A pragmatic solution to Ostertag’s puzzle
Gary Ostertag (Philos Stud 146:249–267, 2009 ) has presented a new puzzle for Russellianism about belief reports. He argues that Russellians do not have the resources to solve this puzzle in terms of pragmatic phenomena. I argue to the contrary that the puzzle can be solved according to Nathan Salmon’s (Frege’s puzzle, 1986 ) pragmatic account of belief reports, provided that the account is properly understood. Specifically, the puzzle can be solved so long as Salmon’s guises are not identified with sentences.
http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.pngPhilosophical StudiesSpringer Journalshttp://www.deepdyve.com/lp/springer-journals/a-pragmatic-solution-to-ostertag-s-puzzle-HHP2055C0b