., see Lupia, 2013). On the flip side, a correction is a communication that provides information to individuals about a belief they may hold, stemming from exposure to a prior communication (e.g., Cobb, Nyhan, & Reifler, 2013; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010): In this case, it would be a message that tells individuals to dismiss a prior communication accentuating politicization toward an emergent technology. Warnings, corrections, motivated reasoning, and counteracting politicization We turn to the theory of motivated reasoning to understand the process by which warnings and corrections may counteract politicization. We follow Taber and Lodge (2006) and focus on two primary motivations that drive the processing of information: directional and accuracy goals.5 A directional goal refers to when a “person is motivated to arrive at a particular conclusion” (Kunda, 1999, p. 236). As defined in Table 1, directional motivated reasoning causes people to view evidence as stronger when it is consistent with prior opinions and dismiss information inconsistent with prior beliefs regardless of its objective accuracy (e.g., see Druckman, Peterson, & Slothuus, 2013; Kunda, 1990, 1999; Lodge & Taber, 2000; Slothuus & de Vreese, 2010).6 To understand the consequences of directional motivated reasoning, consider Druckman and Bolsen's (2011) two-wave study on the dynamics of opinion formation toward two emergent scientific technologies. At wave 1, respondents reported their support for genetically modified (GM) foods or CNTs following exposure to a pro or con frame on each issue. Then, about 10 days later, respondents received three types of information about GM foods or CNTs in a follow-up survey: in the case of GM foods, positive information about how GM foods combat diseases, negative information about the unknown and potentially harmful long-term health consequences of GM foods, and neutral information about the economic consequences of GM foods. They find that opinions formed at wave 1 in response to exposure to positive or negative frames strongly conditioned evaluations toward novel scientific information presented in wave 2. Individuals exposed to positive or negative information about an emergent technology at wave 1 evaluated directionally consistent evidence at wave 2 as more effective, directionally inconsistent evidence at wave 2 as less effective, and neutral evidence as consistent with the direction of the opinion formed at wave 1. The authors report virtually identical results with the same design but on the topic of CNTs (also see Kahan et al., 2009).7 Directional motivated reasoning seems to be pervasive on political and scientific issues where individuals have little incentive to exert great effort in processing competing arguments and technical information (see Taber & Lodge, 2006, p. 767).8Nyhan and Reifler (2010) state, “humans are goal-directed information processors who tend to evaluate information with a directional bias toward reinforcing their pre-existing views…” (p. 307). Dietz (2013) adds, “this process of biased assimilation of information can lead to a set of beliefs that are strongly held, elaborate, and quite divergent from scientific consensus” (p. 14083, italics added). However, directional motivated reasoning also suggests that one can counteract politicization by communicating to people—prior to encountering politicization—that a scientific consensus indeed does exist and that future politicization claims should be dismissed. This establishes an initial attitude that people later use to evaluate subsequent information a la directional motivated reasoning—i.e., that consensual scientific information is credible and politicization should be dismissed. Put another way, when individuals receive a warning to dismiss future claims about politicization with regard to an emergent energy technology, directional motivated reasoning will lead people to discount politicization and trust consensual scientific information. We thus predict that individuals who receive a warning that a scientific consensus exists and should not be politicized will become less threatened and anxious and more supportive of an emergent technology, relative to those who receive no information (hypothesis 3).9 In contrast, directional motivated reasoning implies that corrections to dismiss prior claims about politicization are likely to fail. In this case, individuals form an initial opinion that information related to an emergent technology is the subject of scientific disagreement and thus, due to directional motivated reasoning, view later corrective messages as less credible. Consequently, politicization prevails leading to depressed support a la hypothesis 2: Individuals who are exposed to a correction to dismiss prior politicization will thus become more threatened and anxious and less supportive of an emergent technology, relative to those who receive no information (hypothesis 4).10 Directional motivated reasoning may drive information processing in some contexts; however, in other contexts, individuals instead pursue an accuracy motivation in processing information and forming an opinion. As described in Table 1, accuracy motivated reasoning involves evaluating new information/evidence with the goal of holding a “correct,” or accurate, belief by attempting to engage in an “objective,” or evenhanded, assessment of relevant information (Taber & Lodge, 2006, p. 756; also see Druckman, 2012; Kunda, 1990). Instead of defending a prior belief, identity, or worldview, an accuracy motivation leads individuals to assess all available information objectively, even if it runs counter to one's existing beliefs or identities (Lavine, Johnston, & Steenbergen, 2012). For example, Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook (2014b) find that, in forming an opinion about aspects included in the 2007 Energy Independence Act, when respondents were prompted to process information with an accuracy motivation—that is, they were told they would have to justify their opinions—the bias stemming from directional motivated reasoning disappeared. Respondents' opinions were not driven by the Act's perceived sponsor but rather reflected an assessment of the policy content with which they were provided (also see Nir, 2011; Prior, Sood, & Khanna, 2013). The implication, for us, is that individuals will not dismiss a correction a la directional motivated reasoning when motivated to form an accurate belief; rather, individuals will consider all relevant information and give weight to consensual scientific information previously encountered in forming their overall opinion toward an emergent energy technology. Consequently, when individuals who are induced to process information with an accuracy motivation receive a correction to dismiss prior claims about politicization, it will elevate the impact of consensual scientific information. Individuals will thus become less threatened and anxious and more supportive of an emergent technology, relative to those who receive no information (hypothesis 5). For reasons we will later discuss, this prediction—although perhaps not capturing the motivation of the majority of people when it comes to processing scientific information—may become increasingly relevant in the future as debates about energy evolve and come to have a more direct impact on an individual's everyday life (e.g., as energy debates become more localized) (Sinatra, Kienhues & Hofer, 2014). We summarize our hypotheses in Table 2. Table 2 Experimental Conditions and Hypotheses Condition . Scenario/Stimuli . Hypothesis18 . 1 No information Baseline condition 2 Consensus scientific information Consensus scientific information in support of a technology causes individuals to become less threatened and anxious and more supportive of its use. (hypothesis 1) 3 Politicized scientific information Politicization renders the impact of positive consensus scientific information impotent by generating doubt about its credibility. There is an increase in threat and anxiety and decrease in overall support. (hypothesis 2) 4 Warning to dismiss politicized information → politicized scientific information The warning that a scientific consensus exists and that politicization should be dismissed causes people to dismiss politicization and remain open to consensual scientific information, leading to a decrease in threat and anxiety and an increase in overall support. (hypothesis 3) 5 Politicized scientific information → correction Politicization renders the impact of consensual scientific information impotent. The correction has no counteractive effect, due to directional motivated reasoning, leading to increased threat and anxiety and decreased overall support. (hypothesis 4) 6 Accuracy motivation → politicized scientific information → correction Inducing a motivation to form an accurate opinion will cause the correction to have an effect in counteracting politicization. It will thus overcome directional motivated reasoning and elevate the impact of consensual scientific information, leading to decreased threat and anxiety and increased overall support. (hypothesis 5) Condition . Scenario/Stimuli . Hypothesis18 . 1 No information Baseline condition 2 Consensus scientific information Consensus scientific information in support of a technology causes individuals to become less threatened and anxious and more supportive of its use. (hypothesis 1) 3 Politicized scientific information Politicization renders the impact of positive consensus scientific information impotent by generating doubt about its credibility. There is an increase in threat and anxiety and decrease in overall support. (hypothesis 2) 4 Warning to dismiss politicized information → politicized scientific information The warning that a scientific consensus exists and that politicization should be dismissed causes people to dismiss politicization and remain open to consensual scientific information, leading to a decrease in threat and anxiety and an increase in overall support. (hypothesis 3) 5 Politicized scientific information → correction Politicization renders the impact of consensual scientific information impotent. The correction has no counteractive effect, due to directional motivated reasoning, leading to increased threat and anxiety and decreased overall support. (hypothesis 4) 6 Accuracy motivation → politicized scientific information → correction Inducing a motivation to form an accurate opinion will cause the correction to have an effect in counteracting politicization. It will thus overcome directional motivated reasoning and elevate the impact of consensual scientific information, leading to decreased threat and anxiety and increased overall support. (hypothesis 5) a Predictions are relative to the baseline. Open in new tab Table 2 Experimental Conditions and Hypotheses Condition . Scenario/Stimuli . Hypothesis18 . 1 No information Baseline condition 2 Consensus scientific information Consensus scientific information in support of a technology causes individuals to become less threatened and anxious and more supportive of its use. (hypothesis 1) 3 Politicized scientific information Politicization renders the impact of positive consensus scientific information impotent by generating doubt about its credibility. There is an increase in threat and anxiety and decrease in overall support. (hypothesis 2) 4 Warning to dismiss politicized information → politicized scientific information The warning that a scientific consensus exists and that politicization should be dismissed causes people to dismiss politicization and remain open to consensual scientific information, leading to a decrease in threat and anxiety and an increase in overall support. (hypothesis 3) 5 Politicized scientific information → correction Politicization renders the impact of consensual scientific information impotent. The correction has no counteractive effect, due to directional motivated reasoning, leading to increased threat and anxiety and decreased overall support. (hypothesis 4) 6 Accuracy motivation → politicized scientific information → correction Inducing a motivation to form an accurate opinion will cause the correction to have an effect in counteracting politicization. It will thus overcome directional motivated reasoning and elevate the impact of consensual scientific information, leading to decreased threat and anxiety and increased overall support. (hypothesis 5) Condition . Scenario/Stimuli . Hypothesis18 . 1 No information Baseline condition 2 Consensus scientific information Consensus scientific information in support of a technology causes individuals to become less threatened and anxious and more supportive of its use. (hypothesis 1) 3 Politicized scientific information Politicization renders the impact of positive consensus scientific information impotent by generating doubt about its credibility. There is an increase in threat and anxiety and decrease in overall support. (hypothesis 2) 4 Warning to dismiss politicized information → politicized scientific information The warning that a scientific consensus exists and that politicization should be dismissed causes people to dismiss politicization and remain open to consensual scientific information, leading to a decrease in threat and anxiety and an increase in overall support. (hypothesis 3) 5 Politicized scientific information → correction Politicization renders the impact of consensual scientific information impotent. The correction has no counteractive effect, due to directional motivated reasoning, leading to increased threat and anxiety and decreased overall support. (hypothesis 4) 6 Accuracy motivation → politicized scientific information → correction Inducing a motivation to form an accurate opinion will cause the correction to have an effect in counteracting politicization. It will thus overcome directional motivated reasoning and elevate the impact of consensual scientific information, leading to decreased threat and anxiety and increased overall support. (hypothesis 5) a Predictions are relative to the baseline. Open in new tab Experimental design and measures We tested the hypotheses listed in Table 2 with experiments embedded in a nationally representative survey in the United States (implemented over the Internet) with a total of 2,484 participants across both studies.11 We focus, as mentioned, on two emergent energy technologies. One experiment focused on CNTs, which are tiny graphite tubes that efficiently convert sunlight into electricity and thus offer a novel method to obtain energy from an alternative source. National surveys suggest that nearly half the population knows virtually nothing about CNTs (e.g., the 2010 General Social Survey, see also Druckman & Bolsen, 2011). The other experiment focused on a novel way to obtain energy from a conventional energy source: hydraulic fracturing—a method to obtain energy that “involves drilling horizontally through a rock layer and injecting a pressurized mixture of water, sand, and other chemicals that fractures the rock and facilitates the flow of oil and gas” (Boudet et al., 2014, p. 58). Hydraulic fracturing—which is commonly called “fracking”—fundamentally differs from conventional drilling (http://www.cleanwateraction.org/feature/fracking-explained). Although this method receives greater media coverage than CNTs, the public is “largely unaware and undecided about this issue” (Boudet et al., 2014, p. 63). We opted to use the term “fracking” in the experiment, as opposed to hydraulic fracturing, because of its familiar use in news coverage and in academic work (e.g., see Boudet et al., 2014). We note that the focus on two relatively novel technologies means that most respondents will not have developed strong opinions, which means that any results we uncover potentially tap the upper bounds of movement in terms of the magnitude of the effect of competing communications on opinion formation. We used an identical experimental design to test our hypotheses for both CNTs and fracking. We randomly assigned half of the participants in our sample to an experiment about CNTs (N = 1,256) and the other half to an analogous experiment about fracking (N = 1,228). For each technology, we randomly assigned participants to one of six conditions, as captured in Table 2, that we next discuss. Individuals randomly assigned to Condition 1, which served as a baseline for assessing the hypotheses, received no information about either technology and were simply asked to respond to the key dependent measures. This included questions that gauged: (1) the extent of support for the use of either CNTs or fracking (on a 7-point scale with higher scores associated with greater support), (2) the extent to which the government should decrease or increase investments into research that advances this approach for obtaining energy (on a 7-point scale with higher scores associated with increases in investments), and (3) the extent to which the technology would help ensure long-term energy sustainability (on a 7-point scale with higher scores associated with greater sustainability). We also included measures to test our hypotheses about the impact of the experimental interventions on respondents' perceived levels of threat and anxiety. We measured perceived anxiety by asking respondents, “As you think about [fracking/CNTs] as an approach to obtain energy, how much anxiety do you feel?” (on a 5-point scale with higher scores indicating greater anxiety). We measured perceived threat by asking respondents, “Indicate how dangerous or safe you think it us to use [fracking/CNTs] as an approach to obtain energy” (on a 7-point scale with higher scores indicating greater perceived threat). These central dependent variables followed all of the experimental conditions. As Table 2 illustrates, Condition 2 allows us to test hypothesis 1 by providing respondents with consensual scientific information from a study published in the Proceedingsof the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) about either CNTs or fracking and later assessing support for the respective technology. For example, in the case of CNTs, we provided respondents with a definition of CNTs and informed them that CNTs “offer a novel method to obtain energy that is fundamentally different from conventional approaches and allows for the production of a substantial amount of energy. A recent study published in PNAS shows that CNTs can be safely produced on a large scale (and do not pollute the environment). A professor of chemistry at Stanford referred to recent developments as ‘good and needed.’ The fracking study offered analogous information.12 We confirmed via a pre-test (with participants not in the main experiment) that individuals viewed the source as highly credible. Again, we anticipate (see hypothesis 1, Table 2) decreases in threat and anxiety and an increase in overall support for each technology in this condition, relative to respondents who receive no information. Condition 3 added a statement that has been employed in exactly the same way in prior related work (see Bolsen et al., 2014a) that accentuates politicization, “…Yet, importantly, politics nearly always color scientific work, with advocates selectively using evidence. This leads many to say it is unclear whether to believe scientific evidence related to debates over CNTs. Some argue the process leads to pollution that harms the environment, while others disagree, pointing to evidence that there are minimal or no negative environmental consequences…” We reference contrary arguments because they are more realistic insofar as they raise uncertainty about the existence of scientific consensus without offering specific factual evidence—e.g., by citing a competing scientific study or conclusion.13 We anticipate that politicization will increase threat perceptions and anxiety and stunt overall support for each technology by rendering consensual scientific information impotent (see hypothesis 2, Table 2). Condition 4 added a warning that preceded the politicized scientific information stating, “Some say that it is difficult to assess the benefits of this process because people only point to evidence that supports their position. However, the assessment of CNTs should not be politicized; a consensus of scientists believes CNTs are better for the environment than other energy production methods.” Thus, the warning explicitly provides respondents with a message that a consensus of scientists believes CNTs are positive relative to alternative energy production methods and that their assessment should not be colored by politicization. We later debriefed these participants and informed them whether “a consensus of scientists” actually believes this is debatable. We expect the warning will cause respondents to reject future politicization due to a directional motivation to uphold the initial opinion and be open to consensual scientific information—thereby decreasing individuals' perceptions of threat and anxiety and increasing overall support for an emergent technology (see hypothesis 3, Table 2). Condition 5 included a correction nearly identical to the just described warning, but it was presented to participants after they had already been exposed to politicization. Therefore, due to directional motivated reasoning and the initial opinion toward the technology formed in the presence of politicization, we expect that a correction will not be effective at counteracting politicization, resulting in increases in threat and anxiety and decreases in overall support for an emergent technology (see hypothesis 4, Table 2). Condition 6 coupled the correction with a widely used method for inducing a motivation for accuracy. Participants were informed at the start of the survey, “At some point in this survey, we are going to ask your opinion about an approach related to energy production in the United States. When thinking about your opinion, try to view the approach in an evenhanded way. We will later ask that you justify the reasons for your judgment—that is, why the technology is more or less appealing” (see Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 1984; Tetlock, 1983). We later asked participants to justify their opinions. Prior work demonstrates that inducing accuracy-motivated reasoning causes individuals to consider information in a more evenhanded fashion with the goal of arriving at an opinion that is correct, rather than one that upholds existing beliefs or protects existing identities (e.g., Bolsen et al., 2014b; Kunda, 1990). We thus expect that corrections to dismiss politicization coupled with an accuracy motivational inducement will decrease threat and anxiety and increase overall support for each technology, relative to those who receive no information (see hypothesis 5, Table 2). As mentioned, the dependent measures followed exposure to the experimental stimuli in all conditions.14 Results As noted, we measured support for each technology with the three aforementioned items (support, investment, sustainability); we created scaled measures, using these three items for each technology, to gauge support for CNTs and for fracking. The items scaled together for each technology, coincidentally, with alphas of .94. We evaluate the impact of the experimental conditions on overall support, anxiety, and threat by regressing each dependent variable on the experimental conditions, omitting the pure control condition as the baseline (condition 1, Table 2).15 We present the results for fracking and CNTs, respectively, in Tables 3 and 4.16 (In supporting appendices available online, we report the means, standard deviations, and Ns for each condition for overall support, perceived threat, and level of anxiety for both technologies.) Table 3 Determinants of Support, Anxiety, and Threat Perceptions Toward Fracking . Support . Anxiety . Threat . Scientific information 2.14*** (0.08) −1.44*** (0.10) −1.98*** (0.14) Politicized scientific information −1.75*** (0.08) 0.66*** (0.10) 0.79*** (0.14) Warning + politicized scientific information 1.79*** (0.08) −1.31*** (0.11) −1.11*** (0.14) Politicized scientific information + correction −0.05 (0.08) −0.07 (0.10) 0.17 (0.14) Accuracy motivation + politicized scientific information + correction 0.95*** (0.08) −0.72*** (0.11) −0.21* (0.14) R2 0.73 0.35 0.30 Number of observations 1,164 1,154 1,148 . Support . Anxiety . Threat . Scientific information 2.14*** (0.08) −1.44*** (0.10) −1.98*** (0.14) Politicized scientific information −1.75*** (0.08) 0.66*** (0.10) 0.79*** (0.14) Warning + politicized scientific information 1.79*** (0.08) −1.31*** (0.11) −1.11*** (0.14) Politicized scientific information + correction −0.05 (0.08) −0.07 (0.10) 0.17 (0.14) Accuracy motivation + politicized scientific information + correction 0.95*** (0.08) −0.72*** (0.11) −0.21* (0.14) R2 0.73 0.35 0.30 Number of observations 1,164 1,154 1,148 Note: Entries are ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** p ≤ .01. ** p ≤ .05. * p ≤ .10 (one-tailed tests). Open in new tab Table 3 Determinants of Support, Anxiety, and Threat Perceptions Toward Fracking . Support . Anxiety . Threat . Scientific information 2.14*** (0.08) −1.44*** (0.10) −1.98*** (0.14) Politicized scientific information −1.75*** (0.08) 0.66*** (0.10) 0.79*** (0.14) Warning + politicized scientific information 1.79*** (0.08) −1.31*** (0.11) −1.11*** (0.14) Politicized scientific information + correction −0.05 (0.08) −0.07 (0.10) 0.17 (0.14) Accuracy motivation + politicized scientific information + correction 0.95*** (0.08) −0.72*** (0.11) −0.21* (0.14) R2 0.73 0.35 0.30 Number of observations 1,164 1,154 1,148 . Support . Anxiety . Threat . Scientific information 2.14*** (0.08) −1.44*** (0.10) −1.98*** (0.14) Politicized scientific information −1.75*** (0.08) 0.66*** (0.10) 0.79*** (0.14) Warning + politicized scientific information 1.79*** (0.08) −1.31*** (0.11) −1.11*** (0.14) Politicized scientific information + correction −0.05 (0.08) −0.07 (0.10) 0.17 (0.14) Accuracy motivation + politicized scientific information + correction 0.95*** (0.08) −0.72*** (0.11) −0.21* (0.14) R2 0.73 0.35 0.30 Number of observations 1,164 1,154 1,148 Note: Entries are ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** p ≤ .01. ** p ≤ .05. * p ≤ .10 (one-tailed tests). Open in new tab Table 4 Determinants of Support, Anxiety, and Threat Perception Toward CNTs . Support . Anxiety . Threat . Scientific information 2.26*** (0.09) −1.48*** (0.10) −2.40*** (0.11) Politicized scientific information −1.40*** (0.09) 1.16*** (0.10) 0.72***(0.11) Warning + politicized scientific information 1.59*** (0.09) −1.18*** (0.10) −1.08*** (0.11) Politicized scientific information + correction 0.20** (0.09) 0.23*** (0.10) 0.20** (0.11) Accuracy motivation + politicized scientific information + correction 0.80*** (0.09) −0.53*** (0.10) −0.36*** (0.11) R2 0.64 0.46 0.46 Number of observations 1,203 1,176 1,168 . Support . Anxiety . Threat . Scientific information 2.26*** (0.09) −1.48*** (0.10) −2.40*** (0.11) Politicized scientific information −1.40*** (0.09) 1.16*** (0.10) 0.72***(0.11) Warning + politicized scientific information 1.59*** (0.09) −1.18*** (0.10) −1.08*** (0.11) Politicized scientific information + correction 0.20** (0.09) 0.23*** (0.10) 0.20** (0.11) Accuracy motivation + politicized scientific information + correction 0.80*** (0.09) −0.53*** (0.10) −0.36*** (0.11) R2 0.64 0.46 0.46 Number of observations 1,203 1,176 1,168 Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** p ≤ .01. ** p ≤ .05. * p ≤ .10 (one-tailed tests). Open in new tab Table 4 Determinants of Support, Anxiety, and Threat Perception Toward CNTs . Support . Anxiety . Threat . Scientific information 2.26*** (0.09) −1.48*** (0.10) −2.40*** (0.11) Politicized scientific information −1.40*** (0.09) 1.16*** (0.10) 0.72***(0.11) Warning + politicized scientific information 1.59*** (0.09) −1.18*** (0.10) −1.08*** (0.11) Politicized scientific information + correction 0.20** (0.09) 0.23*** (0.10) 0.20** (0.11) Accuracy motivation + politicized scientific information + correction 0.80*** (0.09) −0.53*** (0.10) −0.36*** (0.11) R2 0.64 0.46 0.46 Number of observations 1,203 1,176 1,168 . Support . Anxiety . Threat . Scientific information 2.26*** (0.09) −1.48*** (0.10) −2.40*** (0.11) Politicized scientific information −1.40*** (0.09) 1.16*** (0.10) 0.72***(0.11) Warning + politicized scientific information 1.59*** (0.09) −1.18*** (0.10) −1.08*** (0.11) Politicized scientific information + correction 0.20** (0.09) 0.23*** (0.10) 0.20** (0.11) Accuracy motivation + politicized scientific information + correction 0.80*** (0.09) −0.53*** (0.10) −0.36*** (0.11) R2 0.64 0.46 0.46 Number of observations 1,203 1,176 1,168 Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** p ≤ .01. ** p ≤ .05. * p ≤ .10 (one-tailed tests). Open in new tab The first column in Table 3 and Table 4 reports the impact of the experimental conditions on overall support for the technology. All reported p-values are from one-tailed hypothesis tests given our predictions are directional (Blalock and Hubert, 1979). First, in support of hypothesis 1, support for fracking and CNTs increases significantly when consensual scientific information is presented relative to the baseline of no information. Also in support of hypothesis 1, the second and third columns in Table 3 and Table 4 show that anxiety and threat perceptions toward the use of the technologies significantly decrease as a result of exposure to positive consensus scientific information. This shows that, sans politicization, consensual scientific information is impactful in shaping opinions toward emergent energy technologies. Of course, the impetus for the study is to explore what often occurs in political contexts: politicization. We find, in support of hypothesis 2, that anxiety and threat perceptions increase significantly in the presence of politicization and overall support significantly decreases for each technology (see Tables 3 and 4). Although this result accentuates that politicization undermines consensual