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THE GOVERNANCE OF EXCHANGES : MEMBERS ’ COOPERATIVES VERSUS OUTSIDE OWNERSHIP
- Publisher
- Springer Journals
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2010 by Springer-Verlag
- Subject
- Economics; Economics, general; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods; Microeconomics; Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics; Public Finance; Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences
- ISSN
- 0931-8658
- eISSN
- 1617-7134
- DOI
- 10.1007/s00712-010-0116-5
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
If consumers wholly or partially control a firm with market power they will charge less than the profit maximizing price. Starting at the usual monopoly price, a small price reduction will have a second order effect on profits but a first order effect on consumer surplus. Despite this desirable static result, it has been argued that cooperatives are vulnerable to take-over by outsiders who will run them as for-profit businesses. This paper studies takeovers of cooperatives. We argue that there will not be excessive takeovers of cooperatives due to the Grossman-Hart problem of free riding during takeovers.
Journal
Journal of Economics – Springer Journals
Published: Jan 28, 2010