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80 roger crisp in this case too. But, of course, she is wrong. It was such things as the hardness and weight of the falling objects, not their wetness, that did the work. Similarly, for all Pereboom has shown, it is the manipulation, not the deterministic causation, that does the intuition-driving work in his cases. Pereboom has failed to justify his diagnosis of the source of the alleged intuition that Plum is not morally responsible for killing White in his cases of manipulation: the deterministic aspect of those cases is dispensable, as I have explained. Consequently, he has failed to provide adequate support for his theses that Plum is not morally responsible for killing White in case 4 and that this is so because ‘his action results from a deterministic causal process that traces back to factors beyond his control’ (116). Pereboom’s four-case argument for incompatibilism fails. Florida State University Tallahassee, FL 32306-1500, USA almele@mailer.fsu.edu References Mele, A. 1995. Autonomous Agents. New York: Oxford University Press. Pereboom, D. 2001. Living Without Free Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. I am grateful to Derk Pereboom for comments on a draft of this paper. Blackwell Publishing Ltd.Oxford, UK and Malden, USAANALAnalysis0003-26382005 Blackwell
Analysis – Oxford University Press
Published: Jan 1, 2005
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