scientific information, the results reported below demonstrate ways to counteract it. We find strong support for hypothesis 3—that is, that a warning vitiates politicization and opens individuals to consensual scientific information. Indeed, Tables 3 and 4 show that the warning generated significantly higher levels of overall support for each technology relative to the baseline of no information. A warning, as Tables 3 and 4 illustrate, also reduces anxiety and perceptions of threat that stem from politicization for both fracking and CNTs. This is the first empirical evidence that we know of that demonstrates a way to counteract politicization. A warning establishes an initial attitude and causes individuals to dismiss subsequent politicization and attend to consensual scientific information. Recognizing that one cannot always anticipate politicization, hypothesis 4 focused on the impact of a correction. It posited, however, that a correction to dismiss politicization after an opinion has already been formed in its presence, due to directional motivated reasoning, would not be successful at counteracting it, leading to increased anxiety and threat perceptions and decreased support. We find little support for this hypothesis. Table 3 shows that, in the case of fracking, the correction neutralized politicization, leading to no change in support relative to the baseline. This neutralizing effect is also apparent, in the case of fracking, with no significant difference relative to the baseline for measures of anxiety and threat perception. Table 4 shows that the correction, again counter to hypothesis 4, significantly increases overall support for CNTs; however, the correction did not counteract the increased anxiety and threat that stems from politicization in this case. We suspect that these mixed findings with regard to the effect of corrections across technologies sans an accuracy motivation reflect the inclusion of strong consensual scientific information on a topic where citizens lack much prior information. This may explain why we found a larger counteractive effect resulting from the correction on CNTs relative to fracking, as citizens know even less about CNTs than fracking. One intriguing question is whether under certain conditions citizens are willing to support emergent energy technologies—e.g., that offer alternative sources of energy—even if they feel some threat and anxiety simply because the counterfactual is a continued reliance on traditional energy sources (Bolsen, 2011; Bolsen & Cook, 2008). To evaluate hypothesis 5, we assess the impact of a correction in the context of an inducement to form an accurate opinion. We find that an accuracy inducement along with a correction counteracts politicization and increases support for both CNTs and fracking (see column 1, Tables 3 and 4). We also find, in support of hypothesis 5, that a correction along with the accuracy motivation reduces anxiety and threat perceptions toward each technology (see columns 3 and 4, Tables 3 and 4). This result demonstrates that an accuracy motivation can play a powerful role in counteracting politicization in the context of competitive communication efforts to open people to consensual scientific information. We illustrate the substantive impact of the experimental conditions on overall support for each technology in Table 5 by reporting the percentage of respondents in each condition who express support above the neutral point (i.e., greater than 4) on the 7-point-scaled dependent measure. This may exaggerate the magnitude of the treatment effects given a tendency, sans information, for individuals to gravitate to the midpoint on the scale in the baseline condition. Moreover, we recognize that the size of the treatment effect is due, in large part, to the fact that most people had scant information on which to base their opinion across conditions and are captive to our survey treatments (Barabas & Jerit, 2010). The percentage of respondents expressing support for each technology is significantly higher in the presence of consensual scientific information relative to the pure control baseline (as previously demonstrated in Tables 3 and 4)—an increase in support from 17% to 95% for fracking and from 22% to 94% for CNTs. Politicization increases anxiety and perceived threat associated with the use of each technology, and this undermines the positive impact of consensual scientific information. In line with previous work (Bolsen et al., 2014a), politicization significantly decreases overall support for each technology relative to the pure control baseline. In the case of fracking, as Table 5 shows, only 4% of respondents support its use in the presence of politicization as compared to 17% in the baseline. In the case of CNTs, the decrease is smaller (5% decline) but remains statistically significant. The decline in support generated by politicization is substantial relative to the support generated by consensual scientific information in condition 2 (a decline from 95% to 4% support for fracking and from 94% to 17% support for CNTs, see Table 5). Perhaps equally striking is the impact of the warning that a scientific consensus exists and that politicization should be dismissed. In this case, as shown in Table 5, 95% of respondents in this condition express support for both fracking and CNTs. Table 5 Percentage Expressing Support for Each Technology . Fracking . CNTs . Pure Control 17% 22% Scientific information 95% 94% Politicized scientific information 4% 17% Warning + politicized scientific information 95% 95% Politicized scientific information + correction 20% 32% Accuracy motivation + politicized scientific information + correction 85% 76% . Fracking . CNTs . Pure Control 17% 22% Scientific information 95% 94% Politicized scientific information 4% 17% Warning + politicized scientific information 95% 95% Politicized scientific information + correction 20% 32% Accuracy motivation + politicized scientific information + correction 85% 76% Note: The data above report the percentage of respondents in each experimental condition who express support greater than the midpoint on the 7-point scale (i.e., =4) for each technology. Open in new tab Table 5 Percentage Expressing Support for Each Technology . Fracking . CNTs . Pure Control 17% 22% Scientific information 95% 94% Politicized scientific information 4% 17% Warning + politicized scientific information 95% 95% Politicized scientific information + correction 20% 32% Accuracy motivation + politicized scientific information + correction 85% 76% . Fracking . CNTs . Pure Control 17% 22% Scientific information 95% 94% Politicized scientific information 4% 17% Warning + politicized scientific information 95% 95% Politicized scientific information + correction 20% 32% Accuracy motivation + politicized scientific information + correction 85% 76% Note: The data above report the percentage of respondents in each experimental condition who express support greater than the midpoint on the 7-point scale (i.e., =4) for each technology. Open in new tab A correction that follows politicization, counter to hypothesis 4, does have a significant effect in increasing support for CNTs relative to the baseline of no information (an increase from 22% to 32%); however, the increase in support for fracking relative to the pure control baseline (an increase from 17% to 20%) is not statistically significant. Nonetheless, in both cases, the correction has some effect at overcoming or neutralizing the negative effects stemming from exposure to politicization. Finally, as Table 5 shows, an accuracy inducement coupled with the correction has a sizeable impact on support for the use of each technology. For fracking, the motivation for accuracy increases the impact of the corrective information by 65% (from 20% support in the corrective condition alone to 85% support when the same information is coupled with an accuracy motivation; see Table 5). The sizeable impact of the accuracy motivation is also apparent in the results from the CNT study. The accuracy motivation coupled with the correction increases support for CNTs by 44% above the correction sans the accuracy motivation (from 32% support in the corrective condition to 76% when the same information is coupled with an accuracy inducement).17 To summarize, our central findings are: The politicization of science undermines the impact of positive consensual scientific information, increases anxiety and threat, and significantly decreases support for emergent energy technologies. Thus, as many have worried, politicization appears to have significant negative implications for new technologies in the absence of counteractive efforts—e.g., by individuals and scientific organizations. The impact of politicization can be counteracted by warnings, or corrections, which increase the impact of consensual scientific information and decrease anxiety and perceived threat stemming from politicization. As we anticipated, warnings are more effective than corrections at counteracting politicization given the prevalence of directional motivated reasoning in this domain. Corrections to dismiss politicization can be effective at combating politicization, especially in the presence of an accuracy motivation; however, a correction by itself does not always eliminate the threat and anxiety generated by politicization. Overall, warnings appear to be the most effective method to counteract politicization; however, should that not be possible, a correction can counteract politicization, particularly in cases where there is a scientific consensus and individuals pursue accuracy motivational goals in processing scientific information. Conclusion We offer a conceptual framework and empirical evidence on how the politicization of science operates in a competitive rhetorical environment. In doing so, we also put forth a research agenda with at least four pressing issues. First, scientists are an obvious potential source of counteractive communications. Yet, to date, scientists generally have not been active in policy debates. Uhlenbrock et al. (2014) explain, “scientists shy away from being part of this dialogue because some science policy issues have become polarized… [yet] however ominous it may seem for scientists to venture into the communication world, there is a great need not only for dissemination of the information but also for science to have a regular voice in the conversation” (p. 95) (also see Lupia, 2014). Scientists cannot do this alone, however, and thus some of the responsibility falls on scientific organizations: “Scientific societies and organizations can play a central role in science policy discourse in addition to an individual scientist's voice” (Uhlenbrock et al., 2014, p. 98; also see Newport et al., 2013). This is critical if scientific disciplines hope to present consensus or near consensus statements about varying scientific issues. As mentioned, the NAS serves this role as part of their mission, but, given the challenge of the current and changing media landscape, other disciplinary organizations need to complement the NAS both in identifying areas of consensus and in making a concerted effort to communicate findings to broader segments of the population. Promoting such communication is important to ensure not only adequate public understanding but also scientific funding. As Lupia (2014) makes clear, “Congress is not obligated to spend a single cent on scientific research” (p. 5) (italics in the original). He continues, “Honest, empirically informed and technically precise analyses of the past provide the strongest foundation for knowledge and can significantly clarify the future implications of current actions” (p. 5). A second central issue involves citizen motivation. Given that, in most circumstances, communications attempting to counteract politicization come after it has occurred (i.e., a correction), our results highlight the importance of developing methods to motivate citizens to process information in an evenhanded fashion with the goal of forming and holding an accurate belief. Although the bulk of Americans may not currently be particularly motivated to process information on science-related issues in this manner, this could change as issues about sustainability and energy sources become more localized (i.e., personally relevant to individuals) (Druckman, 2013). For example, the use of novel approaches to obtain energy (e.g., fracking) becomes the subject of debate as they are implemented in local communities. Localization stimulates individuals to process information with an accuracy motivation (Dietz, 2013; Leeper, 2012; Lupia, 2013). Sinatra et al. (2014, p. 131) suggest that with sustainability issues, individuals who have a vested interest in understanding the best local outcome are less likely to engage in directional motivated reasoning (i.e., processing information with the goal being to protect one's existing beliefs) (also see Leeper, 2012). In addition to localizing issues, motivation can be induced when information comes from varying sources with ostensibly different agendas (e.g., a mix of Democrats and Republicans) (Bolsen et al., 2014b) and/or when individuals anticipate having to explain their opinions to others (akin to our experimental manipulation). This latter method can be pursued by increased usage of participatory engagement/deliberations where people have to justify their opinions and beliefs publicly (Dietz, 2013; Druckman, 2012, 2014; Klar, 2014; Sinclair, 2012). Third, our results accentuate the importance of the quality rather than the quantity of political information. Social scientists often focus on “how much” individuals know (for a detailed discussion of the normative criteria scholars have used to judge the quality of citizens' opinions, see Druckman, 2014)—this is captured in the scientific literacy framework of opinion formation (e.g., Miller, 1998). More information per se, though, does not generate opinions that cohere with extant scientific consensus (Kahan 2012; 2015; Kahan et al., 2011). What is more important is the type of information that is conveyed, with the key being communicating the existence of a consensus when it exists. This of course raises another perplexing issue, however. That is, whether scientists in this day and age can in fact arrive at a consensus and successfully communicate this in a way that informs public dialogue. As mentioned, we focus on situations in which positive consensual scientific information exists and the communications are in support of a technology's usage, but we acknowledge that arriving at this consensus in the first place can itself be difficult. Here, the obstacle is not communication per se but the need for scientists and scientific organizations to work toward arriving at consensual viewpoints and then, when not possible, highlighting points of consensus and areas of uncertainty (Dietz, 2013). A fourth question for future work, in terms of studying communication effects, concerns what occurs when there is not a clear scientific consensus. It is critical to explore ways to credibly communicate alternative perspectives and the accompanying inherent uncertainty that accompanies scientific consensus statements. Identifying effective communication tactics and understanding how citizens process various forms of scientific information is of utmost importance to ensure science works to enhance human well-being. Supporting Information Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article: Appendix S1. Experimental Material and Additional Results Acknowledgment We thank Adam Howat for helpful advice. Notes 1 " Frames are distinct from facts insofar as they prioritize a consideration that may—but need not—include factual content. Although frames sometimes include factual content, in practice, most frames are “fact free” (i.e., do not report a verifiable and reproducible observation stemming from the scientific method) (e.g., Berinsky & Kinder, 2006; Nelson, Oxley, & Clawson, 1997). 2 " Interestingly, Bolsen et al. (2014a) also report that politicization does not undermine consensual scientific information opposed to the use of an emergent technology, likely reflecting the disproportionate weight of negative information (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). We thus focus on situations where there is positive consensual scientific information regarding an emergent technology's societal benefits and where counter efforts are necessary to combat politicization. 3 " This prediction is orthogonal to work on scientific literacy, which focuses on how accumulated knowledge about basic science influences opinions. Recent work suggests that those with more basic knowledge about science hold more polarized attitudes (e.g., Scheufele & Lewenstein, 2005, p. 660; Kahan, 2012, p. 735; Kahan, 2015). The critical distinction between our research and research on scientific literacy is that we focus not on the quantity of basic scientific information, as in prior work, but rather on the impact of high quality and specific information on opinion formation. 4 " A National Research Council (1994, p. 4) report implicitly recognizes how politicization can undermine the impact of scientific information: “Decision-making based on risk assessment is also bogged down. Uncertainty, an inherent property of scientific data, continues to lead to multiple interpretations and contribute to decision-making gridlock.” 5 " Motivated reasoning encompasses a range of distinct goals, including defending prior opinions and behavioral impression motivation (see Kunda, 1999, Chapter 6); however, we follow political communication work to date focusing on directional and accuracy goals. 6 " The theory also suggests people seek out information that confirms prior beliefs (i.e., a confirmation bias), but that is not relevant to our focus (see Druckman, Fein, & Leeper, 2012). Also, Lodge and Taber (2013) explain, “The fundamental assumption driving our model is that both affective and cognitive reactions to external and internal events are triggered unconsciously, followed spontaneously by the spreading of activation through associative pathways which link thoughts to feelings, so that events that occur very early, even those that remain invisible to conscious awareness, set the direction for all subsequent processing… A stimulus event triggers the stream of processing, proceeding through affective and then cognitive mediators, and perhaps leading to the construction of evaluations of political objects and conscious deliberation” (p.18). Lodge and Taber then depict the psychological process such that the emotional aspects are largely contained in the unconscious part of the processing that precedes the formation of stated attitudes. Along these lines, they point out that “absent from [our Figure] is any mention of emotions” (2013, p. 21). In short, emotions play an important role in motivated reasoning, but—because this occurs unconsciously and we do not explore unconscious processes—our focus is on the cognitive aspects of opinion formation. 7 " Druckman and Bolsen's (2011) study is distinct from our focus because they explore the impact of a single piece of evidence that contains factual information (i.e., citing the results of a study) compared to a similar frame that lacks factual content (see endnote 1); they also do not study the impact of politicization or the impact of efforts to counteract it. 8 " Lodge and Taber (2013, pp. 35–36) explain that motivated reasoning, such as this, entails “systematic biasing of judgments in favor of one's immediately accessible beliefs and feelings.… [It is] built into the basic architecture of information processing mechanisms of the brain.” 9 " Most past work on motivated reasoning focuses on how initial opinions with regard to a certain attitude object (e.g., an emergent technology, a political issue) shape subsequent attitudes and information-seeking behavior. Yet, the basic psychological processes apply straightforwardly to beliefs about politicization. Our hypothesis also coheres, to some extent, with inoculation theory, which suggests that warnings can shape the impact of subsequent attempts at persuasion. The difference is that the focus in inoculation theory is on how to prevent future persuasion, whereas our focus—based in motivated reasoning theory—is on how communications can allow individuals to dismiss politicization and be open to persuasion (Compton & Pfau, 2005; Ivanov et al., 2012; McGuire, 1964; Pfau, 1997). 10 " The expectation that warnings will have a greater impact than corrections is consistent with research in different domains that shows warnings exhibit stronger effects than corrections (Compton & Pfau, 2005, p.117; Einwiller & Johar, 2013, p.119; Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; also see Cobb et al., 2013, p. 308). 11 " We hired the firm ResearchNow to conduct the survey. They collected the data from a non-probability-based but representative (on all key census demographics) sample of the United States. When it comes to experimental research, such a sample is sufficient to ensure generalizable causal inferences (Druckman & Kam, 2011). Supplemental appendices are available online that report the sample compositions. 12 " We used quotes from actual articles reporting the findings from studies on CNTs and fracking (Strehlow, 2005; Wines, 2013) that focused on evidence in favor of each technology's usage. As explained, this is a fruitful starting point given prior work suggesting that politicization renders positive information about the usage of an emergent energy technology impotent (Bolsen et al., 2014a). Other than identifying the source of the information as credible, we opted not to vary the source given that we believe this offers an important initial test. Future work should explore source dynamics but doing so would have at least doubled the number of experimental conditions in our large studies. The complete wording of the stimuli for all experimental conditions we discuss in the main text is available in supplementary appendices online. 13 " We found, in pretests, that politicization induced a belief that political considerations affected the presentation of scientific information. We also opted, in this initial study, not to present an explicit political agenda as motivating politicization so as to avoid confounds of political leanings. Clearly, future work is needed to isolate the impact of the political sources that use such communications. 14 " Both experiments included two additional conditions that we do not discuss in the main text. The first condition included the accuracy prompt along with politicization. The second included the accuracy prompt along with politicization preceded by a warning. We included these for exploratory purposes; we do not present them here because we had no clear expectations. Details reporting the exact wording of the stimuli for those conditions and all results are reported in supplementary appendices available online. 15 " We confirmed the success of random assignment, and thus, the results we report to assess the effects of the experimental treatments on our dependent measures are robust to the inclusion of a host of demographic variables. Additionally, we asked respondents, as a manipulation check, the extent to which political considerations affect the nature of the information that the public receives about the technology. As expected, individuals in the conditions where politicization was present viewed political considerations as significantly more salient than those in other conditions. These results are available in supplementary appendices available online. 16 " The Ns in the tables are slightly lower than the overall N due to non-response on specific items. Although it is implicit that anxiety and threat mediate the impact of the communications on overall support, the design of our experiment precludes testing for mediation (see Bullock & Ha, 2011). 17 " Two other findings are of note that we do not address in the main text. First, we asked respondents if they would like to be re-contacted with more information about either fracking or CNTs. The results—available in supplementary appendices online—show that the desire to obtain more information decreases in conditions where anxiety and threat decrease and support for the technology increases. For example, when positive scientific information is presented only 7% to 9% of respondents requested to receive more information about fracking or CNTs, respectively, whereas the percentages requesting information in the presence of politicization ranged from 56% to 73%. A warning or correction with an accuracy motivation significantly reduced perceptions of threat and anxiety associated with each technology's usage and reduced the associated information seeking that anxiety and threat induce, with the warning generating a greater reduction than the correction. We anticipated these results given that it is well established that anxiety generates information-seeking behavior (e.g., Briñol & Petty, 2005, p. 298–299; Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000, but see Case, 2012, Chapter 5, p. 115, on contexts where anxiety can lead to information avoidance). Nonetheless, they raise a perplexing challenge for science communication because efforts to reduce the impact of politicization when consensual scientific information exists cause individuals to be less interested in learning about emergent scientific technologies. Second, as mentioned in a prior note, we asked respondents the extent to which they believe that political considerations affect the nature of the information that the public receives when it comes to fracking or CNTs. Although we find that these scores significantly correlate with a different question that we asked about whether respondents believe political considerations affect the nature of the information that the public believes when it comes to science in general (for fracking, r = .29; p ≤ .01; for CNTs, r = .23; p ≤ .01), given the similarity of the questions, the modest size of the correlations suggests that politicization is a domain-specific dynamic. References Arceneaux , K. ( 2012 ). Cognitive biases and the strength of political arguments . American Journal of Political Science , 56 ( 2 ), 271 – 285 . doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00573.x. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Barabas , J. , & Jerit , J. ( 2010 ). Are survey experiments externally valid? American Political Science Review , 104 ( 2 ), 226 – 242 . doi:10.1017/S0003055410000092. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Bauer , M. , Allum , N., & Miller , S. ( 2007 ). What can we learn from 25 years of PUS survey research? Liberating and expanding the agenda . Public Understanding of Science , 16 ( 1 ), 79 – 95 . doi:10.1177/0963662506071287. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Baumeister , R. F. , Bratslavsky , E., Finkenauer , C., & Vohs , K. D. ( 2001 ). Bad is stronger than good . Review of General Psychology , 5 ( 4 ), 323 – 370 . doi:10.1037/1089-2680.5.4.323. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Berinsky , A. J. , & Kinder , D. R. ( 2006 ). Making sense of issues through media frames: Understanding the Kosovo crisis . Journal of Politics , 68 ( 3 ), 640 – 656 . doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00451.x. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Blalock , J. , & Hubert , M. ( 1979 ). Social statistics (2nd ed.). New York, NY : McGraw-Hill . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Bolsen , T . ( 2011 ). The construction of news: Energy crises, advocacy messages, and frames toward conservation . International Journal of Press / Politics , 16 (2) , 143 – 162 . doi:10.1177/1940161210392782. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Bolsen , T. & Cook , F. L. ( 2008 ). Public opinion on energy policy, 1974–2006 . Public Opinion Quarterly , 72 (2 ), 364 – 388 . doi:10.1093/poq/nfn019. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Bolsen , T. , Druckman , J. N., & Cook , F. L. ( 2014a ). How frames can stunt support for scientific adaptations: Politicization and the status quo bias . Public Opinion Quarterly , 78 ( 1 ), 1 – 26 . doi:10.1093/poq/nft044. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Bolsen , T. , Druckman , J. N., & Cook , F. L. ( 2014b ). The influence of partisan motivated reasoning on public opinion . Political Behavior , 36 ( 2 ), 235 – 262 . doi:10.1007/s11109-013-9238-0. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Boudet , H. , Clarke , C., Bugden , D., Maibach , M., Roser-Renouf , C., & Leiserowitz , A. ( 2014 ). “Fracking” controversy and communication: Using national survey data to understand public perceptions of hydraulic fracturing . Energy Policy , 65 , 57 – 67 . doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2013.10.017. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Briñol , P. , & Petty , R. E. ( 2005 ). Individual differences in persuasion. In D. Albarracin, B. T. Johnson, & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), The handbook of attitudes (pp. 575 – 616 ). New York, NY : Erlbaum . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Bullock , J. , & Ha , S. E. ( 2011 ). Mediational analysis is harder than it looks. In J. N. Druckman, D. P. Green, J. H. Kuklinski, & A. Lupia (Eds.), Cambridge handbook of experimental political science (pp. 508–521). New York, NY : Cambridge University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Caplin , A. , & Leahy , J. ( 2001 ). Psychological expected utility theory and anticipatory feelings . The Quarterly Journal of Economics , 116 ( 1 ), 55 – 79 . doi:10.1162/003355301556347. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Case , D. O. ( 2012 ). Looking for information: A survey of research on information seeking, needs and behavior . Bingley, England : Emerald . