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doi: 10.1007/s12108-017-9367-8
This article evaluates four different ways of relating the normative side of sociology to its empirical side. Two such ways are in existence at present. The first is “dualism,” the idea that sociology provides purely scientific results to political or moral projects that are conducted on some independent normative basis. This position is commonly invoked in the idea of “value-free sociology.” The second is “monism,” the ideas that value-freedom is impossible and that sociology is inevitably value-driven, indeed perhaps that it should be openly so driven. This position is commonly invoked in the idea of “the unity of theory and practice.” These existing approaches are complemented by two that do not yet exist in practice. Both are explicitly normative in part. The first of these is a “canonical” approach, like that of the subdiscipline of political theory, in which normative inquiry within sociology would be formally recognized within the discipline and would be organized around a classical canon of normative works. The second would be a “legalist” approach, which would grow out of new genres of writing that aimed at the systematic normative evaluation of bodies of work or literatures, thus working inductively, in contrast to the canonical approach’s deductivism. The article evaluates these four positions according to four criteria: feasibility, coherence, trajectory, and open-mindedness. It concludes that the current positions (dualism and monism) are both embarrassingly weak: typically unconscious and sometimes naïve, in many cases driven by the unacknowledged – and hence uncritical - assumption that one's particular politics are in fact universally desirable. The discipline should try to create an explicit but rigorously argued normative subdiscipline, probably combining both the canonical and legalist positions.
doi: 10.1007/s12108-018-9368-2
Max Weber (1864–1920) is considered one of the canonical founders of sociology, while W. E. B. Du Bois (1868–1963), author of The Philadelphia Negro (1899), The Souls of Black Folk (1903), and Black Reconstruction (1935), has only recently been included in the sociological canon. We provide a historical review of what we know of their relationship in order to first ask, what did Du Bois say about Weber, and second, what did Weber say about Du Bois? We then analyze the extant scholarly discourse of published English-language academic journal articles that substantively mention both Weber and Du Bois in order to address a third question: what did other scholars say about their relationship? We provide an analysis of the variation of scholars’ perceptions on the relationship between Du Bois and Weber to illumine the dominant assumptions about founding figures and the origin story of American sociology writ large. We argue that three mechanisms of white group interests configured the marginalization of Du Bois from both mainstream and sub-disciplinary sociological theory: (1) reduction or “knowing that we do no know and not caring to know” (when knowledge is perceived as irrelevant to white group interests), (2) deportation or “not wanting to know” (when knowledge is systematically exiled), and (3) appropriation or “not knowing that we do not know”) (when dominant knowledge usurps or assimilates challenges to that knowledge).
doi: 10.1007/s12108-018-9369-1
Designated an early pragmatist, Jane Addams has significantly inspired contemporary pragmatist research. However, Addams also consistently articulated ideas harking to primordial Christianity and sought inspiration in the social gospel of her time. This article explores how Addams’ writing resonated with key tenets of social gospel theology, which imbued her texts with an overarching vision of humanity’s progressive history. It is suggested that Addams’ vision of a major transition in industrial society, one involving a “Christian renaissance” and individuals’ transformation into “socialized selves”, constitutes a political eschatology. Of particular interest is how Addams conceived the relationship between the individual and society, inventing the term “new social ethics” to reconcile the difficult balance between individual autonomy and social solidarity. The article suggests some ways in which Addams’ writings relate to contemporary issues such as individualism, neo-conservatism, and militarism. Her social thought constitutes a thus far under-examined source of sociological critique in regard to such issues of public concern.
doi: 10.1007/s12108-018-9370-8
To what degree does criminology demonstrate the genuine presence or lack of a paradigm (i.e. theoretical-methodological consensus) to help structure its research enterprise? There are trade-offs to consider when pressing the question, such as a potential drain on efficiency in its allocation of resources, limits on its scientific credibility, and weakened institutional strength resulting from conceptual dissensus. Alternatively, an interdisciplinary field may benefit from insights continually drawn from its various parent disciplines. The present research offers a reply in two parts. The first focus relies on a content analysis of 2,109 peer-reviewed articles published in leading journals from 1951-2008 in providing a positive analysis. There is mixed evidence of methodological agreement and less on the matter of commitment to a specific theory. The second inquiry draws from reactions delivered by 17 leading criminologists on the normative question of whether the field’s a-paradigmatic status helps or harms scientific advance. An analysis of the oral histories indicates an indifference to the criticism of lacking paradigmatic uniformity as a legitimate critique and a vehement defense of porous intellectual boundaries. However, pragmatic considerations such as the potential for a diminishing need to train criminal justice undergraduates and threats to government funding may force the profession to give more consideration to the matter of its scientific bone fides.
Cofnas, Nathan; Carl, Noah; Woodley of Menie, Michael
doi: 10.1007/s12108-018-9372-6pmid: 29962513
Data from the General Social Survey indicate that conservatives’ self-reported trust in scientists has steadily decreased since 1974. In Cofnas et al. (The American Sociologist, 2017), we suggested that this trend may have been partly driven by the increasing tendency of scientific institutions, and the representatives of such institutions, to distort social science for the sake of liberal activism. Larregue (The American Sociologist, 2017) makes three opposing arguments: (1) It is “very hard” to establish the charge of bias, especially since we did “not state what [we] mean by ‘bias.’” (2) We did not establish a causal relationship between scientists’ (alleged) liberal activism and conservatives’ distrust of science, and we ignored activism by conservative scientists. (3) We were wrong to advocate “affirmative action” for conservatives in academia. We address these arguments in turn: (1) Larregue does not engage with our main arguments that liberal bias exists in social science. (2) In recent years, prominent scientific organizations have, with great publicity, intervened in policy debates, always supporting the liberal side without exception. It is not unreasonable to assume that this would diminish conservatives’ trust in these organizations. Contra Larregue, in Cofnas et al. (The American Sociologist, 2017) we explicitly acknowledged that conservative scientists can also be biased. (3) We never advocated “affirmative action” for conservatives, and in fact we object to such a proposal.
doi: 10.1007/s12108-018-9374-4
Larregue argued that while there is an ideological imbalance among academics that this imbalance has not unfairly impacted our findings. He also implies that it is the activism of conservatives, rather than progressives, which has created real problems in academia. As such he disputes claims that activism among progressive academics has create a backlash from political conservatives. However, Larregue does not address the previous empirical work on the subject of academic bias. Furthermore, his argument of methodological rigor does not address the tendency of scholars to overlook alternate theories. His argument that progressive scholars are no more biased than conservative scholars fails to account for the sheer number of progressive scholars relative to conservative scholars as it concerns the possibly of institutional bias. I also find his focus on fraud to be misplaced since scholars do not have to engage in fraud to be in ideological silos that do not take alternative theories into account. As to his second major argument, I am unsure whether liberal academic activism leads to conservative mistrust and await further future research on this topic. I do commend Larregue in bringing the question of sources of conservative mistust to our attention.