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Reviews 281 ToshiYoshiharaandJamesR.Holmes.Red Star over the Pacific: China's Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy. Annapolis,MD:Naval InstitutePress,2010.xii,293pp.Hardcover$36.95,isbn978-1-59114-390-1. IfEdgarSnow'sRed Star over Chinaforetoldin1937whytheperipheralChinese CommunistPartyhadthepotentialtogainvictoryintheChinesecivilwarin 1949,YoshiharaandHolmes's Red Star over the Pacific conveysthemessagethat theChinesearecomingwiththeintenttomarchtotheseasbeyondTaiwanand intothePacific.ThismessageundoubtedlyattractsattentionandconcerninEast AsiabecauseChinahaslongbeenconsideredmoreofacontinentalpower,busy managingandmonitoringitslongterritorialborderswithfourteenstates,thanan ambitiousmaritimenation.EvenifChinadecidestoseekmaritimedominance,its oceanicfrontierisblockedbyaforeign-controlledislandchainthatenclosesthe entireChinesecoastalline.AsoneChineseanalystfranklyadmits,Chinafacesthe predicamentof"havingseasbutnottheocean"(p.51)--hummingatunethat recallsimperialGermany'sstruggletodevelopasizableandcapablenavythat couldopenthegatestotheAtlanticduringtheageofBritishnavalsupremacy. Nevertheless,China'sboomingeconomyandtechnologicalinnovationshave offeredboththeresourcesneededtoupgradeandupliftitsnavalforceandthe technologicalsophisticationinmissiledevelopmentrequiredtoovercomethe geographicbarriertotheocean.ThisiscertainlyanalarmingsignaltotheUnited States,whichhasservedasthepredominantproviderandguarantorofregional securityandstabilityintheWesternPacificsince1945.Consequently,thisbookisa welcomeadditiontothestudyofChinesemilitarydevelopment.Ithelpsreaders sizeupChina'smotivesandmovesforabettergraspofChina'snavalchallengesto theUnitedStatesandotherregionalplayers. AnybookonnavaldevelopmentmustpaytributetoAlfredThayerMahanfor hisgeopoliticalinsightsinstrategicanalysis.Thebookopenswithalayoutof Mahan'sdualtridentsofseapower.Thefirsttridentexplainswhycountriescovet accesstodistantplacestosecureaccesstosourcesofeconomicwell-being-- foreigntrade,commerce,andresources--bypoliticalmeasuresconduciveto military,particularlysubstantialnaval,strength.Witheconomicsandcommerce rankedasthepredominantprioritiesinthefirsttrident,anyseapowershould concentrateonthesecondtrident'sthreeprongs:domesticproductionbase, merchantandnavalshippingforeconomicexchanges,andoverseasmarkets. Therefore,Mahanstressestheimportanceofforwardnavalbasesandpowerful battlefleetstoretaincommandoftheseaforunobstructedaccesstocommercial benefits.ForMahan,geopoliticalconditionsandstrategicconsiderationsfor gainingmaritimeaccessforcommercialpurposesconstructthelogicofseapower, whilethematerialgrammarofseapowerconsistsofsuperiorweaponryand operationalplatformsfornavalbattleefficiencyandwarfare. © 2011 by University of Hawai`i Press 282 ChinaReviewInternational:Vol.17,No.2,2010 Invariouschapters,theauthorsinvestigateandportraytheintersection betweenMahan'slogicandgrammarinChina'srecentnavaldevelopmentand deployment.ByexamininghowChinesemilitarystrategicthinkersinterpretand applyAlfredMahan'stheoryinChina'sgeopoliticalenvironment,chapter2ofthe bookshowshowBeijingpursuesitsmaritimestrategy.MuchaswiththeintroductionofWesternideasintoChinainthepast,ChinesescholarsandseafarersmodifyandadaptMahan'sthoughtstoChina'suniquecircumstances.Theyhave incorporatedthecountry'shistoricallegacyofSinocentricviewandMao's"active defense"conceptintoMahan'smalleableclaimsforaseapowertheory"with Chinesecharacteristics"(p.16).Thecomplexityofregionalalliancepolitics,the U.S.concernsovertheeffectofKennethBoulding's"loss-of-strengthgradient"in itspowerprojection,andChina'sinitialjeune écoleapproachtofleetbuildingas wellasdiplomaticprudencehavesofarpreventedbothcountriesfromoutright andtensesaber-rattlingconfrontationsintheirbilateralinteractionsinthe Pacific. TheauthorspointoutthatChina's"offshoreactivedefense"(chapter2,p.84, p. 231,note56)maritimestrategyhasbenefitedfromitscontinent-scalegeography, withtheadvantageofsolidshore-fireandland-basedanti-shipmissiles,which haveabsolutesea-denialcapabilitywithinthefirstislandchain,alinerunning throughtheedgesofJapan,Taiwan,andthePhilippines.China'sattemptto developamodernMahaniannavywith"overbearingpower"(p.10)forthe employmentofMao'sunorthodoxguerrillawarfaretacticsinnavaloperationwill surelymaketheUnitedStatethinktwicepriortoanyseriousmilitaryengagements withChina.Inaddition,asevidencedinthemissileattacksoftheHMSSheffield in the1982FalklandsWarandthefrigateUSSStark