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The Possibility of Buddhist Ethical Agency Revisited—A Reply to Jay Garfield and Chad Hansen

The Possibility of Buddhist Ethical Agency Revisited—A Reply to Jay Garfield and Chad Hansen althoughIagreethatmyaccounthastheimplicationsforatheoryofactionto whichFinnigandrawsattention.Andagain,Ithinkthattheexegeticalquestionis besidethepoint.Ijustdon'twanttheunwaryreadertogetthewrongideaabout thecontentsorpointofGarfield2006. 3­Thereisanotherwaytoputthispointthatmayhelptofocusthedifficultyfor Finnigan'sposition:Abuddhaisnotamoral agentinBuddhisttheory,atleastnot inthesensethatordinarybeingsare.Action(karma),inBuddhistactiontheory, alwaysproduceskarma, andabuddhadoesnotproducekarma. Hence,whateverabuddhadoesisnotaction intheordinarysense.Moreover,Buddhistethics isallaboutwhatanordinarybeingneedstodotobecome abuddha.Itisabout cultivationofvirtue,eliminationofvice,practiceofpath,andsoforth nshort, --i aboutself-transformation,abouttransformingoneselfinto abuddha(seeGarfield forthcoming).Butabuddhahasalreadyaccomplishedthis.So,abuddhaisneitheranagentnorasubjectofethicalassessment,andsoisnotamoralagent. Hence,Finniganisoffonthewrongfoot. References Finnigan,B.,andK.Tanaka.Forthcoming."Don'tThink!JustAct!"InG.Priestand DamonYoung,Philosophy and the Martial Arts. Chicago:OpenCourt. Garfield,J.2006."WhyDidBodhidharmaGototheEast?Buddhism'sStrugglewith MindintheWorld." Sophia45(2):61­80. -.Forthcoming."WhatisitLiketobeaBodhisattva?MoralPhenomenologyin ntideva'sBodhic ry vat ra." Journal of the International Association of Buda a a dhist Studies. Gregory,P.2002.Tsung Mi and the Sinification of Buddhism. Honolulu:University ofHawai`iPress. Hansen,C.1992.A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation. Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. ThePossibilityofBuddhistEthicalAgencyRevisited Replyto --A JayGarfieldandChadHansen Bronwyn Finnigan DepartmentofPhilosophy,UniversityofAuckland IbeginbywarmlythankingProfessorsGarfieldandHansenforparticipatinginthis dialogue.Igreatlyvaluetheworkofbothandappreciatehavingtheopportunityto engageinadialoguewiththem.AsidefromthemanyimportantinsightsIgainfrom theirreplies,IbelievethatbothGarfieldandHansenmisrepresentmyposition.In Volume61,Number1January2011183­194 ©2011byUniversityofHawai`iPress response,Ishallclarifytheargumentcontainedinmyprecedingcomment,andwill considertheobjectionsastheybearonthisclarifiedposition. I Both Garfield and Hansen characterize the central argument of my comment as p esupposingarelativelymainstreamWesternaccountofaction.Theysuggestthat, r withamainstreamWesternaccountinhand,IchallengeClassicalChineseandIndoTibetanBuddhistthoughtfornothavingtheresourcestofitthisaccount.Inreplying tomyargument,theyarguethatthemainstreamaccountofactionisaninappropriate modelofactioninthecontextoftheAsiantraditions.Theyalsomaintainthatthe mainstreamaccountisitselfahighlyproblematicmodelofaction.GarfieldandHansenthenproceedtoofferhighlyinsightfulsuggestionsaboutthepossibilitiesofactionavailableintheirrespectivetraditionsofAsianthought.Theunderlyingthought ofbothreplies,itwouldseem,isthatthedilemmageneratedinmycommentisthe fruitofamistakenpresuppositionaboutthenatureofactionratherthanindicativeof agenuinelimitationinClassicalChineseandIndo-TibetanBuddhistthought. Iftheunderlingargumentofmycommentdid,indeed,fittheabovecharacterization,thenIwouldbeextremelysympathetictoGarfield'sandHansen'slineofreply. And,tobefair,Icanseehowitmaybereadthisway.However,thischaracterization misrepresentstheargument.Toseethis,wefirstneedtoclarifywhatismeantbythe mainstreamWesternviewofthenatureofactionandthenidentifytheaspectsofmy argumentthatGarfieldandHansenbelievecommitmetothisview. Arguably,thedominantcontemporaryWesternaccountofactionisthecausal theory.DonaldDavidsoniswidelyrecognizedtochampionthistheory,characterizedastheideathatintentionalactionsarebothcausedbymentalstateswithpropositional content (i.e., beliefs, desires, intentions) and `rationalized' by reference to these mental states. What does Davidson mean by rationalization?This notion is oteninterpretedastheviewthatthereasonsanagentgivestoexplaintheiractions f correspondstothepropositionalattitudesthatcausedtheaction(i.e.,theyarethe reasonsbecauseofwhichtheagentacted),andthesepropositionalattitudesarerelatedtooneanotherduetosomeprocessofreasoning.Thisconceptionofactionis whatIunderstandGarfieldandHansentomeanbythe`mainstream'view.Significantly,bothscholarsadditionallypresupposethat,inthemainstreamview,thepropositionalattitudesthatcauseactionandarethereferentforrationalizationsofaction are necessarily consciously represented or entertained. Now, there are reasons to think that neither Davidson nor mainstream philosophers of action are explicitly committed to this additional presupposition.1 Nevertheless, Garfield and Hansen seemtothinkmainstreamphilosophersofactionholdtheviewthatanintentional actionisonethatisproducedbypropositionalattitudesthatareconsciouslyrepresentedandrelatedtooneanotherbymeansofaprocessofpracticalreasoningand subsequentlyexplained(orrationalized)byreasonsthatrefertotheseveryattitudes. AccordingtobothGarfieldandHansen,thedefinitionofactionIpresentinmy commentarticulatesthismainstreamview.Idefineanactionasintentionalifitin- volvesthecapacitybothto`direct'behaviorandtogiveexplanations,usingreasons, forthedirectednessofsuchbehavior.Thereisreasontothinkthatthisdefinitionof actionisnotnecessarilycommittedtothemainstreamview. Consider,first,whatIcallthe`weak'senseofintentionality;namely,thatintentionalactionsare"directedorguided."Thisconditionmaycertainlybemetbyagents whoconsciouslyformintentionsoractivelyengageinpracticalreasoningdirectly priortoaction(i.e.,themainstreamview).2However,notonlycanthisconditionbe metbypropositionalattitudesthatarenotconsciouslyentertained,itmayalsobe metbydispositionalaccountsofactionthatsatisfycertainconditionalanalyses.Dispositions need not be mental events or propositional attitudes, though they may counterfactuallydependonthepossessionofcertaineventsandattitudes.3Theweak senseofintentionality,thus,doesnotnecessarilyinvokeconsciousdeliberativeprocessesthatculminateinconsciouslyrepresentedandformedintentionsthatsubsequentlycauseaction. InmycommentIalsodiscussa`strong'senseofintentionality,namelythatintentional actions are http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Philosophy East and West University of Hawai'I Press

