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The notion of a proposition as a set of possible worlds or states occupies central stage in probability theory, semantics and epistemology, where it serves as the fundamental unit both of information and meaning. But this fact should not blind us to the existence of prospects with a different structure. In the paper I examine the use of random variables—in particular, proposition-valued random variables—in these fields and argue that we need a general account of rational attitude formation with respect to them.
Synthese – Springer Journals
Published: Mar 12, 2010
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