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ANDREA REHBERG ietzsche's doctrine the will to power has provoked a large number commentaries and still remains one his most strange, provocative, and disturbing contributions to the ongoing attempt at the overcoming metaphysical schemas thought. The strangeness will to power is in no way alleviated by its intimate proximity to Nietzsche's thoughts about physiology. In fact, one the central assumptions this article will attempt to substantiate is that, in Nietzsche's oeuvre, will to power and physiology belong together as virtual synonyms for each other, and that any distinction between them is a matter emphasis rather than due to a strong conceptual separation. Both the thought will to power and its articulation in terms physiology are here understood as strategies that permit the substitution unitary phenomena, assumed to be pregiven in representational modes thought, by complex economies forces and values, or multiplicities. One the typical ways in which the thought will to power is subsumed back into the order representation--although that is what it most obviously seeks to undermine--is to render it as a unified subject or substance (will) that seeks to make good a lack or absence (power) by an exertion its will. This putative subject is furthermore
The Journal of Nietzsche Studies – Penn State University Press
Published: Jan 3, 2002
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