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Expressivism and Moral Dilemmas: A Response to Marino

Expressivism and Moral Dilemmas: A Response to Marino Simon Blackburn’s expressivist logic of attitudes aims to explain how we can use non-assertoric moral judgements in logically valid arguments. Patricia Marino has recently argued that Blackburn’s logic faces a dilemma: either it cannot account for the place of moral dilemmas in moral reasoning or, if it can, it makes an illicit distinction between two different kinds of moral dilemma. Her target is the logic’s definition of validity as satisfiability, according to which validity requires an avoidance of attitudinal inconsistency. Against Marino’s arguments, I contend that expressivists following Blackburn are able to show how we appreciate the validity of arguments found in dilemma-contexts, and that Marino’s argument concerning the distinction between contingent moral dilemmas and logical moral dilemmas rests on a mistake concerning the logical representation of a contingent dilemma. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Springer Journals

Expressivism and Moral Dilemmas: A Response to Marino

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice , Volume 14 (4) – Aug 1, 2011

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References (6)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2011 by Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
Subject
Philosophy; Political Philosophy; Ontology; Ethics
ISSN
1386-2820
eISSN
1572-8447
DOI
10.1007/s10677-010-9255-6
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Simon Blackburn’s expressivist logic of attitudes aims to explain how we can use non-assertoric moral judgements in logically valid arguments. Patricia Marino has recently argued that Blackburn’s logic faces a dilemma: either it cannot account for the place of moral dilemmas in moral reasoning or, if it can, it makes an illicit distinction between two different kinds of moral dilemma. Her target is the logic’s definition of validity as satisfiability, according to which validity requires an avoidance of attitudinal inconsistency. Against Marino’s arguments, I contend that expressivists following Blackburn are able to show how we appreciate the validity of arguments found in dilemma-contexts, and that Marino’s argument concerning the distinction between contingent moral dilemmas and logical moral dilemmas rests on a mistake concerning the logical representation of a contingent dilemma.

Journal

Ethical Theory and Moral PracticeSpringer Journals

Published: Aug 1, 2011

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