Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Do we perceive natural kind properties?

Do we perceive natural kind properties? Philos Stud (2013) 162:35–42 DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9985-5 Berit Brogaard Published online: 25 July 2012 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012 I respond to three arguments aimed at establishing that natural kind properties occur in the experiential content of visual experience: the argument from phenomenal difference, the argument from mandatory seeing, and the argument from associative agnosia. I conclude with a simple argument against the view that natural kind properties occur in the experiential content of visual experience. 1 High-level properties There are lots of properties which human beings cannot visually detect. As a matter of necessity, (normal) human beings cannot visually detect a range of sensory low- level properties detectable by other sense modalities. I cannot visually detect the coldness of ice cream, the sweetness of strawberries, the softness of your skin, or the pitch of your voice. And, as a matter of contingent fact, (normal) human beings cannot visually detect low-level properties instantiated exclusively by very large objects, very small objects and objects very far away. Assuming that no other object on earth is shaped just like Utah, we could not visually detect the shape of Utah prior to the invention of modern technology. Which properties can we consciously visually http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Philosophical Studies Springer Journals

Do we perceive natural kind properties?

Brogaard, Berit
Philosophical Studies , Volume 162 (1) – Jul 25, 2012
Download PDF
8 pages

Loading next page...
 
/lp/springer-journal/do-we-perceive-natural-kind-properties-0E35SNsHCW

References (8)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2012 by Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
Subject
Philosophy; Philosophy; Epistemology; Philosophy of Mind; Ethics; Metaphysics; Philosophy of Language
ISSN
0031-8116
eISSN
1573-0883
DOI
10.1007/s11098-012-9985-5
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Philos Stud (2013) 162:35–42 DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9985-5 Berit Brogaard Published online: 25 July 2012 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012 I respond to three arguments aimed at establishing that natural kind properties occur in the experiential content of visual experience: the argument from phenomenal difference, the argument from mandatory seeing, and the argument from associative agnosia. I conclude with a simple argument against the view that natural kind properties occur in the experiential content of visual experience. 1 High-level properties There are lots of properties which human beings cannot visually detect. As a matter of necessity, (normal) human beings cannot visually detect a range of sensory low- level properties detectable by other sense modalities. I cannot visually detect the coldness of ice cream, the sweetness of strawberries, the softness of your skin, or the pitch of your voice. And, as a matter of contingent fact, (normal) human beings cannot visually detect low-level properties instantiated exclusively by very large objects, very small objects and objects very far away. Assuming that no other object on earth is shaped just like Utah, we could not visually detect the shape of Utah prior to the invention of modern technology. Which properties can we consciously visually

Journal

Philosophical Studies – Springer Journals

Published: Jul 25, 2012

There are no references for this article.