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Chong , D. , & Druckman , J. N. ( 2007 ). A theory of framing and opinion formation in competitive elite environments . Journal of Communication , 57 ( 1 ), 99 – 118 . doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2006.00331.x. OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Chong , D. , & Druckman , J. N. ( 2010 ). Counterframing effects . Journal of Politics , 75 ( 1 ), 1 – 16 . doi:10.1017/S0022381612000837. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Cobb , M. D. , Nyhan , B., & Reifler , J. ( 2013 ). Beliefs don't always persevere: How political figures are punished when positive information about them is discredited . Political Psychology , 34 ( 3 ), 307 – 326 . doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2012.00935.x. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Compton , J. A. , & Pfau , M. ( 2005 ). Inoculation theory of resistance to influence at maturity: Recent progress in theory development and application and suggestions for future research . Communication Yearbook , 29 , 97 – 145 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Constans , J. I. ( 2001 ). Worry propensity and the perception of risk . Behaviour Research and Therapy , 39 ( 6 ), 721 – 729 . doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(00)00037-1. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS PubMed WorldCat Delli Carpini , M. X. , & Keeter , S. ( 1996 ). What Americans know about politics and why it matters . New Haven, CT : Yale University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Dietz , T. ( 2013 ). Bringing values and deliberation to science communication . Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America , 110 ( 3 ), 14081 – 14087 . doi:10.1073/pnas.1212740110. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS PubMed WorldCat Druckman , J. N. ( 2001 ). Evaluating framing effects . Journal of Economic Psychology , 22 ( 1 ), 91 – 101 . doi:10.1016/S0167-4870(00)00032-5. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Druckman , J. N. ( 2012 ). The politics of motivation . Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society , 24 ( 2 ), 199 – 216 . doi:10.1080/08913811.2012.711022. OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Druckman , J. N. ( 2013 ). Stunted policy support . Nature Climate Change , 3 ( 7 ), 617 . doi:10.1038/nclimate1939. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Druckman , J. N. ( 2014 ). Pathologies of studying public opinion, political communication, and democratic responsiveness . Political Communication , 31 ( 3 ), 467 – 492 . doi:10.1080/10584609.2013.852643. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Druckman , J. N. , & Bolsen , T. ( 2011 ). Framing, motivated reasoning, and opinions about emergent technologies . Journal of Communication , 61 ( 4 ), 659 – 688 . doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2011.01562.x. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Druckman , J. N. , Fein , J., & Leeper , T. J. ( 2012 ). A source of bias in public opinion stability . American Political Science Review , 106 ( 2 ), 430 – 454 . doi:10.1017/S0003055412000123. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Druckman , J. N. , & Kam , C. ( 2011 ). Students as experimental participants: A defense of the ‘narrow data base’. In J. N. Druckman, D. Green, J. Kuklinski, & A. Lupia (Eds.), Cambridge handbook of experimental political science (pp. 41 – 57 ). New York, NY : Cambridge University Press . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Druckman , J. N. , & McDermott , R. ( 2008 ). Emotion and the framing of risky choice . Political Behavior , 30 ( 3 ), 297 – 321 . doi:10.1007/s11109-008-9056-y. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Druckman , J. N. , Peterson , E., & Slothuus , R. ( 2013 ). How elite partisan polarization affects public opinion formation . American Political Science Review , 107 ( 1 ), 57 – 79 . doi:10.1017/S0003055412000500. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Eagly , A. H. , & Chaiken , S. ( 1993 ). The psychology of attitudes . Orlando, FL : Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Einwiller , S. A. , & Johar , G. V. ( 2013 ). Countering accusations with inoculation: The moderating role of consumer-company identification . Public Relations Review , 39 ( 3 ), 198 – 206 . doi:10.1016/j.pubrev.2013.03.002. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Freudenburg , W. R. , Gramling , R., & Davidson , D. J. ( 2008 ). Scientific certainty argumentation methods (SCAMs): Science and the politics of doubt . Sociological Inquiry , 78 ( 1 ), 2 – 38 . doi:10.1111/j.1475-682X.2008.00219.x. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Hansson , S. O. ( 1996 ). Defining pseudo-science . Philosophia Naturalis , 33 ( 1 ), 169 – 176 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Hirsh , J. B. , Mar , R. A., & Peterson , J. B. ( 2012 ). Psychological entropy: A framework for understanding uncertainty-related anxiety . Psychological Review , 119 ( 2 ), 304 – 320 . doi:10.1037/a0026767. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS PubMed WorldCat Horgan , J. ( 2005 ). The Republican war on science: Review. New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/18/books/review/18horgan.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. Ivanov , B. , Miller , C. H., Compton , J., Averbeck , J. M., Harrison , K. J., Sims , J. D., … Parker , J. L. ( 2012 ). Effects of postinoculation talk on resistance to influence . Journal of Communication , 62 ( 4 ), 701 – 718 . doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01658.x. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Jasanoff , S. ( 1987 ). Contested boundaries in policy-relevant science . Social Studies of Science , 17 ( 2 ), 195 – 230 . doi:10.1177/030631287017002001. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Kahan , D. M. ( 2012 ). Cultural cognition as a conception of the cultural theory of risk. In S. Roeser (Ed.), Handbook of risk theory (pp. 725 – 759 ). New York, NY : Springer . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Kahan , D. M. ( 2015 ). Climate-science communication and the measurement problem . Political Psychology , 36 ( S1 ), 1 – 43 . doi:10.1111/pops.12244. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Kahan , D. M. , Braman , D., Slovic , P., Gastil , J., & Cohen , G. ( 2009 ). Cultural cognition of the risks and benefits of nanotechnology . Nature Nanotechnology , 4 ( 2 ), 87 – 90 . doi:10.1038/nnano.2008.341. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS PubMed WorldCat Kahan , D. M. , Jenkins-Smith , H., & Braman , D. ( 2011 ). Cultural cognition of scientific consensus . The Journal of Risk Research , 14 ( 2 ), 147 – 174 . doi:10.1080/13669877.2010.511246. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Kahneman , D. ( 2011 ). Thinking, fast and slow . New York, NY: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux. Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Kahneman , D. , Knetsch , J. L., & Thaler , R. H. ( 1991 ). Anomalies: The endowment effect, loss aversion, and the status quo bias . The Journal of Economic Perspectives , 5 ( 1 ), 193 – 206 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Klar , S. ( 2014 ). Partisanship in a social setting . American Journal of Political Science , 58 ( 3 ), 687 – 704 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Kruglanski , A. W. , & Stroebe , W. ( 2005 ). The influence of beliefs and goals on attitudes: Issues of structure, function, and dynamics. In D. Albarracin, B. T. Johnson, & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), The handbook of attitudes (pp. 323 – 368 ). Mahwah, NJ : Erlbaum . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Kuklinski , J. H. , Quirk , P. J., Jerit , J., Schwieder , D., & Rich , R. F. ( 2000 ). Misinformation and the currency of democratic citizenship . Journal of Politics , 62 ( 3 ), 790 – 816 . doi:10.1111/0022-3816.00033. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Kunda , Z. ( 1990 ). The case for motivated reasoning . Psychological Bulletin , 108 ( 3 ), 480 – 498 . doi:10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.480. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS PubMed WorldCat Kunda , Z. ( 1999 ). Social cognition: Making sense of people . Cambridge, MA : MIT Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Lavine , H. , Johnston , C., & Steenbergen , M. ( 2012 ). The ambivalent partisan: How critical loyalty promotes democracy . New York, NY : Oxford University Press . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Leeper , T. ( 2012 ). Essays on political information and the dynamics of public opinion. Doctoral dissertation, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL. Lerner , J. S. , & Tetlock , P. E. ( 1999 ). Accounting for the effects of accountability . Psychological Bulletin , 125 ( 2 ), 255 – 275 . doi:10.1037/0033-2909.125.2.255. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS PubMed WorldCat Lodge , M. , & Taber , C. S. ( 2000 ). Three steps toward a theory of motivated political reasoning. In A. Lupia, M. McCubbins, & S. Popkin (Eds.), Elements of reason: Cognition, choice, and the bounds of rationality (pp. 183 – 213 ). New York, NY : Cambridge University Press . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Lodge , M. , & Taber , C. S. ( 2013 ). The rationalizing voter . Cambridge, MA : Cambridge University Press . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Lord , C. G. , Lepper , M. R., & Preston , E. ( 1984 ). Considering the opposite: A corrective strategy for social judgment . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 47 ( 6 ), 1231 – 1243 . doi:10.1037/0022-3514.47.6.1231. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS PubMed WorldCat Lupia , A. ( 2006 ). How elitism undermines the study of voter competence . The Critical Review , 18 ( 1–3 ), 217 – 232 . doi:10.1080/08913810608443658. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Lupia , A. ( 2013 ). Communicating science in politicized environments . Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America , 110 ( 3 ), 14048 – 14054 . doi:10.1073/pnas.1212726110. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS PubMed WorldCat Lupia , A. ( 2014 ). What is the value of social science? Challenges for researchers and government funders . PS: Political Science & Politics , 47 ( 1 ), 1 – 7 . doi:10.1017/S1049096513001613. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Maner , J. K. , & Schmidt , N. B. ( 2006 ). The role of risk avoidance in anxiety . Behavior Therapy , 37 ( 2 ), 181 – 189 . doi:10.1016/j.beth.2005.11.003. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS PubMed WorldCat Marcus , G. E. , Neuman , W. R., & MacKuen , M. ( 2000 ). Affective intelligence and political judgment . Chicago, IL : University of Chicago Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC McGuire , W. J. ( 1964 ). Inducing resistance to persuasion: Some contemporary approaches . Advances in Experimental Social Psychology , 1 , 191 – 229 . doi:10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60052-0. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Miller , J. D. ( 1998 ). The measurement of civic scientific literacy . Public Understanding of Science , 7 ( 3 ), 203 – 223 . doi:10.1088/0963-6625/7/3/001. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat National Research Council ( 1994 ). Science and judgment in risk assessment . Washington, DC : The National Academies Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Nature ( 2010 ). Science scorned . Nature , 467 ( 7312 ), 133 . doi:10.1038/467133a. OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Nelson , T. E. , Oxley , Z. M., & Clawson , R. A. ( 1997 ). Toward a psychology of framing effects . Political Behavior , 19 ( 3 ), 221 – 246 . doi:10.1023/A:1024834831093. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Newport , F. , Shapiro , R., Ayres , W., Belden , N., Fishkin , J., Fung , A., … Warren , M. ( 2013 ). Polling and democracy: Executive summary of the AAPOR task force report on public opinion and leadership . Public Opinion Quarterly , 77 ( 4 ), 853 – 860 . doi:10.1093/poq/nft039. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Nir , L. ( 2011 ). Motivated reasoning and public opinion perception . Public Opinion Quarterly , 75 ( 3 ), 504 – 532 . doi:10.1093/poq/nfq076. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Nyhan , B. , & Reifler , J. ( 2010 ). When corrections fail: The persistence of political misperceptions . Political Behavior , 32 ( 2 ), 303 – 330 . doi:10.1007/s11109-010-9112-2. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat O'Keefe , D. ( 2002 ). Persuasion (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA : Sage . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Oreskes , N. , & Conway , E. ( 2010 ). Merchants of doubt . New York, NY : Bloomsbury . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Pew Research Center . ( 2009 , October 22). Fewer Americans see solid evidence of global warming. Retrieved from http://www.people-press.org/2009/10/22/fewer-americans-see-solid-evidence-of-global-warming/. Pfau , M. ( 1997 ). The inoculation model of resistance to influence. In G. A. Barnett, & F. J. Boster (Eds.), Progress in communication sciences (Vol. 13, pp. 133 – 172 ). Greenwich, CT : Ablex . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Pfau , M. , & Burgoon , M. ( 1988 ). Inoculation in political campaign communication . Human Communication Research , 15 ( 1 ), 91 – 111 . doi:10.1111/j.1468-2958.1988.tb00172.x. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Pielke , R. ( 2007 ). The honest broker: Making sense of science in policy and politics . Cambridge, England : Cambridge University Press . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Polasky , S. , Carpenter , S. R., Folke , C., & Keeler , B. ( 2011 ). Decision-making under great uncertainty: Environmental management in an era of global change . Trends in Ecology and Evolution , 26 ( 8 ), 398 – 404 . doi:10.1016/j.tree.2011.04.007. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS PubMed WorldCat Popper , K. R. ( 1984 ). In search of a better world: Lectures and essays from thirty years . New York, NY : Routledge . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Prior , M. , Sood , G., & Khanna , K. ( 2013 ). The impact of accuracy incentives on partisan bias in reports of economic perceptions. Retrieved from http://www.princeton.edu/∼mprior/PSKPartisanBias.current.pdf. Scheufele , D. A. , & Lewenstein , B. V. ( 2005 ). The public and nanotechnology: How citizens make sense of emerging technologies . Journal of Nanoparticle Research , 7 ( 6 ), 659 – 667 . doi:10.1007/s11051-005-7526-2. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Shadish , W. R. , Cook , T. D., & Campbell , D. T. ( 2002 ). Experimental and quasi-experimental designs for generalized causal inference . Boston, MA : Houghton Mifflin . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Shapiro , R. Y. , & Bloch-Elkon , Y. ( 2008 ). Do the facts speak for themselves? Partisan disagreement as a challenge to democratic competence . The Critical Review , 20 ( 1–2 ), 115 – 139 . doi:10.1080/08913810802316373. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Shwed , U. , & Bearman , P. S. ( 2010 ). The temporal structure of scientific consensus formation . American Sociological Review , 75 ( 6 ), 817 – 840 . doi:10.1177/0003122410388488. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS PubMed WorldCat Sinatra , G. M. , Kienhues , D., & Hofer , B. K. ( 2014 ). Addressing challenges to public understanding of science: Epistemic cognition, motivated reasoning, and conceptual change . Educational Psychologist , 49 ( 2 ), 123 – 138 . doi:10.1080/00461520.2014.916216. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Sinclair , B. ( 2012 ). The social citizen: Peer networks and political behavior . Chicago, IL : University of Chicago Press . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Slothuus , R. , & de Vreese , C. H. ( 2010 ). Political parties, motivated reasoning, and issue framing effects . Journal of Politics , 72 ( 3 ), 630 – 645 . doi:10.1017/S002238161000006X. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Steketee , M. ( 2010 , November 20). Some skeptics make it a habit to be wrong. The Australian. Retrieved from http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/some-sceptics-make-it-a-habit-to-be-wrong/story-fn59niix-1225956414538?nk=88273c4b51f7681ad3c1847e54436548. Strehlow , A. ( 2005 ). Scientists find new method for creating high-yield single-walled carbon nanotubes. Stanford Report. Retrieved from: http://news.stanford.edu/news/2005/october26/dai-102605.html. Taber , C. S. , & Lodge , M. ( 2006 ). Motivated skepticism in the evaluation of political beliefs . American Journal of Political Science , 50 ( 3 ), 755 – 769 . doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00214.x. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Tetlock , P. E. ( 1983 ). Accountability and complexity of thought . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 45 ( 1 ), 74 – 83 . doi:10.1037/0022-3514.45.1.74. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Uhlenbrock , K. , Landau , E., & Hankin , E. ( 2014 ). Science communication and the role of scientists in the policy discussion. In J. L. Drake, Y. Y. Kontar, & G. S. Rife (Eds.), New trends in earth-science outreach and engagement advances in natural and technological hazards research (Vol. 38, pp. 93 – 105 ). Enfield, England : Springer . doi:10.1007/978-3-319-01821-8_7. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Weisenfeld , U. , & Ott , I. ( 2011 ). Academic discipline and risk perception of technologies: An empirical study . Research Policy , 40 ( 3 ), 487 – 499 . doi:10.1016/j.respol.2010.12.003. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Wines , M. ( 2013 ). Gas leaks in fracking disputed in study. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/17/us/gas-leaks-in-fracking-less-than-estimated.html. © 2015 International Communication Association

Dunaway, Johanna, L.;Davis, Nicholas, T.;Padgett,, Jeremy;Scholl, Rosanne, M.

doi: 10.1111/jcom.12172pmid: N/A

Abstract This article examines whether objective campaign news stories—defined here as those with equitable tone toward 2 competing candidates—are less informative than slanted stories favoring one candidate over the other. Using a large news content dataset composed of campaign news stories from statewide elections in 2004, 2006, and 2008, we measure news story quality 6 different ways. It is modeled as a function of differences in story tone toward opposing candidates and a host of other news outlet and electoral characteristics known to influence the nature and type of information in campaign news. We find that slant is positively related to the likelihood that news articles focus on substance, issues, and include sourced content. This article examines the relationship between objectivity and information bias in election news stories. The expansion of choice brought about by the current media landscape has breathed new life into longstanding concerns about partisan bias in the media (Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013; Prior, 2013; Stroud, 2010, 2011). Yet, despite often being touted as an economic consequence of the so-called new media environment, concerns about the implications of political media bias are not always weighed against other important consequences of the structural and economic challenges of news-making.1 In fact, several news biases have a history of being intertwined with the economic and structural constraints of journalism, though this is underappreciated in public and sometimes scholarly debates. These constraints have fostered: informational biases resulting in less news quality (Baker, 2002; Bennett, 2012; Hamilton, 2004; McManus, 1994); affective biases such as negativity, incivility, and cynicism in news (Geer, 2012; Mutz & Reeves, 2005; Patterson, 1994, 1996); as well as partisan news bias (Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2010). Typically, ideological and partisan biases in news are treated as more pernicious when, democratically speaking, informational and affective biases could be equally or more harmful. Few studies empirically compare the relative effects of each, or examine the relationships between these biases in content. The primary empirical focus of this article is on the relative information quality of objective campaign news versus campaign news that favors one candidate over the other. Our research question asks whether objective campaign news—defined as coverage equitable in tone toward two opposing candidates—is less informative than slanted coverage equitable in tone toward two opposing candidates—is less informative than slanted coverage favoring one candidate over the other.2 We examine this question in the context of the ways in which economics and the structures, norms, and routines of journalism influence political news content. We demonstrate there may be some positive informational benefits of news that is slanted in favor of one candidate over the other. In light of our findings we question whether, relative to affective and informational biases, concerns about the detrimental effects of slanted news may be overstated. Fragmented media landscape: Implications for journalists, politicians, and audiences The media environment has evolved into a fragmented landscape, drastically altering the economic and structural constraints of journalism (Napoli, 2010, 2011), the choice and autonomy available to news audiences (Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013; Napoli, 2011; Prior, 2007; Stroud, 2010, 2011), and the strategic calculations of candidates and officeholders (Groeling, 2010). Despite these significant disruptions, many of our collective expectations about normatively or professionally desirable news are not yet updated to reflect these changes. A main driver of concern about media fragmentation is that increasingly specialized news media leads to fragmented audiences and silos of partisan discourse (Sunstein, 2001). Yet, there is limited evidence that the effects of partisan or affective news biases hold over time among the mass public (Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013; Prior, 2013). Arceneaux and Johnson (2013) demonstrate how a high choice media environment attenuates mass effects from partisan news due to defection from news for entertainment. Soroka (2014) finds that the individual effects of negative news decay over time. Meanwhile, partisan news is appealing to audiences who routinely prefer like-minded to counterattitudinal news (Stroud, 2011). The same is true of negative news. Individuals are more attentive to and affected by negative news relative to positive news (Soroka, 2014). At a time when media choice is expanding the knowledge gap between those who are interested in politics and those who are not (Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013; Prior, 2007), it is natural to revisit broadcast era notions of what journalists, politicians, and audiences want and need from political news. Journalists' interests The norms to which journalists adhere and the routines that they follow shape the substance of political news (Arnold, 2004; Breed, 1955; Cook, 2005; Epstein, 1973; Kaniss, 1991; McManus, 1994; Tuchman, 1972). Journalism students in introductory reporting classes learn about the characteristics of news—timeliness, impact, prominence, proximity, novelty, conflict, and objectivity—and are expected to integrate these characteristics into their reporting and news writing. On the job, these values are reinforced through newsroom socialization (Breed, 1955; Tuchman, 1972). These traditional news values were formed on expectations about what audiences (and advertisers) want in the advertiser-funded economic model of traditional media institutions (Napoli, 2011). For example, Hamilton (2004) documents how the movement away from the partisan press was prompted largely by the invention of high speed presses and commercial pressures to appeal to the widest possible audience: “To reach more readers, and therefore spread the high fixed costs across many consumers, newspapers stopped talking about politics in an explicitly partisan manner. Independent papers could draw readers from across the political spectrum” (Hamilton, 2004, p. 3). The empirical link between partisan coverage and commercial pressures also coincides with the professionalization of journalism over time, and the growth of an overtly economically driven press system. The coupling of professionalized journalism and the complete evolution to fully market based news has yielded some well-documented consequences for political news content, such as correlations between low news quality and outlet profit maximization (Arnold, 2004; Hamilton, 2004; McManus, 1994), and an emphasis on negative, cynical, and sensational political news (Iyengar, Norpoth, & Hahn, 2004; Patterson, 1994). Traditionally, the criterion of objectivity, which includes detachment, nonpartisanship, and balance, has been of particular importance in the electoral arena. This is especially true given widely held perceptions that journalists and news organizations abandon objectivity to insert their ideological aims into news, even in the absence of systematic empirical evidence (Cook, 2005; Kahn & Kenney, 2002a; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). Journalists and news organizations have often been accused of uneven treatment of opposing candidates. In today's hostile media environment, journalists and mainstream news organizations are especially sensitive to charges of bias and are vigilant in their adherence to objectivity (Bennett, 2012). Reporters consider objectivity a useful professional norm because it gives the appearance of fairness by providing a balance in news stories. Since reporters often lack the time and/or scientific expertise to adjudicate facts in complicated policy or political disputes, they use the objectivity norm as a fair approach to cover competing claims (Tuchman, 1972). One area in which journalists are criticized for following this practice is in reporting about climate change, where stories include quotes from environmental scientists as well as climate change deniers (Corbett & Durfee, 2004; Cunningham, 2004; M. Boykoff, 2007; M. Boykoff & J. Boykoff, 2004, 2007). In short, it is generally well accepted that news-making routines designed for efficiency, objectivity, and professionalism often yield less informative content (Rosenstiel, 2005). This suggests an ongoing trade-off between how news serves the interests of journalists and journalism relative to those of news consumers. Audience and voter interests Media scholars find the objectivity norm problematic because it can undermine the interests of audiences and voters. They argue that in an attempt to avoid bias, journalists generate stories that tell both sides of a dispute equally, without consideration for the truth or widely believed facts (Entman, 1989; M. Boykoff, 2007). In the climate change example, media scholars would contend that by adhering to objectivity and quoting both sides of the debate, journalists misrepresent the scientific consensus on the topic (Corbett & Durfee, 2004; Cunningham, 2004; M. Boykoff, 2007; M. Boykoff & J. Boykoff, 2004, 2007). Bennett (2012) argues that the practice of giving equal importance to unequal facts (in terms of truth or consensus) prevents journalists from covering political news in an informative manner, leading to information biases for citizens and voters. In the campaign setting, legitimate but unequal critical coverage of candidates may be eschewed for the sake of ostensible objectivity. Such practices are helpful to journalists operating under the pressure to create news, but may be harmful to the interests of audiences and voters trying to make meaningful distinctions between competing candidates. Pressure for objectivity coupled with the time and space constraints on news stories does much to remove information attributes candidates and voters find useful in the campaign setting (Patterson, 2013). Preferences and motivations for seeking campaign news vary across individuals, but the environmental shift to active rather than passive audiences requires a parallel examination of news production values. The news industry is facing declining revenues as audiences actively migrate according to niche habits and preferences. Contemporary audience metrics go beyond exposure to things such as attentiveness, loyalty, emotion, and recall. Engagement is all important for media products in this time of choice and autonomy (Napoli, 2011). With the audience autonomy of today's media environment, it may no longer make sense to steer clear of more informative well sourced content to avoid alienating partisan audiences. Rather, content that can engage the audience now seems the safe bet. Though nonsubstantive campaign coverage such as horse race and strategy have entertainment value for the mass public; informative and even slanted depth in coverage is likely to be more engaging for the niche political news audience. Political interests The emphasis on broadcast era news values may also neglect the needs of candidates, parties, and officeholders. News values lead to partisan information dilution, making it difficult for candidates to effectively communicate messages to voters and constituencies. Groeling (2010) argues that partisan communications with voters via the media are critical to nurturing a positive brand name for party members and that parties aim to establish and maintain their brand by coordinating their activities with the related communications to the public. Traditional journalistic news values often do much to disrupt unified partisan communication. News values such as novelty, conflict, and objectivity often derail attempts at party message cohesion. We extend this