The Metaphysics of Knowledge, by Keith Hossack.

The Metaphysics of Knowledge, by Keith Hossack.

Abstract

object nor a sentencelike entity. Rather, it is a universal: it is that property of a mental act that 1146 Book Reviews is its power of contributing to the getting of knowledge’ (p. 100). Similarly, a ‘concept is a mental property of a mind, which in co-operation with other such properties confers on its possessor a certain power: namely, the power to think thoughts with a certain range of contents’ (p. 100). Thoughts, for Hossack, are mental acts; contents are not thoughts, but properties of thoughts — namely, the properties in virtue of which the thinking of the thought is capable, in the right circumstances, of causing one to know a fact. Contents are not literally composed of concepts, in Hossack’s view. Contents and concepts are related, not by the containment relation, but by a relation Hossack calls ‘the activation relation’ (p. 111). The string of concepts 1, … , n that one activates when thinking a given thought determine the thought’s content. Hossack then explains reference as follows: ‘Suppose that in a given context i is the i th concept activated by the content  of [a mental event] e, that e is the apprehending of [a