"ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, The"

Charlesworth, James C.

doi: 10.1177/000271625831800101pmid: N/A

Taeuber, Irene B.

doi: 10.1177/000271625831800102pmid: N/A

The population of Asia today is five times what it was three centuries ago. In 1950 the world population was 2.5 billion people and that of Asia 1.4 billion people. Rates of growth have been high. Factors in this growth have been many and varied: administrative control which brought peace to cer tain areas, particularly when it also brought agricultural im provements ; the introduction of new foods; improved sanita tion; increased production and movement of foods; and recent Western scientific and technical advances. However while Asia's population was growing, its economic change was partial and its social change muted. Rates of growth are increasing because birth rates remain at their ancient levels while death rates decline. Continuation of this situation to the end of the century would increase the population from 1.5 billion of the year 1955 to 4.2 billion in the year 2000. The decisions of the governments of great Asian countries to slow population in crease through encouraging planned parenthood indicate that resolution of the problem of growth may come through reduced fertility rather than increased mortality. The case of Japan is given as an example.

Brown, W. Norman

doi: 10.1177/000271625831800103pmid: N/A

Religion and language move Asians less than anticolonialism and the desire for economic development. It is the hope of Asian countries to attain increased agricultural pro duction, industrial expansion, more equitable distribution of wealth, and the attainment of the good life for their citizens. In the Near East religion and language furnish some of the background for Islamic and Arab hostility to Israel, but they are not strong enough to unite either the Islamic or the Arab nations. In the Far East and Southeast Asia, they play scarcely any part. In South Asia religion led to the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan. This division has been an embarrassment for the Western democracies since it has di vided South Asia at a time when the West wanted a united South Asian support of its cause in the cold war. Language is an internally disruptive force in both India and Pakistan. In South and Southeast Asia the ethical concept of Ahinsa is one of the elements producing "neutralism" toward the cold war. It is felt that this "neutralism" can contribute more toward world peace than the propaganda and arms race.

Malenbaum, Wilfred

doi: 10.1177/000271625831800104pmid: N/A

Output in Asia will need to expand at a rate of al most 2 per cent each year if individual levels of living are not to fall. Unless output grows at least twice as fast, however, in comes in Asia will not improve relative to those elsewhere in the world. Experience in some Asian countries in very recent years, notably in India and mainland China, corroborates con clusions based on the general study of the growth process: the countries of Asia can look forward to a more favorable eco nomic future. This will follow not from the discovery of new resource frontiers, from further technological advances in sources of energy and methods of processing, or from new pro grams of foreign assistance. All these will play a role—but as adjuncts of purposeful domestic action for economic change un der conscious and skilful leadership. Development programs need to be formulated with realistic goals which do demand major efforts by the people. Only government can provide the inspiration for these efforts; this constitutes a priority task among the competing pursuits confronting national leadership in newly independent nations. With this type of action the na tions of Asia can avoid a return in the economic sphere to the stagnation that has characterized the past fifty years or so. To sustain political vigor and even national independence economic progress seems to be essential.

Wildes, Harry Emerson

doi: 10.1177/000271625831800105pmid: N/A

In its attempts to reach a rapprochement with the West, the East sought to Westernize itself; this resulted not in a synthesis of the best elements of both cultures but in a thin Western veneer applied to a solid native base. Instead of try ing to steer this imitative trend into more productive channels, the West was merely flattered by it. As for the East, by indis criminately gulping a frightful mass of Western indigestibles, it gained little but a cultural stomachache. Small wonder, there fore, that, in the first flush of nationalism, reformers and puri tans—proponents of the "New Life"—struck out against cor rupting "foreignisms." Asia for the Asians meant a return to the high spiritual culture of ages past. The wiping out of un wanted Western ways was made easier because they were neither very broadly spread nor deeply rooted. After World War II, Western prestige rose again, and although the East continued to scorn Western materialism as a principle, in prac tice it was willing to bring in the skills, techniques, and tools which gave democracy its strength. Creative energies in the East have been released as the result of national upheavals, and under a more democratic way of life they will surely flourish.— Ed.

Thant, U.

doi: 10.1177/000271625831800106pmid: N/A

Dedication to parliamentary democracy and aver sion to totalitarianism characterize the approach of Burma and her leaders to national and international problems. By means of democratic socialism Burma is endeavoring to create a society of free and equal peoples. The Burmese see the world as plagued by age-old tensions—political, social, and economic— and they believe firmly that the safety and survival of free political institutions depend upon resolving these tensions before they become intolerable. Although committed herself to demo cratic ideals, Burma refuses to pass judgment on the interna tional affairs of other countries and subscribes instead to the principles of peaceful coexistence. She believes that man must rise to the challenge of his age—an age which calls for a new outlook, a new approach, even a new philosophy. The old ways are no longer adequate for the new circumstances and for the crucial issues of today. These issues include not only com munism versus democracy but also strong versus weak, pros perous versus poor, ruler versus ruled, master race versus sub human. These issues can be resolved only when mankind is willing to sit down together and create for itself a world which will guarantee freedom, justice, well-being, and equality to all.—Ed.

