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Gestalt Effects in Counterfactual and Abductive Inference

Gestalt Effects in Counterfactual and Abductive Inference The paper begins by focusing the basic idea that Gestalt phenomena belong not only to the realm of perception but to the realm of inference. It is shown that Gestalt effects (i.e. the derivability of incompatible indifferent conclusions on the basis of the same background information) often occur both in counterfactual and in ampliative – i.e. inductive and abductive – reasoning. The main thesis of the paper is that the common feature of such forms of non-deductive reasoning is provided by a rational selection between incompatible conclusions, where rationality lies in the choice of the alternative which preserves the maximum of background information. It is also stressed a distinction between a weak and a strong notion of incompatibility. Such distinction may help in giving account of some alleged Gestalt phenomena which have been recognized in theory construction and theory change. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Logic Journal of the IGPL Oxford University Press

Gestalt Effects in Counterfactual and Abductive Inference

Logic Journal of the IGPL , Volume 14 (2) – Mar 1, 2006

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References (15)

Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
© The Author, 2006. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
ISSN
1367-0751
eISSN
1368-9894
DOI
10.1093/jigpal/jzk017
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

The paper begins by focusing the basic idea that Gestalt phenomena belong not only to the realm of perception but to the realm of inference. It is shown that Gestalt effects (i.e. the derivability of incompatible indifferent conclusions on the basis of the same background information) often occur both in counterfactual and in ampliative – i.e. inductive and abductive – reasoning. The main thesis of the paper is that the common feature of such forms of non-deductive reasoning is provided by a rational selection between incompatible conclusions, where rationality lies in the choice of the alternative which preserves the maximum of background information. It is also stressed a distinction between a weak and a strong notion of incompatibility. Such distinction may help in giving account of some alleged Gestalt phenomena which have been recognized in theory construction and theory change.

Journal

Logic Journal of the IGPLOxford University Press

Published: Mar 1, 2006

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