logic and expect that the objectivity norm will disrupt the messages of candidates and campaigns by robbing the news of critical pieces of campaign information such as candidate traits and issue positions. In short-term election contexts, candidates often use their traits and issue positions to shape their image. Traits and issues also comprise important pieces of information voters (ideally) need to best evaluate candidates. Yet journalists believe that audiences generally prefer news that is objective, timely, and novel—both during election season and otherwise (Rosenstiel, 2005). This perception is confirmed by extant research on agenda convergence, which finds that campaign news coverage often deviates widely from the issues and characteristics candidates and campaigns want to emphasize. Hayes' (2010) work on agenda convergence demonstrates an unfortunate irony—as races grow more competitive campaign stories diverge further from candidates' talking points and issue agendas—at a time when voters presumably need differentiating information most. Research on campaign news demonstrates that journalists predominantly use strategy and horserace frames to cover elections, largely because these frames provide novel and timely information about candidates' campaigns. Yet, candidate traits and issue positions are only truly novel once during the campaign cycle (Patterson, 1994; Rosenstiel, 2005). For example, Patterson (1994) writes: Policy problems lack the novelty that the journalist seeks . . . although the candidates base their appeals to voters on policy issues, what they say has marginal news value. The first time that a candidate takes a position on an issue the press is certain to report it. Further statements on the same issue become progressively less newsworthy, unless a new wrinkle is added (p. 61). Strategy and horse race frames, however, make for less substantive campaign coverage and are less effective in candidate branding. Moreover, stories discussing candidate traits or issue positions (or both) contain much more political information content and are therefore more amenable to charges of bias, especially in coverage of opposing candidates. Stories with candidate trait and issue information can more easily be interpreted as slanted even when stories do not contrast candidates. Positive stories about candidates' issue positions, experiences, or personal histories may be interpreted as slanted in favor of said candidate or against their opponent. Negative stories about candidate backgrounds, wrongdoings, failures, or issue stances may be more likely to be viewed as slanted against said candidate or in favor of their opponent. Candidates may even experience advantages or disadvantages from a simple imbalance in coverage—especially if the media are spending a disproportionate amount of time highlighting the background, experiences, and issue positions of one candidate and not the other (Kahn & Kenney, 2002a). To avoid the many complications and potential bias charges that come with information complexity, objectivity norms produce truncated “he said, she said” campaign coverage. Intentionally or not on the part of the journalist, stories that contain more policy discussions, candidate trait information, and related information are more likely to end up slanting in one direction or another. At the same time, these stories are able to provide candidate trait and issue information to promote the candidate's brand and provide adequate information signals for voters trying to form an impression or evaluation of what the candidate has to offer. In short, Bennett (2012) suggests that there may be a trade-off in terms of relative slant in coverage of two competing candidates and information substance—where ostensibly objective news may be less informative. This trade-off is the crux of the empirical focus of this article and suggests several of our expectations. We expect that campaign news stories slanted in favor of one candidate or another are more likely to have a primary focus on substantive information about candidates and/or their issue positions than neutral campaign news stories. We also expect that slanted stories are more likely to contain: quoted sources, a higher number of quotes, issue mentions, more distinct issues mentioned, and higher word counts than neutral campaign news stories. Method Sample information Our analysis requires content data as well as information about news outlets and campaign contests.3 Our election sample is drawn with an eye toward several goals: variation across important election characteristics such as office at stake, competition, geography, and open seat races versus those races in which an incumbent is running. The election sample for the whole dataset spans three cycles: 2004, 2006, and 2008 (see Appendix S1, Supporting Information). We sample across election cycles because coverage could be influenced by the broader political context. News coverage Gubernatorial and Senate elections allow for necessary variation across electoral contexts and media outlets (Kahn, 1991; Kahn & Kenney, 2002a). The content analysis data are from local newspapers. We made this choice because local daily papers contain the most depth and breadth of coverage for sub-presidential campaigns (Kahn, 1995), and are the most likely venues for generating the amount of content necessary to conduct our statistical analyses. Even today, “average” voters rely heavily on local media outlets (Jones, 2009),4 even if they find their news content via news aggregator services (Rosenstiel, 2005). This is especially the case for subpresidential elections and politics. The media content analyzed begins on the first of September and continues through Election Day, following Kahn (1995) and Kahn and Kenney (2002a). All campaign stories from most daily newspapers in each state are included. The content analysis is based on purposive, nonrandom sample of news stories collected based on two criteria: geography and availability. Our process is as follows: First, we identified the population of every daily newspaper from the states using the International Editor and Publisher Yearbook for the relevant year. From there we proceeded to locate, pull, and archive every story occurring between those dates for coding. Our primary source for news content is Access World News, an electronic newspaper archive; it is searchable and contains over 400 daily local newspapers across the United States.5 Dependent variables To measure our dependent variable, we perform content analysis of campaign news stories. Content is coded for several aspects related to the quality of information (or depth) in campaign news stories. We utilized six different measures of news story informative quality as dependent variables: substantive focus; the presence of one or more quoted sources; the presence of one or more mentions of issues; the number of sources quoted; the number of distinct issues mentioned; and the overall length of the news story. Only one of our measures, substantive primary focus, is somewhat subjective and requires nuanced explanation. Although coding schemes for the focus of campaign news stories have varied considerably, Kahn (1991) notes that most have included three categories: issues, candidate traits, and campaign strategies. Campaign news coverage that focuses on issues has obvious implications for members of the electorate. During political campaigns, issue coverage also often includes discussion of candidates' positions and proposals concerning these issues. Issue coverage is arguably the most normatively important category of campaign news coverage for making voting decisions (Patterson & McClure, 1976). Campaign news coverage can also focus on candidates' personal characteristics like their personal histories or personality traits like competency (e.g., hardworking, intellectual, informed, experienced), leadership (e.g., inspiring, resilient, independent), integrity (e.g., honesty, trustworthiness, morality), and empathy (e.g., sensitive, kind, really cares, in touch; Kinder, 1986). Though trait coverage is not always substantive, particularly when it focuses on superficial characteristics such as appearance, coverage of a candidate's personal characteristics can be an important source for making voting decisions (Kinder, 1986).6 Finally, campaign news coverage can focus on campaign tactics and strategy or where candidates stand in the polls, topics of coverage frequently included under the umbrella term of horse race coverage. Following previous studies (e.g., Kahn & Kenney, 2002a, 2002b; Kaplan, Goldstein, & Hale, 2005), our dependent variable (Substantive primary focus) is defined as coverage that focuses either on issues or candidate traits and is operationalized as the primary focus of the story (1 = issues or candidate traits; else = 0). Campaign news coverage that is primarily strategic or horserace in nature, therefore, is considered less substantive (Iyengar et al., 2004; Lawrence, 2000; Patterson, 1994). The other five dependent variables are very straightforward. Our measure of whether any quoted source is included in the story (1 + Quoted Sources) is based on coders' count of the number of quotes per news story. If a story was counted as having one or more quotes, it was coded 1, all others were coded as 0. The measure of whether one or more issues are mentioned (1 + Issues Mentioned) was coded in the same way: Coders counted the number of distinct issues mentioned in each story, and those with one or more issues mentioned were coded 1 for this variable, and otherwise 0. The two count dependent variables (Number of quoted sources) and (Number of distinct issues mentioned) are based on the same two coded questions, but are simply not collapsed into 0/1 indicators. Though these measures are somewhat redundant, conceptually we find that is a measure of whether any quotes or issues included are meaningful in a different way than a measure capturing the full range of quotes used or issues mentioned. The final count variable (Article Length) is a simple word count for each story coded. Word counts for stories are provided by the Access World News online news database from which our stories were accessed. While none of the simple count based measures are perfect indicators of information quality, each is a reasonable proxy and has the added benefit of not being subjective. Independent variables The first primary independent variable of interest is relative tone in campaign news stories. Here, the operational measure was created using a coding question (wording below). More than 8,000 news stories were coded for use in this analysis. Coders were instructed as follows: For each candidate, please rate the overall tone of the story? In each case coders could select among the following classifications: negative, neutral, or positive. If a news story had an overall negative tone regarding a candidate, the story was initially coded as “1” negative. If a news story depicts a candidate neutrally, that story was coded as neutral “2.” News stories were coded “3” for positive if they contained a positive tone toward the candidate. We then use this coding question (asked about each major candidate in the race) to calculate a news story measure of Relative Tone which is used to calculate a variable capturing the story level imbalance in tone toward the candidates. Specifically, the relative tone measure is the “difference” between the portrayal of the Democratic candidate and the Republican candidate in each campaign news story. For example, if the coding for the Democratic candidate is “Positive” with a value of 3, and the coding for the Republican candidate is “Negative” with a value of 1, this produces a difference of +2. If both candidates were getting neutral coverage, then the difference would be 0, and so on. The scale, then, runs from −2 (most favorable to Republicans) to +2 (most favorable to Democrats). We then took this variable and recoded it to create an overall measure of the presence and degree of difference in relative tone where 1 = no relative tone, 2 = moderate relative tone, and 3 = extreme relative tone.7 In the Supporting Information, we provide an alternative set of models with a similarly constructed measure of Relative Image, which is based on a different coding question and is more focused on candidate image depictions. Our other independent variables of interest have to do with newspaper ownership structures. Newspapers are commonly owned by publicly traded corporations or large chains instead of privately owned companies or small local chains. Extant research demonstrates corporately owned news outlets often offer less substantive coverage and more negative and sensational coverage. These patterns are attributed to their drive for profits at the behest of shareholders (Baker, 2002; Dunaway, 2008; Hamilton, 2004). The measure we use is intended to capture the various ownership characteristics that scholarly work has investigated: publicly traded versus privately owned and controlled ownership (Dunaway, 2008; Hamilton, 2004; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996); chain ownership (Hamilton, 2004); and nonlocal ownership (Hood, 2007; Napoli, 2002). Our ownership structure variable was constructed using information gathered from the Editor & Publisher International Yearbook (2004, 2006, 2008), news organization websites and we resorted to follow-up phone calls and e-mails for verification where website information was not clear. The indicators for ownership type were dummied out a four category variable where: (Single Holding) represents papers owned by a private company with one media holding; (Small Chain) captures small group chain ownership (few media holdings); (Large Chain) represents papers owned by large chains with many geographically dispersed holdings; and (Corporate) indicates papers owned by a publicly traded corporation (i.e., where no one individual or family holds controlling stock interest; Dunaway, 2008). We also examine market penetration as an explanatory variable (Market Penetration). Market penetration captures economic performance, measured as the percentage of households subscribing to the paper in the market area.8 Newspapers with high market penetration have saturated the market; papers with low penetration still struggle to gain ground in the market. We took market penetration information from the Editor and Publisher Market Guide. Also, circulation (logged) provides a proxy for newspapers' resources. To the extent that journalists' perceptions of newsworthiness are linked to election-specific characteristics (competitiveness, point in cycle, incumbency, etc.) there is reason to expect these to influence the information found in election news coverage. Therefore, we include an indicator of (Electoral Competition). News organizations are known to cover noncompetitive campaigns differently. “Nothing is more boring to the journalist mind,” Arnold (2004) writes, “than a campaign for which reporters have already written the final act” (p. 42). A more competitive race may produce an increase in focus on candidate strategies and polls, leading to a greater proportion of nonsubstantive campaign coverage (Arnold, 2004). The indicator for competition is indicated by the final margin between candidates' vote returns. We expect less substance in coverage of competitive races because of horse race coverage (Dunaway, 2008). Gubernatorial and senate races are included in our sample. (Governor Race) is a dichotomous indicator signifying a gubernatorial election; it is an important control variable because the literature suggests potential differences in campaign news content across federal and state elections (Kahn, 1995). Extant research reveals that campaign coverage varies with candidate status (e.g., Kahn & Kenney, 2002a, 2002b), therefore we include a dummy variable indicating the presence of an incumbent candidate (Incumbent). We also include an indicator for whether any candidate in the race is a woman (Female Candidate). Coverage of races with women running may contain more game frame or trait coverage, which tends to be less substantive (Kahn, 1996). Finally, news organizations may focus on different campaign news topics at different points in the campaign. Days until election, the number of days until the election, controls for differences in topics of campaign coverage due to the temporal proximity of Election Day. The implication, here, then, is that substantive campaign coverage may decrease, and nonsubstantive campaign coverage may increase, as Election Day nears (Dunaway, 2008). Results Table 1 reports coefficients from three mixed effects logistic regression models. In the first model, the dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator of the probability of substantive primary focus in campaign news stories. Models 2 and 3 present the coefficients from the models in which at least one source quoted and at least one issue mentioned are the dependent variables, respectively. Given the hierarchical structure of the data (where news organizations are nested within races) we estimate a multilevel logistic regression model predicting the likelihood of a substantive news story. In the model, the intercepts vary across both news organizations and races.9 Table 1 Mixed Effects Logistic Regression Models . . . . Model 3 . . . Model 1 Substantive Focus . Model 21 + Source Used . 1 + Issues Mentioned . Partisan tone 0.224* 1.038* 0.841* (0.063) (0.066) (0.066) Small chain 0.036 0.220 0.079 (0.224) (0.260) (0.205) Large chain −0.261* 0.205 −0.082 (0.154) (0.187) (0.143) Corporate −0.336* 0.030 −0.006 (0.181) (0.228) (0.178) Market penetration −0.000 −0.006 0.006* (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) Circulation 0.060 0.247* 0.072* (0.041) (0.054) (0.039) Electoral margin 0.027* −0.039* 0.011 (0.008) (0.017) (0.009) Days until election 0.020* 0.003* 0.015* (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) Female candidate running −0.021 −0.248 −0.035 (0.220) (0.493) (0.251) Incumbent running 0.095 −1.988* 0.031 (0.262) (0.553) (0.323) Gubernatorial race 0.308 −0.072 0.324 (0.239) (0.512) (0.270) Offyear −0.238 −0.960* 0.246 (0.197) (0.420) (0.223) Constant −1.315* −2.359* −2.727* (0.626) (0.947) (0.648) Race Constant −0.904* 0.066 −0.712* Level (0.225) (0.160) (0.179) Org Constant −0.708* −0.599* −0.841* Level (0.128) (0.144) (0.124) N 5,990 7,532 6,883 . . . . Model 3 . . . Model 1 Substantive Focus . Model 21 + Source Used . 1 + Issues Mentioned . Partisan tone 0.224* 1.038* 0.841* (0.063) (0.066) (0.066) Small chain 0.036 0.220 0.079 (0.224) (0.260) (0.205) Large chain −0.261* 0.205 −0.082 (0.154) (0.187) (0.143) Corporate −0.336* 0.030 −0.006 (0.181) (0.228) (0.178) Market penetration −0.000 −0.006 0.006* (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) Circulation 0.060 0.247* 0.072* (0.041) (0.054) (0.039) Electoral margin 0.027* −0.039* 0.011 (0.008) (0.017) (0.009) Days until election 0.020* 0.003* 0.015* (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) Female candidate running −0.021 −0.248 −0.035 (0.220) (0.493) (0.251) Incumbent running 0.095 −1.988* 0.031 (0.262) (0.553) (0.323) Gubernatorial race 0.308 −0.072 0.324 (0.239) (0.512) (0.270) Offyear −0.238 −0.960* 0.246 (0.197) (0.420) (0.223) Constant −1.315* −2.359* −2.727* (0.626) (0.947) (0.648) Race Constant −0.904* 0.066 −0.712* Level (0.225) (0.160) (0.179) Org Constant −0.708* −0.599* −0.841* Level (0.128) (0.144) (0.124) N 5,990 7,532 6,883 Notes: Cell entries are coefficients from mixed effects logistic regression models with stories (Model 1 n = 5,990; Model 2 n = 7,532; Model 3 n = 6,883) nested within news organizations (n = 247), nested within electoral contests (n = 31). Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance tests are one-tailed. * p < .05. Open in new tab Table 1 Mixed Effects Logistic Regression Models . . . . Model 3 . . . Model 1 Substantive Focus . Model 21 + Source Used . 1 + Issues Mentioned . Partisan tone 0.224* 1.038* 0.841* (0.063) (0.066) (0.066) Small chain 0.036 0.220 0.079 (0.224) (0.260) (0.205) Large chain −0.261* 0.205 −0.082 (0.154) (0.187) (0.143) Corporate −0.336* 0.030 −0.006 (0.181) (0.228) (0.178) Market penetration −0.000 −0.006 0.006* (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) Circulation 0.060 0.247* 0.072* (0.041) (0.054) (0.039) Electoral margin 0.027* −0.039* 0.011 (0.008) (0.017) (0.009) Days until election 0.020* 0.003* 0.015* (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) Female candidate running −0.021 −0.248 −0.035 (0.220) (0.493) (0.251) Incumbent running 0.095 −1.988* 0.031 (0.262) (0.553) (0.323) Gubernatorial race 0.308 −0.072 0.324 (0.239) (0.512) (0.270) Offyear −0.238 −0.960* 0.246 (0.197) (0.420) (0.223) Constant −1.315* −2.359* −2.727* (0.626) (0.947) (0.648) Race Constant −0.904* 0.066 −0.712* Level (0.225) (0.160) (0.179) Org Constant −0.708* −0.599* −0.841* Level (0.128) (0.144) (0.124) N 5,990 7,532 6,883 . . . . Model 3 . . . Model 1 Substantive Focus . Model 21 + Source Used . 1 + Issues Mentioned . Partisan tone 0.224* 1.038* 0.841* (0.063) (0.066) (0.066) Small chain 0.036 0.220 0.079 (0.224) (0.260) (0.205) Large chain −0.261* 0.205 −0.082 (0.154) (0.187) (0.143) Corporate −0.336* 0.030 −0.006 (0.181) (0.228) (0.178) Market penetration −0.000 −0.006 0.006* (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) Circulation 0.060 0.247* 0.072* (0.041) (0.054) (0.039) Electoral margin 0.027* −0.039* 0.011 (0.008) (0.017) (0.009) Days until election 0.020* 0.003* 0.015* (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) Female candidate running −0.021 −0.248 −0.035 (0.220) (0.493) (0.251) Incumbent running 0.095 −1.988* 0.031 (0.262) (0.553) (0.323) Gubernatorial race 0.308 −0.072 0.324 (0.239) (0.512) (0.270) Offyear −0.238 −0.960* 0.246 (0.197) (0.420) (0.223) Constant −1.315* −2.359* −2.727* (0.626) (0.947) (0.648) Race Constant −0.904* 0.066 −0.712* Level (0.225) (0.160) (0.179) Org Constant −0.708* −0.599* −0.841* Level (0.128) (0.144) (0.124) N 5,990 7,532 6,883 Notes: Cell entries are coefficients from mixed effects logistic regression models with stories (Model 1 n = 5,990; Model 2 n = 7,532; Model 3 n = 6,883) nested within news organizations (n = 247), nested within electoral contests (n = 31). Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance tests are one-tailed. * p < .05. Open in new tab Beginning with Model 1 in Table 1, we analyze how party tone, news organization characteristics, and several electoral characteristics affect the substantive focus of news articles. Recall that for the variable relative tone difference our coding scheme asks coders to classify a given news story according to how they judge the tone in the news story toward each candidate. As a folded, or “absolute” measure, this captures the presence and level of relative tone between both candidates, where 1 = no relative tone difference, 2 = moderate relative tone difference, and 3 = extreme relative tone difference. We find that relative tone differences in news stories are positively and significantly associated with substance (b = 0.224, SE = 0.063), and that relative tone has—by a robust margin—the largest net effect on substance across the set of covariates. Because log-odds coefficients are not intuitively interpretable, Figure 1 illustrates how the presence of relative tone affects substance across different types of news organizations.10 Interestingly, a lack of tone differences—effectively “neutral” news—routinely produces the least substantive articles across small, large, and corporate chains, while highly skewed tone only produces slightly more substance across these organizations. However, moderate relative tone is related to a surprisingly high probability of substantive news: For each chain the probability that substantive news is the primary focus is roughly 80%, almost 20 percentage points higher than either no or high relative tone difference across each organization. Figure 1 Open in new tabDownload slide Probability of substantive primary focus. Figure 1 Open in new tabDownload slide Probability of substantive primary focus. Clearly, stories favoring one candidate over the other in terms of tone are more likely to contain substantive information,11 but only when the relative tone is moderate. Moreover, we note that for corporately held news entities, substantive news on the whole is slightly less likely to be produced (b = −0.226, SE. = 0.181). Transitioning to Model 2 in Table 1, we again find that relative tone has a large positive and statistically significant effect on the probability that at least one source will be cited in a news article (b = 1.038, SE = 0.066). Figure 2 assists in the interpretation of this effect. Across each of the different-sized chains, both no and moderate partisan tone differences produce relatively low probabilities of articles producing quoted sources. High relative tone difference, however, is related to a remarkably high probability of at least one quoted source. There is an interesting discrepancy between these results and the results depicted in Figure 1: While the effect of high relative tone on news substance pales in comparison to moderately relative tone, the effect of highly skewed tone on the probability of producing quote sources is much greater than the effect of moderate partisan tone. This does, however, make some intuitive sense: Although highly skewed news should naturally include a number of quotations both from and about the candidates in question, this does not necessarily translate into substantive news. In fact, it appears that the probability of a news article being “substantive” is most clearly related to the presence of mildly relative tone. Figure 2 Open in new tabDownload slide Probability of one or more quoted sources. Figure 2 Open in new tabDownload slide Probability of one or more quoted sources. Of the other potential variables that may affect sourcing in Model 2, we find that a large electoral margin (i.e., low electoral competition) is related to a smaller probability of sources being quoted (b = −0.039, SE = 0.017). In addition, we note that the presence of an incumbent (b = −1.988, SE = 0.553) and that articles written in off-year elections (b = −0.960, SE = 0.420) also have a negative and statistically significant effect on the probability of sources being quoted. Finally, Model 3 in Table 1 presents a series of estimates that depict the probability that issues will be mentioned at least one time in a news article. We find that the coefficient for relative tone is positive and statistically significant (b = 0.841, SE = 0.066), which suggests that as relative tone difference becomes stronger, the probability that issues will be mentioned increases. Figure 3 illustrates the effect of this variable across various organizational arrangements. Interestingly, we find that the lack of relative tone only produces between a 40 to 45% chance that issues will be mentioned in a news article across each group. The probability of issues being included in a news article when either moderate or high relative tone is present, however, is much higher—70 to 80% respectively—suggesting that it is difficult to divorce coverage advantaging one candidate over the other from issue coverage. In sum, these findings convey that attempts to expunge tone “advantage” from news stories about candidates may actually fail to increase the quality of coverage. Figure 3 Open in new tabDownload slide Probability of one or more issues mentioned. Figure 3 Open in new tabDownload slide Probability of one or more issues mentioned. We now turn to Table 2, which offers a more nuanced series of analyses that model the number of issues and sources included in news articles, in addition to the length of news stories, as a function of the same suite of covariates utilized in Table 1. For models 4 and 5, which cast the dependent variables as the number of quoted sources, the number of distinct issues mentioned, and the number of words per story, respectively, we utilize negative binomial regression models. These are appropriate for count dependent variables and which account for overdispersion of zero values. Here we model fixed effects for states and cluster at the news organization level.12 Table 2 Negative Binomial Regression Estimates . Model 4 . % Δ ExCt . Model 5 . % Δ ExCt . Model 6 . % Δ ExCt . . Number of Issues . +1 SD . Number of Sources . +1 SD . Length of Story . +1 SD . Party tone 0.475* 23.3 0.761* 40.8 0.072* 3.3 (0.067) (0.113) (0.026) Small chain 0.084 2.5 0.405* 12.3 0.116* 3.6 (0.161) (0.135) (0.069) Large chain 0.048 2.4 0.411* 22.7 0.066 3.3 (0.126) (0.128) (0.045) Corporate −0.121 −4.1 0.143 5.4 −0.080 −2.9 (0.138) (0.152) (0.065) Market penetration −0.001 −1.8 −0.010 −11.0 −0.000 −0.2 (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) Circulation 0.030 4.1 0.116* 16.6 0.030* 3.9 (0.040) (0.050) (0.015) Electoral margin −0.014* −14.5 −0.036* −33.2 0.002 1.9 (0.007) (0.009) (0.002) Days until election −0.000 −0.3 0.004 7.4 −0.002* −3.9 (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) Female candidate −0.059 −2.9 −0.587 −25.4 0.162* 8.4 (0.396) (0.535) (0.072) Incumbent running 0.312 13.6 −0.619 −22.4 −0.131 −5.8 (0.579) (0.850) (0.071) Gubernatorial race 0.250 13.1 0.147 7.5 −0.049 −2.3 (0.364) (0.481) (0.067) Offyear 0.646* 37.4 −0.543 −23.4 −0.046 −2.2 (0.284) (0.395) (0.047) Constant −1.969 — −1.632 — 5.767* — (1.296) (1.895) (0.268) lnalpha −0.241 — 1.670* — −0.691* — (0.181) (0.091) (0.048) N 4,610 4,767 5,016 . Model 4 . % Δ ExCt . Model 5 . % Δ ExCt . Model 6 . % Δ ExCt . . Number of Issues . +1 SD . Number of Sources . +1 SD . Length of Story . +1 SD . Party tone 0.475* 23.3 0.761* 40.8 0.072* 3.3 (0.067) (0.113) (0.026) Small chain 0.084 2.5 0.405* 12.3 0.116* 3.6 (0.161) (0.135) (0.069) Large chain 0.048 2.4 0.411* 22.7 0.066 3.3 (0.126) (0.128) (0.045) Corporate −0.121 −4.1 0.143 5.4 −0.080 −2.9 (0.138) (0.152) (0.065) Market penetration −0.001 −1.8 −0.010 −11.0 −0.000 −0.2 (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) Circulation 0.030 4.1 0.116* 16.6 0.030* 3.9 (0.040) (0.050) (0.015) Electoral margin −0.014* −14.5 −0.036* −33.2 0.002 1.9 (0.007) (0.009) (0.002) Days until election −0.000 −0.3 0.004 7.4 −0.002* −3.9 (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) Female candidate −0.059 −2.9 −0.587 −25.4 0.162* 8.4 (0.396) (0.535) (0.072) Incumbent running 0.312 13.6 −0.619 −22.4 −0.131 −5.8 (0.579) (0.850) (0.071) Gubernatorial race 0.250 13.1 0.147 7.5 −0.049 −2.3 (0.364) (0.481) (0.067) Offyear 0.646* 37.4 −0.543 −23.4 −0.046 −2.2 (0.284) (0.395) (0.047) Constant −1.969 — −1.632 — 5.767* — (1.296) (1.895) (0.268) lnalpha −0.241 — 1.670* — −0.691* — (0.181) (0.091) (0.048) N 4,610 4,767 5,016 Notes: Cell entries are estimates from negative binomial regression models with fixed effects, standard errors (clustered on news organization) are in parentheses. Coefficients and standard errors for state level dummy variables are located in the Supporting Information. Tests are one-tailed. Cells in columns marked “% Δ ExCt” contain the percent change in the expected count for a stand standard deviation increase in x. * p < .05. Open in new tab Table 2 Negative Binomial Regression Estimates . Model 4 . % Δ ExCt . Model 5 . % Δ ExCt . Model 6 . % Δ ExCt . . Number of Issues . +1 SD . Number of Sources . +1 SD . Length of Story . +1 SD . Party tone 0.475* 23.3 0.761* 40.8 0.072* 3.3 (0.067) (0.113) (0.026) Small chain 0.084 2.5 0.405* 12.3 0.116* 3.6 (0.161) (0.135) (0.069) Large chain 0.048 2.4 0.411* 22.7 0.066 3.3 (0.126) (0.128) (0.045) Corporate −0.121 −4.1 0.143 5.4 −0.080 −2.9 (0.138) (0.152) (0.065) Market penetration −0.001 −1.8 −0.010 −11.0 −0.000 −0.2 (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) Circulation 0.030 4.1 0.116* 16.6 0.030* 3.9 (0.040) (0.050) (0.015) Electoral margin −0.014* −14.5 −0.036* −33.2 0.002 1.9 (0.007) (0.009) (0.002) Days until election −0.000 −0.3 0.004 7.4 −0.002* −3.9 (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) Female candidate −0.059 −2.9 −0.587 −25.4 0.162* 8.4 (0.396) (0.535) (0.072) Incumbent running 0.312 13.6 −0.619 −22.4 −0.131 −5.8 (0.579) (0.850) (0.071) Gubernatorial race 0.250 13.1 0.147 7.5 −0.049 −2.3 (0.364) (0.481) (0.067) Offyear 0.646* 37.4 −0.543 −23.4 −0.046 −2.2 (0.284) (0.395) (0.047) Constant −1.969 — −1.632 — 5.767* — (1.296) (1.895) (0.268) lnalpha −0.241 — 1.670* — −0.691* — (0.181) (0.091) (0.048) N 4,610 4,767 5,016 . Model 4 . % Δ ExCt . Model 5 . % Δ ExCt . Model 6 . % Δ ExCt . . Number of Issues . +1 SD . Number of Sources . +1 SD . Length of Story . +1 SD . Party tone 0.475* 23.3 0.761* 40.8 0.072* 3.3 (0.067) (0.113) (0.026) Small chain 0.084 2.5 0.405* 12.3 0.116* 3.6 (0.161) (0.135) (0.069) Large chain 0.048 2.4 0.411* 22.7 0.066 3.3 (0.126) (0.128) (0.045) Corporate −0.121 −4.1 0.143 5.4 −0.080 −2.9 (0.138) (0.152) (0.065) Market penetration −0.001 −1.8 −0.010 −11.0 −0.000 −0.2 (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) Circulation 0.030 4.1 0.116* 16.6 0.030* 3.9 (0.040) (0.050) (0.015) Electoral margin −0.014* −14.5 −0.036* −33.2 0.002 1.9 (0.007) (0.009) (0.002) Days until election −0.000 −0.3 0.004 7.4 −0.002* −3.9 (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) Female candidate −0.059 −2.9 −0.587 −25.4 0.162* 8.4 (0.396) (0.535) (0.072) Incumbent running 0.312 13.6 −0.619 −22.4 −0.131 −5.8 (0.579) (0.850) (0.071) Gubernatorial race 0.250 13.1 0.147 7.5 −0.049 −2.3 (0.364) (0.481) (0.067) Offyear 0.646* 37.4 −0.543 −23.4 −0.046 −2.2 (0.284) (0.395) (0.047) Constant −1.969 — −1.632 — 5.767* — (1.296) (1.895) (0.268) lnalpha −0.241 — 1.670* — −0.691* — (0.181) (0.091) (0.048) N 4,610 4,767 5,016 Notes: Cell entries are estimates from negative binomial regression models with fixed effects, standard errors (clustered on news organization) are in parentheses. Coefficients and standard errors for state level dummy variables are located in the Supporting Information. Tests are one-tailed. Cells in columns marked “% Δ ExCt” contain the percent change in the expected count for a stand standard deviation increase in x. * p < .05. Open in new tab Turning to Models 4 and 5, we find that relative tone difference, again, has a positive and statistically significant effect on the number of issues included in a news article (b = 0.475, SE = 0.067) and the number of sources quoted (b = 0.761, SE = 0.113). However, because these count models are iterative and produce nonlinear coefficient estimates, we provide columns containing the percent change in the expected count for a standard deviation increase in x. We find the same basic pattern in these count models: The predicted number of quoted sources increases across differences in relative tone. Conceiving the specific number of issues and presence of sources to be analogs for overall news quality, we find that relative tone differentials—slanted stories—do correlate with issue quality over purely objective or balanced news. Finally, Model 6 in Table 2 presents a similar model that analyzes the length of news articles as the dependent variable. Here, the coefficient for relative tone is positive and statistically significant (b = 0.072, SE = 0.026). In addition, although the length of articles appear to slightly decrease across the news ownership structures, the coefficients for the dichotomous variables large (b = 0.066, SE = 0.045), and corporate (b = −0.080, SE = 0.065) news organizations do not reach statistical significance. Only the coefficient for small newspaper chains (b = 0.116, SE = 0.069) crosses the p < .05 threshold of significance, providing some evidence that the size/ownership structure of media holdings can affect the length (and, potentially, quality) of news articles. Elsewhere in Model 6, we observe that the coefficients for circulation (b = 0.030, SE = 0.015) and the presence of a female candidate running (b = 0.162, SE = 0.072) have positive and significant effects on article length, while the timing of an election, “days until election,” has a small negative but significant effect on the length of a news article. Discussion We investigate the relationship between information quality and objectivity in campaign news coverage. Our analysis reveals some informational merit in slanted campaign news. Slanted coverage is positively related to information substance in campaign news stories. Tone differentials in stories covering the opposing candidates correspond with significantly higher likelihood of information quality, or depth, in news coverage than objective stories. This finding is robust across a wide variety of news quality metrics, including the presence and depth of issue coverage, the amount of sources utilized, and the length of stories. Taken together, the results presented in the preceding sections offer several interesting conclusions and constitute an original contribution to the political communication literature and the field of communication at large. Yet, our arguments and findings ostensibly question some longstanding assumptions regarding political news and much received wisdom in political communication and journalism education. How do we reconcile our findings with the broader literature? It is simpler than it seems. Critics of journalism and media scholars are often neither careful nor consistent in their use of the phrase “media bias.” It is used to describe everything from deliberate efforts to distort information to diligent but critical coverage of people, institutions, or events. However, if we think of slanted or lopsided election coverage as a product of critical but earnest coverage, our findings are far from controversial. In fact, a major contribution of our approach is that it drills down to the story level to illustrate what we think of as an important potential trade-off between the journalistic goals of informing citizens versus the effort to remain objective. Objectivity is good, but its merit must be weighed against the merit of other journalistic goals. In a time when the successful candidate is one who does not deviate from the campaign message, citizens need substantive and sometimes critical and questioning coverage of candidates and campaigns. By turning the typical expectation about objectivity and bias on its head, we hope to move the communication literature forward by provoking questions about when slanted coverage constitutes typically conceived “media bias” and when it does not. Media critics on both sides of the ideological spectrum will almost certainly fail to be cautious in their accusations about media bias, but media scholars cannot. Future work should develop careful conceptual and operational definitions of bias, slant, and critical or objective coverage at the story, journalist, and outlet levels across a host of news platforms. Doing so will allow a much better understanding of when bias occurs and its democratic consequences. Building largely on Groeling (2010), we argue that the objectivity norm may serve to disrupt the messages of candidates and campaigns by robbing the news of critical pieces of campaign information. The normative implications of these findings depend on one's perspective and at least three are relevant here: those of the journalists, the candidates, and the audience. The objectivity norm is often described as a journalistic tool for efficiency in newsgathering, defining the scope of conflict, and insulation against accusations of bias (Bennett, 2012; Tuchman, 1972). While it has critics, a common interpretation of the objectivity norm and its effects is that it yields better news for audiences—better in that it is free from journalists' or news outlets' individual political biases. Yet, from the perspective of informational biases, journalists may be helped by the objectivity norm, but politicians, audiences, and voters are not. Extant research has well demonstrated that the public often benefits from elite political cues because they help to clarify the positions of the parties, allowing for more efficient mapping of mass partisans to their party of choice (Groeling, 2010; Hetherington, 2001; Levendusky, 2009). Our evidence suggests candidates too may be stymied as their attempts to state issue positions, build or shape their image, or claim credit are disrupted in the effort to maintain objectivity. Here we investigate campaign news coverage provided by mainstream local news outlets. A remaining question is whether our results generalize to other types of outlets such as partisan cable news networks. While we think that our arguments about the general motivations of journalists, politicians, and news organizations hold, we would not necessarily expect a similar relationship in content from purposively partisan news outlets. Audience driven incentives of mainstream outlets are different from those of partisan outlets. Audiences for partisan outlets and programs expect tone differentials across partisan candidates. When tone differences are borne from a different set of journalistic constraints (i.e., in the case of partisan outlets catering to audience preferences) they may or may not be linked to substance or information value in coverage. Instead, the incentive structure for partisan outlets may create pressure to distort facts, alter agendas, or tamper with the quality of coverage in other ways. On the other hand, for these outlets all candidates are not alike as subjects of coverage. It may be the case that the link between substance and tone differential is present because, freed from the constraint of objectivity, politicians from the “same side” may be given an undisrupted platform to make their arguments, articulate their issue stances, and craft their brand (Groeling, 2010). Longer stories or stories covering more issues or tapping more sources may reflect an effort to give like-minded politicians coverage akin to free advertising. In short, our findings raise an interesting set of questions about substance and tone from partisan outlets, but these are left for future research. For much of the 20th century, American journalism has adhered to the journalistic norm of objectivity. Yet the fracturing news environment intensifies pressures on competitive news organizations to differentiate their product to ensure their survival and healthy dividends for their investors. There is no shortage of critics of this system: Calls for a return to a responsible form of journalism abound. Yet, media historians are quick to reply that the social responsibility model of the press was but a blip in an otherwise partisan and sensationalist history. And, in an era of expanding media choice, fragmentation, selective exposure, and audience autonomy, rigid adherence to the objectivity norm seems questionable, if not ill advised. We think this is especially true when the objectivity versus quality of information trade-off is weighed against the dangers of information biases in a time when attention to news among the mass public is extraordinarily low (Bennett, 2012). Our results provide a glimmer of hope for those with an otherwise bleak assessment of American journalism based on dire predictions about partisan news. At least in the context of newspaper coverage of gubernatorial and U.S. senatorial races, slanted news stories—those that advantage one candidate over the other—are of higher information quality than objective stories, and these differences are pronounced. Further analysis, however, is necessary to determine whether this greater informational potential actually translates into increased substantive political knowledge among those who consume consistently slanted campaign news. Supporting Information Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article: Appendix S1. Sample information. Appendix S2. Coding scheme and variable information. Appendix S3. Supplemental information, primary models. Notes 1 " But see Prior (2007) for a noteworthy exception highlighting the influence of the changing media environment on the widening gap between those with political interest and those without. 2 " We define objective coverage as being equitable in tone toward two competing candidates and slanted coverage as having unequal tone toward two competing candidates. Relative tone is the degree of difference in story tone toward two competing candidates, which we operationalize with measures based on coding questions (please see Supporting Information for coding scheme). To keep things conceptually clear, we restrict our use of the term bias to describe major classifications of media bias: information bias, partisan bias, and affective bias. 3 " The analyses presented here utilize data from (Dunaway, 2008, 2013); the discussion of the data, sampling, and data collection draw heavily from previous similar descriptions (also see Supporting Information). 4 " Pew State of the News Media Report (2008, 2009). 5 " The newspaper sample was identified using the Editor and Publisher International Yearbook for 2006, and 2008. Coverage was pulled from LEXIS/NEXIS or World Access News. Both of which are available through our university library. In a few instances we borrowed microfilm stories using interlibrary loans. On average, the newspapers in the sample represent 44% of the dailies per state. Please see the Supporting Information for sample and coding details. 6 " We treat trait coverage as substantive in our substantive primary focus measure because trait stories include information that voters are likely to use when assessing candidates. Because voters presumably vary widely in their discernment about which traits are most appropriate to use in a voting calculus, we are hesitant to make distinctions between substantive trait coverage and nonsubstantive. We do however code for appearance mentions and models controlling for those do not produce substantively different results. 7 " We use Cohen's Kappa for inter-coder reliability. Kappa is appropriate because it accounts for agreement based on chance (Stemler, 2001); the statistic moves toward “1” when coding is most reliable and toward “0” when there is no agreement (other than what we expect by chance; Stemler, 2001). Kappa assumes independence of items and coding decisions and mutually exclusive categories. Our coding rules fit with these criteria. Kappa : PA = proportion of units on which the coders agreePC = the proportion of units for which agreement is expected by chance. We apply the following standards for interpreting Kappa: <.00 = poor; .00; .20 = slight; 0.21; .40 = fair; 0.41; .60 = moderate; .61; .80 = substantial; .81; 1.00 = almost perfect (Landis & Koch, 1977, p. 165). Since the Kappa score reported here for substance in newspaper stories is .63, the coding scheme is substantially reliable, yet toward the low end of the scale. The average agreement for the slant and tone variables was .71. Two trained undergraduates coded the entire sample of newspaper and television news content. We calculated agreement using 10% of the sample (randomly selected; Stemler, 2001; Also see Dunaway, 2008). 8 " Source: http://www.stateofthenewsmedia.org. 9 " We estimate a random intercepts logistic regression because of how the data may be clustered at the level of the media organization. Since institutional norms promote similarities among articles released by the same organization, it is important to recognize that observations (here, articles) are not independently observed. As such, estimating a standard logit model where slopes and intercepts are the same will lead to deflated standard errors and test statistics that are too large. This is the same issue that emerges with panel data, where the same unit is repeatedly observed. We correct for this issue by allowing intercepts in the logit model to vary across media markets, which is one among several solutions to this statistical issue. 10 " These estimates are generated using mean levels of circulation and maximum levels of market penetration for news covering a mid election Senate race where there is a mean level of electoral competition, an incumbent running, and no female candidate running. This strategy is kept consistent across each subsequent set of predictions. 11 " Absent the other evidence we present, cautious interpretation of this finding could be warranted; the Kappa coefficient for our substance variable (.63), which is toward the low end of the “substantial agreement” classification. 12 " We use negative binomial regression with fixed effects. This model strategy addresses three distinct data issues present in our last three models: count dependent variables, overdispersion, and zero inflated data (Long & Freese, 2007). References Arceneaux , K. , & Johnson , M. ( 2013 ). Changing minds or changing channels? Chicago, IL : University of Chicago Press . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Arnold , R. D. ( 2004 ). Congress, the press, and political accountability . Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Baker , C. E. ( 2002 ). Media, markets, and democracy . New York, NY : Cambridge University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Bennett , W. L. ( 2012 ). News: The politics of illusion . New York, NY : Pearson Longman . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Boykoff , M. T. ( 2007 ). Flogging a dead norm? Newspaper coverage of anthropogenic climate change in the United States and United Kingdom from 2003-2006 . Area , 39 ( 4 ), 470 – 481 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Boykoff , M. T. , & Boykoff , J. M. ( 2004 ). Bias as balance: Global warming and the US prestige press . Global Environmental Change , 14 , 125 – 136 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Boykoff , M. T. , & Boykoff , J. M. ( 2007 ). Climate change and journalistic norms: A case study of US mass-media coverage . Geoforum , 36 , 1190 – 1204 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Breed , W. ( 1955 ). Social control in the newsroom: A functional analysis . Social Forces , 33 ( 4 ), 326 – 335 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Cook , T. E. ( 2005 ). Governing with the news: The news media as an institution . Chicago, IL : University of Chicago Press . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Corbett , J. B. , & Durfee , J. L. ( 2004 ). Testing public (un)certainty of science: Media representations of global warming . Science Communication , 26 , 129 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Cunningham , B. ( 2004 ). Re-thinking objectivity . Columbia Journalism Review , 42 , 24 – 32 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Dunaway , J. ( 2008 ). Markets, ownership, and the quality of campaign news coverage . Journal of Politics , 70 ( 4 ), 1193 – 1202 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Dunaway , J. ( 2013 ). Media ownership and story tone in campaign news coverage . American Politics Research , 41 , 24 – 53 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Editor & Publisher ( 2004 ). The international yearbook: The encyclopedia of the newspaper industry . New York, NY : Editor & Publisher . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Editor & Publisher ( 2006 ). The international yearbook: The encyclopedia of the newspaper industry . New York, NY : Editor & Publisher . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Editor & Publisher ( 2008 ). The international yearbook: The encyclopedia of the newspaper industry . New York, NY : Editor & Publisher . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Entman , R. ( 1989 ). Democracy without citizens: Media and the decay of American politics . Oxford, England : Oxford University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Epstein , E. J. ( 1973 ). News from nowhere . New York, NY : Random House . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Geer , J. G . ( 2012 ). The news media and the rise of negativity in presidential campaigns . PS: Political Science & Politics , 45 (3) , 422 – 427 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Gentzkow , M. , & Shapiro , J. ( 2010 ). What drives media slant? Evidence from U.S. daily newspapers . Econometrica , 78 ( 1 ), 35 – 71 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Groeling , T. ( 2010 ). When politicians attack: Party cohesion in the media . New York, NY : Cambridge University Press . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Hamilton , J. T. ( 2004 ). All the news that's fit to sell: How the market transforms information into news . Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Hayes , D. ( 2010 ). The dynamics of agenda convergence and the paradox of competitiveness in presidential campaigns . Political Research Quarterly , 63 ( 3 ), 594 – 611 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Hetherington , M. ( 2001 ). Resurgent mass partisanship: The role of elite polarization . American Political Science Review , 95 ( 3 ), 619 – 631 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Hood , L. ( 2007 ). Radio reverb: The impact of ‘local’ news reimported to its own community . Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media , 51 ( 1 ), 1 – 19 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Iyengar , S. , Norpoth , H., & Hahn , K. S. ( 2004 ). Consumer demand for election news: The horserace sells . Journal of Politics , 66 ( 1 ), 157 – 175 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Jones , A. S . ( 2009 ). Losing the news: The future of the news that feeds democracy . New York, NY : Oxford University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Kahn , K. F. ( 1991 ). Senate elections in the news: Examining campaign coverage . Legislative Studies Quarterly , 16 , 349 – 374 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Kahn , K. F. ( 1995 ). Characteristics of press coverage in Senate and gubernatorial elections: Information available to voters . Legislative Studies Quarterly , 20 ( 1 ), 23 – 35 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Kahn , K. F. ( 1996 ). The political consequences of being a woman: How stereotypes influence the conduct and consequences of political campaigns . New York, NY : Columbia University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Kahn , K. F. , & Kenney , P. J. ( 2002a ). The slant of the news: How editorial endorsements influence campaign coverage and citizens' views of candidates . American Political Science Review , 96 , 381 – 394 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Kahn , K. F. , & Kenney , P. J. ( 2002b ). The spectacle of U.S. Senate campaigns . Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Kaniss , P. ( 1991 ). Making local news . Chicago, IL : University of Chicago Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Kaplan , M. , Goldstein , K., & Hale , M. ( 2005 ). Local news coverage of the 2004 campaigns: An analysis of the nightly news broadcasts. A report for the Lear Center Local News Archive, a project of the USC Annenberg School and the University of Wisconsin. Retrieved from http://www.localnewsarchive.org/pdf/LCLNAFinal2004.pdf Kinder , D. R. ( 1986 ). Presidential character revisited. In R. R. Lau, & D. O. Sears (Eds.), Political cognition . Hillsdale, NJ : Erlbaum . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Landis , J. R. , & Koch , G. G. ( 1977 ). The measurement of observer agreement for categorical data . Biometrics , 33 , 159 – 174 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS PubMed WorldCat Lawrence , R. G. ( 2000 ). Game-framing the issues: Tracking the strategy frame in public policy news . Political Communication , 17 , 93 – 114 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Levendusky , M. ( 2009 ). The partisan sort: How liberals became democrats and conservatives became republicans . Chicago, IL : University of Chicago Press . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Long , J. S. , & Freese , J. ( 2007 ). Regression models for categorical dependent variables using STATA . College Station, TX : Stata Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC McManus , J. H. ( 1994 ). Market driven journalism: Let the citizen beware? Thousand Oaks, CA : Sage . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Mutz , D. C. , & Reeves , B. ( 2005 ). The new videomalaise: Effects of televised incivility on political trust . American Political Science Review , 99 (1) , 1 – 16 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Napoli , P. M. ( 2002 , August). Television station ownership and characteristics and commitment to public service: An analysis of public affairs programming. Presented at the 2002 Conference of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Miami, FL. Napoli , P. M. ( 2010 ). Audience evolution: New technologies and the transformation of media audiences . New York, NY : Columbia University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Napoli , P. M. ( 2011 ). Diminished, enduring, and emergent diversity policy concerns in an evolving media environment . International Journal of Communication , 5 ( 2011 ), 1182 – 1196 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Patterson , T. E. ( 1994 ). Out of order: An incisive and boldly original critique of the news media's domination of America's political process . New York, NY : Knopf . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Patterson , T. E. ( 1996 ). Bad news, period . Political Science and Politics , 29 ( 1 ), 17 – 20 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Patterson , T. E. ( 2013 ). Informing the news . New York, NY : Vintage Books . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Patterson , T. E. , & McClure , R. D. ( 1976 ). The unseeing eye: The myth of television power in national politics . New York, NY : Putnam . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Pew Research Center ( 2008 ). The State of the News Media Report . Retrieved from http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/2008/03/17/the-state-of-the-news-media-2008 Pew Research Center ( 2009 ). The State of the News Media Report . Retrieved from http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/2009/03/16/the-state-of-the-news-media-2009 Prior , M. ( 2007 ). Post-broadcast democracy: How media choice increases inequality in political involvement and polarizes elections . New York, NY : Cambridge University Press . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Prior , M. ( 2013 ). Media and political polarization . Annual Review of Political Science , 16 , 101 – 127 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Rosenstiel , T. ( 2005 ). Political polling and the new media culture: A case of more being less . Public Opinion Quarterly , 69 , 698 – 715 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Shoemaker , P. J. , & Reese , S. D. ( 1996 ). Mediating the message: Theories of influences on mass media content . White Plains, NY : Longman Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Soroka , S. N. ( 2014 ). Negativity in democratic politics: Causes and consequences . New York, NY : Cambridge University Press . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Stemler , S. ( 2001 ). An overview of content analysis . Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation , 7 ( 17 ). Retrieved from http://pareonline.net/getvn.asp?v=7&n=17.. OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Stroud , N. J. ( 2010 ). Polarization and partisan selective exposure . Journal of Communication , 60 ( 3 ), 556 – 576 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Stroud , N. J. ( 2011 ). Niche news: The politics of news choice . New York, NY : Oxford University Press . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Sunstein , C. ( 2001 ). Republic.com. Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press . Tuchman , G. ( 1972 ). Objectivity as a strategic ritual: An examination of newsmen's notions of objectivity . American Journal of Sociology , 77 ( 4 ), 660 – 679 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat © 2015 International Communication Association

Gil, de Zúñiga, Homero;Garcia-Perdomo,, Victor;McGregor, Shannon, C.

