Subscribe to thousands of academic journals for just $40/month
Read and share the articles you need for your research, all in one place.

MERGER SIMULATION IN COMPETITION POLICY: A SURVEY

Journal of Competition Law & Economics , Volume 6 (2) – Jun 1, 2010

Details

Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
Copyright © 2010 Oxford University Press
Subject
ARTICLES
ISSN
1744-6414
eISSN
1744-6422
D.O.I.
10.1093/joclec/nhp014
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Preview Only

Expand Tray Hide Tray

MERGER SIMULATION IN COMPETITION POLICY: A SURVEY

Abstract

Advances in competition economics as well as in computational and empirical methods have offered the scope for the employment of merger simulation models (MSMs) in merger-control procedures during the past almost 15 years. Merger simulation is, nevertheless, still a very young and innovative instrument of antitrust, and, therefore, its “technical” potential is far from being comprehensively exploited, and teething problems in its practical use in the antitrust environment prevail. We provide a classification of state-of-the-art MSMs and review their previous employment in merger cases as well as the problems and limitations currently associated with their use in merger control. In summary, MSMs represent an important and valuable extension of the toolbox of merger policy. However, they do not qualify as a magic bullet and must be combined with other more traditional instruments of competition policy to comprehensively unfold its beneficial effects.
Loading next page...

Preview Only. This article cannot be rented because we do not currently have permission from the publisher.

 
/lp/oxford-university-press/merger-simulation-in-competition-policy-a-survey-RD9HE1yfKb