The Ethical Cycle
I. van de Poel
L. Royakkers
ABSTRACT. Arriving at a moral judgment is not a
straightforward or linear process in which ethical theories
are simply applied to cases. Instead it is a process in which
the formulation of the moral problem, the formulation of
possible ‘‘solutions’’, and the ethical judging of these
solutions go hand in hand. This messy character of moral
problems, however, does not rule out a systematic ap-
proach. In this article, we describe a systematic approach
to problem solving that does justice to the complex nature
of moral problems and ethical judgment: the ethical cycle.
Our goal is to provide a structured and disciplined
method of addressing moral problems, which helps to
guide a sound analysis of these problems. We will illus-
trate the usefulness of this cycle with an example. Further,
we will discuss two general issues in applied ethics in
relation to the proposed ethical cycle: the role of ethical
theories and the place of individual judgment versus
collective deliberation.
KEY WORDS: ethics, engineering, moral problems,
designing, deliberation
Introduction
Making an ethical decision is a complex process that
applied ethicists have organized in a series of ‘steps’
(see e.g. Harris et al., 2000; Mitcham and Duvall,
2000). These steps have proven useful both in teach-
ing ethical concepts (see e.g. van der Burg and van de
Poel, 2005), and in analyzing ethical issues in real-life
situations. In this article, we will propose an ethical
cycle for moral problem-solving. The ethical cycle has
been primarily developed for teaching purposes. We
think, however, that it might also be useful for ethical
problem solving in situations in professional practices
because it helps to deal with moral problems in a more
structured and thorough way.
The proposal for a systematic approach to moral
problem-solving consisting of a number of steps
might suggest a commitment to the belief that moral
problems are given beforehand and that solving them
is just a matter of applying different ethical theories to
select the best option. There is, however, not such a
commitment. In fact, we believe that moral prob-
lem-solving is a much more messy and complex
process. There are a number of reasons for this.
Likemanyotherpracticalproblems,moralproblems
are ill-structured problems. Moral problems cannot be
thoroughly described beforehand; the problem will
unfold itself during the process of solving (cf. Whit-
beck, 1998). In cases of other ill-structured problems,
such as design problems, thinking about possible
solutions will further clarify the problem and possibly
lead to a reformulation of the problem (Cross, 1989).
Like other ill-structured problems, moral problems
usually do not have one best solution, but a range of
more or less acceptable solutions (Whitbeck, 1998).
This is due to the fact that for ill-structurted problems,
no single criterion exists to order uniformly the pos-
sible solutions from best to worst (Simon, 1973).
Another characteristic which moral problems
share with other ill-structured problems is that it is
Ibo van de Poel (1966) is Assistant Professor of Ethics and
Technology at Delft University of Technology. He has done
research on the dynamics of technological development, codes of
conduct and professional ethics of engineers, the moral accept-
ability of technological risks, ethics in engineering design, and
ethics and responsibiltiy in R&D networks. He has published
in, among others, Science, Technology & Humans Values,
Research Policy and Science and Engineering Ethics. For more
information, see http://www.tbm.tudelft.nl/webstaf/ibop/.
Lambe
`
r Royakkers (1967) is Associate Professor of Ethics and
Technology at Eindhoven University of Technology, The
Netherlands. He studied Philosophy and Social Sciences,
Technical Mathematics, and Law. He received his PhD at the
Tilburg University in 1996. His dissertation was on the for-
malisation of normative rules with deontic logic. It has been
revised rather thoroughly for the serie Law and Philosophy
published by Kluwer Academic in 1998. His research interests
include ethics and technology, (collective) responsibility, and
logic.
Journal of Business Ethics (2007) 71:1–13 Ó Springer 2006
DOI 10.1007/s10551-006-9121-6