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Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules, and the Problem of the External WorldBy Jack C. Lyons

Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules, and the Problem of the External WorldBy Jack C.... book reviews | 391 References Alston, W. 1993. The Reliability of Sense Perception. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Sosa, E. 2007. A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Vol. I. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Zagzebski, L.T. 1996. Virtues of the Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules, and the Problem of the External World By JACK C. LYONS OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2009. XVIII+198 PP.£37.99 Perception and Basic Beliefs is an engaging defence of a radical form of epistemolo- gical reliabilism. Drawing on modular theories of the mind, it aims to give a natural- istic account of basic beliefs and their justification, and ultimately provide a solution to the traditional problem of external world scepticism. Central to Lyons’s project is a distinctive account of the distinction between basic and non-basic beliefs. This is intended to solve in tandem two recurring epistemolo- gical problems: the delineation problem of specifying which beliefs are basic, and the source problem of specifying in virtue of what basic beliefs are justified. Basic beliefs are identified as the outputs of inferentially opaque modules or primal systems; in the case of perception, for instance, the output of perceptual systems (where perceptual systems http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Analysis Oxford University Press

Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules, and the Problem of the External WorldBy Jack C. Lyons

Analysis , Volume 70 (2) – Apr 6, 2010

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Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
The Author 2010. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org
ISSN
0003-2638
eISSN
1467-8284
DOI
10.1093/analys/anq017
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

book reviews | 391 References Alston, W. 1993. The Reliability of Sense Perception. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Sosa, E. 2007. A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Vol. I. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Zagzebski, L.T. 1996. Virtues of the Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules, and the Problem of the External World By JACK C. LYONS OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2009. XVIII+198 PP.£37.99 Perception and Basic Beliefs is an engaging defence of a radical form of epistemolo- gical reliabilism. Drawing on modular theories of the mind, it aims to give a natural- istic account of basic beliefs and their justification, and ultimately provide a solution to the traditional problem of external world scepticism. Central to Lyons’s project is a distinctive account of the distinction between basic and non-basic beliefs. This is intended to solve in tandem two recurring epistemolo- gical problems: the delineation problem of specifying which beliefs are basic, and the source problem of specifying in virtue of what basic beliefs are justified. Basic beliefs are identified as the outputs of inferentially opaque modules or primal systems; in the case of perception, for instance, the output of perceptual systems (where perceptual systems

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AnalysisOxford University Press

Published: Apr 6, 2010

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