I won’t do it! Self-prediction, moral obligation
and moral deliberation
Jennie Louise
Published online: 7 August 2008
Ó Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008
Abstract This paper considers the question of whether predictions of wrongdoing
are relevant to our moral obligations. After giving an analysis of ‘won’t’ claims (i.e.,
claims that an agent won’t U), the question is separated into two different issues:
firstly, whether predictions of wrongdoing affect our objective moral obligations,
and secondly, whether self-prediction of wrongdoing can be legitimately used in
moral deliberation. I argue for an affirmative answer to both questions, although
there are conditions that must be met for self-prediction to be appropriate in
deliberation. The discussion illuminates an interesting and significant tension
between agency and prediction.
Keywords Actualism Á Possibilism Á Prediction Á Wrongdoing Á
Obligation
1 Introduction: the problem
Do facts about what I will do make a difference to what I ought to do? This
question—or some variant thereof—has been the subject of sporadic debate for
several decades. At the heart of the issue is the observation that the outcome of a
current choice often depends upon the agent’s decision in some other (usually
subsequent) choice situation. As Jackson puts it, ‘‘some actions are such that they
only have good results if they are followed up in the right way.’’
1
If one always does
as one ought, then this presents little practical problem. But sometimes an agent
won’t do as they ought. What is the relevance of this ‘won’t’ in determining the
J. Louise (&)
Discipline of Philosophy, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, SA 5005, Australia
e-mail: jennie.louise@adelaide.edu.au
1
Jackson (1991, p. 480).
123
Philos Stud (2009) 146:327–348
DOI 10.1007/s11098-008-9258-5