Globalization and the rule of law: “A machine that runs of itself?”
Abstract
ARTICLE Gordon Silverstein* Policy makers in Europe and the United States frequently assert that economic liberalization will lead to domestic political and social reform. But just how is this transformation to take place? During recent debates over the admission of China to the World Trade Organization and the struggle over the extension to China of most favored nation status by the United States, policy makers regularly asserted that the desire to secure investment and attract capital would require China to establish the rule of law and develop a judicial branch capable of enforcing binding legal rules.1 Together, they argued, these actions would trigger a chain reaction transforming economic liberalization into political and social reform. Is the rule of law a âmachine that runs of itself,â2 an automated conveyor belt translating economic incentives into political and social liberalization and bearing the body politic along with it? If this popular claim is correct, it would have implications for a wide range of theories dealing not only with international relations and comparative politics but also for those concerned with public law and judicial behavior. If these assumptions are wrong, it suggests that the policy debate over globalization needs to be cast