Notowidigdo, Moekarto

doi: 10.1177/000271625831800107pmid: N/A

Left with the colonial heritage of a lopsided economy, a lack of trained personnel in practically every field, Indonesia, even though rich in natural resources, was born poor. Because it needs peace and tranquility to stabilize its economy and its government, Indonesia is pursuing an independent for eign policy free of alignment with either Western or Communist bloc, but not without international responsibility. Even though it prefers to remain "uncommitted" the true principle of de mocracy is very much alive in Indonesia, having been practiced for centuries in the villages. This principle, allowing all voices to be heard, is now being applied on the national level in the concept of the oft-misunderstood guided democracy of the In donesian government, with a cabinet, responsible to a parlia ment based on general free elections and assisted by an advisory council composed of representatives of all walks of life. Striv ing for peace and given time to correct past mistakes, Indonesia has faith in its ability to achieve and maintain a strong govern ment.

Higgins, Benjamin

doi: 10.1177/000271625831800108pmid: N/A

Because of Hatta's role as a leader of the moder ate and rationalist faction in Indonesia, his book has wide inter est. As Vice President from 1950 to 1956, he was able to act as a buffer between extreme Nationalists and Communists and the more pro-Western groups. His book shows that he takes seriously Article 38 of the Constitution which calls for organi zation of the national economy on a co-operative basis. His anticapitalist attitudes are apparent throughout the book, and he repeatedly contrasts corporations, which are for him the epitome of class struggle, and co-operatives, which are the In donesian route to the classless society. Yet Hatta also regards co-operatives as a technique for economic development; but it is clear even to him that a "co-operative national economy" cannot be attained for decades. Meanwhile, the failure of in dependence to bring prosperity is a major factor in the current conflict in Indonesia. It is clear that Indonesia cannot await the organization of a co-operative economy to begin an effec tive economic development program. What Indonesia needs most now is a large dose of "ad hocery"; it is doubtful whether Hatta alone can provide the necessary leadership for such a practical economic development program.

Linebarger, Paul M.A.

doi: 10.1177/000271625831800109pmid: N/A

In the struggle for leadership in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific, both the West and the Communists have definite advantages. The United States' stake in SEATO depends upon its possessions of western Pacific islands and its strategic bases in the area. Rivalry between India and Russia in the area is significant, while the China-India conflict is an ideological one. India's influence can be best understood in light of her role as the largest power in the British Common wealth of Nations. The pattern of economic co-operation in the Commonwealth is as important as its political structure as exemplified by the Colombo Plan. Russia has a definite for eign policy—Soviet missions have been established in almost every Southeast Asian country; direct Soviet influence is sig nificant and is reinforced by international trade. China's pres sure is not great in Southeast Asia. The United States' im mersal in the area came with World War II. The first phase of American policy supported both the colonial powers and the nationalist rebels; the Korean conflict changed this pattern; and the collapse of Indochina meant the final dissociation with the maintenance of colonial powers. In 1958 American su periority in nuclear weapons began to wane, and Mr. Dulles continued the policy of containment. Southeast Asia is in the ambit of two American foreign policies: the cold war and the policy toward colonial and underdeveloped areas. Since a larger policy—that the interest of humanity as a whole tran scends that of a single nation—is important, it is necessary that behind the citizen's perception of everyday politics, there re mains an awareness of the larger problem of human culture. —Ed.

Warburg, James P.

doi: 10.1177/000271625831800110pmid: N/A

The United States faced its greatest postwar op portunities for constructive leadership toward peace not in Eu rope but in Asia—it held the future of most of Asia in its hands and dropped it. The Truman administration had no Asian policy at all, except with respect to China and Japan. Its China policy was disastrously wrong. Its policy in Japan must await the verdict of history. The Eisenhower administration has pursued a fatally wrong policy throughout Asia. Our two great errors of commission were: involvement in the Chinese civil war and the rearming of Pakistan. Our great error of omission was our failure to utilize the ten years in which the United States alone had the ability to supply economic aid to the newly independent Asian nations. We now face dangerous Communist competition. The problem we face falls into two parts: how to stop doing the wrong things in Asia and how to start doing the right ones. The first category requires a new China policy and a new policy toward Pakistan. Correcting our errors of omission requires a new approach to the economic problems of Asia.