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Book Reviews 435 since success in affording the best conformal explanation is all there is to cor- rect interpretation? This last position is one famously defended by Daniel Dennett, who, like McCarthy, thinks semantic notions can play an indispensa- ble role in explaining the behaviour of more complicated systems. (See, for example, his Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology (Mont- gomery, VT: Bradford Books, 1978 ); we note that, given this affinity, we found it very surprising that McCarthy makes no reference to Dennett’s familiar view.) But Dennett explicitly endorses Quine’s indeterminacy thesis, which sets him apart from ‘intentional realists’ such as Fodor. Given the possibility of Dennett’s instrumentalist position, it seems incumbent on a realist opponent of Quinean meaning scepticism to assure us that (at least non-trivial) indeter- minacies will not arise. In the end, we found McCarthy’s book rather disappointing. This is a diffi- cult book — in our view, more difficult than it needed to be. McCarthy uses the tools of formal logic even in places where this hinders rather than helps. His use of formalisms too often compromises readability, and at times obscures important underlying philosophical issues. As for philosophical rig- our, we would
Mind – Oxford University Press
Published: Apr 1, 2005
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