Journal of Cognition and Culture

Barrett, Justin; Burdett, Emily Reed; Porter, Tenelle

doi: 10.1163/156770909x12489459066345pmid: N/A

AbstractThe present study sought to (1) determine whether Barrett's counterintuitiveness coding and quantifying scheme (CI-Scheme) could be applied to cultural materials with sufficient intercoder reliability, (2) provide evidence concerning just how counterintuitive is too counterintuitive for a concept to be a recurrent cultural idea, and (3) test whether counterintuitive intentional agent concepts are more common in folktales than other classes of counterintuitive concepts. Seventy-three folktales from around the world were sampled from larger collections. Using Barrett's CI-Scheme, two independent coders identified 116 counterintuitive objects and scored them for degree of counterintuitiveness with very high inter-rater concordance. Of folktales, 79% had one or two counterintuitive objects. Of the counterintuitive objects 93% had a counterintuitiveness score of only one. Of counterintuitive objects, 98% were agents. Results suggest the CI-Scheme may have utility for analyzing cultural materials, that the cognitive optimum for cultural transmission falls around one counterintuitive feature, and that counterintuitive agents are more common than other types of counterintuitive objects in folktales.

Burdett, Emily Reed; Porter, Tenelle; Barrett, Justin

doi: 10.1163/156770909X12489459066345pmid: N/A

<jats:sec><jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>The present study sought to (1) determine whether Barrett's counterintuitiveness coding and quantifying scheme (CI-Scheme) could be applied to cultural materials with sufficient intercoder reliability, (2) provide evidence concerning just how counterintuitive is too counterintuitive for a concept to be a recurrent cultural idea, and (3) test whether counterintuitive intentional agent concepts are more common in folktales than other classes of counterintuitive concepts. Seventy-three folktales from around the world were sampled from larger collections. Using Barrett's CI-Scheme, two independent coders identified 116 counterintuitive objects and scored them for degree of counterintuitiveness with very high inter-rater concordance. Of folktales, 79% had one or two counterintuitive objects. Of the counterintuitive objects 93% had a counterintuitiveness score of only one. Of counterintuitive objects, 98% were agents. Results suggest the CI-Scheme may have utility for analyzing cultural materials, that the cognitive optimum for cultural transmission falls around one counterintuitive feature, and that counterintuitive agents are more common than other types of counterintuitive objects in folktales.</jats:p> </jats:sec>

Barrett, Justin; Gregory, Justin

doi: 10.1163/156770909X12489459066381pmid: N/A

<jats:sec><jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>Forty-nine members of the Oxford public took part in a controlled free-recall experiment, the first 'minimal counterintuitiveness theory' study to control concept inferential potential and participant selective-attention timing. Recall of counterintuitive ideas (MCI) was compared with recall of ideas expressing necessary epistemic incongruence (i.e., analytically false), analytically true ideas, and ordinary control ideas. The items expressing necessary epistemic incongruence had better recall than other items. MCI items had a mnemonic advantage over intuitive templates for participants twenty-five years and younger after a one-week delay, but MCI items did not have an advantage for older participants. There was no mnemonic advantage for immediate recall of MCI items in any age group. Analyses suggest this general failure to replicate previously found mnemonic advantages may have been due to restricting the items' inferential potential.</jats:p> </jats:sec>

Gregory, Justin; Barrett, Justin

doi: 10.1163/156770909x12489459066381pmid: N/A

AbstractForty-nine members of the Oxford public took part in a controlled free-recall experiment, the first 'minimal counterintuitiveness theory' study to control concept inferential potential and participant selective-attention timing. Recall of counterintuitive ideas (MCI) was compared with recall of ideas expressing necessary epistemic incongruence (i.e., analytically false), analytically true ideas, and ordinary control ideas. The items expressing necessary epistemic incongruence had better recall than other items. MCI items had a mnemonic advantage over intuitive templates for participants twenty-five years and younger after a one-week delay, but MCI items did not have an advantage for older participants. There was no mnemonic advantage for immediate recall of MCI items in any age group. Analyses suggest this general failure to replicate previously found mnemonic advantages may have been due to restricting the items' inferential potential.

