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Tort Reform Voting in the U.S. Senate

Zaleski,Peter A.; Donati,Penny Maier
Public Finance Review , Volume 28 (5): 415 SAGESep 1, 2000

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Tort Reform Voting in the U.S. Senate

Abstract

This article analyzes the determinants of Senate voting on tort reform. The key issue addressed is the effect of party affiliation, experience as an attorney, constituent economic interests, and contributions to Senate candidates from the American Trial Lawyers' Political Action Committee (ATLPAC) on subsequent voting on tort reform legislation in the Senate. The article employs logit regression to model the determinants of voting on tort reform in the Senate. The results suggest that party interests, constituent interests, and self-interest influenced voting on tort reform. Democratic senators and those who are attorneys were less likely to vote in favor of tort reform. Contributions from ATLPAC significantly decreased the likelihood of a senator voting for tort reform. The size of the legal profession within the senator's state and the number of new corporations in the state have a small but significant impact.
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Title
Tort Reform Voting in the U.S. Senate
Author(s)
Zaleski,Peter A.; Donati,Penny Maier
Journal
Public Finance Review , Volume 28 (5): 415 SAGE – Sep 1, 2000
Publisher
Sage Publications
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 by SAGE Publications
ISSN
1091-1421
eISSN
1091-1421
D.O.I.
10.1177/109114210002800502
Publisher site
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