Abstract
<p>The primary theme of this book holds that “psychology, if it is truly to be about human agents, must give up its pretensions of being a highly deterministic, reductive science” (p. 8). The pretensions stem from traditional natural science, which continually pressures psychological description to be reduced to lower and lower levels, hoping in time to find “the” basic explanation that impels and shapes all events—whether animate or inanimate. The authors intentionally avoid using the concept of “cause” whenever possible in their analysis (p. 12). This is unfortunate because the reductive search for basic explanations in the history of science has always drawn on what Aristotle called “efficient causation” (Rychlak, 1997, pp. 80–85), often referred to as a blind pool-ball or dominoes cause-effect kind of action. The authors note that the subject matter of psychology differs from traditional scientific investigations such as those in physics and biology, so that “the methods and explanations of natural science alone cannot possibly inform psychological studies” (p. 104). Meaning and emotion are always uppermost in psychological explanations. Even so, the authors are not against natural science altogether (p. 25); they merely wish to loosen its grip on psychology's empty-headed emulation, and therebyPreview Only. This article cannot be rented because we do not currently have permission from the publisher.
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