DOI 10.1007/s11229-010-9727-1 Philippe De Brabanter · Mikhail Kissine Received: 16 October 2009 / Accepted: 8 February 2010 / Published online: 27 February 2010 © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010 Like research in any scientiï¬c ï¬eld, semantics starts with observationsâintuitions about the meaning of words and their combinations1 âwhich aim at conï¬rming preexisting hypotheses and/or at producing new ones. Models are built, in order to facilitate predictions on the basis of these hypotheses. In semantics, the most widespread way of formalising oneâs informal assumptions is Model Theory. For convenience, this is the framework we will rely on in the presentation of the way the papers gathered in this volume relate to (what we deem to be) the important issues underlying the contemporary debates on semantic relativism. A model-theoretical semantics assigns to each well-formed sentence in its objectlanguage a truth-value relative to a component of the modelâthe component that many philosophers call âcircumstance of evaluationâ.2 As a result (and assuming a recursive object-language), predictions are derivable that can be tested against further 1 Philosophers of languageâs intuitions usually focus on sentences or on sentences that are quotations of utterances of these sentences but virtually never on actual utterances. 2 We
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