doi: 10.1111/jcom.12174pmid: N/A

Abstract This study focuses on second screening for news, a hybrid media process that combines watching news on television and a second, web-connected screen (i.e., smart-phone, laptop). Based on U.S.-national, 2-wave panel data, the paper (a) examines people's motivations to engage in second screen use, and then (b) advances the relationship between second screening and online political behaviors. Discussing and pursuing further information are both central motivations for second screen use. Furthermore, results suggest second screening for news is a significant predictor of online political participation and a key link between TV news and political engagement as this relationship is fully mediated. The study advances theoretically and empirically ways in which an informed public opinion may partake of a more engaged democracy. Second screening is a trending new media use that embodies one aspect of a phenomenon known as hybrid media (Chadwick, 2013) and highlights the ubiquity of social media and connectedness in modern life. Second screeners use a digital device (i.e., smart phone or laptop) while watching television to access the Internet and social network sites in order to obtain more information about or discuss the program they are watching. This virtual collocation unifies traditional media and online networks, but its effects have not largely been studied. Little is known about the motivations to engage in second screening. Even less explored is the use of second screening in the context of news. What are the effects of engaging in such behavior for democratic outcomes such as online political participation? This study represents an attempt to fill this gap by examining evidence based on two-wave U.S. national panel data. Because it is tied to immediacy, second screening has been widely used by audiences during breaking news, live coverage, political debates, and campaigns (Giglietto & Selva, 2014; Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2012; Wohn & Na, 2011). This popular and news-related use is the focus of our study. Previous studies have shown news consumption through socially networked and computer-mediated spaces positively relates to political and civic participation (Rojas & Gil de Zúñiga, 2010; Shah et al., 2007), and may benefit the democratic process as a whole, at least in regards to mobilization. As second screening involves both news consumption and discussion, the act seems particularly positioned to lead to political participation as it fits well the communication mediation model (McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999) and the cognitive mediation model (Eveland, 2004). Although based in different processes, these theoretical accounts suggest that news consumption, discussion, and mental elaboration upon information individuals consume or discuss play critical roles in the path from news media use to political participation. In that vein, we suggest that when viewers second screen for news, this activity complements TV consumption by better contextualizing the information they consume, enriching their experience with others as they discuss it, and ultimately, leading citizens to political participatory behaviors within online arenas. In short, and based on national two-wave panel data, this study sheds light on political outcomes of modern media use by examining the relationships between news media consumption, second screening, and online political action. Results indicate that second screening for news may conduit people's political engagement online. In the next section, we review the existing literature following this structure: First, we lay out the theoretical foundations tested here. Next, we define second screening for news and explain the motivations for engaging in this activity, taking into account uses and gratifications (U&G) and multitasking. The following sections tie second screening for news to different forms of news media consumption, and finally, to our dependent variable: online political participation. Second screening as a communicative mediating process Recent research demonstrates that media effects on participatory politics are largely mediated through interpersonal discussion about public affairs, and that the different platforms people use to consume media also matter in this process (Yoo & Gil de Zúñiga, 2014). In line with this research, this study combines the perspectives of both the communication mediation model (McLeod et al., 1999; Shah et al., 2007) and the cognitive mediation model (Eveland, 2004; Eveland, Shah, & Kwak, 2003). According to this strand of literature, individuals' news consumption leads to participatory behaviors by means of discussing with others or just reflecting upon the information to which people were exposed. This mediation process is particularly strong for information seeking and expression via the Internet and social media (Gil de Zúñiga, Molyneux, & Zheng, 2014). Despite findings that suggest negative cognitive effects of second screening or multitasking in general (Van Cauwenberge, Schaap, & van Roy, 2014), we suggest that the purposeful use of second screening for information follow-up and discussion while exposed to news on TV enhances individuals' political engagement online. The communication mediation model identifies informational media use and political discussion as important arbiters between orientations and participatory behaviors (McLeod et al., 1999; Shah et al., 2007). The model moves away from traditional direct media effects by incorporating the effects interpersonal communication, more closely reflecting the role of media in public life. So while previous work looking at direct effects from television (Putnam, 2000) on participatory behaviors has found negative associations, we argue that those models don't entirely reflect the complex and prosocial communication reality, in which people process information through discussion. Second screening combines information and discussion, and the combination of these processes may lead to elaboration, another key mediator along the path from news consumption to political participation. The cognitive mediation model (Eveland, 2001; Eveland et al., 2003) incorporates self-reflection and information processing behaviors into the processes of learning and understanding news media. This is particularly important in regards to second screening, since studies on multitasking have shown negative effects on cognition from relevant or irrelevant second screening use (Van Cauwenberge et al., 2014), which differ from the purposive act on which we focus. We theorize that second screening, to the extent that it involves additional news consumption, discussion, and, at least sometimes, elaboration, represents a set of interrelated behaviors that conduits the influence of news media to online political action. Defining second screening for news Second screening is a process in which individuals watching television use an additional electronic device or “screen” to access the Internet or social networking sites to obtain more information about the program or event they are watching or to discuss it in real time. For the purposes of this study, we are only concerned with TV viewers who second screen during news (operationalized as news, election coverage, and political speeches or debates). The immediate nature of second screening, coupled with the live aspect of news, prompts TV viewers to seek information, orientation, and discussion in social media sites via a second screen. It is through this computer-mediated collocation that, we theorize, second screening may lead to online political participation. Not surprisingly, of the few studies focused on second screen use, content is often the focus (Anstead & O'Loughlin, 2011; Wohn & Na, 2011). These studies, as well as findings by survey research organizations, point to the rise of second screening. A report from Nielsen (2012) showed that between 36 and 44% of people age 35–64 used tablets to get more information about the program they were currently watching. Political debates seem poised to spur second screening—in fact, 1 in 10 people second screened during the first debate between Mitt Romney and President Barack Obama (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2012). In part based on the findings summarized here, we carefully constructed a measure of second screen use that encompassed this trend in news-specific contexts. For some, emerging media use trends like second screening have raised concerns about humans' cognitive capability to effectively handle more than one task. Multitasking scholarship like multiple resource theory (Wickens, 2002) and thread cognition (Salvucci & Taatgen, 2008) highlight our restricted cognitive ability to process information when engaging in two or more activities at once. Yet, multiple tasks can be processed effectively in parallel so long as they do not use the same brain resource (Wickens, 2002) (e.g., listening to music and reading a newspaper). The cognitive cost of second screening may manifest in difficulties with factual recall and news comprehension (Van Cauwenberge et al., 2014). While knowledge has been tied to participatory behaviors (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1993), we seek to explore the role of second screening as a facilitator of news contextualization, discussion, and elaboration, rather than basic knowledge retention (Jung, Kim, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2011). Motivations for second screening Despite the risk of negative cognitive effects, second screening offers the opportunity to enhance attention to TV programs as well as promote discussion among users. People appear willing to risk the cognitive cost of multitasking in exchange for extra information and discussion, even if the central TV message may be diminished (Wang & Tchernev, 2012). Wang and Tchernev (2012) also posit that motivations of second screening, like those of multitasking in general, go beyond cognition. They find television viewers feel gratified by multitasking because it fulfills different needs. While the use of secondary devices may pull direct attention from television, the connection does propel involvement, online discussion, and social connection (Fitzgerald & Clarke, 2012). Motivations for news consumption, multitasking, and second screening viewing may also be viewed in light of U&G, which aims to understand what needs multiple media and news sources fulfill (Wang & Tchernev, 2012). Audiences use multiple media to obtain more information (Diddi & LaRose, 2006), to confirm their opinions about the world, and to talk with others (Weeks & Holbert, 2013). In this context, socially driven activities, such as obtaining more information and accessing discussion, link audience motivation and news consumption (Lee, 2013), even over multiple platforms. Rooted in literature on multitasking as well as U&G, this study identifies two distinct motivations for second screening during news—information seeking and discussion. Although related concepts, motivations to get informed and motivations to discuss with others are distinguishable (Cho, Gil de Zúñiga, Rojas, & Shah, 2003).1 These attributes have also been found in content analyses of second screening events. Tweets sent out during TV programs indicate people used Twitter to post and share additional information related to the event or program (Giglietto & Selva, 2014; Wohn & Na, 2011). Wohn and Na (2011) also found that users of Twitter who second screened took advantage of the various interactive affordances of Twitter, like @replies, retweets, and #hashtags, to engage in discussion. Second screeners use social media platforms for supplementary information and to participate in a networked discussion about a TV program. To explore these motivations, we ask: What demographic and antecedent characteristics in Wave 1 of the data collection (W1) may explain motivations for people to second screen during news events at a later time, Wave 2 of the data collection (W2)—RQ1a? And what demographic and antecedent characteristics (W1) may explain second screening for news behavior (W2)—RQ1b? News consumption and second screening for news Second screening combines two types of media consumption—TV news and digital media, usually socially networked or web spaces. However, the relationship between other forms of news media consumption and second screening is unknown. We suggest that newspaper and radio consumption, screen-less mediums, are unlikely to lead to second screening. Accordingly, we anticipate a negative relationship between newspaper/radio news consumption (W1) and second screening for news (W2)—H1a. On the other hand, since second screening by definition involves TV news consumption, we anticipate a positive relationship between TV news consumption (W1) and second screening for news (W2)—H1b. As such, people who second screen may be seeking information outside of traditional media like newspapers, radio, or television. Whether second screeners turn to the web, a common platform for citizen journalism (Holton, Coddington, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2013; Kaufhold, Valenzuela, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2010), or to social network sites, where they may be exposed to a range of news from various sources, they are obtaining additional information. We suggest that these computer-mediated forms of news consumption—whether citizen journalism or social media use for news—will relate to second screening because those who second screen are accessing additional information. They will obtain it from all available sources, especially those available online via a readily available second screen. We hypothesize a positive relationship between social media use for news consumption (W1) and second screening for news (W2)—H1c, as well as between citizen journalism news consumption (W1) and second screening for news (W2)—H2d. Providing evidence of associations between more established forms of media use for news and second screening for news further builds the case for our hypothesized positive relationship between second screen use for news and online political participation. Online political participation Researchers who study political participation, originally defined as voting and working for political parties (Conway, 1985), now provide a more inclusive repertoire of behaviors aimed at influencing government action. Other activities scholars now identify as political participation include working for the community, attending a protest (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995), making a campaign contribution, and writing a letter to a politician or to the editor of a newspaper (Shah, Cho, Eveland, & Kwak, 2005). Taking into account the interactivity of Web 2.0, scholars like Chadwick and Howard (2008) explicate these technological principles for their relevance to politics. As they suggest, the Internet is a platform for political discourse that offers new ways for citizens to participate in public affairs. Because this study examines second screening, which inherently involves Internet connectivity and online activities, we focus on online forms of political participation. We expand previously measured behaviors to include creating an online petition or signing up online to volunteer to help with a political cause. Like television before it, widespread Internet adoption led media pessimists to focus on perceived adverse effects—namely that television and Internet use represent negative predictors of civic engagement and political participation (Kraut et al., 1998). Psychological media effects scholars were among those quick to challenge media naysayers, positing that it is not the time spent with media that matters as much as how people use various media that influences levels of engagement (Shah, Kwak, & Holbert, 2001; Shah, Rojas, & Cho, 2009). News use leads to political participation when people actively engage in discussion (Gil de Zúñiga, Bachmann, Hsu, & Brundidge, 2013) and by providing mobilizing information (Lemert, 1992) and allowing audiences to reflect on political issues (Eveland, 2004). However, while consumption of news from legacy-type media alone may provide a direct path to (offline) political participation, we do not anticipate that they provide a direct path to online participatory action. For instance, television may provide information that allows audiences to gather ideas for debate (Eveland & Scheufele, 2000), but researchers have found that the consumption of television news does not lead to online political participation and discussion (Putnam, 2000; Shah et al., 2001). Thus, we hypothesize a negative relationship between TV news consumption (W1) and online political participation (W2)—H2a and between newspaper/radio news consumption (W2) and online political participation (W2)—H2b. However, it is through the same pathways discussed above that we believe second screening for news will conduit television news use to online political participation. Specifically, we hypothesize that second screening for news (W1), by providing ready access and tools for discussion and elaboration, will mediate the path between TV news consumption (W1) and online political participation (W2)—H3. On the other hand, when it comes to web-based news consumption, we see a more direct path to online political action. Seeking information via different online platforms (e.g., social network site) is a significant predictor of political participation (Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, & Valenzuela, 2012). The Internet appears to reinforce personal interaction (Hampton & Wellman, 2003) and volunteerism (Jennings & Zeitner, 2003). When it comes to web-connected media consumption, Shah et al. (2005) found that “online information seeking and interactive civic messaging—uses of the Web as a resource and a forum—both strongly influence civic engagement” (p. 551). We expect our analysis to confirm these previous findings, so we predict a positive relationship between social media use for news consumption (W1) and online political participation (W2)—H2c. The Internet also hosts many citizen journalists. Using available digital tools, the “people formerly known as the audience” (Rosen, 2008) now generate and exchange information as disseminators, activists, and content producers (Bowman & Willis, 2003). Scholars assert that digital technology has “empowered a growing army of citizen journalists” (Franklin, 2008, p. 307) who complement information processes and encourage democratic debate by offering a more pluralistic view of society (Jenkins, Ford, & Green, 2013). This connection may not only explain a possible path from citizen news consumption toward second screening but also a clearer one toward participation. Citizen journalism seems to have a greater impact on politics on the web than does traditional journalism (Kaufhold et al., 2010). Individuals who consume and trust citizen journalism engage more often in online political discussions and online political participation (Kaufhold et al., 2010; Rojas & Gil de Zúñiga, 2010). Given this, we hypothesize a positive relationship between citizen journalism news consumption (W1) and online political participation (W2)—H2d. As discussed previously, informational uses of many media types have been shown to lead directly and indirectly to political participation, including newspapers (McLeod et al., 1999), television (Norris, 1996), the Internet (Shah et al., 2005), mobile communication technologies (Campbell & Kwak, 2010), and social media (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2014). In addition, we expect that second screening for news, one part informative act, will lead to online political participation. Beyond the information, second screening may engender discussion. Social network sites can lead to community building (Papacharissi & De Oliveira, 2012), and because of its tie to social network sites, we expect second screening to also build a sense of community. We suggest that discussions within these communities may provide a low-cost outlet for elaborative processing, a key aspect of the cognitive mediation model (Eveland, 2001). Additionally, second screening is embedded within a medium that freely avails participants the tools with which to build a more active relationship with political institutions and organizations. This relative ease of participation provides low-barrier access for second screeners to take online political action. As such, we expect a positive relationship between second screening for news (W1) and online political participation (W2)—H4. Method Sample The data for this study were drawn from a two-wave U.S. national panel study conducted by the Digital Media Research Program at The University of Texas at Austin. Both waves of the survey were administered online using Qualtrics, a Web survey software to which authors have a university-wide subscription account. Respondents for the initial survey were selected from among those who registered to participate in an online panel administered by the Nielsen media-polling group. Nielsen employs a stratified quota sampling to recruit the respondents from over 200,000 people. That is, to overcome some of the limitations of surveying Internet users only and to assure national representativeness, a quota based on gender, age, education, and income was established so that the sample match, as much as possible, the distribution of these demographic variables as reported by the U.S. Census (to learn more about this data collection strategy, please see Bode, Vraga, Borah, & Shah, 2014). The first wave of the data collection was conducted in December of 2013 (from an initial sample of 5,000 individuals). In total, 2,060 participants responded, and 247 cases were deleted for incomplete or invalid data. Employing the American Association of Public Opinion Research's (AAPOR) response rate calculator (RR3), the response rate was 34.6% (AAPOR, 2011, pp 45). This response rate falls within acceptable parameters for web-based surveys (Bosnjak, Das, & Lynn, 2016). The second wave was collected in March 2014, yielding 1,024 valid cases for a retention rate of 57%, which falls within the normal parameters of data validity and representation integrity (for a detailed discussion on the importance of retention rate for web panels, see Watson & Wooden, 2006). Respondents to the surveys were slightly older, more educated, and included fewer Hispanics than the U.S. population at large. The differences between W1 and W2 in terms of demographics are minor, within 3% for all categories. The overall sample was comparable to other surveys employing random collection methods (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2012) and was comparable to the U.S. national population as a whole (see Molyneux, Vasudevan, and Gil de Zúñiga (2015) for detailed demographic breakdown). Measures In order to test the proposed research questions and hypotheses in this study, the analyses included five groups of variables. First, the models controlled for as many variables as we identified in the literature to be influential over participatory behaviors and media effects: demographics, sociopolitical controls, news media use, and people's level of media trust. Then the study registered the subject's second screening use for news, as well as the informational and discussion motivations for second screening. Second screening was accordingly used first as a criterion variable to learn more about the specific antecedents and characteristics that may explain this behavior. Finally, it was also placed as an independent variable to predict online political participation.2 As the study relies on two-wave panel data measurements, all the indexes were constructed with the exact same items at W1 and W2. Endogenous and exogenous variables Newspaper/radio news use This variable captured traditional media news consumption relying on print and radio outlets. On a 10-point scale, respondents rated how frequently they “use print media for news,” “use radio for news,” “get the news from national newspapers,” “get news from local newspapers,” “get news from radio news and talk shows” (6 items averaged scale, W1 Cronbach's α = .72; M = 3.7, SD = 1.8; W2 Cronbach's α = .75; M = 3.7, SD = 1.9). TV news use Comprehensibly measuring TV news consumption was key for our study as this variable is directly tied to second screening behavior. Using the same 10-point scale as above, the index was created by adding 11 items that tapped on the frequency of “TV for news,” “network TV news,” “local TV affiliate stations,” “fake TV news” programs (i.e., Daily show, Colbert report), “cable news,” and specific television news from “CNN,” “Fox News,” “MSNBC,” “BBC,” “PBS,” and “Al Jazeera America” (11 items averaged scale, W1 Cronbach's α = .81; M = 4.2, SD = 1.6; W2 Cronbach's α = .81; M = 4.3, SD = 1.6). Citizen journalism We used two items to compose this index asking respondents about how frequently they relied on citizen media to consume information. Respondents were asked to rate on a 10-point scale (where 1 = never and 10 = all the time) “how often do you get news from citizen journalism sites” and “how often do you get news from hyperlocal news sites such as Patch.com, etc.” which also captured citizen-generated media. The construct yielded a fairly high validity level (2 items averaged scale, W1 Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .65; M = 1.9, SD = 1.6; W2 Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .69; M = 2.0, SD = 1.7).3 Social media news use The last index that dealt with media use for news encompasses social media. Using the same 10-point scale, subjects indicated how frequently they use “Facebook for getting news,” as well as “Twitter,” “Google+,” “Pinterest,” “Instagram,” “Tumblr,” “Reddit,” and “LinkedIn” (8 items averaged scale, W1 Cronbach's α = .84; M = 1.7, SD = 1.3; Cronbach's α = .83; M = 1.7, SD = 1.2). Second screening for news This variable was obtained by adding three items to gauge how much individuals use a second device or screen (i.e., laptop, smartphone, etc.) to seek further news or discuss information while watching news on TV. Specifically the survey asked respondents “how often do you second screen during political speeches or debates,” “during news,” and “during election coverage” (3 items averaged scale, W1 Cronbach's α = .92; M = 2.5, SD = 2.4; Cronbach's α = .91; M = 2.6, SD = 2.4). Informational motivations to second screen Using a 10-point scale (1 = completely disagree; 10 = completely agree), two items captured the informational motivations respondents have to engage in second screening behaviors: “I second screen because I get more up-to-date information,” and “I get additional information about what I'm watching” (2 items averaged scale, W1 Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .96; M = 3.4, SD = 2.9; W2 Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .95; M = 3.4, SD = 2.9). Discussion motivations to second screen Likewise, items captured the discussion motivations respondents have to engage in second screening behaviors: “I second screen because I like