Too much of a good thing? Another paradox of hedonism
Abstract
values, is an experience that essentially depends on our natural constitution. What does it mean to say that pleasure is good independently of that? Secondly, the hedonist might be tempted to advocate a ânegativeâ version of the theory and say, in a somewhat Epicurean fashion, that âthe goodâ is really absence of pain, and different kinds of pleasure are just different ways in which pain can be absent. Run-of-the-mill ethical hedonists would jens timmermann be guilty of confusing the complete absence of pain (which is the good) and pleasure (which just happens to coincide with the good). Yet any such move would dilute hedonism, or even turn it into something quite different. Thirdly, the hedonist could argue that at a certain point a further increase in pleasure becomes unpleasant and is rejected as such. I am not sure whether this accords with the phenomena, but even if it does the air of paradox surely remains. The hedonist would just replace one inconcinnity with another. It is far from certain that the sums would come out right, i.e. that the pain caused would outweigh the excess of pleasure in quantitative terms; and it is slightly odd that unpleasantness can