The Possibility of Buddhist Ethical Agency Revisited—A Reply to Jay Garfield and Chad Hansen

Finnigan, Bronwyn.
Philosophy East and West , Volume 61 (1) – Jan 16, 2011
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Abstract

althoughIagreethatmyaccounthastheimplicationsforatheoryofactionto whichFinnigandrawsattention.Andagain,Ithinkthattheexegeticalquestionis besidethepoint.Ijustdon'twanttheunwaryreadertogetthewrongideaabout thecontentsorpointofGarfield2006. 3­Thereisanotherwaytoputthispointthatmayhelptofocusthedifficultyfor Finnigan'sposition:Abuddhaisnotamoral agentinBuddhisttheory,atleastnot inthesensethatordinarybeingsare.Action(karma),inBuddhistactiontheory, alwaysproduceskarma, andabuddhadoesnotproducekarma. Hence,whateverabuddhadoesisnotaction intheordinarysense.Moreover,Buddhistethics isallaboutwhatanordinarybeingneedstodotobecome abuddha.Itisabout cultivationofvirtue,eliminationofvice,practiceofpath,andsoforth nshort, --i aboutself-transformation,abouttransformingoneselfinto abuddha(seeGarfield forthcoming).Butabuddhahasalreadyaccomplishedthis.So,abuddhaisneitheranagentnorasubjectofethicalassessment,andsoisnotamoralagent. Hence,Finniganisoffonthewrongfoot. References Finnigan,B.,andK.Tanaka.Forthcoming."Don'tThink!JustAct!"InG.Priestand DamonYoung,Philosophy and the Martial Arts. Chicago:OpenCourt. Garfield,J.2006."WhyDidBodhidharmaGototheEast?Buddhism'sStrugglewith MindintheWorld." Sophia45(2):61­80. -.Forthcoming."WhatisitLiketobeaBodhisattva?MoralPhenomenologyin ntideva'sBodhic ry vat ra." Journal of the International Association of Buda a a dhist Studies. Gregory,P.2002.Tsung Mi and the Sinification of Buddhism. Honolulu:University ofHawai`iPress. Hansen,C.1992.A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation. Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. ThePossibilityofBuddhistEthicalAgencyRevisited Replyto --A JayGarfieldandChadHansen Bronwyn Finnigan DepartmentofPhilosophy,UniversityofAuckland IbeginbywarmlythankingProfessorsGarfieldandHansenforparticipatinginthis dialogue.Igreatlyvaluetheworkofbothandappreciatehavingtheopportunityto engageinadialoguewiththem.AsidefromthemanyimportantinsightsIgainfrom theirreplies,IbelievethatbothGarfieldandHansenmisrepresentmyposition.In Volume61,Number1January2011183­194 ©2011byUniversityofHawai`iPress response,Ishallclarifytheargumentcontainedinmyprecedingcomment,andwill considertheobjectionsastheybearonthisclarifiedposition. I Both Garfield and Hansen characterize the central argument of my comment as p esupposingarelativelymainstreamWesternaccountofaction.Theysuggestthat, r withamainstreamWesternaccountinhand,IchallengeClassicalChineseandIndoTibetanBuddhistthoughtfornothavingtheresourcestofitthisaccount.Inreplying tomyargument,theyarguethatthemainstreamaccountofactionisaninappropriate modelofactioninthecontextoftheAsiantraditions.Theyalsomaintainthatthe mainstreamaccountisitselfahighlyproblematicmodelofaction.GarfieldandHansenthenproceedtoofferhighlyinsightfulsuggestionsaboutthepossibilitiesofactionavailableintheirrespectivetraditionsofAsianthought.Theunderlyingthought ofbothreplies,itwouldseem,isthatthedilemmageneratedinmycommentisthe fruitofamistakenpresuppositionaboutthenatureofactionratherthanindicativeof