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doi: 10.1177/000271625831700102pmid: N/A
Historically and at their inception the East European Communist parties differed greatly from one another. Whereas those of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland were workers' parties, those of Bulgaria and Rumania were essentially parties of revolutionary intellectuals. From 1945 to 1948 the Com munist parties, strongly supported by Soviet military power, established their one-party dictatorships. There followed a period of intensive economic pres sures in order to create the maximum in heavy industry and general mobiliza tion. Though the pattern was the same in all these countries, some were more severely affected than others. Where revolutions did occur—as in Poland and Hungary—a definite cleavage of opinion at the highest level of the party existed as did a surviving Communist leader of great prestige who symbolized all the desire for reform and freedom which had accumulated over the years. In the remainder of Eastern Europe the parties, internally unstable though they are, have changed very little. It will, nonetheless, be well to watch here for differ ences in personalities, policies, and tactics, for in changed international circum stances these may prove politically decisive.—Ed.
doi: 10.1177/000271625831700103pmid: N/A
Stalin's last years were especially bitter for Eastern Europe. With control firmly in Soviet hands, Stalin sought to tighten the Soviet grip, to re shape the cultural values of the conquered peoples, to develop a heavy indus trial base in each country, to promote agricultural collectivization, to exploit the area more efficiently, and to use it as a point of pressure against Western Eu rope and Tito. He achieved some success, but at the cost of rousing such popular resentment and such dissatisfactions, even among Communists, that his successors were forced substantially to modify his policies.
doi: 10.1177/000271625831700104pmid: N/A
Following Stalin's death, party leaders in Moscow and the satellites made public pronouncements indicating a sharp break with Communist dogma. "New Course" policies included: concessions to agriculture and peasantry, re adjustment of proportions between heavy and light industry, increase in con sumer-goods production, sharp rise in living standards, and a new respect for "forms of Socialist legality." After the introduction of the first economic re forms the "New Course" took on a political dimension. East European party and governmental leaders found themselves in unfamiliar ground—it was no longer merely a case of what the center chose to do, but how the masses would respond. The "New Course" was not a success and initiative was passing from Communist hands. A strategy of restoration was initiated by Russian leaders who intended that 1955 should be a year of salvage, a going back to pre-"New Course" policy. However, in Eastern Europe this was too late.—Ed.
doi: 10.1177/000271625831700105pmid: N/A
Growth in East European industrial output, employment, and la bor productivity, while rapid, slowed down markedly after 1950, as did agricul tural collectivization. These are all explainable by inflationary pressures. At first, governments reacted to inflation only by drastic operations like currency conversions, but in 1952, Stalin's Economic Problems presented a more basic price analysis. His successors rejected it in favor of farm price revision and altered investment. By 1955, a controversy over direct controls had obscured interest in pricing and monetary aspects of inflation, and stressed Marxian theories of whether shortages—an inflationary phenomenon—should be met by more investment in raw materials industries or by increased authority to plant managers.
doi: 10.1177/000271625831700106pmid: N/A
The object of this paper is to analyze the characteristics of the in dustrial development of Eastern Europe from 1950 onwards and to indicate the main directions of the industrial growth of the area. Attention is focused on Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia; but whenever useful, the discussion is extended to Eastern Germany. The postwar period could be conveniently subdivided in the following way: up to 1948, re construction years; from 1949 to the end of 1953, years of planning on an "all- round" basis, that is of simultaneous growth for all branches of the economy with the aim of reaching "self-sufficiency"; 1954-55, years of significant read justments in the previous pattern of investment and growth; 1955-60, years of the second long-term plans 1 characterized by simultaneity in the launching of most of these plans and by efforts toward co-ordination between the countries of the area at both the level of trade and the levels of outputs of certain commodi ties.
doi: 10.1177/000271625831700107pmid: N/A
After World War II, governments carried out agrarian reforms in Eastern Europe. This measure resulted in a radical change in the distribution of land ownership. Later a policy of collectivization and formation of state farms followed. Agricultural production has stagnated and fallen behind the planned mark and needs of the population. Conditions concerning production, marketing, and income reduce incentive for greater production and for the mar keting of larger amounts of production. Agriculture has played a subservient role to the rapid development of industry, and generally represents the least successful sector of Communist economic policy.
doi: 10.1177/000271625831700108pmid: N/A
Refusal to allow the workers to take a direct part in industrial management or leadership and the emergence of the intelligentsia as a privi leged layer, as in the Soviet Union, were confirmed in the first ten years of existence of the Rumanian Popular Republic. The strengthening of the social category of the medium farmers, owning their own farms of between 5 and 20 hectares, is one of the most revealing phenomena of social stratification in that Eastern European "Popular Democracy," differing in this from the Soviet Union.
doi: 10.1177/000271625831700109pmid: N/A
The evidence available points to a successful and steady improve ment in the pedagogical caliber of satellite schools since 1950. Yet the same period witnessed a steady alienation of youth from Communism in Poland and Hungary and to a lesser degree also in Czechoslovakia and Rumania. It is suggested that the schools cannot easily fulfill the role assigned to them by totalitarian regimes. Unless there is some correspondence between the ideals they are asked to teach and actual reality, indoctrination may only increase the chances of youth disturbances.
doi: 10.1177/000271625831700110pmid: N/A
By 1950 standardization of cultural life in Soviet-dominated coun tries was nearly complete. This was more easily effected in literature than in painting or music—areas in which the artist's position was less clearly defined. Pressures for conformity caused artists and writers to resort to three main types of behavior. Some collaborated wholeheartedly, others became semi-collabora tors, and still others chose to collaborate not at all. It soon became obvious that the "new literature" was failing to fulfill the task laid down by the party of re-educating men and was instead stifling creative work. The demand for an essentially romantic picture of everyday reality demanded by "Socialist realism" had become anything but real, and to ease the dilemma writers took refuge in the past. The cultural and political thaw which followed Stalin's death was felt most keenly in Hungary and Poland. In the former the full-scale campaign waged by the Rákosi regime against "rightist deviationism" propelled the coun try into revolution. In the latter a greater sensitivity to popular demand on the part of the leaders has helped to avert such a bloody upheaval. In fact, the freedom of creation under Gomulka's regime is still unequalled in all of Eastern Europe.—Ed.
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