to share my thoughts about an event” and “I like to participate in a conversation about an event I'm watching” (2 items averaged scale, W1 Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .95; M = 2.5, SD = 2.3; W2 Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .96; M = 2.4, SD = 2.3). Political participation online This variable taps the level of political engagement subjects report in online activities. The questionnaire asked respondents how often in the past 12 months they had “created an online petition,” “signed a petition online,” “participated in an online question and answer session with a politician or public official,” “signed up online to volunteer to help with a political cause,” “used a mobile phone to donate money to a campaign or political cause,” and “started a political or cause-related group on a social media site.” All responses were then added into a single index (6 items averaged scale, W1 Cronbach's α = .81; M = 1.9, SD = 1.4; W2 Cronbach's α = .84; M = 1.8, SD = 1.5). For a description of residualized variables, please see Appendix A. Statistical analysis To test the research questions and hypotheses posed in this study, we employ a two-wave panel data design. First, a series of lagged-panel hierarchical regressions were conducted. That is, the wave two measures (W2) were regressed on the time one measures (W1) to understand effects and predict causal patterns (Kenny, 2005). Nevertheless, we further conducted a panel lagged and autoregressive structural equation modeling test to ascertain the causal inference of the variables of interest over participation over time, simultaneously isolating the possible effect participating politically online may have over future engagement (Shah et al., 2001). That is, in this model, an autoregressive term of online political participation was introduced as a control and specified as an exogenous variable, so the gamma coefficient (γ) represents the stability of online political engagement over time, while the rest of the beta coefficients (β) “reflect the influence of predictor variables on the outcome variable above and beyond the causal influence of prior levels of the outcome variable on itself” (Shah et al., 2005, p. 549). Results First, RQ1a sought to reveal which demographics best explain people's motivations to engage in second screening during news events. Information seeking and discussion were operationalized as dependent variables. In total, 22% of variance in information seeking and 28.5% of variance in discussion as motivators for second screening are explained by variables included in this analysis. The full results of this model can be found in Table 1, focusing on the first two columns. Table 1 Lagged Panel Regression Models Testing Demographic and Social Antecedents of Motivations for Second Screening and Second Screening News Use . Information Motivation for Second ScreeningT2 . Discussion Motivation for Second ScreeningT2 . Second Screening for News UseT2 . Block 1: Demographics Age −.211*** −.168*** −.067** Gender (female) −.032 −.032 .046* Education −.010 −.028 −.022 Income −.016 −.031 .011 Race (white) −.055 −.077** .036# ΔR2 7.7% 8.5% 6.0% Block 2: Sociopolitical Controls Discussion Network SizeT1 .033 .003 .037# Discussion FrequencyT1 .056# .078* .022# Political EfficacyT1 .030 .028 .037# Strength of PartisanshipT1 .013 .025 .036# ΔR2 (%) 6.0% 7.6%% 8.0% Block 2: News Media Use TV NewsT1 .117*** .096** .080*** Radio/Newspapers NewsT1 .011 −.018 −.035# Social MediaT1 .085** .179*** .082*** Citizen JournalismT1 .090** .111*** .047# ΔR2 6.4% 10.2% 7.9% Block 4: Media Trust Traditional Media TrustT1 .004 −.001 −.080* Alternative Media TrustT1 .164*** .178*** −.030 ΔR2 1.9% 2.2% .6% Block 4: SS Motivations Second Screening Info.T1 .004 −.001 .513*** Second Screening Disc.T1 .164*** .178*** .188* ΔR2 1.9% 2.2% 31.4% Total R2 22.0% 28.5% 53.9% . Information Motivation for Second ScreeningT2 . Discussion Motivation for Second ScreeningT2 . Second Screening for News UseT2 . Block 1: Demographics Age −.211*** −.168*** −.067** Gender (female) −.032 −.032 .046* Education −.010 −.028 −.022 Income −.016 −.031 .011 Race (white) −.055 −.077** .036# ΔR2 7.7% 8.5% 6.0% Block 2: Sociopolitical Controls Discussion Network SizeT1 .033 .003 .037# Discussion FrequencyT1 .056# .078* .022# Political EfficacyT1 .030 .028 .037# Strength of PartisanshipT1 .013 .025 .036# ΔR2 (%) 6.0% 7.6%% 8.0% Block 2: News Media Use TV NewsT1 .117*** .096** .080*** Radio/Newspapers NewsT1 .011 −.018 −.035# Social MediaT1 .085** .179*** .082*** Citizen JournalismT1 .090** .111*** .047# ΔR2 6.4% 10.2% 7.9% Block 4: Media Trust Traditional Media TrustT1 .004 −.001 −.080* Alternative Media TrustT1 .164*** .178*** −.030 ΔR2 1.9% 2.2% .6% Block 4: SS Motivations Second Screening Info.T1 .004 −.001 .513*** Second Screening Disc.T1 .164*** .178*** .188* ΔR2 1.9% 2.2% 31.4% Total R2 22.0% 28.5% 53.9% Note: Sample size = 1,017. Cell entries are final-entry OLS standardized Beta (β) coefficients. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. Open in new tab Table 1 Lagged Panel Regression Models Testing Demographic and Social Antecedents of Motivations for Second Screening and Second Screening News Use . Information Motivation for Second ScreeningT2 . Discussion Motivation for Second ScreeningT2 . Second Screening for News UseT2 . Block 1: Demographics Age −.211*** −.168*** −.067** Gender (female) −.032 −.032 .046* Education −.010 −.028 −.022 Income −.016 −.031 .011 Race (white) −.055 −.077** .036# ΔR2 7.7% 8.5% 6.0% Block 2: Sociopolitical Controls Discussion Network SizeT1 .033 .003 .037# Discussion FrequencyT1 .056# .078* .022# Political EfficacyT1 .030 .028 .037# Strength of PartisanshipT1 .013 .025 .036# ΔR2 (%) 6.0% 7.6%% 8.0% Block 2: News Media Use TV NewsT1 .117*** .096** .080*** Radio/Newspapers NewsT1 .011 −.018 −.035# Social MediaT1 .085** .179*** .082*** Citizen JournalismT1 .090** .111*** .047# ΔR2 6.4% 10.2% 7.9% Block 4: Media Trust Traditional Media TrustT1 .004 −.001 −.080* Alternative Media TrustT1 .164*** .178*** −.030 ΔR2 1.9% 2.2% .6% Block 4: SS Motivations Second Screening Info.T1 .004 −.001 .513*** Second Screening Disc.T1 .164*** .178*** .188* ΔR2 1.9% 2.2% 31.4% Total R2 22.0% 28.5% 53.9% . Information Motivation for Second ScreeningT2 . Discussion Motivation for Second ScreeningT2 . Second Screening for News UseT2 . Block 1: Demographics Age −.211*** −.168*** −.067** Gender (female) −.032 −.032 .046* Education −.010 −.028 −.022 Income −.016 −.031 .011 Race (white) −.055 −.077** .036# ΔR2 7.7% 8.5% 6.0% Block 2: Sociopolitical Controls Discussion Network SizeT1 .033 .003 .037# Discussion FrequencyT1 .056# .078* .022# Political EfficacyT1 .030 .028 .037# Strength of PartisanshipT1 .013 .025 .036# ΔR2 (%) 6.0% 7.6%% 8.0% Block 2: News Media Use TV NewsT1 .117*** .096** .080*** Radio/Newspapers NewsT1 .011 −.018 −.035# Social MediaT1 .085** .179*** .082*** Citizen JournalismT1 .090** .111*** .047# ΔR2 6.4% 10.2% 7.9% Block 4: Media Trust Traditional Media TrustT1 .004 −.001 −.080* Alternative Media TrustT1 .164*** .178*** −.030 ΔR2 1.9% 2.2% .6% Block 4: SS Motivations Second Screening Info.T1 .004 −.001 .513*** Second Screening Disc.T1 .164*** .178*** .188* ΔR2 1.9% 2.2% 31.4% Total R2 22.0% 28.5% 53.9% Note: Sample size = 1,017. Cell entries are final-entry OLS standardized Beta (β) coefficients. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. Open in new tab For those who second screen for more information, age (β = −.211, p < .001) holds a significant relationship with these motives for second screen use. Again, the younger one is, the more he/she will try to find additional information through second screening. Our lagged panel regression results also indicate that TV news use (β = .117, p < .001), social media use for news (β = .085, p < .01), citizen journalism news (β = .090, p < .01), and alternative media trust (β = .164, p < .001) were all statistically significant predictors of informational motivations to second screen. See Table 1, first column “Information Motivation for Second Screening.” As for discussion as a motivator for second screening, age (β = −.168, p < .001) and race (β = −.077, p < .01) proved significant. Young people and minorities appear more willing to second screen to discuss news. The only sociopolitical variable that explains discussion motivations to second screen is the frequency at which respondents discuss politics (β = .078, p < .05). All types of media consumption except newspaper/radio news use were positive and statistically significant predictors of the discussion motivation to second screen use: TV news (β = .096, p < .01), social media use for news (β = .179, p < .001), and citizen journalism news (β = .111, p < .001). That is, the more people tend to use these media in the first place (W1), the more likely they will be to develop a discussion motivation to second screen (W2). Another interesting finding is that trust in alternative media is also significantly related to and predicts both information seeking (β = .164, p < .001) and discussion (β = .178, p < .001) as motivations for second screening (See Table 1). RQ1b aimed to determine which, and if so how, demographics and sociopolitical variables exerted significant influence on second screen use for news. For instance, trust in traditional media yields a negative relationship (β = −.078, p < .05), while trust in alternative media does not predict people's use of a second device for accessing news (β = −.030, p = .210). In other words, the less people trust traditional media, the more they second screen for news. Among the demographics, age (β = −.067, p < .01) and gender (β = .046, p < .05) also predict second screen use—young people and females tend to do so more than older citizens and males. As may be expected, however, people's motivations to second screen are the strongest predictors in the model: information motivation (β = .513, p < .001), and discussion motivation (β = .188, p < .001). In total, over half of the variance (53.9%) of second screen use for news was explained by variables contained in the analysis (see Table 1). Hypothesis 1 predicted a negative relationship between the consumption of newspaper/radio news (H1a,), and a positive relationship between TV news use (H1b), social media use for news (H1c), and citizen journalism (H1d) (all W1) and second screening (W2). In order to shed light on these relationships, lagged panel regression was employed as well as further clarification through an autoregressive SEM test. As the third column in Table 1 shows, these propositions were partially supported. (Results of the autoregressive SEM test can be seen in Figure 1.) The consumption of TV news (β = .080, p < .001) and social media news (β = .082, p < .001) were significant predictors of second screening for news. The more people use TV news and social media for news, the more likely they are to engage in second screening for news. However, there was no evidence of newspaper/radio news or citizen journalism as predictors of this behavior. The block of news media use alone explains an additional 7.9% of the variance in second screening use for news (ΔR2 = .079, p < .001). Figure 1 Open in new tabDownload slide Lagged and autoregressive effects structural equation model of news use, second screening and online political participation. Figure 1 Open in new tabDownload slide Lagged and autoregressive effects structural equation model of news use, second screening and online political participation. The second set of hypotheses (H2 a through d) aimed to test whether, and if so how, different types of news use may impact people's online engagement. In order to test these relationships, we relied on both a lagged panel regression test to observe the overall effect, as well as an autoregressive SEM model to further test and clarify these effects over time (see Shah et al., 2001). Table 2 presents the regression results in full, with the autoregressive SEM test modeled in Figure 1. As we hypothesized, TV news consumption (H2a) had no direct effect on online political participatory behaviors (β = .035, p < .12). Also of interest and as expected (H2b), newspaper/radio news use yields a negative relationship on online political participation (β = −.067, p < .05). On the other hand, as predicted (H2c and H2d), social media use and citizen journalism news use (W1) positively predicted online political participation at a later time (W2) (β = .232, p < .001) and (β = .148, p < .001) respectively. So the more individuals consume information via traditional means, the less inclined they will be to engage politically online. The news media use block alone explains an additional 11.2% of the variance of online political participation (ΔR2 = .112, p < .001). This relationship varied once a lagged autoregressive model was employed rather than a lagged model. That is, the effects became milder once the model controlled for the effect of people's prior political participatory levels (W1) over time (W2)—see Table 2, Model 2. Table 2 Lagged (Model 1) and Autoregressive Lagged (Model 2) Panel Regression Model Testing Second Screening News Use Effect on Online Political Participation . Online Political ParticipationT2 . Model 1 . Model 2 . Block 1: Demographics Age .013 .011 Gender (female) −.043 −.013 Education −.016 −.019 Income −.037 −.016 Race (white) −.077** −.038# ΔR2 2.0% 2.0% Block 2: Sociopolitical Controls Discussion Network SizeT1 .021 .028# Discussion FrequencyT1 .230*** .057* Political EfficacyT1 .088** .034# Strength of PartisanshipT1 .031 .003 Online Pol. ParticipationT1 — .610*** ΔR2 (%) 19.7% 50.9% Block 2: News Media Use TV NewsT1 .035 .005 Radio/Newspapers NewsT1 −.067* −.050* Social MediaT1 .232*** .082*** Citizen JournalismT1 .148*** .033# ΔR2 11.2% 1.1% Block 4: Media Trust Traditional Media TrustT1 −.082** −.012 Alternative Media TrustT1 .104*** .042# ΔR2 1.0% 0.1% Block 5: Second Screening Second Screen News UseT1 .100*** .061** ΔR2 1.0% 0.4% Total R2 34.5% 54.6% . Online Political ParticipationT2 . Model 1 . Model 2 . Block 1: Demographics Age .013 .011 Gender (female) −.043 −.013 Education −.016 −.019 Income −.037 −.016 Race (white) −.077** −.038# ΔR2 2.0% 2.0% Block 2: Sociopolitical Controls Discussion Network SizeT1 .021 .028# Discussion FrequencyT1 .230*** .057* Political EfficacyT1 .088** .034# Strength of PartisanshipT1 .031 .003 Online Pol. ParticipationT1 — .610*** ΔR2 (%) 19.7% 50.9% Block 2: News Media Use TV NewsT1 .035 .005 Radio/Newspapers NewsT1 −.067* −.050* Social MediaT1 .232*** .082*** Citizen JournalismT1 .148*** .033# ΔR2 11.2% 1.1% Block 4: Media Trust Traditional Media TrustT1 −.082** −.012 Alternative Media TrustT1 .104*** .042# ΔR2 1.0% 0.1% Block 5: Second Screening Second Screen News UseT1 .100*** .061** ΔR2 1.0% 0.4% Total R2 34.5% 54.6% Notes: Sample size = 1,017. Cell entries are final-entry OLS standardized Beta (β) coefficients. # p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. Open in new tab Table 2 Lagged (Model 1) and Autoregressive Lagged (Model 2) Panel Regression Model Testing Second Screening News Use Effect on Online Political Participation . Online Political ParticipationT2 . Model 1 . Model 2 . Block 1: Demographics Age .013 .011 Gender (female) −.043 −.013 Education −.016 −.019 Income −.037 −.016 Race (white) −.077** −.038# ΔR2 2.0% 2.0% Block 2: Sociopolitical Controls Discussion Network SizeT1 .021 .028# Discussion FrequencyT1 .230*** .057* Political EfficacyT1 .088** .034# Strength of PartisanshipT1 .031 .003 Online Pol. ParticipationT1 — .610*** ΔR2 (%) 19.7% 50.9% Block 2: News Media Use TV NewsT1 .035 .005 Radio/Newspapers NewsT1 −.067* −.050* Social MediaT1 .232*** .082*** Citizen JournalismT1 .148*** .033# ΔR2 11.2% 1.1% Block 4: Media Trust Traditional Media TrustT1 −.082** −.012 Alternative Media TrustT1 .104*** .042# ΔR2 1.0% 0.1% Block 5: Second Screening Second Screen News UseT1 .100*** .061** ΔR2 1.0% 0.4% Total R2 34.5% 54.6% . Online Political ParticipationT2 . Model 1 . Model 2 . Block 1: Demographics Age .013 .011 Gender (female) −.043 −.013 Education −.016 −.019 Income −.037 −.016 Race (white) −.077** −.038# ΔR2 2.0% 2.0% Block 2: Sociopolitical Controls Discussion Network SizeT1 .021 .028# Discussion FrequencyT1 .230*** .057* Political EfficacyT1 .088** .034# Strength of PartisanshipT1 .031 .003 Online Pol. ParticipationT1 — .610*** ΔR2 (%) 19.7% 50.9% Block 2: News Media Use TV NewsT1 .035 .005 Radio/Newspapers NewsT1 −.067* −.050* Social MediaT1 .232*** .082*** Citizen JournalismT1 .148*** .033# ΔR2 11.2% 1.1% Block 4: Media Trust Traditional Media TrustT1 −.082** −.012 Alternative Media TrustT1 .104*** .042# ΔR2 1.0% 0.1% Block 5: Second Screening Second Screen News UseT1 .100*** .061** ΔR2 1.0% 0.4% Total R2 34.5% 54.6% Notes: Sample size = 1,017. Cell entries are final-entry OLS standardized Beta (β) coefficients. # p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. Open in new tab Importantly, we also test to what extent second screen use may also become a significant factor in predicting online political behavior. H4 is supported—second screening in W1 also directly predicts online political participation at a later time (W2) (β = .100, p < .001). The more one engages in second screening for news, the more likely he/she is to take political action online. Second screening for news explains an additional 1% of online political participation (ΔR2 = .01, p < .001), for a total variance explained of 34.5% in the overall model (R2 = .345, p < .001). See Table 3. Table 3 Indirect Lagged and Autoregressive Effects Over Online Political Participation Indirect Effects . β . TV News (T1) → Second Screening (T1) → Online Pol. Participation (T2) .017* Social Media News (T1) → Second Screening (T1) → Online Pol. Part. (T2) .022* Indirect Effects . β . TV News (T1) → Second Screening (T1) → Online Pol. Participation (T2) .017* Social Media News (T1) → Second Screening (T1) → Online Pol. Part. (T2) .022* Notes: Standardized regression coefficients (β) reported. N = 1,017. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001 (two-tailed). Open in new tab Table 3 Indirect Lagged and Autoregressive Effects Over Online Political Participation Indirect Effects . β . TV News (T1) → Second Screening (T1) → Online Pol. Participation (T2) .017* Social Media News (T1) → Second Screening (T1) → Online Pol. Part. (T2) .022* Indirect Effects . β . TV News (T1) → Second Screening (T1) → Online Pol. Participation (T2) .017* Social Media News (T1) → Second Screening (T1) → Online Pol. Part. (T2) .022* Notes: Standardized regression coefficients (β) reported. N = 1,017. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001 (two-tailed). Open in new tab As explained earlier, an autoregressive term of the online political participation variable was introduced to control for the effect that individuals' political engagement in W1 may have on future participation at W2. This test better isolates the predicting effect of all the variables in the model accounting for the causal effect online political participation behavior may have on itself overtime. Accordingly, the SEM test (see Figure 1) also clarifies these connections as a structure including prior online political participation on Time 1 (χ2 = 3.28; df = 3; p = .42; RMSEA = .0001, CFI = .995, TLI = .990, SRMR = .016; second screening R2 = 5.5%; online political participation R2 = 7.0%). Frequency of social media news use and citizen journalism news use directly predict online political participation (β = .168, p < .05 or better; β = .188, p < .05 or better), whereas TV news and newspaper/radio media news use do not. Furthermore, second screening also directly predicts online political participation (β = .118, p < .05 or better), providing more support for H4. Interestingly, once the model residualized the effect of online political participation at Time 1, only citizen journalism (β = .188, p < .05 or better), social media use for news (β = .168, p < .05 or better), and second screen use (β = .118, p < .05 or better) remain as statistical significant predictors of future political participation at Time 2. Thus, second screening for news partially mediates the effect of social media news use on participation, and completely mediates the relationship between consuming news on TV and participating online. Therefore, H3 is supported—second screening for news (W1) mediates the relationship between TV news consumption (W1) and online political participation (W2). See also the indirect effects results (Table 3). Also, as it can be expected, the effect of participating politically over time remains fairly stable (γ = .68, p < .001). See Figure 1. Discussion Second screening, as a relatively new media behavior, merits examination at a variety of levels. We specifically analyze second screen use for news. As this activity continues to gain popularity, its definition may evolve. For now, it involves watching television and engaging with supplemental digital media—viewers seeking additional information or an outlet for discussion in a computer-mediated sphere. Our research sheds more light on the phenomenon of second screening by (a) identifying key antecedents and motivations that explain why and how people engage in second screening, and (b) by also empirically exploring whether second screening for news leads to positive democratic outcomes. Results show that information seeking and discussion motivate second screening for news, which predicts online political participation. This finding is consistent with previous research indicating positive and predictive relationships between computer-mediated media use for news and civic and political engagement (Campbell & Kwak, 2010; Shah et al., 2005). By focusing on second screening for news, this study adds weight to the theory that it's how people use media that produces positive effects. Second screening provides users an opportunity to get more information, discuss, and elaborate on TV news, a process that we show mediates the path from TV news consumption to online political participation. As such, we provide new media support for both the Communication Mediation Model (McLeod et al., 1999) and the Cognitive Mediation Model (Eveland, 2004). The confirmed motivations for second screening, to discuss with others and pursue further information, also help explain why those who second screen are politically engaged in a virtual sphere. Previous studies have found positive relationships between media use for news and political participation (Campbell & Kwak, 2010; McLeod et al., 1999; Norris, 1996; Shah et al., 2005), so it's natural to assume that this emerging use of media for news may also lead to political engagement. By using a connected secondary device to obtain more information about news, contextualize the information, and to relate to others through discussion, second screeners are already within the computer-mediated spheres where online political participation happens (i.e., donate money, create online petitions, etc.). Pure ease of action may also explain some of this relationship. In order to more stringently explore the relationship and influences among our variables of interest, this study used nationally representative, two-wave panel data, often utilized for examining and assessing causal inference. Time-lagged panel effects were tested, with actions in Time 1 predicting behavior in Time 2. It's important to note that in this study we have rigorously controlled for previously identified antecedents of political action (Bakker & De Vreese, 2011). Even when residualizing these effects, second screening for news remained a solid predictor of online political participation. An autoregressive structural equation model confirms the main hypothesis of this study, as it shows individual paths from distinct media uses to second screening, which in turn predicts online political participation. Second screening both partially and fully mediates these relationships. This speaks not only to the power of computer-mediated collocation, but also to the benefits of additional information about and discussion of TV news events, especially as they relate to pro-democratic behaviors like online political engagement. Additionally, this study confirms previous findings that tested the effects of citizen journalism consumption and social media use for news in predicting online political participation (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2014). It also sheds light on the relationship between TV news and online political participation when second screening is present as a mediating activity. As previous research has found no relationship (Putnam, 2000,Shah et al., 2001) between TV news and online political participation, second screening for news provides a path for TV news viewers to political engagement and action in the online sphere. This represents a novel and promising path to a more participatory society. Even though these findings illuminate the relationship between TV news viewing, second screening, and the democratic process, this study has some limitations. The nature of U.S. two-wave, survey panel data and its representation comparability in relation to the U.S. Census and Pew Center (RDD collected data) demographic measures means we are confident generalizing these findings and suggesting some causal order. However, the two waves are about 3 months apart, which may raise some doubt regarding the possibility of tracing clearly causes and effects. However, scholars have found empirical evidence of the relationship between seeking information/discussing politics at Time 1 and participating in Time 2 (Shah et al., 2005) even in a short time span. Our study shows effects within this shorter time period. On the other hand, collecting the data in two closer times ensured a high retention rate (57%), which lends validity and representational integrity to the data. Additionally, our two-wave panel data only allowed for causal inference from two points in time. The structural equation model tested in this study would have been more theoretically accurate if presented media uses at time one, predicting second screening use at time two, and online political participation at time three. Future academic efforts should focus on observing specific nuances by which second screen use may lead to political action. Experimental settings and content analysis of second screen use may help clarify this effect. Future research should also examine second screening motivations as antecedent of second screen use and participation. As previous studies have shown (Eveland 2001; Eveland et al., 2003; McLeod et al., 1999; Shah et al., 2007), motivations to discuss politics and to keep up with the news have also been linked to participatory behaviors. Thus, scholars should test whether this connection is direct, indirect, or fully mediated through the use of second screening for news and political discussion. Similarly, future second screen use research should analyze its relationship to offline political activity and civic engagement, which would further probe the hypothesis that interactions in computer-mediated spheres spill over from the screen, resulting in meaningful offline and prodemocratic activities. Finally, future research should also account for the possibility of stronger effects of second screen use as operationalized in this study. That is, this paper may be underestimating the prevalence of second screening, given the relative dearth of political and campaign information during the data collection time frame. It is expected that second screening for news during campaign time may yield stronger effects, never a weaker one. Given the growing popularity of second screening, the relationship between prosocial and prodemocratic behaviors and these relatively new media habits begs further study. Our contribution here marks a starting point for continuing this vein of research. Notes 1 " Given that learning about individuals' motivations to engage in second screening represents a rather novel area in the literature, the authors performed a principal component factor analysis with varimax rotation and Kaiser Normalization to test whether informational motivations to second screen were indeed different from discussion motivations to second screen. Results indicate they are two distinct dimensions of motivations to use second screening: a discussion motivation (48.1% of variance), and an informational motivation (47.8% of variance). 