Empathy and second-person methodology
How the phenomenology of empathy in Husserl and beyond and the second-person approach of cognition are able to mutually enrich and constrain each other? Whereas the intersubjective empathy is limited to face-to-face inter-individual relational experiences or, when socially embedded, results a non-individualized understanding of others in general, the second person approach of cognition opens the way for a plural relational yet individualized understanding of the other. I would like to show in this paper how the integration of both phenomenological and cognitive fields paves the way for the more encompassing description of intersubjective experience as a “relational multiplicity,” which I will ultimately describe through the empirical practice of an emergency psychiatric unit.
http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.pngContinental Philosophy ReviewSpringer Journalshttp://www.deepdyve.com/lp/springer-journals/empathy-and-second-person-methodology-ucDmvx50o4