BioSystems 54 (2000) 165–180
Towards a closed description of observation processes
Dieter Gernert
Department of Economics, Technical Uni6ersity of Munich, Arcisstrasse
21
, D-
80333
Munich, Germany
Received 24 May 1999; received in revised form 26 October 1999; accepted 5 November 1999
Abstract
A closed description of observation processes must necessarily include the observer, too. In order to find a basis
for such a unified description, an operator algebra is developed which enables a formal description of at least a
significant majority of cognitive processes. It is found that this operator algebra, which is a noncommutative semiring
of a type already known in literature, has astonishing similarities with the usual operator algebras in quantum theory.
Combined with a method for the formal treatment of perspective notions, the representation scheme proposed here
may open a chance for a unified description of a process itself together with the relevant cognitive processes on the
observer’s side. By the description of parallel-processing systems on the same basis an operational definition of
‘internal time’ becomes possible. © 2000 Elsevier Science Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords
:
Observation; Measurement; Unified description; Operator algebra; Quantum theory; Cognitive process; Perspective
notion; Semantics
www.elsevier.com/locate/biosystems
1. When is a process of observation completely
described?
‘‘Any description of the world that someone
advocates as being complete… must ‘close the
circle’: it must include an account of how we
come by that description. In particular, any phys-
ical theory that claims such completeness must
account for our experience as observers.’’ (But-
terfield, 1995) The crucial role of the observer in
quantum physics is generally accepted, and there
is an abundant literature just on this topic. Prob-
lems immediately arise when an ‘inclusion of the
observer’ is understood in a strict sense, because
this will inevitably imply a study and formal
description of processes beyond the usual scope of
physics.
‘‘Consciousness exists, but it resists definition.’’
(Flanagan, 1995) This quotation gives a cue to
stop (for a moment) searching for a perfect defin-
ition of terms like ‘consciousness’, ‘mind’, ‘men-
tal’, etc. Rather, an attempt will be made here to
supply a basis for a unifying description
1
through
a ‘change of perspective’, which will not only help
circumventing that trouble with definitions,
but, hopefully, will also bring about some new
insight.
1
The ‘problem of two languages’ and the necessity of a
‘unified description’ are particularly emphasized by Lau-
rikainen (1988).
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