Philos Stud (2011) 154:465â477 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9735-0 Judith Jarvis Thomson Published online: 17 May 2011 à Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011 1. I am very grateful to Harman, Wallace, and Scanlon for their kind words and for the close attention they paid to Normativity. I thank Harman for his very good summary of the text, and for the comments he makes along the way. I mention in particular his comments on my claim that the turn to reasons for action in moral philosophy in the 1950s was a mistake. Since both Wallace and Scanlon reject that claim, I will discuss it in section 9 below, and I will at that point return to Harman: his concluding paragraph responds to a temptation that I take to be one of the two major sources of the attraction that that turn has had for so many moral philosophers. 2. Wallace makes a great many objections; I have space to respond to only ï¬ve of them. (I squeeze brief responses to two more, into footnotes 2 and 3.) By way of background, I said at the outset that normative judgments divide into evaluatives and directives. I said later that the directives include all
/lp/springer-journals/reply-to-critics-ncXYQ0EBr5