Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Luigi Zingales (1994)
The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange ExperienceReview of Financial Studies, 7
Nittai Bergman, Daniel Nicolaievsky (2004)
Investor Protection and the Coasian ViewMIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper Series
P. Aghion, P. Bolton (1992)
An incomplete contracts approach to financial contractingThe Review of Economic Studies, 59
F. Parisi, R. Godoy, A. Parisi
Corporate governance in Chile: recent evidence
Sanford Grossman, O. Hart (1980)
The free-rider problem and the theory of the corporation
Tatiana Nenova (2003)
The value of corporate voting rights and control: A cross-country analysisJournal of Financial Economics, 68
Sanford Grossman, O. Hart (1986)
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral IntegrationJournal of Political Economy, 94
F. Parisi, G. Yanez (2000)
The deal of the century in Chile Endesa España's takeover of Enersis☆International Review of Financial Analysis, 9
(2008)
The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing
L. Zingales
The value of the voting right: a study of the Milan stock exchange
Michael Jensen, W. Meckling (1976)
Harvard Business School; SSRN; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Harvard University - Accounting & Control UnitLSN: Law & Finance: Empirical (Topic)
L. Zingales
Corporate governance
M.C. Jensen, W.H. Meckling
Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and capital structure
S. Djankov, R. La Porta, F. Lopez‐de‐Silanes, A. Shleifer
Courts
S. Grossman, O. Hart
Takeover bids, the free rider problem and the theory of the corporation
Andrei Shleifer, Daniel Wolfenzon (2000)
Investor Protection and Equity MarketsCorporate Finance: Governance
M. Pagano, P. Volpin (1999)
The Political Economy of Corporate GovernanceEuropean Finance Association Meetings (EFA) (Archive)
A. Dyck, L. Zingales
Private benefits of control: an international comparison
Rafael Porta, Florencio López‐de‐Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny (1996)
Law and FinanceJournal of Political Economy, 106
W. Newey, K.D. West
A simple, positive, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix
Luigi Zingales (1995)
What Determines the Value of Corporate VotesQuarterly Journal of Economics, 110
R. Porta, Florencio Silanes, Andrei Shleifer (2003)
What Works in Securities Laws?Emerging Markets: Finance
O. Hart, John. Moore (1988)
Property Rights and the Nature of the FirmJournal of Political Economy, 98
Michael Barclay, C. Holderness (1989)
Private benefits from control of public corporationsJournal of Financial Economics, 25
R. Porta, Florencio Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny (1999)
Investor Protection and Corporate GovernanceChicago Booth: Fama-Miller Working Paper Series
S. Johnson, R. La Porta, F. Lopez‐de‐Silanes, A. Shleifer
Tunneling
M. Faccio, L. Lang (2002)
The Ultimate Ownership of Western European CorporationsCorporate Finance: Governance
S. Claessens, Simeon Djankov, L. Lang (1999)
The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian CorporationsCorporate Finance and Organizations eJournal
Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny (1986)
Large Shareholders and Corporate ControlJournal of Political Economy, 94
Whitney Newey, K. West (1986)
A Simple, Positive Semi-Definite, Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelationconsistent Covariance MatrixEconometrics eJournal
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to describe the wealth expropriation from minority to majority shareholders due to the lack of legislation protecting the interests of minority shareholders in an acquisition deal, validating the claims made on studies made by Zingales and by La Porta et al. Design/methodology/approach – Despite an overall takeover premium of nearly 250 percent, most minority shareholders actually suffered wealth losses ranging from US$ 7.1 to 31.14 millions. These losses are measured using different methodologies, such as accounting value; liquidation value; and economic value. Findings – The Campos Chilenos case study presented here serves as a testing platform for the relationship between well‐developed legal systems and economic development in both a current and future sense. In a current sense, the case illustrates how inadequate minority shareholder protection led to minority shareholder wealth expropriation, discouraging minority investment from both domestic and foreign investors (and limiting economic development). Practical implications – Future implications lay in the corporate governance regulation reforms passed in the aftermath of the Campos Chilenos case. If the Chilean government actively enforces new regulations, the level of economic development in Chile will exceed that of its peers in Latin America and other emerging economies, as claimed by La Porta et al. Originality/value – This study will be useful for governance makers and regulators in emerging countries.
Corporate Governance – Emerald Publishing
Published: Jun 12, 2009
Keywords: Tendering; Corporate governance; Shareholders
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.