2 " When conducting the analyses with MPLUS, we also allow the software to handle missing data encountered in our data by estimating means and intercepts for those missing cases (for detailed explanations on how to work with missing values with structural equation modeling SEM, see Acock, 2005). 3 " Indexes generated with two items need to rely on the Spearman-Brown Coefficient rather than Cronbach's alpha as its formula accounts for the fact that only two items are used in the construct. That is, the reliability test is not sensible to the number of items as it does occur with Cronbach alpha formula (see Spearman, 1910). Appendix A Residualized Variables Table 4   . Measure(s) . Scale . Descriptives . Discussion network size How many people have you “talked to face-to-face or over the phone about politics or public affairs,” and “talked to via the Internet, including e-mail, chat rooms, and social networking sites about politics or public affairs” in the last month Open ended W1M = .33, Mdn = .24, SD = .37, skewness = 1.32; W2M = .54, Mdn = .45, SD = .28, skewness = 1.44a Discussion frequency Estimate frequency of political or public affairs discussions with: “spouse or partner,” “family and relatives,” “friends,” “acquaintances,” “strangers,” “neighbors you know very well,” “neighbors you don't know well,” “coworkers you know well,” and “coworkers you don't know well” 10-point scale 9 items averaged scale, W1 Cronbach's α = .87; M = 3.3 SD = 1.8; W2 Cronbach's α = .86; M = 3.2, SD = 1.7 Political efficacy “people like me can influence government,” “I consider myself well qualified to participate in politics,” “I have a good understanding of the important political issues facing our country,” “no matter whom I vote for, it won't make a difference” (recoded), “people like me don't have any say in what the government does” (recoded) 10-point scale 5 items averaged scale, W1 Cronbach's α = .71; M = 5.4, SD = 1.9; W2 Cronbach's α = .71, M = 5.3, SD = 1.8 Strength of party ID Where would you place yourself on “on social issues,” “on economic issues,” and also in a more general sense “do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent” 11-point scale from strong R to strong D 3 items averaged scale W1 Cronbach's α = .90, M = 5.9, SD = 2.6; W2 Cronbach's α = .90, M = 6.0, SD = 2.6 Folded into 6-point scale, W1M = 2.0, SD = 1.9; W2M = 1.9, SD = 1.9b Traditional media trust Level of trust in “mainstream news media” and in “news aggregators” 10-point scale 2 items averaged scale, W1 Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .48; M = 5.0, SD = 1.9; W2 Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .49; M = 5.1, SD = 2.0 Alternative media trust “how much do you trust news from alternative news media,” and “how much do you trust news from social media sites” 10-point scale 2 items averaged scale, W1 Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .70, M = 3.5, SD = 1.9; W2 Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .71, M = 3.6, SD = 2.0 Demographics Gender M or F 50.2% female Age Open ended M = 52.71, SD = 14.77 Race Categories 77% white Education Highest M = 3.61, Mdn = 2-year college degree Income 8 categories M = 3.61, Mdn = $50,000 to $59,999 . Measure(s) . Scale . Descriptives . Discussion network size How many people have you “talked to face-to-face or over the phone about politics or public affairs,” and “talked to via the Internet, including e-mail, chat rooms, and social networking sites about politics or public affairs” in the last month Open ended W1M = .33, Mdn = .24, SD = .37, skewness = 1.32; W2M = .54, Mdn = .45, SD = .28, skewness = 1.44a Discussion frequency Estimate frequency of political or public affairs discussions with: “spouse or partner,” “family and relatives,” “friends,” “acquaintances,” “strangers,” “neighbors you know very well,” “neighbors you don't know well,” “coworkers you know well,” and “coworkers you don't know well” 10-point scale 9 items averaged scale, W1 Cronbach's α = .87; M = 3.3 SD = 1.8; W2 Cronbach's α = .86; M = 3.2, SD = 1.7 Political efficacy “people like me can influence government,” “I consider myself well qualified to participate in politics,” “I have a good understanding of the important political issues facing our country,” “no matter whom I vote for, it won't make a difference” (recoded), “people like me don't have any say in what the government does” (recoded) 10-point scale 5 items averaged scale, W1 Cronbach's α = .71; M = 5.4, SD = 1.9; W2 Cronbach's α = .71, M = 5.3, SD = 1.8 Strength of party ID Where would you place yourself on “on social issues,” “on economic issues,” and also in a more general sense “do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent” 11-point scale from strong R to strong D 3 items averaged scale W1 Cronbach's α = .90, M = 5.9, SD = 2.6; W2 Cronbach's α = .90, M = 6.0, SD = 2.6 Folded into 6-point scale, W1M = 2.0, SD = 1.9; W2M = 1.9, SD = 1.9b Traditional media trust Level of trust in “mainstream news media” and in “news aggregators” 10-point scale 2 items averaged scale, W1 Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .48; M = 5.0, SD = 1.9; W2 Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .49; M = 5.1, SD = 2.0 Alternative media trust “how much do you trust news from alternative news media,” and “how much do you trust news from social media sites” 10-point scale 2 items averaged scale, W1 Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .70, M = 3.5, SD = 1.9; W2 Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .71, M = 3.6, SD = 2.0 Demographics Gender M or F 50.2% female Age Open ended M = 52.71, SD = 14.77 Race Categories 77% white Education Highest M = 3.61, Mdn = 2-year college degree Income 8 categories M = 3.61, Mdn = $50,000 to $59,999 a As could be expected, the variable was highly skewed (W1M = 4.01, Mdn = 1.00, SD = 20.2, skewness = 19.64; W2M = 3.57, Mdn = 2.00, SD = 5.98, skewness = 10.24), so they were transformed using the natural logarithm (reported above). b This item was folded into a 6-point scale (that is, scores 0 and 10 were recoded to 6, 1 and 9 to 5, 2 and 8 to 4, 3 and 7 to 3, 4 and 6 to 2, and 5 to 1), ranging from no partisanship to strong partisanship. Open in new tab Table 4   . Measure(s) . Scale . Descriptives . Discussion network size How many people have you “talked to face-to-face or over the phone about politics or public affairs,” and “talked to via the Internet, including e-mail, chat rooms, and social networking sites about politics or public affairs” in the last month Open ended W1M = .33, Mdn = .24, SD = .37, skewness = 1.32; W2M = .54, Mdn = .45, SD = .28, skewness = 1.44a Discussion frequency Estimate frequency of political or public affairs discussions with: “spouse or partner,” “family and relatives,” “friends,” “acquaintances,” “strangers,” “neighbors you know very well,” “neighbors you don't know well,” “coworkers you know well,” and “coworkers you don't know well” 10-point scale 9 items averaged scale, W1 Cronbach's α = .87; M = 3.3 SD = 1.8; W2 Cronbach's α = .86; M = 3.2, SD = 1.7 Political efficacy “people like me can influence government,” “I consider myself well qualified to participate in politics,” “I have a good understanding of the important political issues facing our country,” “no matter whom I vote for, it won't make a difference” (recoded), “people like me don't have any say in what the government does” (recoded) 10-point scale 5 items averaged scale, W1 Cronbach's α = .71; M = 5.4, SD = 1.9; W2 Cronbach's α = .71, M = 5.3, SD = 1.8 Strength of party ID Where would you place yourself on “on social issues,” “on economic issues,” and also in a more general sense “do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent” 11-point scale from strong R to strong D 3 items averaged scale W1 Cronbach's α = .90, M = 5.9, SD = 2.6; W2 Cronbach's α = .90, M = 6.0, SD = 2.6 Folded into 6-point scale, W1M = 2.0, SD = 1.9; W2M = 1.9, SD = 1.9b Traditional media trust Level of trust in “mainstream news media” and in “news aggregators” 10-point scale 2 items averaged scale, W1 Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .48; M = 5.0, SD = 1.9; W2 Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .49; M = 5.1, SD = 2.0 Alternative media trust “how much do you trust news from alternative news media,” and “how much do you trust news from social media sites” 10-point scale 2 items averaged scale, W1 Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .70, M = 3.5, SD = 1.9; W2 Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .71, M = 3.6, SD = 2.0 Demographics Gender M or F 50.2% female Age Open ended M = 52.71, SD = 14.77 Race Categories 77% white Education Highest M = 3.61, Mdn = 2-year college degree Income 8 categories M = 3.61, Mdn = $50,000 to $59,999 . Measure(s) . Scale . Descriptives . Discussion network size How many people have you “talked to face-to-face or over the phone about politics or public affairs,” and “talked to via the Internet, including e-mail, chat rooms, and social networking sites about politics or public affairs” in the last month Open ended W1M = .33, Mdn = .24, SD = .37, skewness = 1.32; W2M = .54, Mdn = .45, SD = .28, skewness = 1.44a Discussion frequency Estimate frequency of political or public affairs discussions with: “spouse or partner,” “family and relatives,” “friends,” “acquaintances,” “strangers,” “neighbors you know very well,” “neighbors you don't know well,” “coworkers you know well,” and “coworkers you don't know well” 10-point scale 9 items averaged scale, W1 Cronbach's α = .87; M = 3.3 SD = 1.8; W2 Cronbach's α = .86; M = 3.2, SD = 1.7 Political efficacy “people like me can influence government,” “I consider myself well qualified to participate in politics,” “I have a good understanding of the important political issues facing our country,” “no matter whom I vote for, it won't make a difference” (recoded), “people like me don't have any say in what the government does” (recoded) 10-point scale 5 items averaged scale, W1 Cronbach's α = .71; M = 5.4, SD = 1.9; W2 Cronbach's α = .71, M = 5.3, SD = 1.8 Strength of party ID Where would you place yourself on “on social issues,” “on economic issues,” and also in a more general sense “do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent” 11-point scale from strong R to strong D 3 items averaged scale W1 Cronbach's α = .90, M = 5.9, SD = 2.6; W2 Cronbach's α = .90, M = 6.0, SD = 2.6 Folded into 6-point scale, W1M = 2.0, SD = 1.9; W2M = 1.9, SD = 1.9b Traditional media trust Level of trust in “mainstream news media” and in “news aggregators” 10-point scale 2 items averaged scale, W1 Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .48; M = 5.0, SD = 1.9; W2 Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .49; M = 5.1, SD = 2.0 Alternative media trust “how much do you trust news from alternative news media,” and “how much do you trust news from social media sites” 10-point scale 2 items averaged scale, W1 Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .70, M = 3.5, SD = 1.9; W2 Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .71, M = 3.6, SD = 2.0 Demographics Gender M or F 50.2% female Age Open ended M = 52.71, SD = 14.77 Race Categories 77% white Education Highest M = 3.61, Mdn = 2-year college degree Income 8 categories M = 3.61, Mdn = $50,000 to $59,999 a As could be expected, the variable was highly skewed (W1M = 4.01, Mdn = 1.00, SD = 20.2, skewness = 19.64; W2M = 3.57, Mdn = 2.00, SD = 5.98, skewness = 10.24), so they were transformed using the natural logarithm (reported above). b This item was folded into a 6-point scale (that is, scores 0 and 10 were recoded to 6, 1 and 9 to 5, 2 and 8 to 4, 3 and 7 to 3, 4 and 6 to 2, and 5 to 1), ranging from no partisanship to strong partisanship. Open in new tab References Acock , A. C. ( 2005 ). Working with missing values . Journal of Marriage and Family , 67 ( 4 ), 1012 – 1028 . doi: 10.1111/j.1741-3737.2005.00191.x. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat American Association of Public Opinion Research . ( 2011 ). Standard definitions: Final dispositions of case codes and outcome rates for surveys. Anstead , N. , & O'Loughlin , B. ( 2011 ). The emerging viewertariat and BBC Question Time: Television debate and real-time commenting online . The International Journal of Press/Politics , 16 ( 4 ), 440 – 462 . doi:10.1177/1940161211415519. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Bakker , T. P. , & De Vreese , C. H. ( 2011 ). Good news for the future? Young people, Internet use, and political participation . Communication Research , 38 ( 4 ), 451 – 470 . doi:10.1177/0093650210381738. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Bode , L. , Vraga , E. K., Borah , P., & Shah , D. V. ( 2014 ). A new space for political behavior: Political social networking and its democratic consequences . Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication , 19 ( 3 ), 414 – 429 . doi:10.1111/jcc4.12048. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Bosnjak , M. , Das , M., & Lynn , P. ( 2016 ). Symposium issue on methods for probability-based online and mixed-mode panels . Social Science Computer Review , 34 ( 1 ), 1–5. doi: 10.1177/0894439315579246. OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Bowman , S. , & Willis , C. ( 2003 ). We media: How audiences are shaping the future of news and information . Reston, VA : The Media Center at the American Press Institute . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Campbell , S. W. , & Kwak , N. ( 2010 ). Mobile communication and civic life: Linking patterns of use to civic and political engagement . Journal of Communication , 60 ( 3 ), 536 – 555 . doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2010.01496.x. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Chadwick , A. , & Howard , P. N. ( 2008 ). The handbook of Internet politics . London, England : Routledge . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Chadwick , A. ( 2013 ). The hybrid media system: Politics and power . New York, NY : Oxford University Press . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Cho , J. , Gil de Zúñiga , H., Rojas , H., & Shah , D. V. ( 2003 ). Beyond access: The digital divide and Internet uses and gratifications . IT & Society , 1 , 46 – 72 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Conway , M. M. ( 1985 ). Political participation in the United States . Washington, DC : Congressional Quarterly . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Delli Carpini , C. , & Keeter , S. ( 1993 ). Measuring political knowledge: Putting first things first . American Journal of Political Science , 37 ( 4 ), 1179 – 1206 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Diddi , A. , & LaRose , R. ( 2006 ). Getting hooked on news: Uses and gratifications and the formation of news habits among college students in an Internet environment . Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media , 50 ( 2 ), 193 – 210 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Eveland , W. P. ( 2001 ). The cognitive mediation model of learning from the news evidence from nonelection, off-year election, and presidential election contexts . Communication Research , 28 ( 5 ), 571 – 601 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Eveland , W. P. ( 2004 ). The effect of political discussion in producing informed citizens: The roles of information, motivation, and elaboration . Political Communication , 21 , 177 – 193 . doi:10.1080/10584600490443877. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Eveland , W. P. , & Scheufele , D. A. ( 2000 ). Connecting news media use with gaps in knowledge and participation . Political Communication , 17 ( 3 ), 215 – 237 . doi:10.1080/105846000414250. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Eveland , W. P. , Shah , D. V., & Kwak , N. ( 2003 ). Assessing causality in the Cognitive Mediation Model: A panel study of motivations, information processing and learning during campaign 2000 . Communication Research , 30 ( 4 ), 359 – 386 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Fitzgerald , J & Clarke , J. ( 2012 , August). How multi-screen consumers are changing media dynamics. Coalition for Innovative Media Measurement. Retrieved from http://www.comscore.com/dut/Insights/Presentations&#x02010;and&#x02010;Whitepapers/2012/How&#x02010;Multi&#x02010;Screen&#x02010;Consumers&#x02010;Are&#x02010;Changing&#x02010;Media&#x02010;Dynamics Franklin , B. ( 2008 ). The future of newspapers . Journalism Practice , 2 ( 3 ), 306 – 317 . doi:10.1080/17512780802280984. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Giglietto , F. , & Selva , D. ( 2014 ). Second screen and participation: A content analysis on a full season dataset of tweets . Journal of Communication , 64 , 260 – 277 . doi:10.1111/jcom.12085. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Gil de Zúñiga , H. , Bachmann , I., Hsu , S. H., & Brundidge , J. ( 2013 ). Expressive vs. consumptive blog use: Implications for interpersonal discussion and political participation . International Journal of Communication , 7 , 1538 – 1559 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Gil de Zúñiga , H. , Jung , N., & Valenzuela , S. ( 2012 ). Social media use for news and individuals' social capital, civic engagement and political participation . Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication , 17 ( 3 ), 319 – 336 . doi:10.1111/j.1083-6101.2012.01574.x. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Gil de Zúñiga , H. , Molyneux , L., & Zheng , P. ( 2014 ). Social media, political expression, and political participation: Panel analysis of lagged and concurrent relationships . Journal of Communication , 64 , 612 – 634 . doi:10.1111/jcom.12103. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Hampton , K. , & Wellman , B. ( 2003 ). Neighboring in Netville: How the Internet supports community and social capital in a wired suburb . City & Community , 2 ( 4 ), 277 – 311 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Holton , A. , Coddington , M., & Gil de Zúñiga , H. ( 2013 ). Whose news? Whose values? Citizen journalism and journalistic values through the lens of content creators and consumers . Journalism Practice , 7 ( 6 ), 720 – 737 . doi:10.1080/17512786.2013.766062. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Jenkins , H. , Ford , S., & Green , J. ( 2013 ). Spreadable media: Creating value and meaning in a networked culture . New York: NYU Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Jennings , M. , & Zeitner , V. ( 2003 ). Internet use and civic engagement: A longitudinal analysis . Public Opinion Quarterly , 67 ( 3 ), 311 – 334 . doi:10.1086/376947. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Jung , N. , Kim , Y., & Gil de Zúñiga , H. ( 2011 ). The mediating role of knowledge and efficacy in the effects of communication on political participation . Mass Communication & Society , 14 ( 4 ), 407 – 430 . doi:10.1080/15205436.2010.496135. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Kaufhold , K. , Valenzuela , S., & Gil de Zúñiga , H. ( 2010 ). Effects of citizen and professional journalism on political knowledge and participation . Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly , 87 ( 3/4 ), 515 – 529 . doi:10.1177/107769901008700305. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Kenny , D. A. ( 2005 ). Cross-lagged panel design . Hoboken, NJ : Wiley . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Kraut , R. E. , Patterson , M., Lundmark , V., Kiesler , S., Mukopadhyay , T., & Scherlis , W. ( 1998 ). Internet paradox: A social technology that reduces social involvement and psychological well-being? American Psychologist , 53 , 1017 – 1031 . doi:10.1037/0003-066X.53.9.1017. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS PubMed WorldCat Lee , A. ( 2013 ). News audiences revisited: Theorizing the link between audience motivations and news consumption . Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media , 57 , 300 – 317 . doi:10.1080/08838151.2013.816712. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Lemert , J. B. ( 1992 ). Effective public opinion. In J. D. Kennamer (Ed.), Public opinion, the press, and public policy . Westport, CT : Praeger . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC McLeod , J. M. , Scheufele , D. A., & Moy , P. ( 1999 ). Understanding deliberation: The effects of discussion networks on participation in a public forum . Communication Research , 26 ( 6 ), 743 – 774 . doi:10.1177/009365099026006005. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Molyneux , L. , Vasudevan , K., & Gil de Zúñiga , H. ( 2015 ). Gaming social capital: Exploring civic value in multiplayer video games. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication. Advance online publication. Nielsen . ( 2012 ). The state of the media: The cross platform report. Nielsen Wire. Retrieved from http://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/corporate/us/en/reportsdownloads/2012Reports/Nielsen&#x02010;Cross&#x02010;Platform&#x02010;Report&#x02010;Q2&#x02010;2012&#x02010;final.pdf Norris , P. ( 1996 ). Does television erode social capital? A reply to Putnam . Political Science and Politics , 29 ( 3 ), 474 – 480 . doi:10.2307/420827. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Papacharissi , Z. , & De Oliveira , M. ( 2012 ). Affective news and networked publics: The rhythms of news storytelling on# Egypt . Journal of Communication , 62 ( 2 ), 266 – 282 . doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01630.x. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Pew Research Center for the People and the Press . ( 2012 , October 11). TV trumps digital sources for debate coverage: One in ten ‘Dual-Screened’ the presidential debate. Retrieved from http://www.peoplepress.org/2012/10/11/one&#x02010;in&#x02010;ten&#x02010;dual&#x02010;screened&#x02010;the&#x02010;presidential&#x02010;debate/ Putnam , R. D. ( 2000 ). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community . New York, NY : Simon and Schuster . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Rojas , H. , & Gil de Zúñiga , H. ( 2010 ). Comunicación y participación política en Colombia. In H. Rojas, I. Perez, & H. Gil de Zúñiga (Eds.), Comunicación y Comunidad . Bogotá, Colombia : Universidad Externado de Colombia . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Rosen , J. ( 2008 , July 14). A most useful definition of citizen journalism. Pressthink blog. Retrieved from http://archive.pressthink.org/2008/07/14/a_most_useful_d.html Salvucci , D. , & Taatgen , N. ( 2008 ). Threaded cognition: An integrated theory of concurrent multitasking . Psychological Review , 115 ( 1 ), 101 – 130 . doi:10.1037/0033-295X.115.1.101. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS PubMed WorldCat Shah , D. V. , Cho , J., Eveland , W., & Kwak , N. ( 2005 ). Information and expression in a digital age: Modeling Internet effects on civic participation . Communication Research , 32 , 531 – 565 . doi:10.1177/0093650205279209. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Shah , D. V. , Cho , J., Nah , S., Gotlieb , M. R., Hwang , H., Lee , N. J., … & McLeod , D. M. ( 2007 ). Campaign ads, online messaging, and participation: Extending the communication mediation model . Journal of communication , 57 ( 4 ), 676 – 703 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Shah , D. V. , Kwak , N., & Holbert , R. L. ( 2001 ). “Connecting” and “disconnecting” with civic life: Patterns of Internet use and the production of social capital . Political Communication , 18 , 141 – 162 . doi:10.1080/105846001750322952. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Shah , D. V. , Rojas , H., & Cho , J. ( 2009 ). Media and civic participation: On understanding and misunderstanding communication effects. In J. Bryant, & M. B. Oliver (Eds.), Media effects: Advances in theory and research (3rd ed., pp. 207 – 227 ). New York, NY : Routledge . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Van Cauwenberge , A. , Schaap , G., & van Roy , R. ( 2014 ). TV no longer commands our full attention: Effects of second-screen viewing and task relevance on cognitive load and learning from news . Computers in Human Behavior , 38 , 100 – 109 . doi:10.1016/j.chb.2014.05.021. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Verba , S. , Schlozman , K., & Brady , H. ( 1995 ). Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Wang , Z. , & Tchernev , J. ( 2012 ). The ‘myth’ of media multitasking: Reciprocal dynamics of media multitasking, personal needs, and gratifications . Journal of Communication , 62 ( 3 ), 493 – 513 . doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01641.x. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Watson , N. , & Wooden , M. ( 2006 ). Modelling longitudinal survey response: The experience of the HILDA survey. ACSPRI social science methodology conference, Sydney, Australia. Retrieved from http://old.acspri.org.au/conference2006/proceedings Weeks , B. E. , & Holbert , R. L. ( 2013 ). Predicting dissemination of news content in social media a focus on reception, friending, and partisanship . Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly , 90 ( 2 ), 212 – 232 . doi:10.1177/1077699013482906. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Wickens , C. D. ( 2002 ). Multiple resources and performance prediction . Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science , 3 ( 2 ), 159 – 177 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Wohn , D. , & Na , E. ( 2011 ). Tweeting about TV: Sharing television viewing experiences via social media message streams . First Monday , 16 ( 3 ). doi:10.5210/fm.v16i3.3368. OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Yoo , S. W. , & Gil de Zúñiga , H. ( 2014 ). Connecting blog, Facebook, and Twitter use with gaps in knowledge and participation . Communication & Society , 27 ( 4 ), 33 – 48 . doi:10.15581/003.27.4.33-48. Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat © 2015 International Communication Association