The Economic Journal

Glazer,, Jacob;Herrera,, Helios;Perry,, Motty

doi: 10.1093/ej/ueaa124pmid: N/A

Abstract We propose a model of product reviews in which some are genuine and some are fake in order to shed light on the value of information provided on platforms like TripAdvisor, Yelp, etc. In every period, a review is posted which is either genuine or fake. We characterize the equilibrium of the dynamic model and prove that it is unique. In equilibrium, valuable learning takes place in every period. Fake reviews, however, do slow down the learning process. It is established that any attempt by the platform to manipulate the reviews is counterproductive. Footnotes * Motty Perry, [email protected]. Dept. of Economics, Univ. of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK. We would like to thank the editor of this journal and the referees for very helpful suggestions and comments which led us to rethink and change the focus of this paper. This content is only available as a PDF. © 2020 Royal Economic Society. Published by Oxford University Press. This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/open_access/funder_policies/chorus/standard_publication_model)