inthe1987Iraq-Iranwar,China's advancementofitsguidedmissilesasan"assassin'smace"(shashoujian)canposea significantthreattotheUSsuperiornavalforce.Throughimprovementinmissile capability,size,lethality,andaccuracy,describedinchapter5,China'santi-ship ballisticmissileshaveposedathreattoU.S.aircraftcarriersandtheU.S.regional ballistic-missile-defense(BMD)shieldthatreliesonAegis-equippedvessels.In chapter6,thebookalsoreasonsthatChina'srecentincreaseinthedeploymentof nuclear-poweredballistic-submarineshassubstantiallyreinforcedBeijing'sconvictioninitsdoctrineofminimumdeterrence.Finally,ChinahasemployedMing dynasty'sZhengHe'smonumentalvoyageas"usable"historicaldiscoursesto justifyitsglobalnavalexpansiontomaintainsafetyandorderatsea.China's maritimeendeavorsinthepastdecadeledtothedrasticdisparitiesbetweenthe 1986and2007U.S.assessmentsofitsmilitarycapabilities,vis-à-visChina,inthe regionfromafavorableassessmentadecadeagoindealingwithChina'snaval challengestoableakverdictinlate2000s.Asimilarreversalofopinionof U.S.-ChinamaritimebalanceofpoweralsooccurredamongChinaspecialists, indicatingthattheUnitedStatesneedstoreckonChinesenavalpotentialseri- Reviews 283 ously inEastAsiaforthecomingdecade.Onecertaintyemergingfromthisstudy isthatChina'snavyhasconfidentlycontestedaccesswithinthefirstislandchain andwellbeyondandposesachallengetotheU.S.roleasaregionalsecurity guarantor. Severaldistinctivefeaturesdefinetheauthors'contributionstothefield. Althoughreadersmightfeeloverburdenedbytheirgenerousquotationsofand numerousreferencestoChinesepublications,goodmethodsyieldgoodresults. Theauthors'painstakingattemptstocompareandcontrastdifferentproclamations capturetheintricaciesandcomplexitiesofthedynamicexchangesofpolicy debateswithinChina,includingthereadingofMahanamongChineseanalysts; theevaluationofthePLA'snavalfleettactics;andthestatusandstrengthofChina's emergingunderwaternucleardeterrent.Second,thebook'sanalysisisneatly structuredwithempiricalevidenceandlogicallyreasonedwithinsights.The authorsweavetogetherandsynthesizevariousargumentssuccinctlypriorto articulatingtheirassessmentsjudiciously.Athirdfeatureisthebook'sexcellent treatmentofthegeopoliticalimportanceofTaiwaninChina'snavalstrategyata timewhensomeanalystsandofficialsincreasinglymarginalizeTaiwan'sstrategic significancewithintheframeworkofU.S.-Chinainteractionsinthelastdecade. AccordingtothemindsetofChinesestrategists,Taiwanisthe"Gibraltarofthe East"(p.52),describedbyChina'sanalystYupingLiwelllocatedinthemiddleof thefirstislandchain,denyingChina'sentryintothesecuritydomainguardedby theUnitedStatesanditsallies.WhileChinahasdemandedthereturnofTaiwanas anationalisticurgeforterritorialintegrityonnumerousoccasions,China'shidden agendamayresideinitsviewofTaiwan'spreeminentandindispensablelocationin China'sgrandstrategy.TaiwanholdsthekeyforChinatoembarkonanyserious endeavorstofulfillitsoceanicvisioninthePacific. ShouldoneheedSunTzu'scounsel,"knowtheenemyandknowyourself,ina hundredbattlesyouwillneverbeinperil"(p.77),inhisArt of Warandshow interestinlearningacompletepictureofthenavalcomposition,comparison,and competitionofbothChinaandtheUnitedStates,thebookregrettablyprovidesa relativelylimitedcoverageoftheUnitesStates.Ofcourse,thisshouldnotbe consideredadrawbackofthisimportantwork.Rather,thiswell-executedresearch servesasinvitationforourcontinuouseffortsinanalyzingthecomplicatedand potentiallyexplosiveU.S.-Chinarelationshipintheareaofnavaldevelopment. Surely,thisbookwillnotendthedebatesamongpolicyanalystsandgovernment officialsinseekinganappropriatestrategyandmilitaryposturetomanagetherise ofChineseseapoweratatimeoftheU.S.Navy's"elegantdecline,"inthewordsof RobertKaplan,indownsizingitsglobalnavalforces.AsChinarelentlesslyacceleratesitsmodernizationeffortsinnavalcapability,Thucydides'saxiomof"fear, honor,andinterest"mayeventuallysettleintoChina'sneo-Mahanianstrategic thinkingandmakeChinaoverlyassertiveindealingwiththeUnitedStates.Atthat 284 ChinaReviewInternational:Vol.17,No.2,2010 moment,theredstarwilldischargeanoverbearingglare,ratherthanagentle twinkle,acrossthePacific. Wei-chinLee Wei-chin Lee is a professor of political science at Wake Forest University, WinstonSalem, North Carolina, specializing in studies of Chinese politics, East Asian politics, and international relations. AnthonyC.Yu.Comparative Journeys: Essays on Literature and
China Review International – University of Hawai'I Press
Published: Mar 1, 2010
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