Discrimination and the Law
Abstract
<p>Discrimination is more easily perceived than proved. This is in part so because the meaning of discrimination is uncertain. This uncertainty is reflected in contemporary debates about the meaning of equality, the concept on which definitions of discrimination and justice seem always to come to rest. There is now even disagreement as to the source of the problem: whether the problem is that equality has too many meanings, or that the concept has no meaning at all.</p> <p>Thus Nettler ( 1979 , p. 30) is able to identify three common meanings of equality (numerical, proportional, and subjective equality), all of which are important in determining patterns of legal behavior. “Numerical equality” refers to efforts to make punishments correspond in invariant ways to offenses. This meaning of equality is as old as the desire for “an eye for an eye,” and as new as calls for determinate sentencing laws which require judges to give exactly the same sentences to offenders convicted of the same crimes. “Proportional equality,” on the other hand, seeks to vary the punishment in proportion to some characteristic of the offender; for example, if the punishment is a fine, in proportion to the person’s income, “Subjective