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Abstract: Is aesthetic deference ever rational? In this paper I argue that it can be. I defend aesthetic deference by means of a distinction between two kinds of aesthetic knowledge, predicative aesthetic knowledge and appreciative aesthetic knowledge. Whereas predicative aesthetic knowledge can be transmitted through deferential belief-formation, it is widely believed that appreciative aesthetic knowledge cannot. Building on this distinction and focusing on the relations between these two kinds of aesthetic knowledge I propose conditions under which aesthetic deference can be rational. Nonetheless, I suggest that there may be non-epistemic norms that undermine deferential aesthetic belief formation. In outlining the grounds for rational aesthetic deference, deference to aesthetic experts or educators becomes a possibility.
The Journal of Aesthetic Education – University of Illinois Press
Published: Apr 23, 2016
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