What, exactly, is a paradox?
Abstractcharacterization of paradox | 615 bald-faced lie could ever be wrong and how it can warrant the drama that goes with accusing someone of a bald-faced lie.1 Washington University in St Louis Campus Box 1073 One Brookings Drive St. Louis, MO 63130-4899, USA firstname.lastname@example.org References Boghossian, P. 2006. Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hawthorne, J. and J. Stanley. 2008. Knowledge and action. Journal of Philosophy 105: 571â90. Kant, I. 1924. Lectures on Ethics. trans. Peter Heath and ed. Peter Heath and J. B. Schneewind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Nagel, T. 2002. Concealment and Exposure. New York: Oxford University Press. Sorensen, R. 2007. Bald-faced Lies! Lying without the intent to deceive. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88: 251â64. 1 I thank Tom Carson and Don Fallis for corrections and helpful suggestions. WILLIAM G. LYCAN Quine (1966) offered his classic characterization of the notion of paradox, a taxonomy for paradoxical arguments and some vocabulary for discussing them. In this article, I shall generalize Quineâs taxonomy and defend a simpler characterization. The simpler characterization will have the virtue or the flaw (as might be) of making paradox a matter of degree. 1. Quineâs view For Quine,