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Philosophical Relations, Natural Relations, and Philosophic Decisionism in Belief in the External World: Comments on P. J. E. Kail, Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy

Philosophical Relations, Natural Relations, and Philosophic Decisionism in Belief in the External... , pp. 67­76 My critical comments on Part I of P. J. E. Kail's Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy are divided into two parts. First, I challenge the exegetical details of Kail's take on Hume's important distinction between natural and philosophical relations. I show that Kail misreads Hume in a subtle fashion. If I am right, then much of the machinery that Kail puts into place for his main argument does different work in Hume than Kail thinks. Second, I offer a brief criticism of Kail's argument for reading Hume "as a realist about the external world" (Kail, 67). The two parts are (loosely) tied together because it turns out that Kail and I disagree about how Hume thinks of philosophers' activity generally. One caveat: in what follows I do not offer a review of the highlights of Kail's terrific book. In particular, my arguments do not touch his analysis of the very helpful distinction between feature projection and explanatory projection that plays a crucial role in the two other parts of the book. There is much to admire in Kail's approach, which combines analytic rigor and exegetical care with wide historical learning. There are many illuminating http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Hume Studies Hume Society

Philosophical Relations, Natural Relations, and Philosophic Decisionism in Belief in the External World: Comments on P. J. E. Kail, Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy

Schliesser, Eric
Hume Studies , Volume 36 (1) – Jun 5, 2010
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Hume Society
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Copyright © Hume Society
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1947-9921
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Abstract

, pp. 67­76 My critical comments on Part I of P. J. E. Kail's Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy are divided into two parts. First, I challenge the exegetical details of Kail's take on Hume's important distinction between natural and philosophical relations. I show that Kail misreads Hume in a subtle fashion. If I am right, then much of the machinery that Kail puts into place for his main argument does different work in Hume than Kail thinks. Second, I offer a brief criticism of Kail's argument for reading Hume "as a realist about the external world" (Kail, 67). The two parts are (loosely) tied together because it turns out that Kail and I disagree about how Hume thinks of philosophers' activity generally. One caveat: in what follows I do not offer a review of the highlights of Kail's terrific book. In particular, my arguments do not touch his analysis of the very helpful distinction between feature projection and explanatory projection that plays a crucial role in the two other parts of the book. There is much to admire in Kail's approach, which combines analytic rigor and exegetical care with wide historical learning. There are many illuminating

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Hume Studies – Hume Society

Published: Jun 5, 2010

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