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totelian conception of nature (``we are not, any of us, merely what we are. We are also who we might become--a better or a lesser being, whose traits we acquire and indeed define in the choices we make'' [p. xxx]), which has rightly been termed teleological, his own ontology of nature appears to be strictly descriptive and causal, in conformity with modern scientific conceptions. It is thus an ``anthropomorphic'' confusion to apply our moral notions to the natural realm (p. 123). But the biblical account of creation is itself by fiat, as Hans Kelsen (Society and Nature [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943]; The Pure Theory of Law [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967], pp. 1822) pointed out in describing the ``primitive'' historical roots of the is/ought confusion. And Goodman himself describes law and nature as ``God's two utterances'' (p. 141). Jewish law itself adopted a ``teleological'' conception of the dherekh of animals, though Maimonides reformulated it in purely descriptive terms (Jackson, in Jewish Law Annual 1 [1978]: 168176). Goodman recognizes the survival of such notions in the context of natural disasters when he writes: ``We take that fact [that nature stands aside for no one] for granted
Philosophy East and West – University of Hawai'I Press
Published: Oct 25, 2009
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