Sosis, Richard

doi: 10.1163/156770909X12518536414411pmid: N/A

<jats:sec><jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>The primary debate among scholars who study the evolution of religion concerns whether religion is an adaptation or a byproduct. The dominant position in the field is that religious beliefs and behaviors are byproducts of cognitive processes and behaviors that evolved for other purposes. A smaller group of scholars maintain that religion is an adaptation for extending human cooperation and coordination. Here I survey five critiques of the adapationist position and offer responses to these critiques. Much of the debate can be resolved by clearly defining important but ambiguous terms in the debate, such as religion, adaptation, adaptive, and trait, as well as clarifying several misunderstandings of evolutionary processes. I argue that adaptationist analyses must focus on the functional effects of the religious system, the coalescence of independent parts that constitute the fabric of religion.</jats:p> </jats:sec>

Sosis, Richard

doi: 10.1163/156770909x12518536414411pmid: N/A

AbstractThe primary debate among scholars who study the evolution of religion concerns whether religion is an adaptation or a byproduct. The dominant position in the field is that religious beliefs and behaviors are byproducts of cognitive processes and behaviors that evolved for other purposes. A smaller group of scholars maintain that religion is an adaptation for extending human cooperation and coordination. Here I survey five critiques of the adapationist position and offer responses to these critiques. Much of the debate can be resolved by clearly defining important but ambiguous terms in the debate, such as religion, adaptation, adaptive, and trait, as well as clarifying several misunderstandings of evolutionary processes. I argue that adaptationist analyses must focus on the functional effects of the religious system, the coalescence of independent parts that constitute the fabric of religion.

Legare, Cristine; Gelman, Susan

doi: 10.1163/156770909x12518536414457pmid: 20631923

AbstractThe present study examined children's understanding of illness in a peri-urban community in South Africa where AIDS is prevalent (n=138). Results suggest that children were surprisingly knowledgeable about AIDS at an early age, and may have even erroneously analogized from AIDS to the flu. Furthermore, all age groups attributed different causes for AIDS (transmitted by blood) and flu (casual contagion). However, although factual knowledge about AIDS was identified among all age groups, there was no evidence of understanding biological causal mechanisms. The data have implications both for developmental research on biological reasoning in diverse cultural contexts and for the design of health education programs.

Gelman, Susan; Legare, Cristine

doi: 10.1163/156770909X12518536414457pmid: 20631923

<jats:sec><jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>The present study examined children's understanding of illness in a peri-urban community in South Africa where AIDS is prevalent (n=138). Results suggest that children were surprisingly knowledgeable about AIDS at an early age, and may have even erroneously analogized from AIDS to the flu. Furthermore, all age groups attributed different causes for AIDS (transmitted by blood) and flu (casual contagion). However, although factual knowledge about AIDS was identified among all age groups, there was no evidence of understanding biological causal mechanisms. The data have implications both for developmental research on biological reasoning in diverse cultural contexts and for the design of health education programs.</jats:p> </jats:sec>

Beller, Sieghard; Bender, Andrea; Song, Jie

doi: 10.1163/156770909x12518536414493pmid: N/A

AbstractCross-cultural differences in cognition are often related to one single cultural dimension. Whether this suffices even for simple tasks is examined in the context of causal attribution. Culture-specific attribution biases are well-established for the social domain, but under dispute for the physical domain. In order to identify and assess possible impacts on assigning physical causation, we conducted a cross-cultural experiment with participants from Germany, China and Tonga (n = 377). Participants were required to identify which of two entities is the ultimate cause for a physical interaction that was varied with regard to linguistic cues and content. Our data reveal overall cultural differences in attribution tendencies analogous to those in the social domain, but also an impact of linguistic cues and of the task-specific content.

Song, Jie; Bender, Andrea; Beller, Sieghard

doi: 10.1163/156770909X12518536414493pmid: N/A

<jats:sec><jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>Cross-cultural differences in cognition are often related to one single cultural dimension. Whether this suffices even for simple tasks is examined in the context of causal attribution. Culture-specific attribution biases are well-established for the social domain, but under dispute for the physical domain. In order to identify and assess possible impacts on assigning physical causation, we conducted a cross-cultural experiment with participants from Germany, China and Tonga (n = 377). Participants were required to identify which of two entities is the ultimate cause for a physical interaction that was varied with regard to linguistic cues and content. Our data reveal overall cultural differences in attribution tendencies analogous to those in the social domain, but also an impact of linguistic cues and of the task-specific content.</jats:p> </jats:sec>