agenuinelimitationinClassicalChineseandIndo-TibetanBuddhistthought. Iftheunderlingargumentofmycommentdid,indeed,fittheabovecharacterization,thenIwouldbeextremelysympathetictoGarfield'sandHansen'slineofreply. And,tobefair,Icanseehowitmaybereadthisway.However,thischaracterization misrepresentstheargument.Toseethis,wefirstneedtoclarifywhatismeantbythe mainstreamWesternviewofthenatureofactionandthenidentifytheaspectsofmy argumentthatGarfieldandHansenbelievecommitmetothisview. Arguably,thedominantcontemporaryWesternaccountofactionisthecausal theory.DonaldDavidsoniswidelyrecognizedtochampionthistheory,characterizedastheideathatintentionalactionsarebothcausedbymentalstateswithpropositional content (i.e., beliefs, desires, intentions) and `rationalized' by reference to these mental states. What does Davidson mean by rationalization?This notion is oteninterpretedastheviewthatthereasonsanagentgivestoexplaintheiractions f correspondstothepropositionalattitudesthatcausedtheaction(i.e.,theyarethe reasonsbecauseofwhichtheagentacted),andthesepropositionalattitudesarerelatedtooneanotherduetosomeprocessofreasoning.Thisconceptionofactionis whatIunderstandGarfieldandHansentomeanbythe`mainstream'view.Significantly,bothscholarsadditionallypresupposethat,inthemainstreamview,thepropositionalattitudesthatcauseactionandarethereferentforrationalizationsofaction are necessarily consciously represented or entertained. Now, there are reasons to think that neither Davidson nor mainstream philosophers of action are explicitly committed to this additional presupposition.1 Nevertheless, Garfield and Hansen seemtothinkmainstreamphilosophersofactionholdtheviewthatanintentional actionisonethatisproducedbypropositionalattitudesthatareconsciouslyrepresentedandrelatedtooneanotherbymeansofaprocessofpracticalreasoningand subsequentlyexplained(orrationalized)byreasonsthatrefertotheseveryattitudes. AccordingtobothGarfieldandHansen,thedefinitionofactionIpresentinmy commentarticulatesthismainstreamview.Idefineanactionasintentionalifitin- volvesthecapacitybothto`direct'behaviorandtogiveexplanations,usingreasons, forthedirectednessofsuchbehavior.Thereisreasontothinkthatthisdefinitionof actionisnotnecessarilycommittedtothemainstreamview. Consider,first,whatIcallthe`weak'senseofintentionality;namely,thatintentionalactionsare"directedorguided."Thisconditionmaycertainlybemetbyagents whoconsciouslyformintentionsoractivelyengageinpracticalreasoningdirectly priortoaction(i.e.,themainstreamview).2However,notonlycanthisconditionbe metbypropositionalattitudesthatarenotconsciouslyentertained,itmayalsobe metbydispositionalaccountsofactionthatsatisfycertainconditionalanalyses.Dispositions need not be mental events or propositional attitudes, though they may counterfactuallydependonthepossessionofcertaineventsandattitudes.3Theweak senseofintentionality,thus,doesnotnecessarilyinvokeconsciousdeliberativeprocessesthatculminateinconsciouslyrepresentedandformedintentionsthatsubsequentlycauseaction. InmycommentIalsodiscussa`strong'senseofintentionality,namelythatintentional actions are

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Published: Jan 16, 2011

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