Not So Quick: A Reply to Chambers
Abstract
Jussi Haukioja In âA Quick Reply to Putnamâs Paradoxâ, (Chambers ï²ï°ï°ï°), Timothy Chambers presents a short and rather elegant response to Putnamâs socalled âmodel-theoreticâ argument against metaphysical realism (MR). According to Chambers, Putnam is committed to the following four claims (concerning empirically ideal theories of the sort discussed in Putnamâs argument): (ï±) The ideal theory, T, is consistent. (ï²) If any theory, T*, is consistent, then necessarily (T* is consistent). (ï³) Necessarily: (If a theory, T*, is consistent, then T* has a model, M, such that T* is true-on-M). (ï´) Necessarily: (If a theory, T*, has a model, M, such that T* is true-on-M, then T* is true). Premisses (ï±)â(ï´) jointly entail the following: (ïµ) If we construct an ideal theory, T, then necessarily: (T is true). In a nutshell, Chambers argues as follows: (ïµ) is clearly unacceptable, so we must resist the argument. Premisses (ï²) and (ï³) are unobjectionable. (ï±) and (ï´), on the other hand, are employed as premisses in the modeltheoretic argument. Hence, Putnam is committed to all four and, as a consequence, to the implausible view that an ideal theory is necessarily true. The obvious reaction is to reject (ï´), but without it, the