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PAUL VAN TONGEREN The noblest virtue.--In the first era of higher humanity bravery is accounted the noblest of the virtues, in the second justice, in the third moderation, in the fourth wisdom. In which era do we live? In which do you live? -- Human All Too Human, II, The Wanderer and his Shadow § 64 1 eter Geach is reported to have said that temperance is far from being an interesting subject, but "rather a humdrum common sense matter."2 I hope to show that his opinion proves that he did not know the early history of the concept, nor what Nietzsche wrote about it. My interest in the subject of Nietzsche's conception of Greek measure (for with "measure" I refer to the so-called virtue of temperance) lies in an interest in bridging the subjects of Nietzsche's reception of the Hellenic philosophers and what Nietzsche considered to be his own task as a critic of contemporary culture. It is my contention that these should not be two different subjects, but that the two belong together. I will try to point out what I mean with this in general in my first section. After that I will elaborate it
The Journal of Nietzsche Studies – Penn State University Press
Published: Dec 19, 2002
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